{"id":1258,"date":"2014-04-03T13:07:00","date_gmt":"2014-04-03T13:07:00","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/cpip.gmu.edu\/?p=1258"},"modified":"2026-04-09T19:39:34","modified_gmt":"2026-04-09T19:39:34","slug":"an-insightful-analysis-of-fair-and-reasonable-in-the-determination-of-frand-terms","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.uakron.edu\/ualawip\/2014\/04\/03\/an-insightful-analysis-of-fair-and-reasonable-in-the-determination-of-frand-terms\/","title":{"rendered":"[Archived Post] An Insightful Analysis of \u201cFair and Reasonable\u201d in the Determination of FRAND Terms"},"content":{"rendered":"<p style=\"text-align: center\"><em>By Steven Tjoe<\/em><\/p>\n<p>In his forthcoming <i>George Mason University Law Review<\/i> article entitled \u201c<a href=\"http:\/\/papers.ssrn.com\/sol3\/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2344454\">The Meaning of \u2018Fair and Reasonable\u2019 in the Context of Third-Party Determination of FRAND Terms<\/a>,\u201d Professor Damien Geradin explores the delicate balance of interests protected by the current system of arm\u2019s length negotiations in the standard-setting process, and the detrimental effect disrupting this balance would have on standards-related technologies and our innovation economy.<\/p>\n<p>Fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (\u201cFRAND\u201d) commitments are the subject of frequent criticism in both legal and economic literature.\u00a0 Many policymakers, practitioners, and academics have argued that the inherent ambiguity in establishing \u201cfair and reasonable\u201d terms creates inefficiencies and perverse incentives for standard-essential patent (\u201cSEP\u201d) holders to exercise <i>ex post<\/i> opportunism.\u00a0 Based on this belief, some now argue that the standard-setting organization (\u201cSSO\u201d) contracting process is broken and requires additional legal and regulatory mechanisms to afford standard implementers greater protection.<\/p>\n<p>Professor Geradin\u2019s article brings some much-needed balance to this debate.\u00a0 By highlighting the economic principles and the carefully negotiated terms underlying current SSO contracting processes, Geradin exposes the pitfalls of many of the reforms suggested.\u00a0 Geradin\u2019s analysis elucidates the SSO contracting process itself through dissection of the intensive discussions and negotiations giving rise to the prominent ETSI Intellectual Property Rights (\u201cIPR\u201d) policy, a policy that played a fundamental standardization role in the wireless communication field.\u00a0 The ETSI IPR policy shows that its members understood the notions of \u201cfairness and reasonable\u201d to define a fair balance between the interests of SEP holders and standard implementers \u2013 securing the availability of the standards while simultaneously ensuring that SEP holders are \u201cadequately and fairly rewarded for the use of their [intellectual property rights].\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Professor Geradin addresses two potential forms of <i>ex post<\/i> opportunism \u2013 \u201chold-up\u201d and \u201croyalty stacking\u201d \u2013 and observes that though both could occur in theory, there is little evidence to suggest that they occur in real-world patent licensing.\u00a0 Regarding the hold-up conjecture, Geradin observes that the relative absence of hold-up is consistent with the economics of contracting: parties who repeatedly deal with each other will limit opportunism to protect their reputation.\u00a0 Similarly, royalty stacking is a rare occurrence in high-technology, where cross-licensing is common and greatly diminishes the risk of royalty-stacking.\u00a0 Given the absence of empirical evidence demonstrating opportunistic behavior by SEP holders, Geradin cautions against implementing reforms that systematically weaken the bargaining power of SEP holders, as proposed reforms may themselves trigger reciprocal opportunistic behavior \u2013 such as \u201creverse hold-up\u201d \u2013 by standard implementers.<\/p>\n<p>In the context of FRAND licensing, Geradin observes that for rewards to be adequate and fair, they must not only compensate SEP holders for their risky R&amp;D investments (including investments in prior failed projects), they must also give SEP holders sufficient incentive to keep investing in the development of standardized technologies.\u00a0 The negative consequences of systematically offering below-FRAND terms to SEP holders are two-fold.\u00a0 First, as Geradin eloquently observes, \u201c[i]t is a basic law of finance that capital flows where the best opportunities arise,\u201d and developers of technologies in standardized sectors unduly constrained by low returns may seek opportunities outside the standardized sectors.\u00a0 Second, without adequate returns, major technological contributors may decide to no longer participate in SSOs in order to avoid being bound by FRAND commitments.\u00a0 As a result, standards would likely fail to incorporate the best technology available.<\/p>\n<p>Accordingly, Geradin is skeptical of many of the policy measures suggested to provide additional protections to potential licensees and consumers of standardized technologies.\u00a0 One such measure is the \u201c<i>ex ante<\/i> incremental value method,\u201d where the rate that would have resulted from <i>ex ante<\/i> competition between the technology in question and alternative technological solutions serves as a benchmark to whether a royalty is fair and reasonable.\u00a0 As Geradin observes:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>While the pricing of SEPs at incremental value may facilitate the dissemination of the standard in the short-term, the licensing fee resulting from the incremental value of the SEP holder\u2019s technology would certainly not be enough to properly compensate the investment costs and risks [a] company incurred in developing its superior technology, as well as to incentivize it to make investment in new technologies.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>With respect to this method, Geradin concludes that the \u201c<i>ex ante<\/i> incremental rule is thus not so much an instrument to prevent the theoretical risks of hold-up, but a tool to lower royalty rates to the benefit of standard implementers.\u201d\u00a0 As such, the <i>ex ante<\/i> incremental value rule could potentially have a devastating impact on innovation incentives and standards.<\/p>\n<p>Geradin next explores the multi-factor test contained in <a href=\"http:\/\/www.bvlibrary.com\/pdf\/files\/courtcase\/5368.pdf\"><i>Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp.<\/i><\/a><i> <\/i>(\u201c<i>Georgia-Pacific<\/i>\u201d).\u00a0 In <i>Georgia-Pacific<\/i>, a federal district court established a framework by which fifteen factors offering a variety of benchmarks are used to compute reasonable royalty damages by contemplating a \u201chypothetical negotiation\u201d between a \u201cwilling licensor\u201d and \u201cwilling licensee\u201d at the time the infringement began.\u00a0 Geradin observes:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>A key strength of the <i>Georgia-Pacific framework<\/i> is that it is sufficiently flexible to establish a balance between the dual objective of SSO\u2019s IPR policies \u2026 which are both to ensure standard dissemination and adequate remuneration of the SEP holder.\u00a0 In other words, unlike abstract mathematical methods, which \u2026 can be easily tipped in favor of the prospective licensee (or the prospective licensor), the multi-factor test at the core of the <i>Georgia-Pacific<\/i> framework reduces the risk of bias if it is properly carried out.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>As such, the <i>Georgia-Pacific<\/i> framework can better reflect the reality of contract negotiations, where the parties look to a variety of factors, and not some magic formula, to come to mutually acceptable licensing terms.<\/p>\n<p>In the context of FRAND litigation, however, Geradin cautions against potential pitfalls of applying the <i>Georgia-Pacific <\/i>framework.\u00a0 At the outset, Geradin notes that licensing agreements are often \u201chighly relationship-specific and thus agreements will be hard to compare.\u201d\u00a0 Geradin discusses the practice of comparing the rate offered <i>ex post<\/i> standardization by SEP holders with the rate offered for the same patents <i>ex ante<\/i> standardization.\u00a0 Though many are inclined to treat the <i>ex ante<\/i> rate as a \u201csafe harbor\u201d against any claim of opportunism, Geradin finds that there is little reason why licensors should be prohibited from charging higher rates <i>ex post<\/i> than <i>ex ante<\/i>.\u00a0 Not only may <i>ex post<\/i> contracts be more efficient in the way they incorporate a clearer understanding of the technology and the market, but also forcing SEP holders to charge similar <i>ex ante <\/i>and <i>ex post<\/i> rates deprives SEP holders of giving preferential terms to early adopters of their technology.<\/p>\n<p>Professor Geradin then explores whether patent pools offer a useful benchmark to determine FRAND license terms.\u00a0 Due to the difficulties of forming pools and the different business models of the relevant patent holders, many standardized sectors simply do not have sizeable patent pools covering their standards.\u00a0 Even where sizeable patent pools exist, Geradin observes that the pools often will not serve as the right benchmark for FRAND rate determination.\u00a0 In many standardized sectors, such as in wireless communications, patent pools tend to be used by SEP holders to avoid transactions costs, rather than to obtain FRAND compensation.\u00a0 Moreover, many patent pools base their method of remuneration on the number of a firm\u2019s patents compared to the size of the pool rather than the relative strength of the patents themselves.\u00a0 Where numerical proportionality serves as the metric of FRAND compensation, such as in the recent <a href=\"http:\/\/sunsteinlaw.com\/wp\/wp-content\/uploads\/2013\/11\/Innovatio_Opinion.pdf\"><i>In re Innovatio IP Ventures<\/i> <i>LLC<\/i><\/a> case, SEP holders have the incentive to inflate the number of patents they contribute to the pool.\u00a0 Thus, using patent pools as a benchmark runs the risk of setting rates that are well below FRAND.<\/p>\n<p>The potential <a href=\"http:\/\/www.ftc.gov\/public-statements\/2013\/09\/ssos-frand-and-antitrust-lessons-economics-incomplete-contracts\">welfare-reducing consequences<\/a> of limiting the flexibility of the SSO negotiation process has been well documented in recent legal and economic literature.\u00a0 As Professor Geradin observes, solutions to perceived FRAND inadequacies that aim to weaken the bargaining position of SEP holders often overreach, in effect triggering the \u201cwholesale devaluation of patents.\u201d\u00a0 Instead, FRAND determinations should consider the \u201cdynamic nature of standardization\u201d and should be determined by balancing the need to (1) make standards available and, (2) fairly compensate SEP holders. \u00a0This delicate balance of interests is necessary to protect the future of standardization.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>By Steven Tjoe In his forthcoming George Mason University Law Review article entitled \u201cThe Meaning of \u2018Fair and Reasonable\u2019 in the Context of Third-Party Determination of FRAND Terms,\u201d Professor Damien Geradin explores the delicate balance of interests protected by the current system of arm\u2019s length negotiations in the standard-setting process, and the detrimental effect disrupting [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3627,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[3,7,14,15,16,18,21,26,28,33,35,36,37,45,46,48,1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1258","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-antitrust","category-commercialization","category-damages","category-doj","category-economic-study","category-ftc","category-high-tech-industry","category-innovation-2","category-international-law","category-law-and-economics","category-patent-law","category-patent-licensing","category-patent-litigation","category-reasonable-royalty","category-remedies","category-software-patent-high-tech-industry","category-uncategorized"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uakron.edu\/ualawip\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1258","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uakron.edu\/ualawip\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uakron.edu\/ualawip\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uakron.edu\/ualawip\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3627"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uakron.edu\/ualawip\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1258"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uakron.edu\/ualawip\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1258\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":16966,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uakron.edu\/ualawip\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1258\/revisions\/16966"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uakron.edu\/ualawip\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1258"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uakron.edu\/ualawip\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1258"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uakron.edu\/ualawip\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1258"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}