Categories
Antitrust Innovation Patents

Foreign Antitrust Regulators Are Threatening American Innovation

By David Lund & Matthew Barblan

U.S. Capitol buildingAmerican businesses are suffering as foreign governments improperly use their antitrust laws to discriminate against American companies. Recently, the United States Chamber of Commerce assembled an International Competition Policy Expert Group to examine this problem. The Group released a report describing particular harmful and inappropriate uses of antitrust law and providing recommendations for U.S. policymakers to address these harms.

Although the report addresses foreign antitrust law abuses broadly, there has been a recent upsurge in the misapplication of these laws in the context of intellectual property. The report itself identifies several unique ways that innovative industries have been harmed by this unfortunate trend, noting that “legitimate IP rights are often not respected for their role in incentivizing investment in innovation that can have an enormously positive long term impact on competition.”

This is a critically important issue, and it is becoming increasingly relevant in DC policy circles. For example, later this week the House Judiciary Committee will be holding a hearing on Recent Trends in International Antitrust Enforcement, including testimony from Deborah Garza (Co-Chair of the Chamber’s International Competition Policy Expert Group) and Scalia Law’s Koren Wong-Ervin (Director of the Global Antitrust Institute), among others.

Over the next couple of months, CPIP will be writing a series of essays highlighting issues discussed in the report that are of particular relevance to the intellectual property policy community.

Industrial Policy Masquerading as Antitrust Law

By securing to innovators exclusive property rights to the fruits of their productive labors, intellectual property law incentivizes innovation and forms the foundation of the myriad partnerships and transactions that enable creators and innovators to commercialize their inventions. In theory, antitrust law is supposed to support the IP system by providing a fair marketplace where innovative companies thrive according to their own merit. The main thesis of the Chamber’s report, however, is that several countries are misusing their antitrust laws to pursue domestic industrial policy goals that allow the government to pick particular winners and losers. The report notes:

[Competition law enforcement] may reflect an effort to improperly discriminate against a U.S. competitor to further “industrial policy” goals, such as by favoring domestic commercial interests or state-owned enterprises over foreign competitors. Report, Page 24.

When antitrust law is used for industrial policy goals or simple political favoritism, it undermines the basic premise of the IP system. Often the selected winners are cherry-picked nationals of the countries at issue. This harms the ability of innovative American companies to compete in these markets based on the actual economic value of their products and IP. As the report states:

Commercial success may turn on political cronyism, rather than on the ability of a firm to efficiently provide the goods and services consumers desire at a competitive price (the result the consumer welfare approach to antitrust law is designed to foster). Report, Pages 20-21.

The misuse of antitrust law is particularly damaging in IP-intensive industries. IP incentivizes research and investment based on the property rights it secures to creators. These property rights are only valuable—and thus only function as an incentive—when IP owners deploy them in the marketplace without undue interference. When countries use antitrust laws to devalue the IP rights of foreign companies in order to favor their own local businesses, it undermines the purpose and function of the IP system as a whole.

Inconsistent Notions of “Fairness”

The Chamber’s report discusses several improper uses of antitrust law that undermine IP owners’ ability to freely deploy their property rights in the marketplace. One key problem is the inconsistent application of vague “fairness” considerations. As the report states:

Where competition rules include inherently subjective concepts such as substantive “fairness” (as is the case in many jurisdictions), for example, the legal treatment of business conduct may differ profoundly on a case-by-case basis, often driven by ad hoc political considerations. Report, Page 20.

“Fairness” may be an important value for children to learn, but when it is vaguely applied to a complex body of law it can result in inconsistent and even contradictory outcomes. The report highlights one particular dichotomy to show just how problematic vague conceptions of fairness can be: pricing. Jurisdictions have used antitrust law to scrutinize prices as being “unfair” both for being too high and too low. But high prices often simply reflect higher consumer demand for a better product. Conversely, low prices often reflect more efficient business practices, precisely the kind of improvements antitrust law is supposedly designed to promote.

Importantly, businesses have no way of knowing ahead of time whether a country’s antitrust regulators will find “fairness” violations for their prices. This prevents companies from taking affirmative steps to comply with the law, thereby increasing volatility, increasing costs to set up and maintain a business, and undermining sound business planning and investment.

Because subjective considerations such as “fairness” can easily be applied arbitrarily, the real-world application of these laws often brings in more nefarious purposes. When there is no objective guide or lodestar to the legal system, cronyism runs rampant. It no longer matters who is the most efficient producer or who invented the technology. What matters is who is friends with the antitrust law enforcement agency. As a result, subjective doctrines of “fairness” perversely create an unfair playing field, making it easy for foreign governments to discriminate against American businesses, even when it ultimately works to the detriment of consumers in their country.

IP-intensive industries are particularly subject to being victimized in the name of “fairness.” The business benefits that come from property rights in innovation can include the ability to set prices that far exceed marginal costs. This makes sense from both an economic and a moral standpoint—innovative companies routinely make millions (if not billions) of dollars worth of up-front R&D investments before commercializing their inventions. And the fruits of their labor are justly secured to them as their property in the form of IP. But from a antitrust law enforcement perspective, pricing far above marginal costs makes IP owners particularly vulnerable to claims that their prices are “unfair.”

Even though it makes perfect sense for an IP license fee to be high when the IP enables important functionality in a product, antitrust law authorities are adept at minimizing the economic value of the IP while criticizing the price of the license as unfair. This is particularly true in industries where American companies are leaders in researching and developing foundational innovations that foreign companies want to integrate into their products. As a result, IP-intensive American companies are particularly vulnerable to abusive and inconsistent antitrust law scrutiny under supposed considerations of “fairness.”

A Worrisome Lack of Due Process and Regulatory Humility

In another troubling trend for American IP owners, foreign antitrust authorities are increasingly pursuing investigations that go beyond the scope of any reasonable antitrust concerns. Despite being baseless, these investigations have serious negative consequences for the targeted firms, particularly in the case of innovative firms trying to license their IP or get their products to market while their patents are still in force and while their technology is still cutting-edge. As the Chamber’s report notes:

Enforcement activities may reflect local case law that allows an agency to exercise its powers of investigation and its decision-making authority in an expansive and highly discretionary way. Where this occurs, competition authorities can tend to discount the costs and disruption that their enforcement activities impose on legitimate business conduct, give too little weight the costs of wrongfully condemning conduct that is procompetitive, and exaggerate the likelihood and consequences of wrongfully exonerating conduct that might have anticompetitive impact. Report, Page 22.

In parallel with overly expansive investigations, many jurisdictions do not offer the basic procedural due process safeguards necessary for businesses to defend themselves. Once again, this effectively allows authorities to pick winners and losers based on political cronyism or domestic industrial policy goals rather than actually promoting competition. The report states:

[L]eading U.S. companies have complained that in certain jurisdictions they are subject to investigations and enforcement actions in which they are not given adequate notice or time for responses to questions; are not informed of the particular acts or practices which are a subject of concern; are not allowed to obtain from enforcers information about the theory of anticompetitive harm…. Report, Page 29.

The report further notes that IP-intensive industries suffer additional harms from poorly conducted enforcement activities because of their novel, complex, and dynamic nature. Unfortunately, the regulatory pendulum is swinging in the wrong direction. The report notes that some countries are considering creating liability simply for failing to license patents, including for failing to license outside of the country in question. This will create a whole new burden on IP owners that does not exist for any other industry.

How Should the US Respond?

The report provides several potential solutions to the harms it identifies, some of which will be familiar to the IP community. These solutions include actions that can be taken by the United States alone as well as actions that utilize international organizations. We will discuss these in more detail in a future essay, but two general points are worth mentioning here.

First, the report notes that Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 has expansive language that could be more widely used to “respond to unjustifiable, unreasonable or discriminatory practices of foreign governments that burden or restrict U.S. commerce.” The “Special 301 Report,” which names countries that are failing to live up to their IP law commitments, is the most widely known use of this section, but as the report notes, the Trade Act provides for much more.

Second, the report notes the possibility that existing mechanisms in the WTO or OECD may provide internationally-recognized means to examine the substantive and procedural aspects of antitrust law that may be in conflict with international agreements. Such recognition would be valuable to promote harmonization of antitrust law not just across jurisdictions, but also with the underlying principles of antitrust law itself.

The report provides an important examination of the harms caused by improper use of antitrust law across the globe. Over the coming weeks, we will provide more commentary on how this is playing out in particular places, for particular industries, and what the United States should do to fix it.

Categories
Copyright Patents Trademarks

From Star Wars to La La Land: How Intellectual Property Fuels Films

The following post comes from Mandi Hart, a rising third-year law student at Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University, who worked as a video producer before going to law school.

cameraBy Mandi Hart

Movies are a first-love in America and around the world, and their production is made possible by the existence of intellectual property (IP) rights. Although most moviegoers may not recognize the vital role that IP plays in film, without it, screens would be dark. This post explains the critical role that copyright, trademark, and patents play in film production and financing.

Copyright is the Lifeblood of Movies

Copyright secures to creators certain exclusive rights in their original works of authorship, including rights of reproduction, distribution, public display, performance, and the creation of derivative works. These exclusive rights make it possible for creators and copyright owners to deploy their creative works as property rights in a free market.

Copyright’s exclusive right to distribute creative works is particularly important in the film industry. Distribution deals are essential to the filmmaking process, as many filmmakers finance the production of their movies by selling the exclusive right to distribute their film in a given territory. Distributors purchase these rights via a pre-sale, committing to pay a certain amount to the producer when the completed film is delivered in accordance with technical specifications. The pre-sale agreement serves as collateral for bank loans that provide actual cash for a film’s production. Once a film is completed and delivered, the payment from the distributor is then used to pay back the loan.

Without copyright, producers would have no distribution rights to sell in the first place, and without distribution deals, many producers wouldn’t be able to secure the funding necessary to make their movies.

Copyright also makes it possible for authors to option pre-existing works for adaptation into movies. An author or publisher can sell a film producer the right to create a derivative work from a novel, short story, play, or comic book. And films themselves might inspire derivative works—think of the breadth and popularity of Star Wars movies and shows today, 40 years after the original movie was released. Copyright not only protects the original creative works that often serve as the foundation for films, it also makes possible the many licensing deals that turn individual films into trilogies, series, or full-blown universes.

Copyright also fuels the music and sounds we hear in movies. From original scores and sound effects to the innumerable songs licensed for use in movies, copyright ensures that the people involved in the creation of movie sounds—whether artists, composers, or engineers—are incentivized and rewarded for their contributions.

By giving artists and creators a property right in the fruits of their artistic labor, copyright provides the foundation for the creation of movies as we know them today.

Trademark Helps Movies Get Made and Protects Their Brands 

Just as copyright protects several aspects of any given film, trademark helps establish and protect a movie’s brand while providing supplemental sources of financing. As studios move away from traditional film financing mechanisms due to economic recession, consolidation within the industry, and risk-aversion in credit markets, a growing number of producers are looking for new funding sources. Product placement has become an increasingly common source of financing, providing mutual benefit to producers and marketers.

Featuring recognizable brands in a film enables a producer to leverage the reputation and public perception of certain products to craft characters and settings. Indeed, a character may become identified with a particular brand or product—think James Bond driving an Aston Martin, ET eating Reeses Pieces, or Carrie Bradshaw wearing Manolo Blahnik. A product may even become a character itself, as with the Wilson volleyball in Castaway.

The inclusion of known brands lends authenticity to the world of the film and the characters inhabiting it. When Mia asks Sebastian to get the keys to her Prius from a valet in La La Land, and Sebastian sees nothing but Prius key fobs on the valet stand, more is communicated to the audience than just the type of car Mia drives. Viewers get a sense of the world in which Mia lives, her friends and associates, and her subculture and values.

And of course, Prius benefits from the connection with an acclaimed film that won multiple Academy awards. While product placement represents a creative choice, it is also a shrewd business move for producers in need of funds and marketers looking for more subtle promotional opportunities than the traditional hard-sell advertisement.

Additionally, trademark serves to protect merchandise and ancillary products created in connection with a film. Marketing trademark-protected clothing, toys, home appliances, bedding, wallpaper, and other film-related merchandise is another critical source of revenue for producers, particularly those hoping to build a film franchise. Just as copyright is central to film financing and content, trademarks make an increasingly vital contribution to production funding and the creation of on-screen worlds.

But Without Patented Technology, Films Wouldn’t Exist

In addition to copyright and trademark, patents also play an essential role in film. A patented invention—the kinetoscope—allowed individual, consecutive images imprinted onto film to be projected in order and at speeds capable of creating the illusion of movement. Thomas Edison, holder of the kinetoscope’s patent, began documenting the world around him and created the first microdocumentaries for exhibition to paying customers. Across the Atlantic, the Lumiere brothers also embraced the possibilities that early film technology offered, creating short fiction films, the most enduring of which, Trip to the Moon, is still watched to this day.

The original film technologies, to both capture and display moving images, gave birth to a new form of leisure and entertainment. In less than three decades an entire industry had been established to exploit the commercial value of film and to satisfy the growing public appetite for movies.

Sound recording and playback technology revolutionized the industry and were followed just a few years later by technicolor, the debut of which—in The Wizard of Oz—changed filmmaking forever. Patented technologies created, then upended, the film industry, and to this day provide the foundation upon which advancements in filmmaking and viewer experience are based.

Just as the development of VistaVision in the 1950s gave directors more onscreen real estate and enabled sweeping scenic compositions, the implementation of Dolby Surround Sound in the 1980s allowed composers and sound editors to weave rich sonic tapestries. Composers were able to create complex filmic symphonies, and sound editors could immerse the audience more deeply into the world of the film by literally enveloping them in the movie’s aural field.

The switch from analog to digital, and the integration of computer technology into filmmaking, allowed for special effects unlike anything seen before. Computer-generated images put an end to an era of hand-drawn animation and manual splicing, as entire worlds could be created and manipulated digitally. Today, the development of 3D and virtual reality technology are set to revolutionize the film industry, changing the way images are captured and exhibited. Add to the distribution mechanisms numerous exhibition platforms (laptop, tablet, cell phone, etc.), and it is obvious the central role that patented technology plays in film creation and consumption.

Conclusion

In any given film, copyright, trademark, and patent play crucial roles in crafting the story, securing financing, and translating script to screen. Copyright secures property rights in (and incentivizes the creation of) original films as well as adaptations of prior works, while trademark contributes to the development of setting and characters. As an industry founded on patented technology, filmmaking relies on the innovation made possible by a patent system that encourages and incentivizes inventors. Those who developed sound recording and transmission technology, technicolor, panoramic projection, and many other innovations at the heart of moviemaking could not—and would not—have done so without the assurance that they would own the fruits of their innovative labor.

Next time you settle into a plush reclining chair, as the lights dim and the trailers begin, think about all the intellectual property embedded in the story you watch play out on-screen, because without it, that story wouldn’t exist.

Categories
Infringement Patent Theory

Explaining Efficient Infringement

By Adam Mossoff & Bhamati Viswanathan

files labeled as "patents"In a recent New York Times op-ed, “The Patent Troll Smokescreen,” Joe Nocera used in print for the first time the term, “efficient infringement.” This pithy phrase quickly gained currency if only because it captures a well-known phenomenon that has been impossible to describe in even a single sentence. Unfortunately, some commentators are confused about the validity of this term. This is understandable, because no one has yet described exactly what it means, especially in comparison to the similar commercial practice of “efficient breach” in contract law.

In a nutshell, efficient infringement occurs when a company deliberately chooses to infringe a patent given that it is cheaper than to license the patent. The reason it is cheaper is what makes it hard to explain briefly: a slew of legal changes to the patent system by Congress, courts, and regulatory agencies in the past ten years have substantially increased the costs and uncertainties in enforcing patents against infringers.

Accused infringers now can very easily invalidate patents, either in court or at the “patent death squad” known as the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. If a patent owner runs this gauntlet after several years of costly litigation and obtains a judgment in its favor, courts are increasingly refusing to award injunctions for anyone other than manufacturing companies. What is left for the patent owner is only damages, but changes in the legal rules for awarding damages have made damage awards very minimal compared to the actual economic harms suffered by a patent owner (a 2015 PricewaterhouseCoopers study found that median damage awards in 2014 were at their second lowest level in the past 20 years).

The result of all of this is that a company economically gains from deliberately infringing patents. It pays less in either legal fees or in court-ordered damages than it would have paid in a license negotiated with a patent owner. This is efficient infringement.

As a term in the legal policy debates, efficient infringement draws some inspiration from the well-known economic model of “efficient breach” in contract law. But the two seem very different, at least superficially.  Thus, efficient infringement needs further explanation by way of a more explicit comparison to efficient breach theory.

The model of efficient breach posits an overall net gain in social welfare from a willful breach of contract. It supposes a scenario in which one contracting party has an opportunity to obtain a higher payment for its goods or services, producing a profit that exceeds any damages from a breach of contract that would be paid to the other contracting party. Thus, the contracting party breaches: it receives the higher payment, it pays the other contracting party its “expectancy interest” (lost profits), and it pockets its net profits. Everyone wins and society is better off, at least according to this highly stylized and abstract economic model.

In practice, though, one rarely finds cases in which this opportunistic breach of contract works. The losses suffered by a victim of a breach of contract easily exceed mere profits, and courts account for this by awarding reliance and restitution damages, as well as punitive damages for deliberate misconduct like opportunistic breach of contract. Other legal claims, such as tortious interference with a contract and equitable claims for rescission and restitution, provide additional sources of relief for victims of willful breaches of contracts. In fact, one reason contracting parties negotiate liquidated damages provisions in their agreements is to limit liability for these widely recognized costs that go beyond mere expectancy interests.

These additional damages reflect the total costs created by strategic, opportunistic breaches of contract. These include institutional and systemic harms in eroding reasonable reliance on contractual commitments, lost investments made on the basis of contractual commitments, lost opportunities to pursue other commercial transactions, reputational harms, and so on. A victim of an opportunistic contract breach, for example, can seek the equitable remedy of rescinding the contract and seek restitution to disgorge the willful bad actor of his wrongful gains at the expense of the victim.

This is why one usually finds successful efficient breach only in hypothetical examples in economic textbooks or in law review articles, and not in actual court cases. As one of the scholars who first coined this term in 1977 recently observed, “efficient breach is both a null set as well as an oxymoron.” Or, as Professor Gregory Klass similarly notes, efficient breach is a “dead letter,” although he still believes it “remains a great teaching tool.”

Recognizing this difference between theory and practice is key in understanding the parallels between efficient breach and efficient infringement.  In theory, efficient breach considers only the lost profits in a one-off case of contract breach, and it thus sounds like a gain in social welfare because everyone benefits. But, in practice, contracting parties and courts recognize the total individual and systemic costs caused by willful violations of legal rights, whether a contract right or a property right. The same is true for efficient infringement, in both theory and practice.

Theoretically, efficient infringement posits a breach of a legal right that enhances both private and social welfare. The company benefits privately because it pays less via a patent infringement lawsuit in either legal fees (invalidating the patent) or in a compulsory license (court-awarded damages). Society is better off, too, because the company engaging in efficient infringement has more resources to put to productive endeavors, as opposed to paying for use of an invalid patent (a monopoly) or in making a larger wealth transfer payment on the basis of a negotiated license.

In the real world, though, efficient infringement creates more costs than merely the lost licensing profits for the patent owner, or the lost patent itself. The more fundamental problem with efficient infringement is that it undermines the proper functioning of the patent system. It frustrates the promise of the reward to the innovator for one’s inventive labors. Once inventors know that the deck of (legal) cards is stacked against them and that they will suffer efficient infringement, they will create less patentable innovation. Without legal security in stable and effective property rights, venture capitalists will not invest in inventors or startups and the innovation economy will suffer.

The important point is that these negative dynamic efficiency effects from efficient infringement are systemic in nature. This is similar to the concern about systemic costs represented by such causes of action for willful breach of contract as restitution and disgorgement of wrongful gains. As a matter of real-world practice, the costs created by efficient infringement are similar to the broader private and systemic costs created by opportunistic breaches of contract—both threaten the viability of legal institutions and the policies that drive them, such as incentivizing investments and promoting commercial transactions.

Categories
Intellectual Property Theory

In Defense of an Inclusive IP Conversation

hand under a lightbulb drawn on a chalkboardIn a recent essay responding to a divisive critique of his book, Justifying Intellectual Property, Robert Merges makes clear from the start that he won’t be pulling any punches. He explains that the purpose of his essay, Against Utilitarian Fundamentalism, is to address the misleading and polarizing conclusions of Mark Lemley’s 2015 article, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, recapitulate the arguments he makes in Justifying IP, and show that those who approach intellectual property theory through a nonstrict empirical lens can still make meaningful contributions to the debate.

Merges exposes the key hypocrisy of Lemely’s article: By flippantly dismissing theories that deviate from his own, Lemley ultimately champions the same inflexible exclusivity he purports to condemn.

The underlying dispute between Lemley and Merges turns on what place nonstrict empirical research has in theoretical IP debates. Philosophical empiricism is the idea that experiment-based evidence is the best path to knowledge. Strict empiricists, such as Lemley, argue that hard data-driven evidence is the only evidence capable of supporting reasonable theoretical conclusions. (As an aside, Lemley’s insistence that strict empirical data is the only evidence worthy of scholarly discussion is curious given his vigorous promotion of theories that lack any empirical support. I should also note that his conclusions regarding the current state of the empirical evidence are controversial in their own right, particularly when combined with a willingness to make broad policy recommendations that ignore important empirical criticisms of the data supporting those recommendations.)

While nonstrict empiricism recognizes the importance of data-driven evidence, it allows for the inclusion of evidence-based investigations into human nature and the way people distinguish right from wrong. This research into the nature of duty and obligation—also known as deontology—is seen by nonstrict empiricists in the IP field as a significant supplement to data-driven evidence in reaching meaningful conclusions on theories of ownership and property.

Strict versus nonstrict empiricism debates—sometimes referred to as utilitarian v. deontological—are not new and are not confined to discussions of ownership and intellectual property. What makes the dispute between Lemley and Merges notable is that Lemley, in disparaging Merges’ approach to research, adopts a rigid position on what evidence merits consideration by IP theorists, making the claim that only hard, data-driven empirical research should influence scholarship. It’s a bold assertion that has led many to offer critical responses to Lemley’s essay (see here, here, here, here, and here), especially considering that the exclusive and narrow-minded approach to IP theory he accuses Merges of supporting is exactly what his essay ultimately promotes.

Lemley Misrepresents Alternatives to Strict Empiricism

Merges first takes issue with Lemley’s critique of nonstrict empirical IP theories as inherently suspect due do their basis “on fundamental commitments that are resistant to counterarguments, particularly empirically-based counterarguments.” Lemley contends that these theories operate with a bias similar to blind religious faith, have an intrinsic disregard for reason, and have no place in scholarly discourse. According to Lemley, they are unscientific and unpersuasive views that cannot be seriously considered in discussions of IP law and policy. In his provocative essay, Lemley uses highly-charged rhetoric to associate nonstrict empirical theorists with religious fundamentalists, resorting to ad hominem attacks and scare tactics to argue that his foundational beliefs are the “one true path.”

Merges points out that by relegating all non-empirical theories into a single, derogatory category, and raising his preferred empirical/utilitarian theory to a “true path to enlightenment” status, Lemley commits the fatal error of promoting an exclusive approach to scholarly discourse. Lemley’s argument has roots in the works of Oliver Wendell Holmes and Richard Posner, who dismissed non-empirical foundations as incapable of being influenced by reason. But Merges repeats that he is “not rejecting empirical evidence of all kinds, but expressing honest doubts about the adequacy of the available evidence,” and that Lemley’s mischaracterization of this skepticism is “more in the way of propaganda than scholarship.”

Research on People’s Moral Intuitions Reveals Significant Shared Judgments About IP

Lemley conflates that which is empirical with that which is rational, assuming there is no empiricism in the study of people’s moral judgments. But Merges notes that deontologists, or those who study the nature of duty and moral obligation are “interested in shared judgments about right and wrong, rather than a strict and exclusive interest in empirical data about the consequences of different courses of action,” and that studies in this field can reveal important theoretical foundations to IP.

Discussing the importance of empirical evidence derived from studies on moral obligations, Merges presents a hypothetical ethical dilemma that has revealed “universal morals” shared across cultures, age groups, and other demographic categories. In the “trolley problem,” a person is presented with the scenario of an out of control trolley headed for a group of five bystanders, and the only way to avoid the trolley killing the entire group is to activate a switch that will divert the trolley to a path that will result in the death of one person. Another variation involves pushing one person in front of the train to save the group of five. Merges notes that researchers found widespread agreement across ethnicities, ages, and backgrounds about which actions were right and wrong, and that rather than based on “irrational institutions,” these judgments are based on a “universal moral grammar” hard-wired in all human beings.

These inherent principles have been directly tied to shared ideas regarding both tangible and intellectual property. Merges describes studies in which children are exposed to a person handling an object, then putting the object down, at which point someone else picks up the object. The children not only routinely infer ownership of tangible goods with first possession, but have also been found to associate creative labor with ownership. As Merges explains, “there are strong regularities in people’s thinking about ownership, fairness, and the importance of creative labor,” and these regularities are “less due to socialization in a particular culture and more due to a basic shared moral sense.”

Though strict empiricists criticize these findings as non-empirical forms of evidence, Merges rejects the idea that strictly empirical studies are the only form of rational and practical investigation. He confronts this argument by showing that empirical evidence focusing solely on consequentialism, or the final net consequence of an action, is not only largely impractical, but often leads to morally reprehensible outcomes.

Illustrating the impractical nature of strict consequentialism, Merges fills nearly an entire page with the myriad potential consequences of both strict and liberal liability standards for internet service providers in identifying copyright infringement. What’s clear is that the vast and complex consequences cannot warrant a “net grand total” conclusion of any kind, and that exercises in attempting to draw causal connections are hopeless. Merges also invokes a hypothetical example of enslaving writers and forcing them produce original content to show that, while it may be the most efficient way to deliver works into the market, it’s a utilitarian approach to IP that’s contrary to the shared moral ideas of right and wrong that societies invoke to reject such operations.

IP Theory Should be Inclusionary and Diverse  

Merges dedicates the end of his essay to a summary and defense of his arguments in Justifying Intellectual Property, including the explicit assertions that his ideas do not “have any claim to exclusivity,” and that his book promotes a “public space” in which differing opinions are not only welcome, but essential to a meaningful debate. For Faith-Based Intellectual Property to insist otherwise leads Merges to question whether Lemley has any real awareness of the work he so vehemently criticizes.

Discussing his pluralistic approach, Merges identifies four “midlevel principles” that serve as a bridge between those with differing foundational commitments to IP. According to Merges, proportionality, efficiency, nonremoval or the public domain, and dignity make up these midlevel principles and create an “overlapping consensus” among scholars and theorists with otherwise conflicting views. Offering an example of this consensus, Merges discusses a recent amicus brief that both he and Mark Lemley cooperated and agreed on. Merges explains that the fact that the two authors could discuss and agree on case outcomes and underlying policy rationales directly refutes Lemley’s conclusion that the sides have “nothing to say to each other.”

Concluding his essay, Merges maintains that Justifying Intellectual Property seeks to formulate a liberal theory of IP while respecting all manners of approaches, and that the book “neither predicts nor expects universal agreement.” And while Merges accepts that some may accuse the book of being wrong, naïve, boring, or didactic, to accuse it of being resistant to inclusive discourse and reasoned arguments reveals an unawareness of its actual content. Lemley’s response is an unfortunate reaction to an open assessment of the ways those with differing views can come together. Ironically, Lemley promotes the very same exclusive approach to scholarly debate that he claims to reject.

 

Categories
Copyright

New CPIP Policy Brief: Open-Access Mandates and the Seductively False Promise of “Free”

the word "copyright" typed on a typewriterCPIP has published a new policy brief entitled Open-Access Mandates and the Seductively False Promise of “Free.” The brief, written by CPIP Legal Fellow Bhamati Viswanathan and CPIP Director of Academic Programs & Senior Scholar Adam Mossoff, exposes the lack of evidence or justification for the proliferating legal mandates by federal agencies that coerce authors and publishers to make their scholarly articles available for free to the world.

The Introduction to the policy brief is copied below:

Introduction

Federal agencies are increasingly mandating or proposing free public access for copyrighted works that report on federally-funded research. These “open-access mandates” compel scholars and researchers to make their articles or other writings freely available to billions of people around the world. Furthermore, many of the mandates also allow the public to modify these copyrighted works without the authors’ consent. Countless authors and publishers must comply with this legal mandate of “free.” Federal agencies—such as the Department of Education, the National Institutes of Health, and the Department of Energy—disburse billions annually in research grants. As a result, open-access mandates encompass millions of published articles, test-related materials (including those relating to standardized tests and testing services), and even computer software source code.

Open-access mandates have the potential to significantly harm the publishing industry. In 2015, the American publishing sector generated $27.78 billion in net revenue, representing 2.71 billion published works in electronic and print formats. This includes over 500,000 works in higher education, as well as learning materials for primary and secondary education. Works of scholarship, such as scientific research, also account for a significant share of revenue-generating materials. Unfortunately, open-access mandates are a direct threat to the business model that enables the multi-billion dollar market in scholarly and educational publishing to thrive.

Open-access mandates require publishers to place their works in government-operated repositories that are openly accessible and free of charge to users. But publishers typically invest hundreds of millions of dollars in building and supporting their own innovative and sophisticated systems for delivering copyrighted works to the public. Open-access mandates frustrate these efforts, effectively undermining publishers’ proven business models. Further, they force publishers to compete with government-run systems that need not be efficient, advanced, or profitable. By inserting the government as a competitor to private actors in the publishing sector, open-access mandates undermine publishers’ incentives to invest in both copyrighted works and effective systems for disseminating those works.

Open-access mandates also strike at the heart of copyright law by depriving publishers of their right to own and commercialize their copyrighted works as they see fit. U.S. copyright law secures to copyright owners fundamental property rights in their works; these rights cannot be eviscerated by administrative fiat. By forcing publishers to forfeit their rights to commercialize their copyrighted works, open-access mandates in works that report on federally-funded research are incompatible with fundamental principles of copyright law.

The publishing industry is built upon a business model that is proven, realistic, and robust. Moreover, the industry is constantly investing in innovation and improvement of its products and services. Proponents of open-access mandates seek to replace this model with an untested set of systemic changes. Yet they have not offered any evidence that the open-access model is viable and sustainable. Barring such evidence, open-access mandates should not be adopted.

Open-access mandates should be rejected as a prime example of regulatory overreach. In this paper, we address four reasons why this is the case:

  • Open-access mandates undercut publishers’ ability to invest in producing and distributing copyrighted works.
  • Open-access mandates contradict basic principles of copyright law.
  • Open-access mandates are the classic example of a solution in search of a problem: there is no evidence of a systemic market failure in scholarly publishing requiring a massive regulatory intervention.
  • Open-access mandates are based on untenable economic models.

We begin, however, by noting that while open-access mandates raise serious legal, policy, and economic concerns, the open-access model itself is unobjectionable when done on a voluntary basis.

To read the policy brief, please click here.