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CPIP Roundup

CPIP Roundup – July 31, 2020


Greetings from CPIP Executive Director Sean O’Connor

Sean O'Connor

I hope summer is seeing you healthy and safe. Over four months have passed since the Washington, D.C., area began to feel the impact of COVID-19. Now, as summer progresses and we start anticipating and planning for fall, we’re looking to navigate the new normal in the classroom, workplace, and of course in the virtual space.

In June, CPIP hosted the WIPO-CPIP Summer School on Intellectual Property for the third year running. Usually the program is held at Antonin Scalia Law School in Arlington, Virginia, and both U.S. and international attendees gather to study and network for two weeks in June. This year, however, we opted to move the entire program online, streaming it via Webex. Nearly one hundred attendees from all over the world were able to attend live virtual lectures and panels by a great lineup of experts, both in IP and related fields. We’re grateful to the CPIP staff, our IT support at Scalia Law, and to all our speakers and students for helping make this year’s Summer School successful and memorable in many ways.

As part of the Summer School, CPIP co-hosted a public panel, Patents on Life: Diamond v. Chakrabarty at 40, with the Smithsonian Institution’s Lemelson Center on June 17. We’re grateful to all the speakers who lent their expertise to this interesting and timely discussion, and most especially Dr. Ananda Chakrabarty, the inventor at the heart of the Diamond v. Chakrabarty case. Sadly, less than a month after the panel, we received the news that Dr. Chakrabarty had passed away. Our deepest condolences go out to his family and friends as we also remember his personal and professional legacy.

COVID-19 has complicated plans for many upcoming events, including ours. While we had hoped to hold our much-anticipated The Evolving Music Ecosystem conference in person by moving it from this past spring until the fall, best guidance now dictates that we move it online. We still look forward to a stellar event running from September 9-11, including a keynote address from Rosanne Cash. We will also move our Annual Fall Conference on October 8 to a fully online format. This year’s theme will focus on the IP issues surrounding the rollout of 5G wireless technology. Thank you for your patience as we pursue dual priorities: continuing to support the dialogue surrounding IP and keeping everyone involved safe and well.

I would like to congratulate and welcome Dr. Hina Mehta, Director of Mason’s Office of Technology Transfer, as an Affiliate Scholar with CPIP. Dr. Mehta has taught during the WIPO-CPIP Summer School these past two years, and we’re happy to have her join us and work with us on a more official basis.

I also want to thank those IP scholars who signed our May response to the Office of Science and Technology Policy’s call for comments on the possible effects of free, public access to scholarly research.

On a personal note, I have become a regular contributor to The Hill with a mix of IP and other opinion topics based on my broader historical research. Articles to date include: Avoiding Another Great Depression Through a Developmentally Layered Reopening of the Economy, Cancel Culture, Copyright, and the Harper’s Letter, and How We Finally Tip Into “Bread and Circuses’ Authoritarianism.

In May, I participated as a panelist for the COVID-19 CHHS Webinar Series with Mason’s College of Health and Human Services in the episode Weighing the Decision to Safely ‘Reopen’ Northern Virginia; the episode was also noted by DCist and Fairfax County Economic Development Authority. COVID-19 has not completely taken over all events and conversations, though. I spoke in April at a virtual session on copyright and social justice hosted by the University of Akron School of Law’s Intellectual Property & Technology Law Association, and in June at the NVTC Impact AI Conference on the panel Protecting AI Inventions: Current Issues and Best Practices.

I’d like to thank Akron’s Professor Camilla Hrdy for providing her comments on my paper Distinguishing Different Kinds of Property in Patents and Copyright, which was also shared on the Private Law Theory blog.

In conclusion, the past few months have been full and productive, and I look forward to seeing CPIP and our friends and supporters successfully navigate the remainder of 2020. I wish you the best over the coming months as we hope and cooperate to put COVID-19 behind us. Until then, we continue to be in this together.


Online Music Law Conference with Rosanne Cash on September 9-11

Rosanne Cash

We are excited to announce that the music law conference, The Evolving Music Ecosystem, which will be held online from Antonin Scalia Law School in Arlington, Virginia, has now been extended to a three-day event on September 9-11, 2020. The keynote address will be given by Rosanne Cash, and it features panel presentations from leading experts.

This unique conference continues a dialogue on the music ecosystem begun by CPIP Executive Director Sean O’Connor while at the University of Washington School of Law in Seattle. In its inaugural year in the D.C. area, the conference aims to bring together musicians, music fans, lawyers, artist advocates, business leaders, government policymakers, and anyone interested in supporting thriving music ecosystems in the U.S. and beyond.

For more information, and to register, please click here.


“Patents on Life” Panel Discussion Video Now Available

the U.S. Capitol

On June 17, 2020, CPIP and the Smithsonian Institution’s Lemelson Center for the Study of Invention and Innovation co-hosted a virtual panel discussion entitled Patents on Life: Diamond v. Chakrabarty at 40. CPIP Executive Director Sean O’Connor delivered closing remarks after a panel presentation that included the late inventor and distinguished professor of microbiology and immunology Dr. Ananda Chakrabarty.

The panelists discussed the 1980 Supreme Court ruling in Diamond v. Chakrabarty that authorized the first patent on an intentionally genetically modified organism and that contributed to the rise of the modern biotechnology industry and reshaped the agriculture industry. Video from the panel discussion is available here, and our blog post summarizing it is available here.


Spotlight on Scholarship

a pair of glasses, an apple, and a stack of books

Christopher M. Holman, Congress Should Decline Ill-Advised Legislative Proposals Aimed at Evergreening of Pharmaceutical Patent Protection, 51 U. Pac. L. Rev. 493 (2020)

Many believe that drug prices in the U.S. are unnecessarily high because the pharmaceutical industry is exploiting legal loopholes and acquiring dubious patents to extend protection and delay generics from entering the market (so-called “evergreening” behavior by drug innovators). However, CPIP Senior Scholar Chris Holman of the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law has published a new paper arguing that these recent concerns regarding patents and drug prices are unfounded. The paper, entitled Congress Should Decline Ill-Advised Legislative Proposals Aimed at Evergreening of Pharmaceutical Patent Protection and published in the University of the Pacific Law Review, further challenges recent legislative proposals aimed at pharmaceutical evergreening, finding that they “are largely misguided, and, if enacted, would be likely to cause more harm than good by discouraging innovation in pharmaceuticals without effectively addressing the core concern.” Our blog post summarizing the paper is available here.

Michael S. Greve, Exceptional, After All and After Oil States: Judicial Review and the Patent System, 26 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 1 (2020)

What if there is a way for a patent applicant to obtain a “gold-plated patent” that is immune to administrative cancellation before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)? This intriguing notion is the subject of a recent paper by Professor Mike Greve of Scalia Law, titled Exceptional, After All and After Oil States: Judicial Review and the Patent System and published in the Winter 2020 edition of the Boston University Journal of Science and Technology Law. Prof. Greve presented an early draft of this paper at the “Perspectives on the PTAB: The New Role of the Administrative State in the Innovation Economy” conference that was co-hosted by CPIP and the Gray Center at Scalia Law. Our blog post summarizing the paper is available here.


Activities, News, & Events

a lit lightbulb hanging next to unlit bulbs

CPIP Executive Director Sean O’Connor continues to lead the law school’s new Innovation Law Clinic. The Clinic teams law students (IP, corporate, tax) to analyze and counsel entrepreneurs, creators, and inventors from the University’s internal and external communities. The course teaches students about entrepreneurship and commercializing innovation and creativity, as well as how to craft an overall legal strategy in the context of a client’s business, technology, and/or artistic vision. A core deliverable is the Innovator’s Roadmap, which provides a comprehensive, client eyes-only analysis of the venture and legal issues it needs to address in the near and mid-term. Anticipated projects include hydrogen fuel cell refilling technology venture; edutainment and fundraising franchise system for community building; emerging fashion designer; online platform for fictional world-building authors; and an innovative medical device venture spinning out of the University. Specific legal services to be delivered can include entity formation; securing or licensing IP; drafting employment agreements; and advice on tax filings.

CPIP Director of Copyright Research & Policy Sandra Aistars will lead the law school’s Arts & Entertainment Advocacy Clinic again this fall. The Clinic teaches students the legal and policy skills required for engaging with Congress, agencies, and courts on behalf of copyright owners. Students will develop substantive legal knowledge in copyright and related areas of law as well as practical skills in research, writing, and advocacy by counseling clients and preparing legal and policy documents. Anticipated projects this fall include identifying ownership and clearing rights for illustration created in the 1960s, conducting an online legal clinic for members of Washington Area Lawyers for the Arts (WALA), contract drafting and strategic planning for a musician-owned music licensing service, and continued collaboration and special projects for the U.S. Copyright Office.

CPIP has published a new policy brief by CPIP Senior Fellow for Innovation Policy Jonathan Barnett entitled The Long Shadow of the Blackberry Shutdown That Wasn’t. The policy brief looks at how the Blackberry litigation and the “patent troll” narrative ultimately contributed to the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in eBay v. MercExchange that limited the availability of injunctive relief for successful patentees. Prof. Barnett then examines the problematic legacy of the post-eBay case law, which significantly shifted the legal infrastructure supporting the U.S. innovation markets. In particular, he explains how this shift has led to opportunistic infringement that favors downstream incumbents with the resources to fund extensive litigation at the expense of upstream innovators—a dynamic that is exemplified in the recent litigation between Sonos and Google.


Categories
Innovation Patent Law

New CPIP Policy Brief: The Long Shadow of the Blackberry Shutdown That Wasn’t

CPIP logoCPIP has published a new policy brief by CPIP Senior Fellow for Innovation Policy Jonathan Barnett entitled The Long Shadow of the Blackberry Shutdown That Wasn’t. The policy brief looks at how the Blackberry litigation and the “patent troll” narrative ultimately contributed to the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in eBay v. MercExchange that limited the availability of injunctive relief for successful patentees.

Professor Barnett then examines the problematic legacy of the post-eBay case law, which significantly shifted the legal infrastructure supporting the U.S. innovation markets. In particular, he explains how this shift has led to opportunistic infringement that favors downstream incumbents with the resources to fund extensive litigation at the expense of upstream innovators—a dynamic that is exemplified in the recent litigation between Sonos and Google.

The introduction is copied below:

Introduction

In early 2006, there was widespread public interest in a seemingly arcane patent infringement litigation brought by a small IP licensing entity, NTP, Inc., against Research in Motion (or “RIM”), the maker of the then-ubiquitous Blackberry mobile communications device. The reason: NTP alleged that the Blackberry device and service infringed upon its patents relating to wireless email communications. In the district court litigation, NTP had secured a judgment of willful patent infringement against RIM, entitling NTP to treble damages, attorneys’ fees, and a permanent injunction (stayed pending appeal) that placed at risk the continued operation of the Blackberry service.

Given NTP’s success at the district court, and uncertainty surrounding RIM’s ability to design a non-infringing alternative, there seemed to be a material risk that the appeals court would sustain the lower court’s rulings and, most importantly, the injunction order. Faced with this predicament, RIM settled all claims with NTP in March 2006 for the impressive sum of $612.5 million.

In this contribution, I revisit the almost 15-year-old Blackberry litigation and its connection with both the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, which limited patent owners’ ability to secure injunctions, and ongoing infringement litigation (commenced in January 2020) involving Google and Sonos, a leading innovator and supplier of wireless audio systems. While the eBay decision may have deterred certain opportunistic uses of patent infringement litigation, there are growing indications that it has had a significant adverse effect on the innovation ecosystem.

As illustrated by the Google/Sonos litigation, eBay and post-eBay case law has enabled incumbents that maintain key technology platforms and distribution pathways to infringe upon patent-protected technologies held by others at relatively modest legal and business risk. The increasing normalization of patent infringement as a rational business strategy endangers the property-rights infrastructure behind important segments of the U.S. innovation economy.

To read the policy brief, please click here.

Categories
Legislation Patent Law

New Paper Looks at “Ill-Advised Legislative Proposals” to Address Pharmaceutical “Evergreening”

The following post comes from Yumi Oda, an LLM Candidate at Scalia Law and a Research Assistant at CPIP.

dictionary entry for the word "innovate"By Yumi Oda

Many believe that drug prices in the U.S. are unnecessarily high because the pharmaceutical industry is exploiting legal loopholes and acquiring dubious patents to extend protection and delay generics from entering the market (so-called “evergreening” behavior by drug innovators). However, CPIP Senior Scholar Chris Holman of the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law has published a new paper arguing that these recent concerns regarding patents and drug prices are unfounded. The paper, entitled Congress Should Decline Ill-Advised Legislative Proposals Aimed at Evergreening of Pharmaceutical Patent Protection and published in the University of the Pacific Law Review, further challenges recent legislative proposals aimed at pharmaceutical evergreening, finding that they “are largely misguided, and, if enacted, would be likely to cause more harm than good by discouraging innovation in pharmaceuticals without effectively addressing the core concern.”

Concepts and Doctrines in the Evergreening Debate

Prof. Holman starts by reviewing the academic literature and other commentaries relevant to the current evergreening debate. He divides his discussion into five concepts and doctrines that have come under scrutiny as purportedly facilitating evergreening: product hopping, product thicketing, secondary patents (or follow-on patents), double patenting, and continuation practice.

1. Product Hopping. Prof. Holman explains that the pejorative term “product hopping” is aimed at “pharmaceutical companies’ efforts to develop follow-on products and to switch patients to these products from an earlier version of the drug.” Critics, who now acknowledge “the fact that literal evergreening generally does not occur,” have shifted the argument to blame product hopping for forcing a market shift by making only a small change to an existing patented drug, such as with a new form, formulation, or dosage, and convincing doctors to prescribe it. Of course, while no patent directed to an earlier composition or biologic is permissible, a new patent on a new formulation, manufacturing process, or use of a previous drug is allowed in our patent system. While some may attack these new patents as a type of evergreening, Prof. Holman points out that these are the very types of innovations the patent system is meant to encourage.

2. Patent Thicketing. Prof. Holman describes another pejorative term, “patent thickets,” which refers to pharmaceutical “companies obtaining multiple patents covering a single pharmaceutical product.” Popularized in the early 2000s and dating back to the term “patent anticommons” that was coined in the late 1990s, patent thickets originally raised concerns that when “too many patents” around the same product are held by different owners, transactional licensing costs could increase substantially. Prof. Holman points to a recent review of patent thicket literature demonstrating that the term is not used coherently. In fact, patent thickets today are sometimes claimed to exist even when the patents are held by the same owner, where potential transaction cost issues would not apply.

3. Secondary or Follow-On Patents. So-called “secondary patents” are those that claim something other than the active ingredients in drugs, such as new formulations or dosages. Prof. Holman dislikes the term “secondary patents” since it suggests they are somehow less meritorious and less worthy of patent protection, and he instead chooses to call them “follow-on patents” since they generally follow the invention of the active ingredient. Critics often target follow-on patents based on the belief that “a drug is a single product and thus should only be subject to the protection of a single patent.” However, Prof. Holman explains that this view oversimplifies how pharmaceutical inventions come about and underappreciates their true value for patients. For example, his earlier article illustrates how Burroughs-Wellcome obtained a follow-on patent for AZT, a failed cancer drug that was ultimately used to treat AIDS.

4. Double Patenting. Some critics complain that pharmaceutical companies are engaged in “double patenting,” where they obtain multiple patents on the same invention or obvious variations of a patented invention. Prof. Holman explains that double patenting rejections—especially nonstatutory, “obviousness-type” rejections—prevent a patent applicant from extending the patent term by filing a second patent “on a non-identical but still merely obvious variant of a patented invention.” Nevertheless, some critics argue that companies are avoiding such rejections by “dressing up part” of their original invention “as a new one,” and they claim that prohibitions on double patenting should be strengthened. Prof. Holman notes that these arguments typically focus particularly on pharmaceutical products, and they fail to consider the effect such changes would have on inventions more generally.

5. Continuation Practice. Prof. Holman explains that some commentators argue that pharmaceutical companies are using continuation practice to engage in evergreening. Continuations entitle patent applications to benefit from the filing date of an earlier-filed patent application, and the patent applicant can amend claims or even add new ones so long as they are supported by the parent application. Some critics claim that this practice allows pharmaceutical companies to “obtain multiple patents covering obvious variants of the same drug” and to extend effective patent terms. However, Prof. Holman notes that these concerns have already been successfully addressed by Congress in statutory amendments.

Proposed Legislation Aimed at the Pharmaceutical Industry

Having identified and summarized the concepts and doctrines that arise in the evergreening debate, Prof. Holman then analyzes three proposed bills from 2019 that are specifically designed to rein in evergreening in the pharmaceutical industry: the Affordable Prescriptions for Patients Act of 2019, the No Combination Drug Patents Act, and the Terminating the Extension of Rights Misappropriated Act of 2019.

1. Affordable Prescriptions for Patients Act of 2019. The Affordable Prescriptions for Patients Act of 2019 attempts to tackle product hopping and patent thicketing. To combat product hopping, the bill would make it a prima facie antitrust violation for a drug manufacturer to (1) discontinue or withdraw the “reference drug’s” application (or announce discontinuance of or withdrawal of the application) once it receives notice of an application to market a generic version or (2) market or sell a follow-on product during a period of time referred to as the “competition window.” A drug manufacturer can rebut the presumption by showing that the drug was discontinued or withdrawn from the market for “significant and documented safety reasons.”

The bill would also make pharmaceutical patent thicketing a prima facie antitrust violation. The bill broadly defines “patent thicketing” as covering any action by a patentee to limit competition for an approved drug when certain conditions are met. A drug manufacturer can rebut the presumption by establishing that the pro-competitive effects of the action are not outweighed by its anti-competitive effects, which in turn can be rebutted by the FTC demonstrating that the harm to consumers outweighs the benefit from the action.

Prof. Holman warns that the effect of this bill “would be to discourage pharmaceutical innovators from improving existing products,” instead of encouraging further innovation and research to improve the first version of a drug. Prof. Holman cites testimony by Prof. David Olson before the Senate Judiciary Committee stating that, despite the common misconception that a large number of patents delays innovation, “there is no conclusive evidence that smartphone or other high-tech innovation is being retarded by the large numbers of patents that may cover these devices.” Prof. Olson explains that this is also true for pharmaceutical patents, where the number of patents covering one specific drug is relatively low—not enough “to constitute a substantial thicket that will deter innovation.”

2. No Combination Drug Patents Act. The No Combination Drug Patents Act would change the nonobviousness standard under Section 103 for follow-on pharmaceutical innovations. If enacted, it would create a presumption that any “covered claimed invention” is obvious if it “contains or uses a drug or biological product that is prior art” and differs from the prior art under one or more of four enumerated criteria. An applicant may rebut this presumption by showing that the invention is either a new treatment for a new indication or that it leads to a statistically significant increase in the drug’s efficacy.

Prof. Holman points out that the proposed “rule of construction” exempting certain claimed inventions “could largely eviscerate the bill’s effect,” depending on how it is interpreted. He presents three possible interpretations, two of which could be easily overcome by filing a divisional application. Under the third possible interpretation, which seems like the one the bill’s drafters intended, Prof. Holman predicts that pharmaceutical companies would be forced to significantly change their current patent filing strategy, which affords some time to figure out and secure claims directed to inventions that were unknown when the parent application was filed, by starting to file many patent applications at the outset.

Stepping back for a moment, Prof. Holman explains that the proposal to raise the nonobviousness bar especially for follow-on pharmaceutical patents is not new. However, he questions such a proposition because the “assumption that many types of pharmaceutical inventions are inherently obvious and undeserving of patent protection” does not withstand scrutiny. Prof. Holman notes that numerous follow-on inventions have been upheld by the courts and recognized for the positive impact they have on people’s lives. (For a CPIP policy brief by Prof. Holman responding to such a proposal by the United Nations, please see here.)

3. Terminating the Extension of Rights Misappropriated Act of 2019. Finally, Prof. Holman discusses the Terminating the Extension of Rights Misappropriated Act of 2019, which is designed to prevent double patenting in drug patents by presuming that the patentee has “disclaimed the patent term for each of the listed patents after the date on which the term the first patent expires.” Prof. Holman explains that the bill neither alters the standard for determining obviousness-type double patenting, nor the remedy, but it does shift the burden of proof from the PTO to the patent applicant to prove that the listed patents are patently distinct from one another. The bill would also require the PTO to conduct a comprehensive review of its examination procedures.

Conclusion

Prof. Holman echoes Senator Thom Tillis’ concern that “by just focusing on patent protections, and the number of patent protections available to a single product, [Congress] may be doing more harm than good to our nation’s innovation economy.” And he notes that it “is important to bear in mind that the reason there has been such an uproar over the price of drugs is that these drugs provide huge benefits for society, far exceeding most other patentable innovation.” Prof. Holman mentions that these drugs would probably not have been available in the first place without proper incentives, and he worries that the legislation aimed at preventing the perceived problems with evergreening “could discourage the investment necessary to bring the next generation of pharmaceutical innovation to patients.”

Further, Prof. Holman criticizes the current evergreening debate for failing to target the supposed misuse of patents by going after the patents and not that misuse. For example, if the claim of product hopping were true and patients were being prescribed much more expensive drugs with no additional benefit, that would be an issue with the market, not with the patent system. Similarly, if drug companies were using anti-competitive means in the same scenario, that would be an antitrust violation, not a patent issue. As such, instead of the current legislative proposals targeting the patents themselves, Prof. Holman concludes that any legislation should focus on the alleged bad actions of pharmaceutical companies, not on changing the patent incentives for pharmaceuticals inventions overall.

Categories
Copyright

Copyright Office Questions Legality of Internet Archive’s National Emergency Library

the word "copyright" typed on a typewriterOn March 24, the Internet Archive (Archive) unveiled what it called the “National Emergency Library” (NEL) in order to “address our unprecedented global and immediate need for access to reading and research materials.” The announcement specified that Archive would suspend the waitlist for 1.4 million books in its unlicensed “lending library” until at least June 30, thus allowing an unlimited number of people to download electronic copies of the same book at the same time. Archive had previously employed a controlled digital lending (CDL) model where the number of downloads was tied to the number of physical copies Archive or its partners possessed. With the waitlist suspended, Archive temporarily abandoned the CDL model that it had relied on since 2011.

Archive’s release of 1.4 million copyrighted works without a license certainly caught people’s attention. The Authors Guild quickly condemned the move, claiming that Archive “has no rights whatsoever to these books, much less to give them away indiscriminately without consent of the publisher or author.” Maria Pallante, President and CEO of the Association of American Publishers, likewise denounced Archive’s announcement: “We are stunned by the Internet Archive’s aggressive, unlawful, and opportunistic attack on the rights of authors and publishers in the midst of the novel coronavirus pandemic.” Archive then responded in a blog post explaining that it had suspended its waitlist due to the “tremendous and historic outage” in the nation’s libraries caused by the pandemic and arguing that fair use is the “legal doctrine underlying” its CDL model “during normal times.”

A couple of weeks later, on April 16, Senator Tom Udall (D-NM) sent a letter to Acting Register of Copyrights Maria Strong asking the Office “to examine the National Emergency Library that has been organized by the Internet Archive which is operating without typical library licenses and is causing authors in New Mexico concern about the integrity of their copyrights.” In particular, Sen. Udall asked the Office to “include a legal analysis of the Internet Archive’s National Emergency Library” under Section 107 and to “recommend any corrective action that you deem necessary to comply with copyright law and protect authors.”

On May 15, Acting Register Strong submitted a detailed response to Sen. Udall, noting that “it is not the Office’s general practice to provide legal advice about specific factual scenarios” and that the “Office is particularly cautious about weighing in on circumstances or disputes between private parties.” Nevertheless, the Office provided a general analysis of how copyright law applies to libraries and then looked at how that analysis applies to “the Internet Archive’s recent activities.” Notably, the Office ultimately concluded that it “would have been beneficial for the Internet Archive to engage with writers and publishers prior to launching the National Emergency Library to discuss the contemplated parameters for the project and determine their willingness to participate.”

On June 1, a couple of weeks after the Office submitted its response to Sen. Udall, four major publishers, including Hachette, HarperCollins, Penguin Random House, and Wiley, filed suit against Archive for copyright infringement in the Southern District of New York. The complaint, which includes 127 works-in-suit, alleges that Archive’s CDL and NEL models infringe on their works, both directly and indirectly. This blog post does not address that dispute, though the publishers do raise many of the same issues in their complaint that the Office raised in its response to Sen. Udall. This blog post merely summarizes the Office’s reasoning on the fair use analysis of Archive’s National Emergency Library. It is worth noting that, even though Archive announced on June 10 that it was shutting down its NEL, the legality of the NEL is still a live issue in the publishers’ lawsuit.

Fair Use Under Section 107

Looking at the first fair use factor under Section 107 generally, the Copyright Office notes that while the “goals of promoting scholarship and education are explicitly identified in the statute as favored purposes,” it “is generally understood that many uses of copyrighted works by schools and universities must be licensed.” Citing Oracle v. Google and Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, the Office points out that “reproducing the text of physical books in digital format is not transformative unless the change in format results in new uses for the work.” Moreover, it explains that using educational materials for educational purposes “would not serve a different purpose than the original.”

Turning to the NEL specifically, the Office takes issue with Archive’s claim that “the vast majority” of the books it makes available “do not have a commercially available ebook” that would be publicly available given that libraries are closed. On the contrary, the Office states that “Archive does not appear to have verified if any of the works in its collection were available to the public in digital formats prior to including those books in its collection or removing its waiting lists” and that the NEL “includes many books for which ebooks are available commercially” at local libraries. Thus, the argument that Archive was making available works that were otherwise unavailable “does not apply to any books that were available in digital formats at the time of the copying.”

The Office notes that the NEL is available to the public for free such that Archive’s use is noncommercial. However, it emphasizes that Archive’s stated purpose of promoting scholarship and education “alone does not establish fair use.” Indeed, the Office points out that “at least some” of the 1.4 million works, such as “Stephen King thrillers and joke books,” are “likely to be accessed for entertainment rather than educational purposes.” Even for the educational books that are not available in digital formats, the Office explains that the noncommercial purpose must be weighed against “the non-transformative nature of the use.” Given that educational works are “originally intended to educate,” Archive’s use of these works “is not transformative.” And given that Archive does not provide “search functionality,” it does not fit within the “digitization cases” that were “deemed transformative,” such as Google Books and HathiTrust.

On the second factor, the Office cites Campbell v. Acuff-Rose for the proposition that “some works are closer to the core of intended copyright protection than others” and Harper & Row v. Nation for the point that the “law generally recognizes a greater need to disseminate factual works than works of fiction or fantasy.” The Office also notes that there may be “more justification” for reproducing previously published works that are “currently unavailable in the marketplace.” Nevertheless, it explains that the existence of organizations to provide copies of such works is relevant to this factor, and it mentions that the case law on a “work’s print status under the second factor is mixed.”

Applying this to the NEL, the Office clarifies that the analysis of the second factor is necessarily “fact-specific” and that each work or category of works “would need to be evaluated independently.” For example, “creative works” would be analyzed differently than “factual or informational works.” And while the unavailability of certain works might favor fair use “in some circumstances,” the Office notes that this does not appear to have been Archive’s focus. Archive instead focused on whether the books were available in digital form, making no “mention of the works’ overall availability.”

The key to the third factor, the Office explains, is “whether the secondary use employs more of the copyrighted work than is necessary, and whether the copying was excessive in relation to any valid purposes asserted under the first factor.” Moreover, while “copying an entire work often weighs against a finding of fair use,” the factor “would not weigh against a finding of fair use” if “it were necessary to copy the entire copyrighted work to achieve the purpose of the secondary use.”

The Office notes that the CDL White Paper, upon which Archive relies, “argues that it is necessary to copy the entire book to achieve the purpose of providing digital access to the work, such that the copying is not excessive in relation to the library’s purpose.” The CDL White Paper also argues that “the library prevents users from making additional copies of or further distributing the book and limits the duration for which a user can access a book.” In response, the Office points out that the courts in Google Books and HathiTrust “emphasized that the defendants had not made the full text of the copied works visible to the public” and how the Office itself (see here, here, and here) has “consistently expressed doubt that providing digital access to complete works can be considered a fair use.”

Quoting Harper & Row, the Office notes that the fourth factor, which is “undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use,” turns on “whether widespread conduct similar to the conduct of the alleged infringer ‘would adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work.’” The Office explains that, under Google Books and HathiTrust, the third and fourth factors are linked: “the risk that the digitized version will serve as a market substitute for the original work increases as the amount of the work that is made accessible to the public increases.” In both of those cases, the copying of entire works was permissible because it enabled transformative search functionality without serving as a market substitute by making the entire works available.

Turning to the NEL, the Office acknowledges a “disagreement among stakeholders over whether the analysis of market harm under the fourth fair use factor should consider the Internet Archive’s activities as roughly analogous to physical lending by libraries, or whether the markets for physical lending and ebook licensing to libraries are distinct.” The Office points out that no court has embraced the former approach and that “the Second Circuit squarely rejected it” in Capitol Records v. ReDigi. Moreover, the Office cites its own report noting that there are “significant differences” between lending physical copies and digital ones. And it points out that the NEL “lacks the controls cited by the CDL White Paper as necessary to mitigating market harm” since it allows “an unlimited number of users to borrow any given title simultaneously.”

On the latter approach, which holds that the market for ebook licensing is distinct from that of physical lending, the Office states that there is already “an established market” where “publishers and authors license their works to libraries for the purpose of digitally ‘lending’ them to patrons.” The fourth factor analysis here “might focus on whether the creation and distribution of digital versions of these works would affect this market, and also how, if such conduct became widespread, it would affect this market.” If digital versions of some works were not available in the marketplace, the Office concludes, “this factor might favor fair use for some, but not necessarily all, of the works contained in the National Emergency Library.”

The Office also examines how “exigent circumstances” related to the pandemic may factor into a fair use analysis. The Office notes that there “is undoubtedly a strong public interest in ensuring continued access to educational materials in this unprecedented time, which could weigh in favor of fair use.” However, while Archive’s goal “may be laudable, so is respect for copyright.” The Office states that it “would be imprudent to excuse widespread copying due to a national emergency without considering the possible repercussions on copyright law and copyright owners” since there “is also a strong public interest in ensuring that authors are able to financially survive the coronavirus crisis to be able to continue to produce creative works.” And it concludes by noting that a “court would almost certainly also take into account” Archive’s effect “on writers and publishers.”

Conclusion

The Copyright Office ultimately suggests that Archive may wish to “explore opportunities for collaboration with writers and publishers” such as by “allowing them to opt into making digital versions of their works publicly available.” While the Office never explicitly says that any particular work is being infringed, its analysis does indicate that, in its opinion, Archive cannot claim that it is engaging in fair use for all of the works made available with its National Emergency Library. Furthermore, the Office explains why other statutory limitations, such as the first sale doctrine under Section 109, would not apply to Archive’s activities. All in all, it seems clear that the Office is quite skeptical of the NEL’s legality under the fair use doctrine. Though, it remains to be seen whether the Southern District of New York will agree with the Office’s analysis.

Categories
Trademarks

Consumer Perception Wins the Day: A Case Overview of USPTO v. Booking.com

The following post comes from Ryan Reynolds, a rising 3L at Scalia Law and a Research Assistant at CPIP.

U.S. Supreme Court buildingBy Ryan Reynolds

Last week, the Supreme Court in USPTO v. Booking.com held that a combination of an otherwise generic term and a generic top-level domain (TLD) may be protected as a trademark so long as consumers perceive it as capable of distinguishing among the members of a class of goods or services and not as a reference to the class itself. The Court rejected the nearly per se rule applied by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) that such combinations are necessarily generic.

The Background

Between 2011 and 2012, Booking.com filed four trademark registration applications for the “Booking.com” mark with the USPTO. The USPTO denied the registrations because it found that the mark was generic as applied to online hotel reservation services. On appeal, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) affirmed the denial. The TTAB analyzed “Booking” and “.com” separately and found the mark generic.

The Lanham Act provides that a trademark is “any word, name, symbol, or device” used by a person in commerce “to identify and distinguish his or her goods . . . from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods.” Five categories of marks are recognized under the Lanham Act that have varying levels of protection. Fanciful, arbitrary, and suggestive marks receive immediate protection. Descriptive marks only receive protection upon showing secondary meaning, that is, once consumers understand the mark to communicate a single source. Lastly, generic marks can never receive trademark protection. A generic mark does not help a consumer distinguish one good or service from another; it instead merely refers to the common name of the good or service itself. The restriction on generic marks is based on the concern that competitors should have free use of the terms necessary to identify their products or services to consumers.

Having lost at the TTAB, Booking.com then filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The district court applied the primary significance test, which states: “[T]he primary significance of the registered mark to the relevant public . . . shall be the test for determining whether the registered mark has become the generic name of goods or services in connection with which it has been used.” The district court held that “Booking.com” was a descriptive mark that had acquired secondary meaning, based on the perception of the mark by the relevant consuming public. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that “Booking.com” was eligible for trademark protection. The USPTO then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.

The Arguments

The central issue was whether the Lanham Act had legislatively overruled the Supreme Court’s 132-year-old decision in Goodyear’s India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co. In Goodyear’s, the Court created a per se rule that the addition of an entity designator such as “company” to the end of an otherwise generic mark could not create a valid trademark. The Court reasoned that entity designators do not serve a source-identifying function, but instead only indicate that parties have formed an association to deal in goods or services.

The USPTO contended that, like entity designators, TLDs such as “.com” do not serve a source-identifying function as they only communicate a business’ online presence to the public. Therefore, it argued that Goodyear’s per se rule controlled the case as both lower courts had found “Booking” alone to be generic. It further argued that ruling for Booking.com would cause competitive harm by opening the door to the registration of countless generic marks. It stressed that this harm was heightened by the competitive advantages the internet already grants to Booking.com as the only party that can use its domain name. It argued that, due to these competitive advantages and the opportunity for Booking.com to pursue protection under unfair competition laws, “Booking.com” does not require trademark protection.

In contrast, Booking.com alleged that the Lanham Act had legislatively overruled Goodyear’s through its creation of the primary significance test. It argued that the primary significance test is the exclusive test for all marks to determine genericism, with the Lanham Act creating no special category for domain names as marks. Likewise, Booking.com maintained that the piecemeal analysis by the USPTO of “Booking” and “.com” separately went against the Lanham Act’s directive to assess the mark as a whole for purposes of registration.

Booking.com further contended that the primary significance test reinforces the aims of trademark law by helping consumers navigate the marketplace. By requiring marks to pass both the primary significance test and show secondary meaning in order to receive protection as a descriptive mark, non-source-identifying marks are eliminated. Booking.com also pointed out that the USPTO has inconsistently applied Goodyear’s per se rule by allowing marks similar to “Booking.com” to be registered, and this inconsistency has not caused harm to fair competition in the marketplace. It also warned that the USPTO’s per se rule would usher in a “mass extinction event” for hundreds of registered marks.

 The Ruling

In its opinion affirming the Fourth Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court rejected the USPTO’s per se rule as to combination terms like “Booking.com.” The majority opinion, authored by Justice Ginsburg and joined by seven other justices, held: “Whether any given ‘generic.com’ term is generic, we hold, depends on whether consumers in fact perceive that term as the name of a class or, instead, as a term capable of distinguishing among members of the class.”

The majority stated that USPTO’s reliance on Goodyear’s was flawed since it would find terms ineligible for trademark protection even if consumers would understand them to signify source: “That bedrock principle of the Lanham Act is incompatible with an unyielding legal rule that entirely disregards consumer perception.” The majority reasoned that the Court’s decision in Goodyear’s stood only for the proposition that a “compound of generic elements is generic if the combination yields no additional meaning to consumers capable of distinguishing the goods or services.” Thus, the majority held that a consumer could understand “Booking.com” to refer to the source of the goods or services and not merely to describe the website itself.

Addressing the anticompetitive arguments raised by the USPTO, the majority noted that the concern of hindering competitors “attends any descriptive mark” and that the likelihood of confusion and fair use doctrines would “guard against the anticompetitive effects.” Further, the majority rejected the USPTO’s argument that unfair competition laws could provide an adequate remedy for Booking.com, stating that there is “no cause to deny Booking.com the same benefits Congress accorded other marks qualifying as nongeneric.” Lastly, the majority declined to “open the door to cancellation of scores of currently registered marks” due to the inconsistency of the USPTO’s own application of the per se rule for which it argued.

In her brief concurrence, Justice Sotomayor raised two observations. First, she noted her appreciation for the dissent’s skepticism of consumer-survey evidence as an “unreliable indicator of genericness.” Second, she observed that the USPTO may have properly “concluded based on such dictionary and usage evidence, that Booking.com is in fact generic” and that the district court may have erred in concluding otherwise—an issue that was not before the Supreme Court.

In his dissent, Justice Breyer argued in favor of the USPTO’s per se rule, stating that the Lanham Act had not repudiated Goodyear’s and that its “principle is sound as a matter of law and logic.” In addition to tracing many of the same arguments advanced by the USPTO in its briefs, Justice Breyer criticized the “fact-specific” approach established by the majority to determine genericism. He claimed that survey evidence is an unreliable metric of genericness and that there would be little to stop the registration of countless generic marks. Justice Breyer argued that this influx of “generic.com” marks would open the door to potentially serious anticompetitive consequences, and he contended that the Court’s decision may lead to costly litigation that will “no doubt chill others from using variants on the registered mark and privilege established firms over new entrants to the market.”

While the ultimate consequences are not yet known, this decision clearly marks the strong resolution of the Supreme Court that, where genericism is concerned, consumer perception is key.