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Biotech Economic Study Patent Licensing Uncategorized

UNITAID’s Request for Suggestions on Breaking Down IP Barriers Ignores Harmful Patent Delay

dictionary entry for the word "innovate"Last month, global health initiative UNITAID launched an appeal for suggestions on breaking down barriers that frustrate the progress of public health. UNITAID is a multilateral partnership hosted by the World Health Organization whose mission is to develop systematic approaches to identifying challenges in the treatment of devastating diseases such as HIV, TB, and malaria. The call for suggestions comes as UNITAID launches a renewed effort to improve access to health products for “the needy and vulnerable.”

Unfortunately, UNITAID’s request takes a narrow view of the obstacles to a better public health system, choosing to blame intellectual property and patents for blocking access to life-saving medicines. The call for suggestions posits that while patents reward innovation, they also hamper access to drugs by limiting competition. After promoting several controversial mechanisms that would strip patent owners of their intellectual property rights, UNITAID urges responders to submit ideas that would further weaken patent systems around the world.

In response to UNITAID’s request, CPIP’s Mark Schultz and Kevin Madigan submitted comments that call attention to a serious and underappreciated problem detailed in the forthcoming white paper, The Long Wait for Innovation: The Global Patent Pendency Problem. Excessive patent application processing delays and inefficient patent systems are obstructing the distribution of ground-breaking new drugs by deterring both home-grown startups and foreign companies from investing in innovation. The following comments stress that effective property rights are critical to delivering health products to patients and that without a competent patent system, the market for medical innovations cannot function.

High-Level Suggestions to UNITAID on Intellectual Property Rights
Mark Schultz & Kevin Madigan[1]
September 15, 2016

We submit these comments in response to UNITAID’s call for high-level suggestions on intellectual property rights (IPRs). UNITAID’s request for suggestions observes that IPRs can pose a barrier to health products reaching “the needy and vulnerable.” However, the suggestions received will be incomplete if they fail to account for how effective IPRs are critical to delivering health products to patients.

An effective IPR system is essential to a well-functioning market in health products. It’s not just that patents secure investment in inventing a new cure; they also secure the investment made to bring that cure to patients in each market. A country’s ineffective IPR system can deter companies from making the substantial investments necessary to build a market in that country—these investments can include regulatory compliance, securing and negotiating reimbursement, building a distribution system, and educating health care providers about the benefits and administration of the drug. In fact, recent studies have shown a link between weak patent protection and delayed availability of drugs.[2]

In a forthcoming white paper for the Center for the Protection of Intellectual Property at Antonin Scalia Law School, The Long Wait for Innovation: The Global Patent Pendency Problem, we illuminate an under-appreciated obstacle to bringing new drugs to patients. (The paper will be available soon at http://cip2.gmu.edu.) While debates and headlines focus on issues of patentable subject matter and exclusive property rights, the problem of patent pendency has been largely overlooked and under-examined. The reality is that in many countries, it simply takes too long to get a patent, thus deterring both home-grown startups and foreign companies from creating or even distributing ground-breaking new drugs.

Graph: Figure 1: Average Granted Pharmaceutical Application Age for Selected Countries 2011-2015 (in years). Argentina, 3.04. China, 3.1. USA, 3.8. Australia, 3.97. Korea, 4.37. Japan, 6.33. EPO, 6.51. India, 6.73. Egypt, 8.14. Brazil, 13.01. Thailand, 14.91.

As Figure 1 shows, our study found that in 2011-2015, average time from application to grant for pharmaceutical patents ranged from Argentina, at 3.04 years, to Thailand at 14.91 years. The averages mask even worse problems—in 2015, Thailand issued 10 pharmaceutical patents with less than a year of term left. Five of them had 3 months or less of term left.

A long patent pendency period can deter a drug-maker from entering a market. Until a patent grant confirms that it can protect its investment in building a market, it is less likely to enter the market. If a company takes a wait-and-see approach, then consumers are in for a very long wait in countries such as Thailand and Brazil.

Causes of patent delay include a number of factors, many of which simply call for good governance. They include a simple lack of patent examiners and duplication of work already done by other capable patent offices. Our study suggests accelerated examination procedures, hiring more and better-qualified examiners, and work-sharing and recognition programs.

UNITAID is to be lauded for its innovative, market-based solutions, but well-functioning markets are founded on effective property rights. Without a competent patent system, the market for medical innovations cannot function. There should be a functioning market before one seeks to identify and correct market failures.

[1] Mark Schultz is Co-Founder and Senior Scholar at the Center for the Protection of Intellectual Property (CPIP) at Antonin Scalia Law School at George Mason University. Kevin Madigan is Legal Fellow at CPIP. The views of the authors are their own and not those of CPIP or GMU.

[2] Iain M. Cockburn, Jean O. Lanjouw, & Mark Schankerman, Patents and the Global Diffusion of New Drugs, NBER Working Paper 20492, http://www.nber.org/papers/w20492 (2014); Ernst R. Berndt & Iain M. Cockburn, The Hidden Cost of Low Prices: Limited Access to New Drugs in India, 33 Health Affairs 1567 (2014); Joan-Ramon Borrell, Patents and the Faster Introduction of New Drugs in Developing Countries, 12 Applied Econ. Letters 379 (2005).

 

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Biotech High Tech Industry History of Intellectual Property Innovation Intellectual Property Theory Inventors Legislation Patent Law Patent Litigation Patent Theory Patentability Requirements Software Patent Supreme Court Uncategorized

Federal Circuit Brings Some Clarity and Sanity Back to Patent Eligibility Doctrine

By Adam Mossoff and Kevin Madigan

closeup of a circuit boardFollowing the Supreme Court’s four decisions on patent eligibility for inventions under § 101 of the Patent Act, there has been much disruption and uncertainty in the patent system. The patent bar and most stakeholders in the innovation industries have found the Supreme Court’s decisions in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank (2014), AMP v. Myriad (2013), Mayo Labs v. Prometheus (2012), and Bilski v. Kappos (2010) to be vague and doctrinally indeterminate. Given the moral panic about the patent system that has been created as a result of ten years of excessive lobbying in D.C. for legislation that weakens patent rights, judges have responded to the excessive discretion they have under these cases by invalidating whole swaths of patented innovation in the high-tech, biotech, and pharmaceutical industries. The Patent Office is also rejecting patent applications at record levels, even for traditional inventions outside of high-tech and life sciences directly affected by the recent § 101 case law.

In Sequenom v. Ariosa, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to bring some clarity to the law of patent eligibility and to reign in some of the judicial and Patent Office excesses, but unfortunately it rejected this opportunity when it denied Sequenom’s cert petition this past June. Fortunately, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is now taking the lead in providing some much-needed legal guidance on patent eligibility to the inventors and companies working in the innovation industries. In two recent decisions, Enfish v. Microsoft and Rapid Litigation Management v. CellzDirect, the Federal Circuit has set forth some important doctrinal guideposts for defining what counts as a patent-eligible invention. Not only do these two decisions bring some reason and clarity back to the law of patent eligibility under § 101, they provide important doctrinal insights on how stakeholders may wish to address this problem if they ultimately choose to seek relief in Congress.

Enfish and the Patentability of Computer-Implemented Inventions (a/k/a “Software Patents”)

At the time it was decided, some commentators believed that the Alice decision was a directive from on high that most, if not all, computer software programs were not patentable inventions. This was a surprising claim if only because the Alice Court did not once use the phrase “software” in its entire opinion. Of course, “software patent” is not a legal term in patent law; the proper term is “computer-implemented invention,” as used by the Alice Court, and so the Court may have been only avoiding vague rhetoric from the patent policy debates. More important, though, this claim about Alice contradicts the Court’s opinion in Bilski just four years earlier, when the Court warned the Federal Circuit not to adopt a bright-line rule that limited § 101 to only physical inventions of the “Industrial Age,” because this created unnecessary and innovation-killing “uncertainty as to the patentability of software.”

Unfortunately, the ambiguities in Alice and in the Court’s prior patentable subject matter decisions, such as Mayo, left enough discretionary wiggle room in applying the generalized patent-eligibility test to permit judges and patents examiners to wage war on computer-implemented inventions. They thus made real again in the twenty-first century Justice Robert Jackson’s famous observation in 1949 that “the only patent that is valid is one which this Court has not been able to get its hands on.” Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). As one commentator remarked several months after Alice was decided, “It’s open season on software patents.” The data over the next several years has borne out the truth of this statement.

The key argument against patents on computer-implemented inventions, such as key components of word processors, programs that run internet searches (like the patented innovation that started Google), and encryption software, is that such inventions are inherently “abstract.” The judicial interpretation of § 101 has long maintained that abstract ideas, laws of natural, and natural phenomena are unpatentable discoveries. In Alice, for instance, the Court held that a complex software program for extremely complex international financial transactions was an “abstract idea” and thus unpatentable under § 101. But beyond claims that something long known is “abstract,” the Court has failed to define with precision what it means for a discovery to be abstract. With little to no specific guidance from the Alice Court, it is no wonder that judges and examiners have succumbed to the recent moral panic about patents and declared “open season” on patents covering computer-implemented inventions.

In this context, the Federal Circuit’s decision in Enfish v. Microsoft is extremely important because it ends the unreasoned, conclusory “I know it when I see it” rejections of patents as “abstract” by judges and examiners.

In Enfish, the Federal Circuit reversed a trial court’s summary judgment that a patent on a computer-implemented invention was an unpatentable abstract idea. The patent covered a type of database management system on computers, a classic incremental innovation in today’s digital world. In its decision, the trial court dissected the invention down into the most basic ideas in which all inventions can be reframed as representing; for example, methods of using internal combustion engines can easily be reframed in terms of the basic laws in thermodynamics. In this case, the trial court asserted that this patent on a computer-implemented invention covered merely the “abstract purpose of storing, organizing, and retrieving” information. The trial court thus easily concluded that the invention was merely “abstract” and thus unpatentable.

The Federal Circuit rejected the trial court’s conclusory assertion about the invention being “abstract” and further held that such assertions by courts are a legally improper application of § 101. With respect to the patent at issue in this case, Judge Todd Hughes’ opinion for the unanimous panel found that

the plain focus of the claims is on an improvement to computer functionality itself, not on economic or other tasks for which a computer is used in its ordinary capacity. Accordingly, we find that the claims at issue in this appeal are not directed to an abstract idea within the meaning of Alice.

More important, the Enfish court cautioned courts against the methodological approach adopted by the trial court in this case, in which “describing the claims at such a high level of abstraction and untethered from the language of the claims all but ensures that the exceptions to § 101 swallow the rule.” The court recognized that adopting a “bright-line” rule that computer-implemented inventions—the “software patents” decried by critics today—are necessarily “abstract” runs counter to both § 101 and the recent Supreme Court cases interpreting and applying this provision: “We do not see in Bilski or Alice, or our cases, an exclusion to patenting this large field of technological progress.”

Further confirming that Enfish represents an important step forward in how courts properly secure technological innovation in the high-tech industry, the Federal Circuit relied on Enfish in its recent decision in BASCOM Global Services Internet Inc v AT&T Mobility LLC. Here, the Federal Circuit again rejected the trial court’s dissection of a patent claim covering a software program used on the internet into an “abstract” idea of merely “filtering content.” The BASCOM court emphasized that courts must assess a claim as a whole—following the Alice Court’s injunction that courts must assess a patent claim as “an ordered combination of elements”—in determining whether it is a patentable invention under § 101. As numerous patent scholars explained in an amicus brief filed in support of Sequenom in its failed cert petition before the Supreme Court, requiring a court to construe a “claim as a whole” or “the invention as a whole” is a basic doctrinal requirement that runs throughout patent law, as it is essential to ensuring that patents are properly evaluated both as to their validity and in their assertion against infringers.

CellzDirect and the Patentability of Discoveries in the Bio-Pharmaceutical Industry

The high-tech industry is not the only sector of the innovation industries that has been hit particularly hard by the recent §101 jurisprudence. The biotech and pharmaceutical industries have also seen a collapse in the proper legal protection for their innovative discoveries of new therapeutic treatments. One recent study found that the examination unit at the Patent Office responsible for reviewing personalized medicine inventions (art unit 1634) has rejected 86.4% of all patent applications since the Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo. Anecdotal evidence abounds of numerous rejections of patent applications on innovative medical treatments arising from extensive R&D, and the most prominent one was the invalidation of Sequenom’s patent on its groundbreaking innovation in prenatal diagnostic tests.

In this light, the decision on July 5, 2016 in Rapid Litigation Management v. CellzDirect is an extremely important legal development for an industry that relies on stable and effective patent rights to justify investing billions in R&D to produce the miracles that comprise basic medical care today. In CellzDirect, the trial court found unpatentable under § 101 a patent claiming new methods for freezing liver cells for use in “testing, diagnostic, and treating purposes.” The trial court asserted that such a patent was “directed to an ineligible law of nature,” because scientists have long known that these types of liver cells (hepatocytes) could be subjected to multiple freeze-thaw cycles.

In her opinion for a unanimous panel, Chief Judge Sharon Prost held that the method in this case is exactly the type of innovative process that should be secured in a patent. Reflecting the same methodological concern in Enfish and BASCOM, the CellzDirect court rejected the trial court’s dissection of the patent into its foundational “laws of nature” and conventional ideas long-known in the scientific field:

The claims are simply not directed to the ability of hepatocytes to survive multiple freeze-thaw cycles. Rather, the claims of the ’929 patent are directed to a new and useful laboratory technique for preserving hepatocytes. This type of constructive process, carried out by an artisan to achieve “a new and useful end,” is precisely the type of claim that is eligible for patenting.

In other words, merely because a patentable process operates on a subject matter that constitutes natural phenomena does not mean the patent improperly claims either those natural phenomena or the laws of nature that govern them. To hold otherwise fails to heed the Mayo Court’s warning that “all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas,” and thus to dissect all patents down into these unpatentable foundations would “eviscerate patent law.” The CellzDirect court was explicit about this key methodological point in evaluating patents under § 101: “Just as in [the industrial process held valid by the Supreme Court in] Diehr, it is the particular ‘combination of steps’ that is patentable here”—the invention as a whole.

Conclusion

The U.S. has long prided itself as having a “gold standard” patent system—securing to innovators stable and effective property rights in their inventions and discoveries. As scholars and economic historians have long recognized, the patent system has been a key driver of America’s innovation economy for more than two hundred years. This is now threatened under the Supreme Court’s § 101 decisions and the “too broad” application of the Court’s highly generalized patent-eligibility tests to inventions in the high-tech and bio-pharmaceutical sectors. The shockingly high numbers of rejected applications at the Patent Office and of invalidation of patents by courts, as well as the general sense of legal uncertainty, are threatening the “gold standard” designation for the U.S. patent system. This threatens the startups, new jobs, and economic growth that the patent system has been proven to support. Hopefully, the recent Enfish and CellzDirect decisions are the first steps in bringing back to patent-eligibility doctrine both reason and clarity, two key requirements in the law that have been sorely lacking for inventors and companies working in the innovation economy.

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Biotech Innovation Patent Law Uncategorized

Proposed CREATES Act Threatens Patent Owners’ Rights

By Erika Lietzan, Kevin Madigan, & Mark Schultz

scientist looking through a microscopeEarlier this month, a bipartisan group of Senators introduced the Creating and Restoring Equal Access to Equivalent Samples Act (or CREATES Act). The proposed bill is aimed at deterring what the bill’s author, Sen. Patrick Leahy, claimed were “inappropriate delay tactics that are used by some brand-name drug manufacturers to block competition from more affordable generic drugs.” Whether the bill would produce the intended consequences is the subject of some debate, but we thought it important to point out some (hopefully) unintended consequences: The CREATES Act would impose vague standards and draconian remedy provisions to force innovators to surrender their intellectual property rights for the benefit of generic competitors.

The CREATES Act

It’s no surprise that the legislation might generate unintended consequences, as it would add further complexity to an already challenging regulatory scheme for approving drugs.

As a general rule, for a generic drug manufacturer to get permission to market a duplicate of an already approved drug, it usually[1] must have access to samples of the already approved drug. The generic drug company uses these samples in the bioequivalence studies required in its abbreviated new drug application. The same general principle applies to companies developing biosimilar versions of already approved biological medicines; they conduct comparative trials for approval of their abbreviated applications, and these trials generally require samples of the “reference” product. In addition, FDA sometimes[2] requires drug and biologic manufacturers to develop risk evaluation and mitigations strategies (REMS) if safety measures beyond standard labeling are needed to ensure that the product’s benefits outweigh its risks. These REMS can include elements to assure safe use (ETASU)—essentially, a system of use or distribution restrictions—if necessary to mitigate a specific serious risk. A generic or biosimilar manufacturer seeking to distribute its version of a product that is subject to a risk management distribution program must generally develop its own system or negotiate to share the existing system.

The CREATES Act is spurred by concerns that innovators are hampering competition by strategically exploiting these regulatory requirements imposed on their generic and biosimilar competitors. That is, critics contend that innovators are raising barriers that prevent their generic and biosimilar competitors from obtaining samples of the reference drug and from participating in existing distribution programs.

While the FTC and members of Congress have raised these concerns before, the concerns are particularly topical because of the controversy surrounding Turing Pharmaceuticals and its notorious former CEO Martin Shkreli (described by one publication as the most-hated man in America). Turing is a small company that acquired the only license to market the off-patent drug Daraprim and raised the price by over 5000%, meanwhile preventing potential competitors from obtaining samples for use in developing a competing supply. While Turing is a small company marketing an off-patent drug, its actions have been misattributed (through confusion or purposeful obfuscation) to mainstream, R&D-intensive innovative drug companies.

The CREATES Act proposes to prevent strategic exploitation of regulatory requirements by giving generic and biosimilar manufacturers their own strategic advantage in their negotiations with competitors – the threat of a lawsuit. The Act would give these follow–on developers the ability to sue their competitors to obtain samples of any drugs that they wish to use as references in testing for approval of generic and biosimilar versions. Follow–on drug developers could also sue their competitors to be allowed to share in existing distribution systems.

Although the Act contemplates that the parties will negotiate with respect to purchase of samples and sharing of any distribution system already in place, it would decisively shift bargaining power in favor of follow-on competitors. To begin with, it imposes unreasonable deadlines on innovators—for instance, one month to manufacture and provide samples, after which the follow–on applicant may sue. Also, it creates enormous liability exposure. If the plaintiff proves its case, the court will order the innovator to provide “sufficient” quantities of its product for testing and, if applicable, to share its REMS distribution system with its follow–on competitor. Further, the court must award not only reasonable attorney fees and costs, but also a “monetary amount sufficient to deter” the innovator from failing to provide other applicants with sufficient quantities, or failing to share its risk management system, as applicable. The “maximum” award—which will surely be taken as a suggestion at least of the magnitude envisioned—is the total revenue on the product for every day that the innovator failed to provide samples or to agree to share its developed risk management system. It bears no rational relationship to any harm suffered by the follow–on applicant and is functionally punitive.

The CREATES Act Creates Potential Intellectual Property Problems

The CREATES Act raises two significant intellectual property issues. Essentially, it would create a mechanism to force innovators and patent owners to supply their products and intellectual property to their competitors.

First, it would require an intellectual property owner to make its product for the benefit of a competitor. The Act allows a generic or biosimilar applicant to sue for drug samples to use in testing. In many instances, those drugs will still be under patent. While the so-called Bolar provision permits a generic or biosimilar applicant to conduct tests during the patent term, the CREATES Act turns the Bolar shield into a sword by empowering a court to order a company to provide its patented drug to a potential competitor. This, in turn, will require the company to manufacture the drug for that competitor. Whether it makes a small or large supply for the market, it will need to adjust its production to ensure supplies for its competitor as well, and indeed as many competitors as want samples. This conflicts directly with a basic and valued tenet of the patent system in the United States: we do not require a patent owner to practice his or her invention. In short, the CREATES Act directs courts to order patent owners to practice their patents for the benefit of others.

Second, it would require a drug company with intellectual property rights in a REMS distribution system to forego those rights for the benefit of a competitor. The Act allows a generic or biosimilar applicant to sue the innovator in order to use the specific risk management system that the innovator developed. Although current law creates a default rule that generic drug companies and drug innovators should use a single shared system, there is no such default rule for biosimilar companies and biologic innovators. And the default for generic drugs is simply a default; FDA may waive the default if, for instance, some aspect of the system is claimed by a patent or subject to trade secret protection. This bill would authorize the court to order the innovator to share its system, regardless of any unexpired patent or trade secret protection. It short, it permits courts to order intellectual property holders to surrender their intellectual property or face the threat of monetary penalties.

An innovator may have lawful and legitimate reasons for declining to manufacture its patented product for its competitors and for declining to share its patented risk management system with those competitors. Yet, the unreasonable deadlines and punitive liability provisions of the CREATES Act mean that it will have little scope to resist the demands of its competitors. This essentially nullifies the innovator’s intellectual property—which will discourage future investment and innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.

Important IP Rights in Safety Systems: The Example of Celgene

The IP problems unleashed by the CREATES Act are illustrated by their effect on the IP rights and incentives of a company such as the Celgene Corporation (which submitted a statement on the bill to the Senate Judiciary Committee). Celgene is an innovative biopharmaceutical company that focuses on treatments for cancer and immune–inflammatory related diseases in patients with limited treatment options. The company’s first approved drug was Thalomid, initially approved by FDA for leprosy and then approved for its primary indication—multiple myeloma, a particularly pernicious form of blood and bone marrow cancer. The active ingredient of Celgene’s product, thalidomide, is a powerful teratogen, causing severe disfiguring birth defects. It was marketed in other parts of the world in the late 1950s and early 1960s as a treatment for morning sickness in women, and FDA has estimated that more than 10,000 children in 46 countries were born with severe birth defects attributable to thalidomide. As a result of this history and the special risks associated with this life–saving medicine, Celgene developed an extremely detailed and meticulous protocol dedicated to ensure safe distribution, prescription, and use. Essentially, Celgene’s innovative contribution was inventing a safe way to use an otherwise dangerous drug to fight cancer. The company’s special system for managing the risk of thalidomide is formalized at FDA as the “elements to assure safe use” portion of a REMS. It is also subject to patent protection.

The CREATES Act would force companies such as Celgene to share the proprietary elements of their REMS programs. It would give the company the choice: share its patent system or face a lawsuit that might result in catastrophic damages and mandatory sharing anyway. This functionally nullifies the patent. This, in turn, would discourage innovation and investment in the programs. The essence of thalidomide, and other drugs subject to use and distribution restrictions, is that these drugs require special programs. Their benefits do not outweigh their risks, without these special programs in place. If functionally nullifying the innovator’s patent protection means the innovator will not invest in creative solutions to difficult safety risks, then the products that require these solutions cannot be approved—and will never reach patients.

Conclusion

The CREATES Act has been presented as a panacea for the suspect activity of a few bad actors. But while it might force those companies to share their products and safety systems, it would also affect—and penalize—the much larger group of innovators that have legitimate reasons for withholding the fruits of their labors. By imposing unreasonable deadlines for action, failing to consider legitimate explanations for the choices made by innovative drug manufacturers, and imposing draconian penalties, it tramples the intellectual property rights of drug innovators. Yet, this industry is deeply reliant on intellectual property rights; they provide the incentive for research into tomorrow’s cures. The CREATES Act should be laid aside, if Congress truly wants to promote innovation and investment in life-saving medicines for future generations of Americans.

Erika Lietzan is an Associate Professor at University of Missouri School of Law and is participating in CPIP’s 2016-2017 Thomas Edison Innovation Fellowship Program.


[1]In fact, the situation is more complicated than proponents of this bill have stated. In instances where samples of an already-approved drug are unavailable for any reason, FDA has several regulatory options at its disposal. After all, if a brand company withdraws its product from the market, that doesn’t preclude generic companies from seeking approval, even years later. So long as the Reference Listed Drug (RLD) was not withdrawn for safety or efficacy reasons, it can be cited in a generic application. In that situation, one thing FDA can do is designate another generic to be the RLD for bioequivalence testing. The statute says only that the ANDA must demonstrate bioequivalence; it does not expressly require that the generic applicant use the innovator’s product in the testing.

Even if there aren’t other generics, it might be possible to obtain ANDA approval based on a showing of bioavailability and the same therapeutic effect. FDA has repeatedly noted, when finding that a particular RLD was not withdrawn for safety or efficacy reasons, that the agency may approve an ANDA for a generic version of a withdrawn product even if the withdrawn product is not commercially available. These Federal Register notices state that if the RLD is not available for bioequivalence testing, the applicant should contact the FDA’s Office of Generic Drugs to determine what showing would be required to satisfy the approval requirements of the statute.

[2]Despite the controversy around this issue, there are relatively few REMS, and even fewer with ETASU. The FDA maintains a downloadable list on its website, with the ETASU marked. As of this writing (July 2016) there are 75 REMS listed, only 40 of which have ETASU. Of these, 6 already have approved generics that share in an approved risk management system. More than a dozen of the remaining products are still under regulatory exclusivity.

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Biotech Gene Patents Innovation Inventors Uncategorized

How IP-Fueled Innovations in Biotechnology Have Led to the Gene Revolution

scientist looking through a microscopeWe’ve released a new issue paper, The Gene Revolution, by Amanda Maxham, a research associate and writer at the Ayn Rand Institute.

Dr. Maxham explores how innovations in biotechnology, enabled by the intellectual property rights that protect them, have led to the “Gene Revolution,” where scientists use genetic engineering to dramatically improve human life. In order to combat widespread misinformation about genetically modified organisms (GMOs), she traces mankind’s long history of improving plants, animals, and microorganisms to better serve our needs.

We’ve included the Executive Summary below. To read the full issue paper, please click here.

The Gene Revolution

By Amanda Maxham

Executive Summary

Mankind has been improving plants and animals for millennia. Simply by selecting and breeding those they liked best, our ancestors radically improved upon wild species. Today’s biological inventors, with a deeper understanding of genetics, breeding, and heredity, and with the protection of intellectual property rights, are using the technology of genetic engineering to start a “Gene Revolution.”

In the field of medicine, custom-built genetically engineered microorganisms are brewing up rivers of otherwise rare human hormones, life-saving medicines, and much-needed vaccines. In agriculture, scientists are combining their understanding of plant genetics with laboratory techniques of modern molecular biology to “unlock” the DNA of crop plants. By inserting genes from other plants or even common microorganisms, they are able to give plants desirable traits, solving problems that farmers have faced for millennia—faster and more precisely than ever before.

But despite its successes and a bright future, biotechnology is under attack by activists who spread misinformation and foster consumer mistrust. They have been directly responsible for onerous regulations and other hurdles to innovation that are threatening to stifle what could and should be the “third industrial revolution.”

In an effort to combat this misinformation, this paper situates genetic engineering within mankind’s long history of food improvement and then highlights how genetic engineering has dramatically improved human life. In it, you’ll find 29 plants, animals, and microorganisms, from insulin-secreting E. coli to engineered cotton, from cheese-making fungus to chestnut trees, that represent the promise and possibilities that the Gene Revolution holds–if we hold precious and continue to protect the freedom to invent and the power of scientific innovation.

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Administrative Agency Biotech High Tech Industry Innovation Intellectual Property Theory Inventors Legislation Patent Law Patent Litigation Patent Theory Software Patent Statistics Supreme Court Uncategorized

The One Year Anniversary: The Aftermath of #AliceStorm

The following post, by Robert R. Sachs, first appeared on the Bilski Blog, and it is reposted here with permission.

It’s been one year since the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank. On its face the opinion was relatively conservative, cautioning courts to “tread carefully” before invalidating patents, and emphasizing that the primary concern was to avoid preemption of “fundamental building blocks” of human ingenuity. The Court specifically avoided any suggestion that software or business methods were presumptively invalid. But those concerns seem to have gone unheeded. The Court’s attempt to side step the tricky problem of defining the boundary of an exception to patent eligibility—”we need not labor to delimit the precise contours of the ‘abstract ideas category in this case'”—has turned into the very mechanism that is quickly “swallow[ing] all of patent law.” The federal courts, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, and the USPTO are using the very lack of a definition to liberally expand the contours of abstract ideas to cover everything from computer animation to database architecture to digital photograph management and even to safety systems for automobiles.

Let’s look at the numbers to present an accurate picture of the implications of the Supreme Court’s decision. My analysis is a data-driven attempt to assess the implications of Alice one year out. It is with an understanding of how the Supreme Court’s decision is actually playing out in the theater of innovation that we can better project and position ourselves for what the future holds.

Alice at Court

Table 0 Fed Courts

As of June 19, 2015 there have been 106 Federal Circuit and district court decisions on § 101 grounds, with 76 decisions invalidating the patents at issue in whole or in part. In terms of patents and claims, 65% of challenged patents have been found invalid, along with 76.2% of the challenged claims.

The success rate of motions on the pleadings (including motions to dismiss and judgments on the pleadings) is extremely impressive: 67% of defense motions granted, invalidating 54% of asserted patents. There has never been a Supreme Court ruling that the presumption of validity does not apply to § 101—only the Court’s use of the originally metaphorical notion that eligibility is a “threshold” condition. Given that, and the general rule that to survive a motion to dismiss the patentee (historically) need only show that there was a plausible basis that the complaint states a cause of action— there is a plausible basis that the patent claim is not directed to an abstract idea, law of nature, or natural phenomena. One would be forgiven for thinking, as did former Chief Judge Rader in Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC that a “Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal for lack of eligible subject matter will be the exception, not the rule.” Apparently the rules change in the middle of the game.

Turning specifically to the Federal Circuit, the numbers are stark:

Table 00Fed Circuit

Of the 13 decisions, 11 are in software or e-commerce and only two are in biotech. The one case where the court held in favor of the patentee, DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P. appeared to offer a narrow avenue for patentees to avoid invalidation. However, only nine district court opinions have relied upon DDR to find patent eligibility, with over 30 court opinions distinguishing DDR as inapplicable. Even more interesting is the fact that in DDR the Federal Circuit essentially held that creating a website that copies the look and feel of another website is patent eligible. In the Silicon Valley, that’s called phishing, and it’s not a technology in which most reputable companies invest.

Alice at the Office

The impact of Alice is similarly impacting practitioners before the USPTO. In December, 2014 the Office issued its Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, providing guidance to patent examiners as to how to apply the Alice, Mayo, and Myriad decisions along with various Federal Circuit decisions, to claims during prosecution. Importantly, the Guidance noted that “the Supreme Court did not create a per se excluded category of subject matter, such as software or business methods, nor did it impose any special requirements for eligibility of software or business methods,” and it reminded examiners that “Courts tread carefully in scrutinizing such claims because at some level all inventions embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea.” Alas, most patent examiners are acting as if the patent applications before them are the exceptions to these cautionary instructions.

With the assistance of Patent Advisor, I compiled a dataset of almost 300,000 office actions and notice of allowances sampled in two week periods during 2013, 2013, 2014 and early 2015, and all actions during March, April and May 2015, across all technology centers:

Table0 Number of Apps

About 100,000 actions were notices of allowances, leaving about 200,000 office actions. Each office action was coded as to whether it included rejections under §§ 101, 102 and 103. For each office action the art unit and examiner was identified as well, and the status of the application (abandoned, pending or patented) as of the date that the data was obtained. I then analyzed the data for office actions rejections based on § 101, allowance rates, and examiner rejection rates. Here’s what I found.

Percent of all Actions with § 101 Rejections

Table2

Here, we have the percentage of all actions in each period that received a § 101 rejection, considering both rejections issued and notices of allowances. The black line separates pre-Alice from post-Alice data. For example, in TC 1600, the biotech area, in January, 2012 6.81% of all actions issued (counting both office actions and notices of allowances) were office actions with § 101 rejections; by May 2015 that percentage almost doubled to 11.86% of actions.

Overall, data shows that in 2012 subject matter rejections were mainly in the computer related Tech Centers (2100, 2400) and began declining thereafter, while escalating in biotechnology (1600) and so-called “business methods” Tech Center, TC 3600, following Mayo and Alice. Other technology centers such as semiconductors and mechanical engineering had essentially low and constant rejection rates. But that’s not because there are no software patents in these technology centers: you find plenty of software patents in these groups. Rather, my view is that it is because examiners in these groups treat software patents as they do any other technology.

The rejection rates in Tech Center 3600 in the 30-40% range are higher than any other group, but they also mask what’s really going on, since TC 3600 covers more than business methods. Tech Center 3600 has nine work groups:

Percent of all Actions with § 101 Rejections in TC 3600 Work Groups

Table3 Ecomm Rej

In TC 3600 most of the work groups handle good old-fashioned machines and processes, such as transportation (3610), structures like chairs and ladders (3630), airplanes, agriculture, and weapons (3640), wells and earth moving equipment (3670), etc. Three work groups handle e-commerce applications: specifically, 3620, 3680 and 3690. Here we see that these groups have significantly higher § 101 rejections than the rest of TC 3600. But let’s drill down further.

Each of work groups 3620, 3680 and 3690 have between five and 10 individual art units that handle specific types of e-commerce technologies, but they are not all under the same work group. For example business related cryptography is handed by both art units 3621 and 3685; healthcare and insurance is handled by art units 3626 and 3686; operations research is handled in 3623, 3624, 3682 and 3684. If we consolidate the data according to technology type and then look at rates of § 101 rejections we get the following:

Percent of all Actions with § 101 Rejections in E-Commerce Art Units by Technology Type

Table3 Ecomm Rej

What’s going on? After Bilski in 2010, the § 101 rejections were running between 17% and 50%. Not great but tolerable since these were mostly formal and were overcome with amendments adding hardware elements (“processor,” “memory”) to method claims or inserting “non-transitory” into Beauregard claims.

But after Alice, everything changed and § 101 rejections started issuing like paper money in a hyperinflation economy. If your perception as a patent prosecutor was that the every application was getting rejected under § 101, this explains your pain. Here’s another view of this data, in terms of actual number of § 101 rejections per sample period:

Number of Office Actions with § 101 Rejections in E-Commerce Art Units by Technology Type

Table4 Ecomm Rej Nos

Notice here that the number of office actions in March, 2015 fell dramatically, and then in April the flood gates opened and hundreds of actions issued with § 101 rejections. This is consistent with the Office’s statements in January 2015 that it was training examiners in view of the 2014 Interim Guidance, so office actions were being held until the training was completed. Apparently, the training skipped the part about no per se exclusions of business methods.

Now let’s consider notice of allowance rates. First with respect to all Tech Centers.

Percent of Actions that Are Notices of Allowance

Table5 All TCs NOA

This data reflects, of all the actions that were issued in a given period, the percentage that were notices of allowances. (Note here that contrary to the preceding tables, red cells are low percentage, and green cells are high since notices of allowance are good things, not bad things). The numbers look good, with a general increasing trend over time.

Now consider what’s happening in TC 3600’s business methods art units.

Percent of Actions that Are Notices of Allowance in Business Methods

Table6 NOAs in Ecomm

Now the picture is quite different. The rate of NOAs drops dramatically after Alice, especially in finance and banking and operations research. If it seemed that you were no longer getting a NOAs, this is why. The zero percent rate in March, 2015 is a result of the Office holding up actions and NOAs in view of the Interim Guidance training, as mentioned above.

Patents issued in the business methods art units typically are classified in Class 705 for “Data Processing.” I identified all patents with a primary classification in Class 705 since January, 2011, on a month by month basis, to identify year over year trends. Again the black line separates pre-Alice from post-Alice data.

Table7 Class 705 Patents

This table shows a precipitous decline in the number of business method patents issued following Alice, especially year over year. The lag between the June, 2014 Alice decision and the drop off in October 2014 is an artifact of the delay between allowance and issuance, as well as the USPTO’s unprecedented decision to withdraw an unknown number of applications for which the issue fee had already been paid, and issue § 101 rejections. It’s an interesting artifact, as well, that the number of Class 705 patents issued peaked in the month after Alice: you have to remember that these patents were allowed at least three months, and as much as a year, before the Alice decision; it just took a long time to actually get printed as a patent.

Next, we’ll consider abandonment rates, on a comparative basis, looking at the percentages of applications that were ultimately abandoned in relationship to whether or not they received a § 101 rejection. We’ll compare the data from January 2012 to July 2014. Again, consider the entire patent corps:

Percent of Abandoned Applications with Prior § 101 Rejection

Table8 Abandon all TCs

Here we see that of the applications that were abandoned during the respective sample periods, the vast majority did not have a prior § 101 rejection. Only in TC 3600 did the majority shift after Alice with 51.83% applications that received § 101 rejections in July 2014 being subsequently abandoned by May 31, 2015. Again, let’s drill down into the business method art units in TC 3600:

Percent of Abandoned Applications with Prior § 101 Rejection

Table9 Ecomm Abandon

First, prior to Alice, abandonments in the business method units appeared to result more frequently from other than § 101 rejections, typically prior art rejections. This is shown by the fact that the Jan. 2012 “No” column (no prior 101 rejection) is greater than the Jan. 2012 “Yes” column. Then after Alice, there is a huge shift with the vast majority of applications that were abandoned having § 101 rejections, as shown by the July, 2014 “Yes” column. The vast majority of abandonments, upwards of 90%, followed a 101 rejection. That’s applicants essentially giving up over what only a few years ago was a relatively minor hurdle. That’s what happens when you change the rules in the middle of the game. Second, there is also significant differential behavior in the business method areas as compared to the rest of the technology centers after Alice.

Here’s my personal favorite.

Rates of Examiner § 101 Rejections in TC 3600

Table12 Examiner Rates

This table shows the numbers of examiners in the business method art units with respect to the percentage of applications in which they issued § 101 rejections after Alice. The first row shows that during the sampled periods since Alice, 58 business methods examiners issued § 101 rejections in 100% of their applications, for a total of 443 applications. Twenty examiners issued § 101 rejections for between 90% and 99% of their cases, covering 370 applications. In short, 199 examiners issued § 101 rejections more than 70% of the time, covering 3,304 applications or about 70.6% of all applications. This is not “treading carefully.”

We find similar, though less dramatic, trends and variations in TC 1600 which handles biotechnology, pharma, and chemistry.

Percent of all Actions with § 101 Rejections in TC 1600 Work Groups

Table10 1600 101 Rej Rate

The red line separate pre-Mayo/Myriad data from post-Mayo/Myriad, and the increase in the post-period is significant. Here too, the various work groups mask the more significant rejection rates in specific technology areas, with the rejection rate in microbiology first jumping up to 34.6% post-Mayo and steadily climbing to the current 53.2%.

Percent of all Actions with § 101 Rejections in TC 1600 by Technology

Table11 1600 Tech Type Rej

This table breaks down the work groups into technology types, and then these are sorting average rejection rate over the past four months. Following Alice, we see a significant increase in eligibility rejections in bioinformatics related applications–inventions that rely on analysis and identification of biological and genetic information, and which are frequently used in diagnostics and drug discovery. This is especially disconcerting because bioinformatics is critical to the development of new diagnostics, therapies and drugs.

Note as well the enormous spike in rejections for plant related applications from 0% between July 2015 and April 2015, to 50% in May 2015. This is likely a result again of the USPTO’s Interim Guidance which essentially instructed examiners to reject any claim that included any form of a natural product.

At least pesticides and herbicides are safe from Alice, since we definitely need more of those. The irony is that the more pesticides and herbicides that come to market, the more we need bioinformatics inventions to identify and treat conditions potentially resulting from these products.

Alice at the Board

The Patent Trial and Appeal Board has been even more hostile to software and business methods patents under the Covered Business Method review program:

Total Petitions

Petitions Granted

Percent Invalid

PTAB CBM Institution on § 101

72

64

89%

PTAB Final Decisions on § 101

27

27

100%

Covered Business Method review is available for patents that claim “a method, apparatus, or operation used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service.” The Board takes a very broad view of what constitutes a financial product or service: if the patent specification happens to mention that the invention may be used in a financial context such as banking, finance, shopping or the like, then that’s sufficient. The Board has found CBM standing in 91% of petitions, and instituted trial in 89% of petitions asserting § 101 invalidity. Once a CBM trial has been instituted, the odds are heavily in the petitioner’s favor: of the 27 final CBM decisions addressing § 101, the Board has found for the petitioner 100% of the time.

Finally, we look at the Board’s activity in handling ex parte appeals from § 101 rejections for the period of March 1, 2015 to May 30, 2015:

  • 32 Ex Parte Decisions on § 101, with 15 in TC 3600.
  • 28 Affirmances overall, 13 in TC 3600
  • Two Reversals on § 101, both in TC 3600
  • Four New Grounds of Rejection for § 101

Following suit with how the Board is handling CBMs, they are also heavily supporting examiners in affirming § 101 rejections. More disconcerting is the trend of new grounds of rejection under § 101. While only four were issued in this period, there have been several dozen since Alice. In this situation, the applicant has appealed, for example, a § 103 rejection. The Board can reverse the examiner on that rejection, but then sua sponte reject all of the claims under § 101. What are the odds that the examiner will ever allow the case? Close to zero. What are the odds that an appeal back to the Board on the examiner’s next § 101 rejection will be reversed? If the Board’s 100% rate of affirming its CBM institution decisions on § 101 is any indication, then you know the answer.

Conclusions

Looking at the overall context of the Alice decision, it’s my view that Supreme Court did not intend this landslide effect. While they were certainly aware of the concerns over patent trolls and bad patents, they framed their decision not as a broadside against these perceived evils, but as simple extension of Bilski and the question of whether computer implementation of an abstract idea imparts eligibility. At oral argument, the members of the Court specifically asked if they needed to rule on the eligibility of software and they were told by CLS and the Solicitor General that they did not. To the extent that there is broad language in that opinion, it is the cautionary instructions to the courts to avoid disemboweling the patent law from the inside, and the emphasis on preemption of fundamental ideas—not just any ideas—as the core concern of the exclusionary rule. The evidence above shows that these guideposts have been rushed past quite quickly on the way to some goal other than the preservation of intellectual property rights.

If the present trends hold, and I see no reason to suggest that they will not, we will continue to see the zone of patent eligibility curtailed in software (not to mention bio-technology after Mayo and Myriad). Indeed, the more advanced the software technology—the more it takes over the cognitive work once done exclusively by humans, the more seamless it becomes in the fabric of our daily lives—the less patent eligible it is deemed to be by the courts and the USPTO. What technologies will not be funded, what discoveries will not be made, what products will never come to market we do not know. What we do know is this: there is only one law that governs human affairs and that is the law of unintended consequences.

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Biotech Gene Patents Innovation Intellectual Property Theory Inventors Patent Law Patent Litigation Patent Theory Patentability Requirements Supreme Court Uncategorized

Federal Circuit Threatens Innovation: Dissecting the Ariosa v. Sequenom Opinion

By Patent Publius

Earlier this month, the Federal Circuit issued its opinion in Ariosa v. Sequenom, a closely-watched biotechnology case with significant repercussions for patent-eligibility analysis generally. Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit misapplies the Supreme Court’s analytical framework from Mayo v. Prometheus, striking down Sequenom’s important innovation for the prenatal diagnosis of fetal abnormalities. The shame here is that the Mayo opinion itself was unnecessarily broad, and the Federal Circuit has now interpreted it to be even broader.

Section 101 of the Patent Act provides that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter . . . may obtain a patent therefor,” but there are judicial exceptions for “laws of nature, natural phenomenon, and abstract ideas.” Those exceptions are relevant here, where the Federal Circuit considers whether the claimed method of using cell-free fetal DNA (“cffDNA”) to make diagnoses is patentable subject matter.

In the Mayo opinion, the Supreme Court established a two-step analysis for determining whether method claims merely “set forth laws of nature” or instead apply those natural laws with “additional features” so as to become patent-eligible processes. The first step looks at whether the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible law of nature, and the second step looks at whether additional elements “transform the nature of the claim” into something that amounts to more than a claim on the law of nature itself.

Applying Mayo to the case at hand, the Federal Circuit’s analysis of the first step is perfunctory:

In this case, the asserted claims of the ‘540 patent are directed to a multistep method that starts with cffDNA taken from a sample of maternal plasma or serum—a naturally occurring non-cellular fetal DNA that circulates freely in the blood stream of a pregnant woman. . . . It is undisputed that the existence of cffDNA in maternal blood is a natural phenomenon. . . . The method ends with paternally inherited cffDNA, which is also a natural phenomenon. The method therefore begins and ends with a natural phenomenon. Thus, the claims are directed to matter that is naturally occurring.

The Federal Circuit’s conclusion that the method “begins and ends with a natural phenomenon” tells us very little of how this principle is to be applied generally. Certainly, the method begins with a biological sample of maternal plasma or serum that contains paternally-inherited cffDNA, and it makes sense to say that it begins with a natural phenomenon. Of course, everything begins with a natural phenomenon, so this is hardly instructive.

But it’s inaccurate to say that the method simply ends with cffDNA. The method itself takes the miniscule amount of cffDNA found in the sample and exponentially amplifies it to detectable levels. The resulting substance, unlike the beginning sample, gains significant and new utility from a diagnostic perspective. What comes out of the process is an artificially-enriched substance that, unlike the maternal plasma or serum fed into the process, can be used for many diagnostic purposes. That is, the method ends with a substance that is anything but a natural phenomenon.

Applying the second step of the Mayo framework, the Federal Circuit finds that Sequenom’s claimed methods are not significantly transformative:

Like the patentee in Mayo, Sequenom contends that the claimed methods are patent eligible applications of a natural phenomenon, specifically a method for detecting paternally inherited cffDNA. Using methods like PCR to amplify and detect cffDNA was well-understood, routine, and conventional activity in 1997. The method at issue here amounts to a general instruction to doctors to apply routine, conventional techniques when seeking to detect cffDNA. Because the method steps were well-understood, conventional and routine, the method of detecting paternally inherited cffDNA is not new and useful. The only subject matter new and useful as of the date of the application was the discovery of the presence of cffDNA in maternal plasma or serum.

The last sentence is the most perplexing: The “discovery of the presence of cffDNA in maternal plasma or serum” is what sets Sequenom’s method apart from that which was “well-understood, routine, and conventional activity in 1997.” The problem here stems from the Federal Circuit’s failure to consider the claimed method as a whole, as it purportedly sets out to do: “[W]e next consider the elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine whether additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.”

Undoubtedly, some parts of Sequenom’s method were already well-known. No one denies, for example, that some of the techniques involved in amplifying and then detecting cffDNA were, in their general features, already conventional activity in the field (e.g., PCR). What makes the Sequenom method patentable is the sum of its parts, that is, the method as a whole that the Federal Circuit acknowledges to contain the new and useful discovery of cffDNA in the maternal plasma or serum.

This is the principal feature of Sequenom’s claimed invention and its central argument throughout the litigation. Yet, the Federal Circuit relegates it to one of “Sequenom’s remaining arguments” and addresses it in a brief paragraph near the end of the opinion, where it inexplicably claims: “This argument implies that the inventive concept lies in the discovery of cffDNA in plasma or serum. Even if so, this is not the invention claimed by the ’540 patent.” On the contrary, this discovery is anything but conventional, and the method as a whole transforms a natural phenomenon into something both artificial and patentable.

Overbroad (and Dangerous) Principles

The overbreadth of the Federal Circuit’s analysis threatens diagnostic methods across the board. If a method of detecting a natural phenomenon is always “directed to” that natural phenomenon, as the Federal Circuit suggests, then all such methods are prima facie patent-ineligible under the first step of the Mayo framework and must fight the uphill battle under its second step. This is particularly troubling since virtually all diagnostic tests detect natural phenomena. Moreover, the Federal Circuit’s application of the second step of the Mayo framework looks at each part of the method individually, ignoring the claimed method as a whole.

Not only is this principle breathtakingly broad in the damage it could cause to the diagnostics industry, it is neither required by, nor even consistent with, the controlling case law. Only claims to natural phenomena are per se patent-ineligible; however, applications of natural phenomena are generally patentable. Detecting a natural phenomenon is not the same thing as the phenomenon itself. It is instead a specific application of that phenomenon. While the Federal Circuit states that applications of natural phenomena are patent-eligible, it quickly proceeds to categorically suggest a principle under which all diagnostic inventions may have one foot in the Section 101 grave.

Another overly-broad principle from the Federal Circuit opinion comes from this statement: “For process claims that encompass natural phenomenon, the process steps are the additional features that must be new and useful.” This may at first seem obvious and uncontroversial, but in the context of the rest of the opinion, it proves quite problematic. The Federal Circuit cites Parker v. Flook as support: “The process itself, not merely the mathematical algorithm, must be new and useful.” But note the subtle distinction between the two quotes. The Supreme Court discussed the “process itself,” while the Federal Circuit discusses the “process steps.”

This distinction has two important effects. First, it is one of many signals in the opinion that demonstrates the Federal Circuit’s improper dissection of the claimed method into its components parts. Rather than consider whether the “process itself” is “new and useful,” as the Flook opinion had done, the Federal Circuit analyzes each step individually. There’s no consideration of how the steps integrate into the process as a whole, and there’s no mention of whether that entire process claims something other than the natural phenomenon itself.

Second, the Federal Circuit looks at each step in a very general way and ignores the details of the steps that confer patent eligibility. For example, the opinion spends much time discussing how routine the PCR method was at the time of filing. But Sequenom never claimed the PCR method itself. The Federal Circuit fails to address Sequenom’s central argument: The claimed method is a new process of detecting cffDNA by devising a novel sample source from which to extract it, namely, maternal plasma or serum. The application and adaptation of known techniques in this inventive way to a newly-discovered sample source is not conventional.

Finally, the most problematic and new principle that may emerge from this opinion is a subtle, yet very significant, extension of Mayo to invalidate claims directed to routine and conventional applications of natural laws. Mayo teaches that the mere addition of what is purely routine and conventional at the time of filing cannot save a claim directed to a law of nature: “In particular, the steps in the claimed processes (apart from the natural laws themselves) involve well-understood, routine, conventional activity previously engaged in by researchers in the field.”

The Federal Circuit appears to exclude from the patent system a routine application of a law of nature, rather than, as Mayo requires, a law of nature to which merely routine activities have been appended. That is, if one skilled in the art could, after being informed of a newly-discovered law of nature, use routine skill to arrive at the claimed invention, then that claimed invention may be invalidated under the Federal Circuit’s reasoning.

This is contrary to Mayo, and it could conceivably invalidate huge swaths of meritorious inventions. Once the principles underlying a new method are known, application of those principles to devise that method will very often be obvious. The Supreme Court has been very consistent in saying that applications of laws of nature are patent-eligible, including those applications that would have been obvious in view of newly-discovered laws of nature. It is a subtle, but important, point to recognize that Mayo did not say the opposite, as the Federal Circuit now interprets it.

The Preemption Question

One potential bright spot in the Federal Circuit’s opinion is its treatment of preemption. Instead of being a test for patent eligibility, preemption is properly understood as being solely a policy underlying eligibility exclusions. It can at most serve as an after-the-fact check on whether an already-reached conclusion of eligibility is consistent with this policy. The Federal Circuit here mostly validates this position:

The Supreme Court has made clear that the principle of preemption is the basis for the judicial exceptions to patentability. Alice, 134 S. Ct at 2354 (“We have described the concern that drives this exclusionary principal as one of pre-emption”). For this reason, questions on preemption are inherent in and resolved by the § 101 analysis. . . . Where a patent’s claims are deemed only to disclose patent ineligible subject matter under the Mayo framework, as they are in this case, preemption concerns are fully addressed and made moot.

This may ultimately be a hollow victory, however. The Federal Circuit also says: “While preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” The problem here is that it is impossible to ever show complete preemption because it is impossible to know at the time of filing whether something outside the claims could also be conceived. Inventions are, by definition, unforeseeable.

Moreover, allowing anything less than complete preemption to be sufficient to invalidate a claim threatens to invalidate far too much subject matter. By their very nature, patents are preemptive. Allowing courts and patent examiners to freely draw the line between allowable and prohibited levels of preemption invites unpredictable and arbitrary decisions based on personal value judgments. That very problem arose here, where the district court held the claims invalid, at least in part, because they covered what the judge deemed to be “the only commercially viable way of detecting” the embodiment of the law of nature.

The Promising Potential in Judge Linn’s Concurrence

Judge Linn’s concurrence is promising, but it falls short of its full potential. Judge Linn does a better job than the majority in recognizing and understanding the legal significance of the important facts of this case:

[N]o one was amplifying and detecting paternally-inherited cffDNA using the plasma or serum of pregnant mothers. Indeed, the maternal plasma used to be “routinely discarded,” . . . because, as Dr. Evans testified, “nobody thought that fetal cell-free DNA would be present.”

It is encouraging to see that a Federal Circuit judge has finally gone on record to point out the problems caused by ever-broadening applications of Mayo:

I join the court’s opinion invalidating the claims of the ‘540 patent only because I am bound by the sweeping language of the test set out in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. . . . In my view, the breadth of the second part of the test was unnecessary to the decision reached in Mayo. This case represents the consequence—perhaps unintended—of that broad language in excluding a meritorious invention from the patent protection it deserves and should have been entitled to retain.

Judge Linn errs, however, in his acquiescence that Mayo requires the majority’s conclusion. Judge Linn’s concurrence generally reads more like a dissent, but he undercuts his own criticism of Mayo and its effects by calling his opinion a “concurrence.” As he laments:

The Supreme Court’s blanket dismissal of conventional post-solution steps leaves no room to distinguish Mayo from this case, even though here no one was amplifying and detecting paternally-inherited cffDNA using the plasma or serum of pregnant mothers.

But the second half of this sentence shows the critical distinction that makes Sequenom’s claims patent-eligible, even in view of Mayo. Unlike the claims analyzed in Mayo, Sequenom’s process is new and not routinely engaged in by researchers in the field. Judge Linn even states the point better elsewhere in his own concurrence:

Unlike in Mayo, the ‘540 patent claims a new method that should be patent eligible. While the instructions in the claims at issue in Mayo had been widely used by doctors—they had been measuring metabolites and recalculating dosages based on toxicity/inefficacy limits for years—here, the amplification and detection of cffDNA had never before been done.

Judge Linn should be praised for critiquing Mayo as bad law that has led to the invalidation of untold meritorious patent claims. Unfortunately, however, he may have unintentionally contributed to the expansive scope of Mayo about which he complains by failing to factually distinguish (and hence cabin) the Supreme Court’s opinion when presented with such a good opportunity to do so.

All told, the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Ariosa v. Sequenom is a predictable, yet unfortunate, application of the Supreme Court’s disastrous reasoning in Mayo. The unintended consequences of the Supreme Court’s opinion have been further realized in the Federal Circuit’s denial of Sequenom’s innovative claimed method for diagnosing fetal abnormalities. Only time will tell how many other innovations will suffer under the Supreme Court’s careless expansion of Section 101’s patent eligibility analysis.

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Biotech Commercialization Conferences Copyright Innovation Intellectual Property Theory Inventors Uncategorized

The Common Economic Case for Patents and Copyrights

This is the second in a series of posts summarizing CPIP’s 2014 Fall Conference, “Common Ground: How Intellectual Property Unites Creators and Innovators.” The Conference was held at George Mason University School of Law on October 9-10, 2014.  Videos of the conference panels and keynote will be available soon.

The opening panel of CPIP’s 2014 Fall Conference examined the common economic case for patents and copyrights. Unfortunately, IP policy discussions often include a false narrative that intellectual property produces monopolies that harm innovation and economic growth.  The panelists, Troy Dow (Disney), Professor Stan Leibowitz (University of Texas at Dallas), Jon Santamauro (Abbvie), and Professor Jay Kesan (University of Illinois College of Law), highlighted how this narrative, in fact, ignores the essential role that intellectual property serves in enabling the creation, development, and commercialization of both inventions and creative works.

Kesan explained how patents provide economic benefits from both an ex-ante and ex-post perspective. Ex-ante, a strong patent system provides incentives to create, invest in R&D, and finance further innovation. While there are other ex-ante motivations to invent (such as a first mover advantage, the ability to secure trade secrets, and reputational advantages), Kesan argued that innovation is best facilitated ex-ante by a combination of all of these incentives plus the incentives created by patents. The ideal system incorporates a heterogeneous mix of these incentives to invent—in the absence of patents the level of disclosure decreases and innovation slows down.

Patents also provide numerous ex-post benefits. Patents facilitate coordination with producers and perform important signaling functions. They additionally allow for important private ordering by giving inventors increased control over who uses their invention and under what circumstances. In many industries, this is essential to collaboration, interoperability of products, and the aggregation of complementary benefits.

Jon Santamauro discussed the role of patents in the pharmaceutical industry. The exclusive property rights created by patents encourage R&D and serve as a crucial catalyst for new discoveries and businesses.  Patent protection is particularly important in the pharmaceutical industry due to the high-risk, lengthy, and costly process necessary to develop new, safe, and effective drugs.

Pharmaceutical companies developing new drugs screen thousands of potential compounds over 6-7 years of testing to gain FDA approval, at an average cost of about $1.2 billion per drug. The reasons for the high R&D costs?  Out of 10,000 initial molecules tested, only 6 go to clinical trials, and of these, only 1 is approved by the FDA for use in the healthcare market.  Of the 1 out of 10,000 drugs that make it to market, only 2 out of every 10 medicines produce enough revenues to recoup the initial high costs of R&D and also provide revenue to invest in more R&D. In short, pharmaceutical and biotech firms face very high risk—high R&D expenditures and very few market successes.  Strong IP protection helps offset this risk and encourages further investment and research.

Leibowitz explained that one of the primary criticisms of copyright—that it grants a monopoly, and that monopolies are intrinsically bad for society—is utterly thoughtless. A property right is, by definition, a monopoly of sorts. This criticism is an indictment of property rights on the whole, including real property rights.  This is even more inapt to copyright, as copyright does not restrict entry and does not provide an economic monopoly.

Leibowitz also addressed the common argument that IP isn’t necessary because inventors and creators would continue inventing and creating even if they didn’t get to own the fruits of their productive labors.  While some innovative and creative activity would undoubtedly continue, many innovators and creators do not simply create for creations sake. They need salaries (like everyone else), and strong IP rights allow them to capture the value of what they produce.

Finally, Troy Dow highlighted the benefits of strong copyright protection in the movie industry. Bringing a film to market involves substantial risks that many people do not appreciate.  He explained that studios perform the same market function as venture capitalists: they invest in  films at the birth of the original idea and then provide financing all the way through the final showing in movie theaters. This financing comes from banks, other investors, or other studios in order to spread the risk. Dow analogized a new film project to a new startup company, as each new film has its equivalent of a CEO (producer), COO (director), and thousands of employees and independent contractors.  And just as with startup companies, everyone must be paid before the film makes a single cent in revenue.

A single film can cost over $200 million to produce. While a particularly big hit can gross over $350 million after long-term distribution (including on-demand and DVD sales), only 4 out of every 10 movies recoup their investment at the box office. Copyright thus serves the vital function of making it possible for studios to make substantial, upfront investments with the hope of a return on this investment and a sufficient profit to reinvest in further film projects.

Disney’s IP is enormously valuable and is the dominant driver of their business. Even though only $6 billion of Disney’s $45 billion in revenues last year came directly from movie revenue, the movies, including the stories they tell, are at the heart of the Disney experience.  The movies form the basis for other products, media networks, theme parks, and licensing. A strong copyright regime allows studios like Disney to keep producing both creative works and the myriad other products and experiences that so many of us enjoy.

Together, the four panelists illustrated that the economic foundations of IP are equally applicable to the creative industries as they are to the innovation industries.  By securing for inventors and creators the value of their productive labors, IP provides the economic bedrock of our creative and innovative economy.

Categories
Biotech Commercialization Gene Patents Innovation Patent Law Patentability Requirements Uncategorized

The Critical Role of Patents in the Development, Commercialization, and Utilization of Innovative Genetic Diagnostic Tests

Last week, CPIP released an important new policy brief, The Critical Role of Patents in the Development, Commercialization, and Utilization of Innovative Genetic Diagnostic Tests, by Professor Chris Holman.  Professor Holman explains the important role that patents play not only in attracting the capital investment needed to bring genetic tests to market, but also in incentivizing companies to invest in educating patients and their doctors about new tests and in facilitating insurance reimbursements for new tests. Professor Holman addresses the common mistaken assumption that patents negatively impact patient access to genetic diagnostic testing, concluding instead that patent protection is a critical spur for the innovation and commercialization of next-generation genetic diagnostic tests.

The full document (including endnotes) is available here, and we’ve also included the text (without endnotes) below.

The Critical Role of Patents in the Development, Commercialization, and Utilization of Innovative Genetic Diagnostic Tests

Christopher M. Holman

Genetic diagnostic testing is an increasingly high-profile subject in the minds of the public, academia, and policymakers.  This increased attention was prompted in part by highly publicized events such as Angelina Jolie’s decision to undergo a preemptive double mastectomy based on the results of a genetic diagnostic test, followed shortly thereafter by a U.S. Supreme Court decision invalidating patent claims held by the company (Myriad Genetics) that developed the test used by  Ms. Jolie.   Although traditionally viewed as a relatively unglamorous sector of the healthcare market (accounting for less than 2% of total health care spending), genetic analysis and other innovative molecular diagnostics seem poised to become “a powerful element of the healthcare value chain,” playing an increasingly important role in the prediction, detection, and treatment of disease. “Personalized medicine,” a new term that refers to the pairing of a molecular diagnostic test with a patient-specific course of pharmaceutical treatment, represents a particularly promising avenue through which molecular diagnostics might improve therapeutic outcomes while containing healthcare costs.

Those involved in the development and commercialization of innovative molecular diagnostics stress the important role of effective intellectual property rights in attracting the substantial capital investment required to bring these products to market.  Influential voices outside the innovation community, however, have argued strongly against patent protection for molecular diagnostics, claiming that such patents are overly broad, reduce patient access, and inhibit research that might otherwise lead to new and improved diagnostic tests. Most of these critics would acknowledge that strong patent protection is appropriate, and indeed critical, for the development of innovative drugs, in view of the huge cost of developing drugs and securing FDA marketing approval. They argue, however, that the same considerations do not apply to diagnostic tests.  Unfortunately, their argument is based largely on the outdated and now-incorrect belief that diagnostic tests are developed by publicly-funded academics who are primarily motivated by non-patent incentives, and that commercialization of these tests is cheap and easy.

The critics have been heard and are finding resonance in the legislative, judicial, and executive branches.  Legislation to limit the patentability of genetic inventions and the enforceability of genetic patents has been introduced in Congress, although not yet enacted. Omnibus patent reform legislation enacted in 2011 does contain a section requiring the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) to conduct a study examining the “impact that current exclusive licensing and patents on genetic testing activity has on the practice of medicine, including but not limited to the interpretation of testing results and performance of testing procedures,” and to report back to Congress with recommendations as to how to deal with presumed problems with respect to the ability of health care providers “to provide the highest level of medical care to patients” and of innovators to improve upon existing tests. In the courts, the alleged impact of genetic diagnostic patents on genetic research and the availability of diagnostic testing played an important role in litigation brought by the ACLU against  the genetic testing company Myriad Genetics, challenging the validity of Myriad’s so-called “gene patents.” The ACLU won before the Supreme Court.  The Obama administration filed amicus briefs in the Myriad litigation arguing against patent eligibility for patent claims allegedly relating to genetic testing, and National Institutes of Health (NIH) Director Francis Collins has been an outspoken critic of patents on genetic tests.

The plaintiff’s victory in Myriad has not lessened the call for more severe restrictions on the availability of effective patent protection for innovative molecular diagnostics. When the Supreme Court invalidated some of Myriad’s patent claims relating to the BRCA breast cancer genes, a number of Myriad’s competitors were emboldened to enter the BRCA testing market, and Myriad responded by filing lawsuits alleging infringement of some of its remaining patent claims (patent claims that were not at issue in the previous litigation). In response, Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) sent a letter to Francis Collins asking NIH to “use its march-in rights under the Bayh-Dole Act to force Myriad Genetics Inc. to license its patents related to testing for genetic mutations associated with breast and ovarian cancer.”

This essay addresses some of the criticisms that have been leveled against genetic diagnostic testing patents.  It identifies the critical role that patents play not only in the discovery and development of new molecular diagnostic tests, but also in making these tests more accessible to the patients who can benefit from them. When we move beyond the improperly restricted and crabbed view of patents as incentivizing only discovery of new medical drugs or tests, we recognize that patents also have a fundamental role in incentivizing companies like Myriad to create markets for these new discoveries by investing in educating patients and their doctors and in facilitating the reimbursement of patients for the cost of the test via their insurance plans.

Molecular Diagnostic Tests and Personalized Medicine

To understand the important role of patents in molecular diagnostic testing, it is important to have a basic understanding of what these tests are and where they come from. This is important if only because there is substantial misinformation in the public policy debates about these innovative medical discoveries.  Thus, a brief primer on the topic is in order.

Molecular diagnostic tests involve the detection and/or analysis of a molecular biomarker in a patient in order to discern clinically relevant information about that patient. Molecular biomarkers come in many forms – prostate-specific antigen (PSA), for example, is a protein biomarker used to diagnose prostate cancer, while high levels of glucose in the blood can serve as a biomarker for diabetes. Today some of the most promising biomarkers are genetic variations, which are detected by analyzing an individual’s genomic DNA. Some genetic variations in the human breast cancer genes BRCA1 and BRCA2, for example, can be used to predict the likelihood that an individual harboring that variation will develop breast or ovarian cancer. Although significant progress already has been made, scientists are just beginning to scratch the surface of the potential of molecular diagnostic testing. Research continues in the quest to identify and validate new biomarkers correlated with a host of diseases and disease outcomes.

Testing for molecular biomarkers is not only useful in the diagnosis and prognosis of disease; it can also be used to guide doctors in the best course of treatment tailored to the needs of an individual patient. Personalized medicine, for example, encompasses the use of molecular diagnostic testing to identify the best course of drug therapy for an individual patient by (1) identifying the best drug for that individual, or (2) predicting the optimal drug dosage for that particular patient in terms of safety and efficacy.  In a case involving determining personalized levels of drug dosage, Mayo v. Prometheus, the Supreme Court recently invalidated patent claims covering a non-genetic molecular diagnostic test that enables doctors treating patients for Crohn’s disease to prescribe a drug dosage at a level that maximizes efficacy while minimizing the horrible side effects too often endured by patients before the test became available. In doing so, the Court overturned a decision by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit which upheld the validity of the claims – the Federal Circuit’s decision explicitly acknowledged that the claims relate to methods of medical diagnosis and treatment which have until recently been assumed to constitute patentable subject matter.

The fundamental challenge in developing molecular diagnostic tests is identifying and validating clinically significant molecular biomarkers.  The magnitude of this challenge is vastly underappreciated by those who argue against patent protection for these tests. It is true that some relatively rare genetic diseases such as sickle cell anemia, cystic fibrosis and Tay-Sachs are associated with specific genetic variations (sometimes referred to as mutations), and once those variations have been identified it is relatively straightforward for any competent clinical laboratory to test for the presence of a mutation that has been unambiguously associated with the disease. But these are the low hanging fruit. For the vast majority of human diseases which have a genetic component, the correlation between biomarker and clinically relevant information is much less straightforward, and substantial investment is necessary to support the lengthy and labor-intensive research efforts required to discern and validate the clinical significance of novel biomarkers.

With respect to any two individual humans there typically exists about 6 million genetic variations (referred to as polymorphisms) spread across the genome. Most comprise single nucleotide variations that occur on average about once in every 1000 nucleotides. Significantly, almost all of these polymorphisms are believed to be clinically irrelevant.  Thus, the challenge is to identify that small cohort of human genetic variations that can function as useful biomarkers, and to assign and validate their clinical significance.

Compounding the difficulty is the fact that the clinical significance of most genetic variations is substantially affected by the influence of other genetic variations residing throughout the rest of the genome, oftentimes in a manner that is not additive, and by interactions with non-genetic environmental factors. For example, there is often an observed synergistic amplification of susceptibility to disease caused by the interaction of variations at multiple locations in the genome, or, conversely, a dampening of the effect of one variation caused by variations at other locations. It can be extremely difficult to identify and validate correlations for multifactorial genetic diseases of this type, which in large part explains the relatively modest progress that has been made in molecular diagnostic testing in the decade subsequent to the initial sequencing of the human genome.

For example, some genetic variations in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 breast cancer genes have been shown to be associated with an extremely high likelihood of developing cancer, while others are associated with a likelihood of developing cancer only somewhat higher than the general population.  Many of the observed variations in the BRCA genes are believed to be neutral, having no cancer-related implications. In fact, even after years of research and millions of dollars in investments, we are still finding patients with variations in the BRCA genes for which the significance is currently unknown. These “variations of uncertain significance,” or VUSs, constitute a major limitation on the clinical usefulness of molecular diagnostic tests. Patents provide the incentive for the substantial up-front investment in gathering and analyzing the clinical data necessary to assign a predictive value to a VUS.

Shrinking Patent Protection for Molecular Diagnostics and Personalized Medicine

For years, innovative scientists and physicians working in diagnostics and personalized medicine have sought and obtained patent protection for diagnostic tests that are based on the detection and/or analysis of molecular biomarkers. While patent claims covering isolated and synthetic DNA molecules can play some role in this regard, the most direct and effective means of patenting a diagnostic test is by claiming the method itself.  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Mayo and Myriad have substantially impaired the ability of innovators to obtain effective patent protection for DNA molecules used in diagnostic testing and for diagnostic testing methods per se.  Although Myriad has garnered more public attention, Mayo is likely a much more significant decision with respect to the patentability of diagnostic tests, since it most directly implicates the method claims which are so important for effective patent protection in this area of technology.

Three aspects of Mayo could prove extremely problematic for future patenting of molecular diagnostics in general. First, the Court adopted a very broad definition of the term “natural phenomena” as it is applied in the context of patent eligibility for discoveries in medical treatments. The Mayo Court’s definition of this term, which refers to facts of nature that are unpatentable, appears to encompass the discovery of clinically significant biomarkers that is the essence of innovation in diagnostics and personalized medicine. Second, the Court held that in order to be patent eligible, a method claim must include some “inventive concept” above and beyond the discovery of a natural phenomenon. And third, the Court declared that a method claim is patent ineligible if it “preempts” all practical applications of a natural phenomenon.

A recent district court decision, Ariosa Diagnostics v. Sequenom, illustrates the profoundly troubling implications of Mayo for patents on molecular diagnostic methods. On a motion for summary judgment, the judge invalidated all of the genetic diagnostic testing method claims at issue in the case for failure to satisfy the requirements of patent eligibility as set forth in Mayo. In particular, the judge held that the claims failed the “inventive concept” test because they encompassed conventional methods of DNA analysis, and failed the “preemption” test based on a determination that the claims would cover all “commercially viable” methods of performing the test as of the filing date of the patent.

If this is indeed the standard by which the validity of molecular diagnostic claims will be assessed, the prospect for effective patent protection appears bleak.  Innovation in molecular diagnostics resides primarily in the identification and characterization of biomarkers of clinical significance, e.g., genetic variations useful in the diagnosis and prognosis of disease. Once the biomarker and its clinically significant correlation has been identified, conventional forms of DNA analysis involving techniques such as PCR amplification and/or labeled hybridization probes are employed for diagnostic testing. A patent eligibility test that bars the inventor from claiming the use of conventional DNA analysis techniques will render the patent ineffective in blocking competitors from entering the market and thereby free-riding on the initial inventor’s substantial investments in the discovery of this molecular biomarker.

This troubling concern is not mere prophecy. In Ariosa Diagnostics,the judge held that Mayo prohibits any patent claim that encompasses all “commercially viable” means of testing for a biomarker. This decision renders any protection afforded by a valid diagnostic patent illusory.  After all, how many venture capitalists are interested in investing hundreds of millions of dollars in a start-up diagnostic company whose patents are unable to preclude competition by free-riders using alternate, unpatented (but still commercially viable) methods for detecting the same biomarkers that the start-up invested in identifying?

Furthermore, in Myriad, the Supreme Court held that isolated DNA molecules corresponding to naturally occurring DNA are patent ineligible, absent some significant structural difference compared to the naturally occurring molecule. This holding is problematic for innovators in genetic testing because the DNA molecules used in the course of genetic diagnostic testing, such as DNA primers for PCR and hybridization probes, are inherently highly similar in chemical structure to naturally occurring DNA molecules, and thus apparently patent ineligible under Myriad. A district court recently adopted this view in a decision denying the patentee’s motion for preliminary injunction against an alleged infringer in a lawsuit commenced post-Myriad, finding that product claims directed towards DNA primers useful in BRCA genetic testing are likely invalid under Myriad.  The PTO recently issued guidance adopting the same restrictive interpretation of Myriad with respect to DNA primer claims.

The Role of Patents in Molecular Diagnostic R&D

The Unfounded Assumption that Patents Inhibit Research

The plaintiffs in Myriad argued that Myriad’s patents inhibit research that might otherwise lead to improvements in BRCA testing.  Unfortunately, many share this pessimistic view of the role of patents in the research and development of molecular diagnostic tests, and this deeply mistaken notion found support in a number of amicus briefs filed with the Supreme Court in support of the Myriad plaintiffs. A typical example was an amicus brief filed by the American Medical Association, which argued that patents are not only unnecessary to incentivize the optimal level of innovation in genetic diagnostic tests, but that genetic diagnostic patents allegedly inhibit research that could develop improved tests.

The argument that patents inhibit research in genetic diagnostics is based largely on an unfounded assumption that the existence of a patent necessarily precludes research on the patented subject matter. In fact, empirical studies have shown that basic researchers follow a norm of ignoring patent infringement, and that patent owners do not enforce their patents against basic researchers, resulting in a de facto research exemption from liability. Patent owners have little if any incentive to enforce patents against basic researchers – to the contrary, patent owners often welcome third-party basic research on patented subject matter, since it tends to promote and enhance the value of the patented subject matter.

Myriad’s policy toward basic research on the BRCA genes is a good case in point. During the time in which Myriad’s BRCA patents have been in force, basic research on the BRCA genes has flourished in both the US and abroad. While patent-skeptics assume that Myriad’s patents preclude research on the genes, in fact thousands of research articles relating to the genes have been published, many by researchers at leading US academic institutions such as the University of Pennsylvania, the University of Chicago, Emory University, and the University of Rochester. While it has been widely publicized that Myriad has on occasion threatened lawsuits against academic institutions that engaged in genetic diagnostic testing, it is important to bear in mind that these academic institutions were invariably engaged in commercial genetic testing, not basic research – i.e., they were charging patients for the testing services and thus competed with Myriad.

In attempting to support their assertion that patents harm research and development of diagnostic tests, patent-skeptics often point to the “SACGHS Report,” a 2010 report on the impact of patents on patient access to genetic tests that was prepared by the Secretary of Health and Human Services’ Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society. Despite these citations to the SACGHS Report, the case studies presented in the SACGHS Report for the most part show exactly the opposite. For example, the Report’s case study on the impact of patents and patent licensing practices on access to genetic testing for hereditary hemochromatosis concluded not only that “concerns regarding inhibition of research due to the HFE gene patents do not seem to be supported,” but that substantial basic research aimed at identifying new genes and genetic variations associated with hemochromatosis, along with new methods of testing for these biomarkers, were proceeding in spite of third-party patents.  Similar findings were reported with respect to genetic tests investigated in other case studies, including the tests for cystic fibrosis, hearing loss, and Alzheimer’s disease.

The Important Role of Patents in the Development and Commercialization of Diagnostic Tests

While patents do not inhibit basic research, they do play a critical role in incentivizing the substantial investment required to translate the results of basic research into high-quality, commercially available diagnostic tests that meaningfully impact people’s lives. In a recent report, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology found that the “ability to obtain strong intellectual property protection through patents has been, and will continue to be, essential for pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies to make the large, high-risk R&D investments required to develop novel medical products, including genomics-based molecular diagnostics.” Similarly, commentators familiar with the challenges associated with the development and commercialization of diagnostics have concluded that patents are vital “to incentivize the significant investment required” for clinical research in personalized medicine. And while the AMA came out against genetic diagnostic testing patents in Myriad, the Association of American Physicians and Surgeons (“AAPS,” a national nonprofit association representing thousands of physicians) filed an amicus brief in support of Myriad’s patents, explaining that “advancing patients interests means supporting and defending incentives for medical innovations.”

Innovators in molecular diagnostics rely heavily on venture capital to fund the years of research, development, and validation necessary to bring a novel diagnostic product to market, and the decision of whether to invest is heavily dependent upon the availability of effective patent protection. Weakening of patent protection for molecular diagnostics will inevitably cause venture capitalists to shift their investments to other sectors of the economy. Not surprisingly, the National Venture Capital Association filed an amicus brief with the Supreme Court in support of Myriad.

One of the most compelling amicus briefs submitted to the Supreme Court insupport of Myriad was filed by Lynch Syndrome International (“LSI”), an all-volunteer organization founded and governed by Lynch syndrome survivors, their families, and health care professionals who treat Lynch syndrome.  Lynch syndrome is a genetic condition caused by genetic variations in certain genes that result in a greatly increased risk of developing colon cancer. Lynch syndrome and BRCA mutations are highly analogous, with one important difference – patents in the area of Lynch syndrome have been nonexclusively licensed, so there has been no single provider to invest in developing and improving genetic tests for Lynch syndrome, nor in making the test widely available to the patients who could benefit from it. In its brief, LSI argues passionately for greater patent protection in the area of genetic diagnostic testing, in the hope that patent exclusivity might incentivize a patent owner to invest in Lynch syndrome in a manner comparable to Myriad’s investment in BRCA testing.

LSI explains that:

The development and commercialization of genetic tests require significant amounts of capital, but capital sources will not provide the necessary funding unless the newly developed tests will have patent protection. Only patent protection will assure the capital sources of sufficient investment return to make the provision of funding worthwhile.

LSI’s brief goes on to urge the Supreme Court to maintain patent eligibility for genetic tests in the hope that patents might provide incentives for the development of high-quality tests comparable to those available for BRCA thanks to the investments made by Myriad. LSI points to the long odds against success facing start-up companies like Myriad, noting that most start-up companies fail, particularly in the area of diagnostics. In the words of LSI:

Myriad’s survival, due largely to patent eligibility for genetic tests, has been a miracle for BRCA1 and BRCA2 patients: without Myriad, it is possible that only fragmented and potentially unregulated testing would be available. Lynch syndrome patients desperately need access to the quality testing that Myriad has been able to provide to BRCA1 and BRCA2 patients.

While the SACGHS Report found little evidence that patents impede basic research, it also found (incorrectly) that patents are largely unnecessary for genetic research, based largely on an assumption that genetic research is primarily conducted by academics who are not particularly interested in obtaining patents. The Report opines that while patents incentivize some private investment in genetic research, this private funding is “supplemental to the significant federal government funding in this area.” In conclusion, the Report states that “patent-derived exclusive rights are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for the development of genetic test kits and laboratory-develop tests.”  But these conclusions are seriously flawed, as explained below.

When the Report assumes that most genetic research is conducted by academic researchers, it is specifically referring to the identification of genes associated with genetic disease. While finding a gene associated with genetic disease is an important first step, the Report fails to take into account the much more difficult and costly research required to discern and validate the clinical significance of genetic variations.  The Report’s conclusions, based on an analysis of the relatively straightforward genetic diseases that have been the basis for the first round of genetic diagnostic tests, are largely inapplicable to the next generation of diagnostic tests, where the correlation between genetic variation and clinical significance will be much more attenuated and difficult to establish.

The BRCA genes provide a good example of this. While the discovery of the genes in the 1990s was an important first step, the real work began after the genes were identified, as Myriad and others sought to distinguish the clinically significant variations in the BRCA genes from the clinically insignificant, and to quantify and validate the likelihood of cancer for patients having clinically significant variations. Some variations have been shown to correspond with only a marginal likelihood of cancer, others with a very high likelihood. Myriad reports that even today 3% of the variations it finds when it tests patients are still of unknown significance, and this is after performing thousands of tests and compiling enormous amounts of data. In Europe, where for years Myriad has as a practical matter not enforced its patents, many independent laboratories perform BRCA tests. The number of variations of uncertain significance in Europe is much higher than in the US, not surprising since without an exclusive provider there is less incentive and ability to gather and analyze the data necessary to assign significance to ambiguous variations.

Celera Diagnostics, a private-sector developer of advanced diagnostic tests, made this point in a comment submitted in connection with the SACGHS Report:

Even though the Draft Report suggests that scientists who search for gene-disease associations may not be motivated by the prospect of receiving a patent, they cannot conduct this type of research without considerable capital and resources. In our experience, meaningful gene-disease associations are confirmed only if the initial discoveries are followed by large scale replication and validation studies using multiple sample sets, the costs of which are prohibitive for many research groups. Private investors who provide funding for such research invariably look to patents that result from such work as a way of protecting their investment.

The SACGHS Report concluded that patents are unnecessary for the development and commercialization of diagnostic test, but that conclusion was based on an unrealistic assumption that the cost of developing a sequencing-based diagnostic test is in the range of $8,000-$10,000. While this paltry sum might have been sufficient for the development and commercialization of the simple diagnostic tests considered by SACGHS in preparing its Report, it is orders of magnitude short of the investment required for the critical next generation of diagnostic tests being developed by companies such as Myriad, Celera, and Genomic Health.

Furthermore, patents also promote innovation by facilitating collaboration and coordination between firms, which will be particularly important in the development of personalized medicine. For example, the pairing of the cancer drug Herceptin with a companion genetic diagnostic test that identifies patients likely to benefit from treatment with Herceptin represents one of the first successful implementations of personalized medicine. Herceptin, a biotechnology drug developed by Genentech, is only effective for a subpopulation representing about 30% of breast cancer patients, but for those for which it is effective it can reduce the recurrence of a tumor by 52%. Another pharmaceutical company, Abbott, developed the companion genetic diagnostic test used to distinguish between patients who will benefit from Herceptin and those who will not. The distinction is important because it allows doctors to rapidly begin Herceptin treatment for patients who will benefit from it, while avoiding the high cost and delay that result from trying Herceptin on a patient that, for genetic reasons, will not respond to the treatment. Patents play an important role in incentivizing companies like Abbott to develop a companion diagnostic, as well as facilitating the collaboration necessary to effectively pair one company’s diagnostic with another company’s drug.

Now that Myriad’s patent protection has been weakened, some argue that the company should make its proprietary data freely available in order to allow competitors to improve their tests. At one time Myriad did share this data, but in recent years it has adopted a policy of maintaining much of it as a trade secret. Of course, this is exactly the response one would predict in the face of weakened patent protection. No company is likely to invest in the creation of a valuable database if competitors are free to appropriate the value of the data. An important attribute of patents is that they encourage the disclosure of information that in the absence of the patent would likely be kept as a trade secret. Indeed, the SACGHS Report explicitly recognized that an absence of patent protection promotes secrecy, and that such “secrecy is undesirable because the public is denied new knowledge.”

The Important Role of Patents in Promoting Access

One of the main complaints leveled against patents on genetic diagnostic tests is that a patent owner like Myriad is able to charge a higher price as the exclusive test provider, which limits access for patients who cannot afford the test.  A study included in the SACGHS Report attempted to assess this allegation by comparing the cost for Myriad’s BRCA test with the genetic test for Lynch syndrome.  When normalized for the relative sizes of the genes, the Report found that Myriad charges “little if any price premium” for its exclusively controlled BRCA testing relative to the price charged for nonexclusively licensed testing of the Lynch genes. The Report concluded that this “surprising” finding “suggests that the main market impact of the BRCA patents is not on price but rather on volume, by directing BRCA full-sequence testing in the United States to Myriad, the sole provider.”

While the prices of BRCA and Lynch syndrome testing are comparable, many more BRCA tests are performed in the US compared to Lynch syndrome testing, suggesting that, at least with respect to these two tests, patent exclusivity actually serves to enhance patient access. Epidemiologically the two syndromes are quite similar – both have a similar prevalence in the overall population and in cancer populations, both can result in drastic increases in the risk of developing cancer, and breast and colon cancer are two of the leading causes of cancer death in the country. Prior to the Myriad decision there were 15 providers of full sequence Lynch syndrome testing in the US, and only one authorized provider of full sequence BRCA testing (Myriad).  However, in the period from June 2010 through March 2013 nearly 5 times as many patients in the US received BRCA testing than testing for Lynch syndrome (339,294 vs. 70,294).

One explanation for the discrepancy could lie in the relative quality of the tests. The turnaround time for Lynch syndrome testing results is reportedly longer than that of Myriad’s BRCA tests, and the VUS rate is much higher for Lynch syndrome (15-30% for non-Myriad Lynch testing vs. 3% for Myriad BRCA testing). The amicus brief filed by LSI specifically noted the superiority of Myriad’s BRCA test, which LSI attributed to the patent exclusivity enjoyed by Myriad with respect to the BRCA genes.

Increased public awareness of BRCA testing relative to Lynch syndrome testing is likely to account for much of the discrepancy in usage of the tests. The SACGHS Report specifically found that the “incentive to advertise the service and broaden the market is stronger for a monopoly provider than in a shared market because a monopolist will gain the full benefit of market expansion.”  According to the Report, one of the social benefits of patents is that they incentivize an exclusive test provider like Myriad to invest in creating more public knowledge of the availability of genetic tests.  The Report acknowledges a clear “link between [Myriad’s] status as a single provider and incentives for direct-to-consumer advertising, with single provider status in this case associated with exclusive patent rights for BRCA testing.”

A Center for Disease Control (CDC) survey found an increase in BRCA test requests and questions about testing among women, and an increase in test-ordering among physicians and providers, in cities where Myriad invested in direct-to-consumer “public awareness campaigns.”  The SACGHS Report noted that “[t]he overall impact of a DTC advertising campaign on the Kaiser Permanente health system in Denver was a more than two-fold increase in number of women in the high risk category getting tested, a more than three-fold surge in contacts about testing.”  Another study showed that high-risk women—those eligible for BRCA testing based on family history—were three times as likely to get tested following a physician recommendation as those who did not get such a recommendation.

Ironically, while Myriad fought to inform patients and healthcare providers about the availability of BRCA testing, many policymakers argued in favor of restricting patient access to the results of these tests. For example, the Working Group of Stanford’s Program in Genomics, Ethics and Society recommended that ‘for most people, testing for BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations is not appropriate.’  Similarly, NIH director Francis Collins testified before Congress that the results of genetic testing for BRCA mutations should generally not be made available to patients. With respect to BRCA testing, patents have played an important role in empowering patients to take control of their own their own genetic information, in the face of a medical establishment that sought to limit patient access to this information.

One of the most formidable obstacles facing patients in need of genetic diagnostic testing services is insurance reimbursement. Patents play an important role in overcoming this obstacle, by providing an incentive for patent owners to work with insurance companies to ensure that a maximum number of patients will be able to get insurance reimbursement for testing. For example, in 1995 only 4% of insurance providers allowed reimbursement for BRCA genetic testing. By 2008 Myriad was able to report that it had established contracts or payment agreements with over 300 carriers and has received reimbursement from over 2500 health plans, reducing the number of self-pay patients to single-digit percentages of its clientele. By 2010 BRCA genetic testing in the U.S. was covered for roughly 95% of those requesting tests, and reimbursed to cover 90% of their charges.  In contrast, non-profit diagnostic testing services in many cases charge patients upfront for genetic testing, and require patients to seek their own reimbursement from their insurance company, which can be slow in coming, assuming it comes at all.

Conclusion

Arguments in favor of reining in the availability of effective patent protection in the area of genetic diagnostic testing are based largely on two fundamental misconceptions regarding the role of patents in this important area of technological innovation. The first is the mistaken assumption that patents negatively impact patient access to genetic diagnostic testing by preventing research that might lead to new or improved versions of a genetic test and by increasing the cost of testing services. The second is the failure to appreciate the substantial positive role patents play in in the development and utilization of genetic diagnostic tests. In fact, patents have little if any negative impact on basic research, and have been proven to significantly improve patient access to advanced diagnostic testing services by incentivizing the substantial investment that is necessary not only to bring these tests to market, but also to educate patients and their doctors with respect to the availability of the tests, and to work with third-party payers to expand patients’ eligibly for reimbursement. Next-generation technologies are poised to dramatically improve healthcare and patient outcomes, but this will only occur if effective and enforceable patent protection is available as the necessary spur for innovation and commercialization.

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Biotech Gene Patents Patent Law Uncategorized

A Critique of a Recent Article Which Found That Sequence Patents Cover the Entire Human Genome

By Professor Christopher Holman

[The following is a blog posting by Christopher Holman, a patent law scholar at UMKC School of Law, that he originally posted on April 5, 2013 at his blog, Holman’s Biotech IP Blog, where Professor Holman regularly blogs on important issues in biotech and IP law.  Professor Holman kindly gave us permission to repost his blog posting here.]

A Critique of a Recent Article Which Found That Sequence Patents Cover the Entire Human Genome
By Christopher Holman

I recently fielded a phone call from a reporter with a leading international scientific journal, asking for my opinion of an article entitled “Pervasive Sequence Patents Cover the Entire Human Genome,”recently published in a publication called Genome Medicine. I have published several articles debunking the myth that 20% of human genes are patented, and the reporter thought that the article in Genome Medicine, authored by a researcher affiliated with Yale Law School’s The Information Society Project, contradicted the results of my study. I took a look at the “Pervasive Sequence Patents” article and found it to be a fundamentally flawed empirical study that will sadly be used to further support the widespread misperception that access to a large percentage of the human genome is precluded by a thicket of gene patents.

The “Pervasive Sequence Patents” article does cite to my 2012 Nature Biotechnology article Debunking the Myth That Whole Genome Sequencing Infringes Thousands of Gene Patents, but the authors apparently missed the main point I was trying to make. The myth that 20% of human genes are patented was born out of a 2005 article published in Science by Jensen and Murray that found that the sequence of 20% of human genes (or in some cases the protein encoded by human gene) is mentioned in a US patent claim. The problem arose when people assumed that the mention of a gene’s DNA sequence in a patent claim is equivalent to the patenting of the gene, which led to an assumption that any use of or research on any of these genes would result in patent infringement. In my article, I explained that in patent law “the name of the game is the claim “(to quote Judge Rich), and that when one actually reads the patent claims in the patents identified by Jensen and Murray it is clear that few if any of the patents would be infringed by many forms of research or genetic testing, including diagnostic testing and whole genome sequencing.

Unfortunately, the authors of “Pervasive Sequence Patents” have apparently fallen into the same trap, assuming that mention of a gene’s DNA sequence in a patent claim results in the patenting of the gene in a manner that totally blocks access to the gene. Even more problematically, the authors seem to assume that every patent with a claim mentioning a gene sequence also claims every 15mer present in the sequence, i.e., every contiguous 15 nucleotide sequence appearing in the gene. Presumably they made this assumption because the Myriad gene patent litigation includes a patent claim directed to 15mers of the BRCA1 encoding sequence, including Claim 5 from US patent number 5,747,282:

An isolated DNA having at least 15 nucleotides of the DNA of claim 1.

There are two fundamental problems with this empirical approach. One is that it does not necessarily follow that the mention of a gene’s DNA sequence in a claim equates with the patenting of the gene – that was the main point of my Nature Biotechnology article. The other is to assume that all of these patents include claims analogous to Claim 5 of the ‘282 patent.

In my experience, claims of this type are extremely rare. I looked at hundred patents identified as gene patents in the Jensen Murray study and found that most only claim the full-length gene sequence, and if fragments were claimed the fragments are much larger than 15 nucleotides. In fact, I looked through hundreds of gene patents trying to find another 15mer claim analogous to those in the Myriad patents and could not find one. The patent claims at issue in the Myriad case will be expiring within the next few years I believe, and I doubt that this sort of broad 15mer claim has been issued by the patent office in recent years, or if it has it seems to be extremely rare.

In any event, in 2010 Keppler et al. published an article entitled “Metastasizing Patent Claims in BRCA1” which showed that if the BRCA 15mer claims are interpreted so broadly as to cover any DNA sequence comprising any 15mer appearing in a BRCA gene, there appears to be a wealth of prior art that would invalidate the claim regardless of the claims patent eligibility.

The flawed methodology used in the “Pervasive Sequence Patents” article is readily apparent from the results of their empirical study. Here is what they reported as the result of their study:

[W]hen we took existing gene patents and matched their 15mers to known genes, we found that 100% of known genes have at least one 15mer claimed in a known patent. Current gene patents were observed to match each gene many times, with 1,295 matches to other genes on average (standard deviation 1,208). When we examined the amount of total sequence space in human genes that is covered by 15mers in claims from current patents (Additional file 2), we found 58 patents whose claims covered at least 10% of the bases of all human genes. The top patent was US7795422, whose claims’ sequences matched 91.5% of human genes. Interestingly, we also observed a patent for improving bovine traits (US7468248) with explicit claims for 15mers that matched 84% of human genes. This patent was not even aimed at any human sequence, yet covered a majority of human genes once we examined the claim’s matches at the 15mer scale.

First off, let’s look at the “top patent” they found, US7795422, “whose claims sequences matched 91.5% of human genes.”  The ‘422 patent has only one independent claim:

1.       A chemically modified short interfering nucleic acid (siNA) molecule, wherein: (a) the siNA molecule comprises a sense strand and an antisense strand, each strand having one or more pyrimidine nucleotides and one or more purine nucleotides; (b) each strand is independently 18 to 27 nucleotides in length, and together comprise a duplex having between 17 and 23 base pairs; (c) the antisense strand is complementary to a human Hypoxia Inducible Factor 1 (HIF1) RNA sequence comprising SEQ ID NO:567; (d) a plurality of pyrimidine nucleotides present in the sense strand are 2′-deoxy-2-fluoro pyrimidine nucleotides and a plurality of purine nucleotide present in the sense strand are 2′-deoxy purine nucleotides; and (e) a plurality of pyrimidine nucleotides present in the antisense strand are 2′-deoxy-2′-fluoro pyrimidine nucleotides and a plurality of purine nucleotides present in the antisense strand are 2′-O-methyl-puine nucleotides.

When one reads the claim, it is apparent on the face that the claim is limited to “chemically modified” molecules comprising 2′-deoxy-2-fluoro pyrimidine nucleotides and 2′-deoxy purine nucleotides.  DNA does not contain 2′-deoxy-2-fluoro pyrimidine nucleotides and 2′-deoxy purine nucleotides, these are synthetic analogues to the nucleotides that appear in DNA. This patent that the authors found to match 91.5% of human genes does not cover any gene or any DNA molecule, only chemically modified synthetic molecules for use in RNA interference.

Next the authors reported that US7468248 contains “explicit claims for 15mers that matched 84% of human genes.” In fact, the ‘248 patent has only two independent claims, both of them method claims:

1.       A method for inferring a trait of a bovine subject from a nucleic acid sample of the bovine subject, comprising identifying in the nucleic acid sample, a nucleotide occurrence of a single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) at position 300 of SEQ ID NO:21645, thereby inferring the trait, wherein the trait is marbling, tenderness, fat thickness, red meat yield, or average daily weight gain.

22. A method for determining a nucleotide occurrence of a polymorphism in a bovine sample, comprising: a) contacting a bovine polynucleotide in the sample with an oligonucleotide that binds to a target region, wherein the target region comprises a position at position 300 of SEQ ID NO:21645 or wherein the target region is within 3000 nucleotides of a nucleotide at position 300 of SEQ ID NO:21645, and b) determining the nucleotide occurrence of a single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) at position 300 of SEQ ID NO:21645, wherein the determination comprises analyzing binding of the oligonucleotide or detecting an amplification product generated using the oligonucleotide, thereby determining the nucleotide occurrence of the polymorphism.

Both of these claims would only be infringed by someone performing a specific genetic test on a bovine subject (colloquially a cow). The patent does not include any claim covering any DNA sequence, and the authors’ assumption that the patent “explicitly claims 15mers that matched 84% of human genes” implies that they either did not read the claims or do not understand the basics of claim interpretation.

The problems with this article are pretty apparent once one reads the claims of the patents that were identified as “matching” human genes. Unfortunately, it is just the latest installment of a prolific stream of fundamentally flawed academic articles that are being cited in support of the notion that human gene patents are a pervasive problem.  I don’t doubt that the authors meant well, but it’s dangerous to conduct empirical patent studies without appreciating and understanding the critical role of the patent claim. And the publication of the article highlights the limitations of peer review (assuming Genome Medicine engages in peer review).