Category: Infringement

Categories
Copyright Copyright Licensing Fair Use Infringement

Copyright and Tattoos: New Amicus Brief in Sedlik v. Von Drachenberg; Oct. 29 Virtual Clinic for Visual Artists

CIP2 congratulates the Arts & Entertainment Advocacy Clinic at Scalia Law, led by Professor Sandra Aistars, and Student Advocate Natalie Nachman, and supported by Counsel of Record Matt Hersh of Mestaz Law, for filing a powerful amicus brief on behalf of three Tattoo Artists in the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals this week in Sedlik v. Von Drachenberg. The tattooers weighed in to support photographer Jeff Sedlik, who is appealing a copyright decision that permitted celebrity tattooist Kat Von D to tattoo a virtually exact replica of his iconic Miles Davis photograph on a client’s arm. Kat Von D and her companies also reproduced and promoted her infringing use of the Sedlik photo and resulting tattoo widely via social media in order to drive business to her various commercial interests without seeking permission or a license from Jeff.

The three tattoo artists explain the nature of the tattoo industry to the court. They also explain that the decision runs counter not only to the traditions of copyright law, but also to traditions of tattooing itself. Most tattooers have a deep respect for the creations of others. And modern tattooers have grown up with exposure to a wide variety of licensed sources. The amici understand that visual artists are part of a creative ecosystem, and that neither art form will flourish if the other is impoverished. If allowed to stand, this decision will ultimately be harmful to the tattoo industry.

To learn more about licensing in the visual arts, join Professor Aistars, Matt, and Natalie to discuss the case and other copyright issues with Jeff and one of their tattoo clients, Ross Berg, during the Virtual Legal Clinic: “Protect Your Body of Work” on Tuesday, October 29, from 2:00 – 3:30 PM Eastern! Register for free today.

Categories
Copyright Infringement Journalism

Trump Interview Lawsuit Exposes Uncertainty in a Corner of Copyright Law

Will Donald Trump’s lawsuit against Bob Woodward and publisher Simon & Schuster[1] finally resolve the question of who owns the copyright over interviews? While the complaint has other challenges, it calls out a surprisingly muddled and unresolved area of copyright law.

One might assume that the copyright ownership of interviews is a settled question. But two major questions have never been resolved:

    1. Are interviewee’s responses to an interviewer’s questions copyrightable?
    2. If they are, then who owns that copyright?

C-IP2 2022-2023 Edison Fellow Mary Catherine Amerine presciently identified and analyzed these issues in a 2017 article in the Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review.[2] We relied on her article and current expertise in producing this blog post.

Courts were considering the first question as early as the 1960s, when the estate of Ernest Hemingway claimed that Papa Hemingway, a book that included lengthy quotes from conversations between Hemingway and an interviewer, infringed the estate’s copyright over the interviews themselves.[3] The court ruled on an implied license theory and thus dodged the copyrightability of Hemingway’s conversational statement as captured in an audio recording. In dicta, the court speculated that an interviewee would need to make some clear statement bracketing parts of their extemporaneous responses to an interviewer’s questions “to mark off the utterance . . . from the ordinary stream of speech, . . . to adopt it as a unique statement and that he wished to exercise control over its publication.”[4]

A decade later, a different court employed different reasoning to rule against Jerry Falwell’s copyright infringement claims for republication of interviews in Penthouse Magazine.[5] Whereas the Hemingway dicta suggests that copyrightability turns on an objective manifestation by the interviewee that a particular oral statement has the requisite authorial intent and thus is not mere extemporizing, the Falwell holding turns on whether the content of the particular oral statement is “concrete” enough to indicate authorial intent.[6] This holding then curiously (albeit perhaps unintentionally) imports patent law’s exclusion of “abstract ideas” from patent eligibility into copyright law: “However different or unique plaintiff’s thoughts or opinions may be, the expression of those opinions or thoughts is too general and abstract to rise to the level of a literary or intellectual creation . . . .”[7]

Courts have followed this reasoning ever since, distinguishing off-the-cuff extemporizing typical of unrehearsed oral responses to media questions from the sort of carefully planned oral statements of executives of publicly traded companies on analysts’ earnings calls.[8] At the same time, some courts have upheld copyright in the interviewer for interview quotes as a compilation (which avoids ownership of individual quotations).[9]

While the exact contours of whether there is copyright in any particular interview source material are still not clear, the question of who holds that copyright, should it exist, is even less certain. Trump’s Complaint requests a declaratory judgment for his ownership of the entirety of the interview’s sound recordings,[10] audiobook, and all derivative works, or, in the alternative, “copyright in his responses . . . . ”[11] Trump’s ownership of the entire copyright in the interviews would be unprecedented; no court has held that an interviewee could own the copyright over an entire interview. But the question of ownership of the copyright to an interview—in whole or in part—turns on three other questions:

    1. Can the interviewer seek to claim copyright of all contents of the interview on the theory that they directed and recorded the interview?
    2. Can neither party own copyright to the other’s statements because they did not create or make them, and hence each owns only their own contribution (“divided copyright”)?
    3. Should the entirety be viewed as a work of joint authorship by the interviewer and interviewee?

The court in Suid v. Newsweek Magazine, addressing a reporter’s attempt to claim the entirety of copyright in interviews he conducted, adopted “B” and divided copyright: “The author of a factual work may not, without an assignment of copyright, claim copyright in statements made by others and reported in the work because the author may not claim originality as to those statements.”[12] By contrast, the court in Foundation for Lost Boys v. Alcon Entertainment, LLC was inclined to adopt “C” when it held that interviewee plaintiffs had pled facts sufficient to support a finding of joint authorship with interviewer defendants. Ruling on defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court rejected the argument that plaintiffs’ interview responses were not copyrightable, as telling “personal stories in response to questions designed to elicit material” likely rose to the required level of creativity. Further, the court held that “[T]he interplays between prompts and responses in the Interviews necessarily merged the respective contributions of the [Plaintiffs and interviewers] into inseparable parts of a whole,” even though the refugees had not specifically asserted that they had intended to create a joint work.[13] However, the case settled, leaving the interview copyright ownership question unanswered.

A final wrinkle in interview copyright cases arises when the party asserting copyright does not have physical custody of the interview materials and so cannot register the copyright with the U.S Copyright Office. Parties in similar circumstances have attempted to skirt this issue by positioning their claims as declaratory judgment actions rather than directly claiming infringement, as copyright registration is a requirement for filing a copyright infringement lawsuit. These declaratory judgment actions have generally requested that the court grant an injunction requiring defendants to provide copies of the work in question to allow the plaintiffs to register their copyright. So far, courts have been divided on whether this strategy is a permissible circumvention of the copyright registration requirement.

In Johnson v. Magnolia Pictures LLC, the court granted a motion to dismiss by a producer who created a movie about comedian Gilda Radner based on recorded interviews found in an attic. The court ruled that a declaratory judgment is not an independent cause of action that could survive without the underlying copyright infringement claim, which was itself dismissed for lack of copyright registration.[14] Similarly, in Whistleblower Productions, LLC v. St8cked Media LLC, the court dismissed a copyright infringement case because even as plaintiff claiming ownership of the interview footage used to make a documentary, they did not possess the footage and hence had been unable to register the copyrights.[15] But in Lost Boys, the Sudanese refugees case, the court stated that if the refugees proved facts sufficient to show copyright infringement in a trial on the merits, then they would be entitled to an injunction compelling defendants to turn over the interview materials needed for the plaintiffs to register the copyrights.[16]

Trump’s lawsuit faces a similar registration challenge: the Complaint conspicuously fails to plead that Trump has a copyright registration. According to Trump’s attorney, he was unable to register the copyright because he does not have the interview tapes.[17] Thus, similar to the cases above, he does not plead copyright infringement directly, but instead seeks a declaratory judgment that he owns the interview copyright, in whole or in part. However, distinct from the above cases, Trump does not currently seek an injunction to obtain the interview materials copyright registration. Further, because Trump has filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida, where no local or circuit decisions bind the court on these issues, it is unclear whether the court will allow the suit to proceed as an action for declaratory judgment, or whether the lack of copyright registration will be fatal.

If Trump’s suit survives the likely motion to dismiss for lack of copyright registration, then the court would still need to decide whether to find no copyright, divided copyright, sole copyright owned by either Trump or Woodward (or Simon & Schuster), or joint authorship. Trump has already sought to reject the latter, pleading in the Complaint that “President Trump never sought to create a work of joint authorship, and in the hours of the Interviews, there is neither allusion to nor confirmation of such.”[18] The Lost Boys decision indicates that this lack of intent does not necessarily preclude joint authorship, as interview questions and responses may be “inseparable or interdependent parts” that create a “unitary whole.”[19] However, this is the only case that has directly addressed the possibility of joint authorship of an interview in these circumstances. It remains to be seen whether the court would find this reasoning persuasive or would return to earlier decisions to hold either that interview responses cannot be copyrighted at all, or that interview questions and responses are protected by two separate copyrights owned by the interviewer and interviewee, respectively.[20]

Regardless of the outcome of Trump’s case, this high-profile lawsuit has made it impossible to ignore the unsettled nature of a copyright question that has been long overlooked.

[1] Trump v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., Case No. 3:23-cv-02333-RV-ZCB (Dkt. 1, Complaint, Jan. 30, 2023).

[2] 21 Marq. Intell. Prop. Rev. 159 (2017) available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2878800. Drafts of the article won both AIPLA’s Robert C. Watson National Writing Award and the Virginia State Bar Intellectual Property Section’s Student Writing Competition. Amerine is currently an associate at Shearman & Sterling.

[3] Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250 (N.Y. 1968). While this and the Falwell case discussed below were brought under common-law copyright, the courts’ analyses are still relevant to the copyright of interviews under the Copyright Act of 1976.

[4] Id. at 256.

[5] Falwell v. Penthouse Intern., Ltd., 521 F. Supp. 1204 (W.D. Va. 1981).

[6] “There is nothing concrete which distinguishes his particular expression of his ideas from the ordinary.” Id. at 1208.

[7] Id. Notwithstanding, the court also relied in part on the reasoning of the Hemingway dicta: “the actual dialogue, including the unprepared responses of plaintiff, was spontaneous and proceeded in a question and answer format. There is no defined segregation, either by design or by implication of any of plaintiff’s expressions of his thoughts and opinions on the subjects discussed which would aid in identifying plaintiff’s purported copyrighted material.”  Id.

[8] Compare Taggart v. WMAQ Channel 5 Chicago, No. 00-4205-GPM, 2000 WL 1923322 at *5 (S.D.

Ill. Oct. 30, 2000) (“comments during the interview were unprepared and spontaneous responses,” and therefore “simply do not rise to the level of a literary or intellectual creation enjoys the protection of the copyright law.”) with Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 808 F. Supp. 2d 634, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (oral statements of executives “possess the requisite creativity to qualify for copyright protection.”).

[9] Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 554 (D.D.C. 1981).

[10] The question of sound recordings adds a layer of complexity beyond the scope of this post. It will be addressed in a subsequent post.

[11] Trump v. Simon & Schuster, supra Note 1 at ¶¶ 64-65.

[12] Suid v. Newsweek Mag., 503 F. Supp. 146, 147 (D.D.C. 1980).

[13] Foundation for Lost Boys v. Alcon Ent., LLC,  No. 1:15-CV-00509-LMM, 2016 WL 4394486 at *2-4 (N.D. Georgia Mar. 22, 2016).

[14] Johnson v. Magnolia Pictures LLC, No. 18 CV 9337, 2019 WL 4412483, at * 1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2019) (reconsideration denied, Johnson v. Magnolia Pictures LLC, No. 18 CV 9337, 2019 WL 5569610 (Oct. 29, 2019). The interviews formed the basis of the film Love, Gilda.

[15] Whistleblower Prods., LLC v. St8cked Media LLC, No. 18-CV-5258, 2019 WL 3082482 (E.D.N.Y. July 15, 2019)

[16] Found. for Lost Boys and Girls of Sudan, Inc. et al v. Alcon Ent. at *9.

[17] Kyle Jahner, Trump’s Woodward Lawsuit Called Flawed, Intriguing by IP Lawyers, Bloomberg News, Feb. 3, 2023, available at https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ip-law/trumps-woodward-lawsuit-called-flawed-intriguing-by-ip-lawyers#:~:text=Trump’s%20Woodward%20Lawsuit%20Called%20Flawed%2C%20Intriguing%20by%20IP%20Lawyers,-By%20Kyle%20Jahner&text=Former%20President%20Donald%20Trump’s%20copyright,property%20rights%20over%20recorded%20interviews.

[18] Trump v. Simon & Schuster, supra Note 1 at ¶ 47.

[19] Found. for Lost Boys and Girls of Sudan, Inc. et al v. Alcon Ent. at *8.

[20] A fourth alternative, not yet adopted by courts but proposed by Amerine in her article, is that the journalist own copyright over the entire interview as the “mastermind” who controls the project and can be considered the “author” under the Ninth Circuit’s authorship analysis in Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000). Supra note 2 at 182-184.

Categories
Copyright Infringement

Alliance for Creativity and Entertainment (ACE) Unites to Fight Online Piracy

hand holding remote pointed towards a TV screen showing a sports gameAs digital piracy shifts away from torrent downloads and towards unauthorized streaming and theft-based extortion, stakeholders from all parts of the creativity community are reassessing their efforts to fight online infringement. This week, a global coalition of creators and leading on-demand entertainment services joined forces to better address the ever-evolving threat that piracy poses not only to artists and copyright owners, but to consumers and end users. Named the Alliance for Creativity and Entertainment (or ACE), the group brings together 30 industry leaders—including Amazon, HBO, Warner Bros., Netflix, Disney, Hulu, and the BBC—to maximize consumer experience while ensuring the vibrant creative ecosystem they support is not undermined by piracy.

In an opening press release, the Alliance describes the recent exponential growth of digital distribution models and the development of nearly 500 online services that provide consumers with a legitimate on demand viewing experience. And while these platforms have revolutionized the way consumers watch TV and movies, they’ve also added great value to a creative sector that is responsible for $1.2 trillion and 5.5 million jobs in the US alone.

Unfortunately, illicit websites—which sometimes offer pirated works within hours of release—remain a burden to the creative ecosystem and the artists and platforms that drive it. Despite encouraging efforts both in the US and abroad to disable some of the worst offenders, the constant game of cat and mouse with mirroring websites and the emergence of illicit streaming sites continue to frustrate the fight against piracy. According to the press release, in 2016 there were an estimated 5.4 billion downloads of pirated films and television shows and 21.4 billion total visits to illicit streaming websites that profit from the theft and unauthorized distribution of creative works.

To combat these enduring acts of infringement, ACE brings together creative companies from all over the world to combine resources and work in concert with seasoned antipiracy experts at organizations such as the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA). Specifically, “ACE will conduct research, work closely with law enforcement to curtail illegal pirate enterprises, file civil litigation, forge cooperative relationships with existing national content protection organizations, and pursue voluntary agreements with responsible parties across the internet ecosystem.”

By reducing illegal online piracy, ACE will also work to eliminate the risks to consumers that so often accompany the illegitimate distribution of creative works. A recent study by the Digital Citizens Alliance found that one in three pirate sites expose users to infectious malware and that visitors to these pirate sites are 28 times more likely to encounter malware than visitors to legitimate websites. The serious threats posed to consumers by malware and viruses include not only identity theft and financial loss, but the complete immobilization of entire computer systems, as seen in the recent Wannacry attack.

With pirate site operators finding new ways to profit from the theft and distribution of creative works, it’s encouraging to see a unified and global effort dedicated to reducing piracy, supporting creators, and protecting consumers.

 

Categories
Infringement Patent Theory

Explaining Efficient Infringement

By Adam Mossoff & Bhamati Viswanathan

files labeled as "patents"In a recent New York Times op-ed, “The Patent Troll Smokescreen,” Joe Nocera used in print for the first time the term, “efficient infringement.” This pithy phrase quickly gained currency if only because it captures a well-known phenomenon that has been impossible to describe in even a single sentence. Unfortunately, some commentators are confused about the validity of this term. This is understandable, because no one has yet described exactly what it means, especially in comparison to the similar commercial practice of “efficient breach” in contract law.

In a nutshell, efficient infringement occurs when a company deliberately chooses to infringe a patent given that it is cheaper than to license the patent. The reason it is cheaper is what makes it hard to explain briefly: a slew of legal changes to the patent system by Congress, courts, and regulatory agencies in the past ten years have substantially increased the costs and uncertainties in enforcing patents against infringers.

Accused infringers now can very easily invalidate patents, either in court or at the “patent death squad” known as the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. If a patent owner runs this gauntlet after several years of costly litigation and obtains a judgment in its favor, courts are increasingly refusing to award injunctions for anyone other than manufacturing companies. What is left for the patent owner is only damages, but changes in the legal rules for awarding damages have made damage awards very minimal compared to the actual economic harms suffered by a patent owner (a 2015 PricewaterhouseCoopers study found that median damage awards in 2014 were at their second lowest level in the past 20 years).

The result of all of this is that a company economically gains from deliberately infringing patents. It pays less in either legal fees or in court-ordered damages than it would have paid in a license negotiated with a patent owner. This is efficient infringement.

As a term in the legal policy debates, efficient infringement draws some inspiration from the well-known economic model of “efficient breach” in contract law. But the two seem very different, at least superficially.  Thus, efficient infringement needs further explanation by way of a more explicit comparison to efficient breach theory.

The model of efficient breach posits an overall net gain in social welfare from a willful breach of contract. It supposes a scenario in which one contracting party has an opportunity to obtain a higher payment for its goods or services, producing a profit that exceeds any damages from a breach of contract that would be paid to the other contracting party. Thus, the contracting party breaches: it receives the higher payment, it pays the other contracting party its “expectancy interest” (lost profits), and it pockets its net profits. Everyone wins and society is better off, at least according to this highly stylized and abstract economic model.

In practice, though, one rarely finds cases in which this opportunistic breach of contract works. The losses suffered by a victim of a breach of contract easily exceed mere profits, and courts account for this by awarding reliance and restitution damages, as well as punitive damages for deliberate misconduct like opportunistic breach of contract. Other legal claims, such as tortious interference with a contract and equitable claims for rescission and restitution, provide additional sources of relief for victims of willful breaches of contracts. In fact, one reason contracting parties negotiate liquidated damages provisions in their agreements is to limit liability for these widely recognized costs that go beyond mere expectancy interests.

These additional damages reflect the total costs created by strategic, opportunistic breaches of contract. These include institutional and systemic harms in eroding reasonable reliance on contractual commitments, lost investments made on the basis of contractual commitments, lost opportunities to pursue other commercial transactions, reputational harms, and so on. A victim of an opportunistic contract breach, for example, can seek the equitable remedy of rescinding the contract and seek restitution to disgorge the willful bad actor of his wrongful gains at the expense of the victim.

This is why one usually finds successful efficient breach only in hypothetical examples in economic textbooks or in law review articles, and not in actual court cases. As one of the scholars who first coined this term in 1977 recently observed, “efficient breach is both a null set as well as an oxymoron.” Or, as Professor Gregory Klass similarly notes, efficient breach is a “dead letter,” although he still believes it “remains a great teaching tool.”

Recognizing this difference between theory and practice is key in understanding the parallels between efficient breach and efficient infringement.  In theory, efficient breach considers only the lost profits in a one-off case of contract breach, and it thus sounds like a gain in social welfare because everyone benefits. But, in practice, contracting parties and courts recognize the total individual and systemic costs caused by willful violations of legal rights, whether a contract right or a property right. The same is true for efficient infringement, in both theory and practice.

Theoretically, efficient infringement posits a breach of a legal right that enhances both private and social welfare. The company benefits privately because it pays less via a patent infringement lawsuit in either legal fees (invalidating the patent) or in a compulsory license (court-awarded damages). Society is better off, too, because the company engaging in efficient infringement has more resources to put to productive endeavors, as opposed to paying for use of an invalid patent (a monopoly) or in making a larger wealth transfer payment on the basis of a negotiated license.

In the real world, though, efficient infringement creates more costs than merely the lost licensing profits for the patent owner, or the lost patent itself. The more fundamental problem with efficient infringement is that it undermines the proper functioning of the patent system. It frustrates the promise of the reward to the innovator for one’s inventive labors. Once inventors know that the deck of (legal) cards is stacked against them and that they will suffer efficient infringement, they will create less patentable innovation. Without legal security in stable and effective property rights, venture capitalists will not invest in inventors or startups and the innovation economy will suffer.

The important point is that these negative dynamic efficiency effects from efficient infringement are systemic in nature. This is similar to the concern about systemic costs represented by such causes of action for willful breach of contract as restitution and disgorgement of wrongful gains. As a matter of real-world practice, the costs created by efficient infringement are similar to the broader private and systemic costs created by opportunistic breaches of contract—both threaten the viability of legal institutions and the policies that drive them, such as incentivizing investments and promoting commercial transactions.

Categories
Copyright Infringement Uncategorized

Content Thief Turned Content Creator Rails Against Piracy

Cross-posted from the Mister Copyright blog.

cameraLast week, YouTube celebrity (yes, that’s a thing now) Olajide “JJ” Olatunji posted an expletive-filled tirade aimed at those illegally downloading his new movie “Laid in America.” After fans of Olatunji (aka KSI), whose YouTube page has over 14 million subscribers, began notifying him of the film’s availability on a number of illicit torrent sites, he lashed out at the people pirating the film, listing the many legal services offering his work, and explaining – in not so subtle terms – how illegally downloading the film hurts all who contributed to its creation. Some commenters were quick to point out that Olatunji himself used pirated software to create the very videos that made him famous. But while Olatunji readily admitted his outburst was somewhat hypocritical, the dramatic rant speaks to an important aspect of the nature of piracy: The extensive damage caused by the illegal downloading of creative works often isn’t appreciated by those unfamiliar with all that goes into producing them.

Illegally downloading creative content online is all too easy. Unlike stealing a physical product from a store, there’s no need to stealthily conceal the merchandise, avoid security guards, or worry about magnetic security tags. A user can visit any number of torrent sites, simply click on a title, and wait for the work to download. The ease and perceived absence of repercussions for illegally downloading content has been perhaps one of the biggest impediments to quelling the massive amount of piracy that continues to saturate the Internet. Unfortunately, it’s a mindset that seems to be ingrained in a younger generation of Internet users: How could something so easy and consequence-free be bad?

Even if some users realize that sharing pirated copies of music, movies, TV shows, or software is wrong and illegal, they often don’t understand why. A common narrative among those distributing illicit copies of copyrighted works is that movie studios or record labels are corrupt and already making enough money, and that illegally downloading a film or album won’t affect the entertainment business in the long run. Then there’s the exposure myth. It goes something like this: If I share this album with all my friends, the band will gain more fans and the fans will go see them live and buy their t-shirts. It’s a cute idea, but artists can’t live on exposure. Take their word for it here, here, and here.

Others just don’t understand all that goes into making an album, show, or film. They believe that when they pay for a movie, the money goes to an already wealthy actor, musician, or big studio executive. While portions of the proceeds certainly do, the money is also paying the salaries of the hundreds and sometimes thousands of people behind the scenes, without whom the work could never be created. As Olatunji so eloquently clarifies:

I’m not the only one that made this movie. There were hundreds, and hundreds, and hundreds of people that made this movie. Because it’s not just me you’re f*cking over. You’re f*cking over so many people. You’re f*cking over the producer, director, actors, people who did the music in the film, the cameramen, the lighting crew, the set crew. No, but seriously, it’s f*cking ridiculous.

A seasoned anti-piracy advocate couldn’t have said it any better.

The point is that the entertainment and copyright-based industry is larger and comprised of so many more components and workers than most realize. A 2014 report by the International Intellectual Property Alliance details the contribution copyright industries make to the United States GDP, quantifying the value at over 1.1 trillion dollars. The study found that copyright industries “make up an increasingly large percentage of value added to GDP; create more and better-paying jobs; grow faster than the rest of the U.S. economy; and contribute substantially to U.S. foreign sales and exports, outpacing many industry sectors.”

Illegal distribution of copyrighted works threatens much more than the pocketbooks of successful artists and executives. The fact that proponents of a “free” Internet and those engaged in piracy either don’t realize or refuse to acknowledge the far-reaching effects of stealing creative works is troublesome. The passion of Olatunji’s appeal to his fans and those stealing his movie speaks volumes about the misconceptions surrounding piracy and how a little insight into the creative process can make things so clear. Respect for creative processes shouldn’t be an abstract concept, and if more creators and celebrities lend their voice to educating the public, art and entertainment will flourish.

Categories
Copyright Infringement Trademarks Uncategorized

Criminal Copyright Infringement is Crime of "Moral Turpitude"

Cross-posted from the Law Theories blog.

sheet musicThis past Friday, the Board of Immigration Appeals held that criminal copyright infringement constitutes a “crime involving moral turpitude” under immigration law. The Board reasoned that criminal copyright infringement is inherently immoral because it involves the willful theft of property and causes harm to both the copyright owner and society.

The respondent, Raul Zaragoza-Vaquero, was indicted in 2012 for selling illicit CDs of popular artists including Justin Bieber, Lady Gaga, and Jennifer Lopez over a five-year period. After a three-day trial, the jury found Zaragoza-Vaquero guilty of criminal copyright infringement under Section 506(a)(1)(A), which makes it a crime to “willfully” infringe “for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain.” The crime was a felony under Section 2319(b)(1) because it involved the “reproduction or distribution, . . . during any 180-day period, of at least 10 copies or phonorecords, of 1 or more copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of more than $2,500.” Zaragoza-Vaquero was sentenced to 33 months in prison and ordered to pay $36,000 in restitution.

Under immigration law, an alien who has been ordered removed from the United States may ask the Attorney General to cancel the removal order. However, there is an exception for “any alien convicted of . . . a crime involving moral turpitude,” in which case the Attorney General is powerless to cancel the removal. Zaragoza-Vaquero was ordered removed in early 2015, and the Immigration Judge pretermitted his application to have the removal order cancelled by the Attorney General. The Immigration Judge held that criminal copyright infringement is a “crime involving moral turpitude,” thus making Zaragoza-Vaquero ineligible for such cancellation. On appeal, the Board agreed, rejecting Zaragoza-Vaquero’s bid to have the Attorney General consider his removal.

Even though crimes of “moral turpitude” have been removable offenses since 1891, Congress has never defined what the phrase means nor listed the crimes that qualify. That job instead has been left to immigration judges and the federal courts. In 1951, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that “crimes in which fraud was an ingredient have always been regarded as involving moral turpitude.” Indeed, many property crimes have been held to involve “moral turpitude” when committed willfully because there is the criminal intent to defraud the property owner of its rights. “Moral turpitude” has thus been found to exist in numerous crimes against property, including arson, burglary, embezzlement, extortion, blackmail, bribery, false pretenses, forgery, larceny, receiving or transporting stolen goods, and check or credit card fraud.

Crimes against intellectual property have likewise been found to involve “moral turpitude.” For example, the Ninth Circuit held in 2008 that the use of counterfeit marks, in violation of state law, is “a crime involving moral turpitude because it is an inherently fraudulent crime.” The Ninth Circuit reasoned: “Either an innocent purchaser is tricked into buying a fake item; or even if the purchaser knows the item is counterfeit, the owner of the mark has been robbed of its value. The crime is really a species of theft. . . . The commission of the crime necessarily defrauds the owner of the mark, or an innocent purchaser of the counterfeit items, or both.”

Similarly, the Board of Immigration Appeals held in 2007 that trafficking in counterfeit goods, in violation of federal law, is a crime of “moral turpitude.” The Board reasoned that the conviction required the federal prosecutor to prove that the defendant “intentionally trafficked” and “knowingly used a spurious trademark that was likely to confuse or deceive others.” Even though the statute did not require proof that the defendant had the specific intent to defraud, the Board held that such trafficking involved “moral turpitude” because it is “inherently immoral” to willfully exploit the property owner and the public.

Turning back to Zaragoza-Vaquero, the Board defined “moral turpitude” as “conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to society in general.” The Board then noted that trafficking in counterfeit goods has been held to be a crime of “moral turpitude” because it involves (1) “theft of someone else’s property,” (2) “proof of intent to traffic,” (3) “societal harm,” and (4) “dishonest dealing and deliberate exploitation of the public and the mark owner.”

Reasoning by analogy to these trafficking cases, the Board ultimately held that criminal copyright infringement “must also be a crime involving moral turpitude.” Criminal copyright infringement statutes “were enacted to protect a form of intellectual property,” and offenses “must be committed willfully, meaning that a defendant must voluntarily and intentionally violate a known legal duty not to infringe a copyright.” The Board noted that criminal copyright infringement “also involves significant societal harm,” since “piracy” has “harmed the film and recording industries, including actors, artists, and musicians.” It pointed to a recent report by the Government Accountability Office, which found that “intellectual property crimes cause negative effects on health, safety, and lost revenue.”

The Board’s holding that criminal copyright infringement is a crime of “moral turpitude” thus extends the long line of cases finding that crimes against property are inherently immoral when the criminal intentionally defrauds the owner of its rights. While many will surely balk at the suggestion that there’s anything immoral about criminal copyright infringement, I think the Board reached the right conclusion—both in the moral and legal sense. A defendant such as Zaragoza-Vaquero, who for years willfully infringed for profit, has acted in a way that shocks the conscience and has shown a conscious disregard for the rights of others. And while prosecutors need not show the specific intent to defraud in securing such a conviction, the element of willfulness suffices to establish the intent to defraud the copyright owner of its property.

Categories
Copyright Copyright Licensing Copyright Theory Infringement International Law Internet Legislation Uncategorized WIPO

European Union Draws a Line on Infringing Hyperlinks

Cross-posted from the Mister Copyright blog.

a gavel lying on a table in front of booksLast week, the European Court of Justice—the judicial authority of the European Union—issued an anticipated decision in the Sanoma hyperlinking case, declaring that commercial linking with knowledge of unauthorized content constitutes copyright infringement. The opinion comes after years of similar cases in Europe stirred debate over whether linking to pirated works was a ‘communication to the public’ and therefore infringing, and provides a sensible test that protects the works of authors and creators while ensuring the internet remains a bastion of free speech.

Sanoma involved the popular Dutch news and gossip site GeenStijl, which ran an article in 2011 that included links to an Australian website where copyrighted Playboy magazine photos were made available. The photos were published on the Australian website without the consent of Sanoma, Playboy’s editor and copyright owner of the photos at issues, but taken down after the site was notified of their infringing nature. Despite similar notifications, GeenStijl refused to remove the hyperlinks and actually provided links to another website hosting the unauthorized photos after the Australian website took them down.

Sanoma brought a copyright infringement claim against GS Media, which operates the GeenStijl website, and the Supreme Court of the Netherlands sought a preliminary ruling from the European Court of Justice on whether hyperlinks represent the communication of a work to the public. According to an earlier EU directive, any communication to the public of works protected by copyright must be authorized by the copyright owner. Due to the ubiquity of links and hyperlinks on the Internet, a ruling classifying them as communications to the public would have major ramifications for anyone linking to unauthorized content.

In its judgment, the European Court of Justice found that the concept of ‘communication to the public’ requires individual assessment and laid out the following three factors that must be considered when determining whether a link or hyperlink qualifies.

1) The deliberate nature of the intervention – According to the Court, “the user makes an act of communication when it intervenes, in full knowledge of the consequences of its actions, in order to give access to a protected work to its customers.”
2) The concept of the ‘public’ covers an indeterminate number of potential viewers and implies a large number of people.
3) The profit-making nature of a communication to the public – The Court explains that when hyperlinks are posted for profit, “it may be expected that the person who posted such a link should carry out the checks necessary to ensure that the work concerned is not illegally published.”

Applying these criteria to Sanoma, the Court found that because GS Media runs a commercial website that makes money from advertising, it is undisputed that they posted the hyperlinks for profit, and that it is also undisputed that Sanoma had not authorized the publication of the photos. It also found that because they were notified by Sanoma and continued to repost links after the original source website took down the content, GS Media was aware of the infringing nature of the photos and “cannot, therefore, rebut the presumption that it posted those links in full knowledge of the illegal nature of that publication.” The Court concluded that by posting the links, GS Media therefor effected a ‘communication to the public.’

The Court goes on to detail its desire to maintain a fair balance between the interest of copyright owners and authors and the protection of the interests and fundamental rights of Internet users, “in particular their freedom of expression and of information, as well as the general interest.” After providing the criteria for assessing whether a link qualifies as a communication to the public, the opinion emphasizes the important role hyperlinks play in the exchange and free flow of information over the internet, and clarifies that linking—even to unauthorized content—is not a communication to the public if there is no profit motive or knowledge of the infringing nature of the linked-to works. Even so, it’s important to note that not-for-profit hyperlinking may still be considered a communication to the public if the person posting the link knew or should have reasonably known that the content was posted without authorization.

Perhaps most surprising about the Court’s decree is the relative approval by both copyright owners and supporters of the rights of those posting links. While it speaks to the reasonable approach the Court has taken in determining what qualifies as a communication to the public, it may also represent a hesitation to condemn or praise the order due to a significant ambiguity. It’s not entirely clear who carries the evidentiary burden of proving whether an individual knew or should have reasonably known certain content was posted on the Internet without authorization. If copyright owners and authors are forced to prove a user knew or should have known content was unauthorized every time they attempt to remove links that can appear online incessantly, it could render the new directives ineffectual in protecting creative works.

Regardless of the uncertainly surrounding this burden of proof, the current test seems to strike a balance that holds commercial websites more accountable, while allowing for some flexibility for the general public. With debates over the effectiveness of notice and takedown intensifying in the United States, the EU’s decision on communications to the public should be recognized as workable approach to dealing with infringing hyperlinks. As the United States Copyright Office admits in its 2016 study on the making available right, jurisprudence in the US regarding offering access to content hosted elsewhere on the Internet through hyperlinking is less developed as some foreign jurisdictions. But the study acknowledges the progress made in the EU, and emphasizes the need to include ‘offers of access’ in the crucial making available right.

Despite semantic differences, the EU and the US are both moving towards systems that will impose greater accountability for posting links to unauthorized works. The EU’s directive makes clear that commercial hyperlinking to unauthorized content is indeed a communication to the public and therefor copyright infringement, while ensuring that the free flow of information through general public linking will not be threatened and the Internet will remain unbroken. It’s an approach that represents the greater goals of copyright law around the world, and other jurisdictions should follow the lead of the EU when crafting copyright policies that address the intricacies of the Internet.

Categories
Copyright Copyright Licensing Copyright Theory Infringement Intellectual Property Theory Internet Reasonable Royalty Uncategorized

Despite What You Hear, Notice and Takedown is Failing Creators and Copyright Owners

cameraIn a recent op-ed in the LA Times, Professors Chris Sprigman and Mark Lemley praise the notice and takedown provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) as “a bit of copyright law worth saving.” They argue that Section 512 of the DMCA continues to serve its purpose of balancing the rights of copyright owners and creators with those of Internet service providers (ISPs), while leaving both sides only “slightly disappointed.” Satisfying these two groups is indeed a difficult charge, but it’s simply disingenuous to suggest that creators and copyright owners are satisfied with a system so clearly in need of an overhaul.

As the Copyright Office embarks on its review of the DMCA, supporters and critics of the nearly twenty-year-old doctrine are weighing in on its effectiveness in addressing online infringement. Sprigman and Lemley claim that the “process has worked well for years,” and that the result of shifting more enforcement burden to ISPs “could be a broken Internet.” But for those creators and copyright owners who have their works resurface online just minutes after they are taken down, the Internet is already “broken.” The fact that piracy continues to intensify, despite incredible efforts to have infringing content taken down, shows that notice and takedown is largely ineffective.

As CPIP Senior Scholar Sean O’Connor testified before Congress, the notice and takedown system is not working for any of its intended beneficiaries. The constant game of whack-a-mole renders the system essentially futile for copyright owners and creators, and it creates significant burdens for ISPs that want to comply—especially small to mid-level companies that can’t afford compliance staff. Worse still, by shielding service providers from liability, the DMCA creates perverse incentives where there’s little downside to ignoring infringing content. In fact, reviewing content could lead to an ISP having knowledge of infringement and losing its safe harbor.

Now that the Copyright Office’s review is underway, it’s somewhat strange to see some supporters claim that all is well. But has anything actually changed since the Office announced its study?  Of course not. The whack-a-mole problem remains, and the knowledge standards are still interpreted broadly to disproportionately favor ISPs. When one side says the system is working and the other side says it’s broken, the truth is that the system is not working well for everyone. Sprigman and Lemley can claim that the DMCA is “worth saving” only by downplaying the true plight of creators and copyright owners.

A concrete example of this struggle comes from the comments filed by Universal Music Group (UMG) as part of the Copyright Office’s study. UMG describes the painstaking efforts devoted to protect just one artist’s creative work. In October of 2014, UMG and Big Machine Records launched a joint offensive to protect Taylor Swift’s “1989.” A staff of UMG employees dedicated 100% of their time and resources to manually search for infringements on YouTube, SoundCloud, and Tumblr, and through March of 2016, they had sent over 66,000 DMCA takedown notices. Despite their considerable efforts, over 500,000 links to the album were identified, and “1989” was illegally downloaded nearly 1.4 million times from torrent sites.

Of course, this type of effort would be impossible to replicate for any works other than those that attract such massive attention. For most artists, the burden of monitoring the Internet and sending takedown notices would fall entirely on their shoulders, with no guarantee of putting a stop to the theft of their works. Sprigman and Lemley ignore these problems, instead claiming that since copyright owners sent “more than 500 million takedown requests just to Google last year,” we know that the “system is a powerful tool against pirated content.” That would be great, if true, but the reality is that those notices barely made a dent.

Sprigman and Lemley claim that the “genius of the DMCA” is that it “enables entertainment companies to turn piracy into legitimate revenue.” They give the example of “YouTube’s Content ID system,” which “gives copyright owners the opportunity to ‘claim’ their work and share in any advertising revenue rather than pull it off the site.” From the perspective of creators and copyright owners, the only “genius” of this system is that YouTube can legally present them with an unfair choice—suffer infringement and get nothing or monetize and get next to nothing.

While Sprigman and Lemley praise the “more than $1 billion” paid out by YouTube, the real question is how much more copyright owners and creators would have been paid in a properly functioning market. YouTube is consistently teeming with infringing videos—one recent report revealed that over 180 million infringing videos had been removed in 2014 alone. And the artists that YouTube’s largess supposedly benefits are loudly complaining about their exploitation. If Content ID is so great, why are so many creators and copyright owners upset with the arrangement? The monetization Google offers to copyright owners and artists is less than half of the royalties paid out by streaming services like Pandora, an amount that artists have denounced as already inequitable.

In her excellent piece on the fictions of the Content ID system, Grammy-winning artist Maria Schneider exposes Content ID as a way for Google to cash in by actually legitimizing and perpetuating piracy. She explains that a majority of creators that opt for monetization realize miserable percentages of ad revenue, and the continued illegal uploading of their music and content drives billions of users to YouTube’s platform. YouTube has turned the weakness of the DMCA into a system that exploits artists while offering embarrassingly lower royalty rates than what would be negotiated in a free market.

The current situation is untenable, and if change means “breaking” the Internet, then we should pull out the pickaxes and get to work. A system of notice and staydown, rather than just takedown, would help alleviate the constant and seemingly ineffectual vigilance required by the current system. By removing all copies of a protected work and blocking inevitable re-postings, ISPs would honor the original purpose of the DMCA while actually doing their part to earn the protection of the safe harbor provisions. Only by ensuring that targeted works do not resurface will ISPs respect the rights of those without whose content they would cease to exist.

How anyone can honestly say that the current notice and takedown system is working for copyright owners and creators is mystifying given the constant calls for reform from creators and the numerous critical comments filed with the Copyright Office. The incredible magnitude of takedown notices sent and the seemingly unstoppable reappearance of infringing works online are a clear signal that the system is completely failing those it was meant to protect. Creators and copyright owners deserve a better chance at protecting the fruits of their labors, and the DMCA needs to be changed so that it truly is a system “worth saving.”

Categories
Administrative Agency Commercialization Copyright Copyright Licensing Infringement Innovation Internet Legislation Supreme Court Uncategorized

Letter on FCC Set-Top Box Regulation Once Again Confuses the Issue

Washington, D.C. at nightLast week, a group of law professors wrote a letter to the acting Librarian of Congress in which they claim that the current FCC proposal to regulate cable video navigation systems does not deprive copyright owners of the exclusive rights guaranteed by the Copyright Act. The letter repeats arguments from response comments they  filed along with the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), accusing the Copyright Office of misinterpreting the scope of copyright law and once again bringing up Sony v. Universal to insist that copyright owners are overstepping their bounds. Unfortunately, the IP professors’ recurring reliance on Sony is misplaced, as the 30-year-old case does not address the most significant and troubling copyright violations that will result from the FCC’s proposed rules.

In 1984, the Supreme Court in Sony held that recording television shows on a personal VCR was an act of “time-shifting” and therefor did not constitute copyright infringement. The court also ruled that contributory liability requires knowledge, and such knowledge will not be imputed to a defendant based solely on the characteristics or design of a distributed product if that product is “capable of substantial noninfringing uses.” But while this precedent remains good law today, it does not apply to the real concerns creators and copyright owners have with the FCC’s attempt to redistribute their works without authorization.

The FCC’s proposed rules would require pay-TV providers to send copyrighted, licensed TV programs to third parties, even if the transmission would violate the agreements that pay-TV providers carefully negotiated with copyright owners. A different group of IP scholars recently explained to the FCC that by forcing pay-TV providers to exceed the scope of their licenses, the proposed rules effectively create a zero-rate compulsory license and undermine the property rights of creators and copyright owners. The compulsory license would benefit third-party recipients of the TV programs who have no contractual relationship with either the copyright owners or pay-TV providers, depriving creators and copyright owners of the right to license their works on their own terms.

This unauthorized siphoning and redistribution of copyrighted works would occur well before the programming reaches the in-home navigational device, a fact that the authors of the recent letter to the Librarian of Congress either don’t understand, or choose to ignore. Creators and copyright owners are not attempting to “exert control over the market for video receivers,” as the letter suggests. The manufacture and distribution of innovative devices that allow consumers to access the programming to which they subscribe is something that copyright owners and creators embrace, and a thriving market for such devices already exists.

As more consumers resort to cord cutting, countless options have become available in terms of navigational devices and on-demand streaming services. Apple TV, Roku, Nexus Player and Amazon Fire Stick are just a few of the digital media players consumers can choose from, and more advanced devices are  always being released. But while the creative community supports the development of these devices, it is the circumvention of existing licenses and disregard for the rights of creators to control their works that has artists and copyright owners worried.

Sony has become a rallying cry for those arguing that copyright owners are attempting to control and stymie the development of new devices and technologies, but these critics neglect the substantial problems presented by the transmission of digital media that Sony couldn’t predict and does not address. In the era of the VCR, there was no Internet over which television was broadcast into the home. In 1984, once a VCR manufacturer sold a unit, they ceased to have any control over the use of the machine. Consumers could use VCRs to record television or play video cassettes as they pleased, and the manufacturer wouldn’t benefit from their activity either way.

The difference with the current navigation device manufacturers is that they will receive copyrighted TV programs to which they’ll have unbridled liberty to repackage and control before sending them to the in-home navigation device. The third-party device manufacturers will not only be able to tamper with the channel placement designed to protect viewer experience and brand value, they will also be able to insert their own advertising into the delivery of the content, reducing pay-tv ad revenue and the value of the license agreements that copyright owners negotiate with pay-TV providers. The FCC’s proposal isn’t really about navigational devices, it’s about the control of creative works and the building of services around TV programs that the FCC plans to distribute to third parties free of any obligation to the owners and creators of those programs.

The authors of the letter conflate two distinct issues, misleading influential decision makers that may not be as well versed in the intricacies of copyright law. By stubbornly comparing the copyright issues surrounding the FCC’s proposed rules to those considered by the Supreme Court in Sony, they craftily try to divert attention away from the real matter at hand: Not what consumers do with the creative works they access in the privacy of their own homes, but how those works are delivered to consumers’ homes in the first place.

It’s curious that after many rounds of back-and-forth comments discussing the FCC’s proposal, proponents of the rules still refuse to address this primary copyright concern that has been continuously raised by creators and copyright owners in corresponding comments, articles, and letters (see also here, here, here, and here). Perhaps the authors of the recent letter simply do not grasp the real implications of the FCC’s plan to seize and redistribute copyrighted content, but given their years of copyright law experience, that is unlikely. More probable is that they recognize the complications inherent in the proposal, but do not have a good answer to the questions raised by the proposal’s critics, so they choose instead to cloud the issue with a similar-sounding but separate issue. But if they truly want to make progress in the set-top box debate and clear the way for copyright compliant navigational devices, they’ll need to do more than fall back on the same, irrelevant arguments.

Categories
Copyright Infringement Internet Uncategorized

The Dangerous Combination of Content Theft and Malware

Cross-posted from the Mister Copyright blog.

circuit boardMalware, short for malicious software, has been used to infiltrate and contaminate computers since the early 1980s. But what began as relatively benign software designed to prank and annoy users has developed into a variety of hostile programs intended to hijack, steal, extort, and attack. Disguised software including computer viruses, worms, trojan horses, ransomware, spyware, adware, and other malicious programs have flooded the Internet, allowing online criminals to profit from illicit activity while inflicting enormous costs on businesses, governments and individual consumers.

Purveyors of malware target unsavory websites to embed and distribute their programs, often making deals with those in the business of disseminating stolen content. Content theft websites that appear online through legitimate hosting and content delivery systems are frequently riddled with devious malware that infect the computers of users looking to download or stream pirated music, movie and television shows.

Last week, the Digital Citizens Alliance (DCA) published a report detailing how US tech companies are allowing cyber criminals to use their services to perform a myriad of illegal exploits. Enabling Malware focuses on how stolen content is being used as bait to infect users’ computers and how domestic hosting and content delivery companies are permitting online criminals to profit from the spread of dangerous malware.

Employing the expertise of Internet security firm RiskIQ, the report found that 1 in 3 content theft websites expose users to infectious malware and that visitors are 28 times more likely to encounter malware on content theft sites than mainstream, legitimate websites. And although these nefarious websites are usually created and maintained by overseas operators, they rely on North America hosting companies to function.

It’s a tricky partnership because while the hosting companies are not breaking the law by allowing disreputable websites to make us of their services, they are facilitating criminal networks whose activities could have catastrophic consequences. The report likens these service companies to landlords who turn a blind eye to the illegal activity of a renter. The issue is the same one being examined by the Copyright Office in its DMCA 512 study: When does a service provider have the requisite knowledge of illicit activity to trigger a duty to address the problem?

But while Section 512 of the DMCA hopes to combat copyright infringement online, the introduction of malware to content theft sites has consequences more far-reaching and dire than the dissemination of stolen works. Once malware infiltrates a system and hackers are able to take over, the results can be disastrous. The report details a wide range of criminal activity that can result from malware infection including the theft of bank credentials and credit card information that is then subsequently sold online, locking computers and demanding ransoms to return access, and hijacking webcams to film users without consent. The report warns:

[T]hese companies are now contributing to a growing issue for Americans: the threat of computer infections, the rise of identity theft and loss of financial information. The U.S. Department of Justice reports that 16.2 million U.S. consumers have been victimized by identity theft, with financial losses totaling over $24.7 billion.

According to the study, one of the most notorious companies enabling the websites that spread malware is CloudFlare. Marketing itself as a global content protection and security service provider, CloudFlare actually conceals a website’s true hosting information, inserting their network information instead. This allows for notorious content theft websites to mask information related to their actual hosting companies, making it more difficult to identify those complicit in their illegal activity.

Employing CloudFlare’s services are websites like Putlockerr.io, which offers a wide array of pirated movies for download. But when a user attempts to watch a movie via Putlocker, they download more than pirated content. After a user clicks to watch a movie, they are redirected to a new site that prompts them to download a new video player in order to view the content. This download is in fact a mechanism to deliver the malware that will wreak havoc on their system.

One of the worst distributors of malware identified by RiskIQ was watchfreemoviesonline.top. According to the study, the websites malware exposure rate was 32 percent and baited users into downloading the infectious software by offering popular movies like Captain America: Civil War in advance of its theatrical release. Watchfreemoviesonline.top uses Hawk Host, a company offering services similar to CloudFlare, to hide information about their actual hosting affiliations.

The Digital Citizens Alliance contacted both CloudFlare and Hawk Host to inform them of the findings of the RiskIQ report, and received differing responses. After being presented with clear evidence of the shady and illegal activities of watchfreemoviesonline.top, Hawk Host acknowledged that the site violated their terms of service and told the DCA that the site would come down. Hawk Host also agreed to meet with DCA researches to further discuss the RiskIQ report.

Unfortunately, the DCA’s interaction with CloudFlare was not as encouraging. In response to an email informing the company of the findings of the RiskIQ report, CloudFlare responded with a vague comment disclaiming any responsibility for the content of their client websites.

In the past few years, there’s been progress among service companies’ accountability efforts, with many refusing to deal with criminal websites. Payment providers like PayPal and Visa have stopped permitting illicit websites to use their services, and online advertisers have vowed to stop dealing with infamous content theft sites. But in order to eradicate content theft sites and the malware they propagate, the companies that help veil their identities and enable criminal activity must be help accountable.