Category: Infringement

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Copyright Infringement Internet Uncategorized

Three Years Later, DMCA Still Just as Broken

By Matthew Barblan & Kevin Madigan

cameraIn 2013, CPIP published a policy brief by Professor Bruce Boyden exposing the DMCA notice and takedown system as outdated and in need of reform. The Failure of the DMCA Notice and Takedown System explained that while Section 512 of the DMCA was intended as a way for copyright owners and service providers to work together to fight infringement in the digital age, the notice and takedown system has been largely ineffective in managing the ever-increasing amount of piracy.

Three years later, the DMCA is still just as broken. Since we published the brief, courts have further diminished service providers’ responsibility to cooperate with copyright owners to detect and deter infringement, rendering the DMCA even more fruitless and desperately in need of retooling.

Boyden explained the fundamental problems with the system at the time, beginning with the fact that “despite all the notice, there is precious little takedown to show for it. Unless a site employs some sort of content filtering technology, the same content typically re-appears within hours after it is removed.” The notice and takedown system is particularly unsuited for the twenty-first century, where “infringement is persistent, ubiquitous, and gargantuan in scale. It is a problem that needs to be policed” with more than just takedown notices that don’t give copyright owners “a single day when the content is not available on the most heavily trafficked sites.”

Boyden noted that “even for the largest media companies with the most resources at their disposal, attempting to purge a site of even a fraction of the highest-value content is like trying to bail out an oil tanker with a thimble.” And Boyden pointed out that the courts hadn’t made the situation any better: “The DMCA’s unsuitability as a tool to manage chronic, persistent, and pervasive infringement is particularly apparent after recent decisions from the Second and Ninth Circuit that construed the duty of website owners very narrowly under Section 512.”

To further illustrate his point, Boyden collected data on takedown notices sent by MPAA companies and counter-notices received. Between March and August of 2013, MPAA companies sent takedown notices for over 25 million infringing URLs and received only 8 counter-notices in response. That’s a counter-notice rate of 0.000032%, suggesting that the astronomical volume of notices represents a likewise astronomical volume of infringement rather than overly-aggressive notice-sending.

Grand Totals. Infringing URLs: 25,235,151. URLs Sent to Websites: 13,238,860. URLs Sent to Search Engines: 11,996,291. Counter-Notices Received: 8.

Boyden concluded:

The impossibility of keeping up with new [infringing] uploads means that an online service provider can create a site aimed at and dedicated to hosting infringing copyrighted works, comply with every takedown notice, and still benefit from the safe harbor, as long as its intent remains hidden. If the site has enough users, any popular content removed will be supplanted by new copies almost immediately.

Sadly, three years later the “chronic, persistent, and pervasive” infringement that Boyden described continues, with stolen copyrighted works popping up on sites almost immediately after being taken down. Google Search—one product of one company—has receive nearly 90 million takedown notices this month alone. The situation has gotten so bad that last week a long list of artists, including Paul McCartney and Taylor Swift, signed a digital petition to bring attention to a broken DMCA system that allows companies like YouTube to benefit from infringement at the expense of songwriters and artists.

The artists’ main message: “The existing laws threaten the continued viability of songwriters and recording artists to survive from the creation of music.” They note that “the tech companies who benefit from the DMCA today were not the intended protectorate when it was signed into law nearly two decades ago,” and they ask Congress to “enact sensible reform that balances the interests of creators with the interests of the companies who exploit music for their financial enrichment.”

Recognizing the growing frustration with the DMCA, the U.S. Copyright Office initiated a study earlier this year to examine whether the statute is fulfilling its purpose. We submitted comments to the Copyright Office on behalf of a group of copyright law scholars, noting that courts have disrupted the balance Congress sought to create when it enacted the DMCA. In particular, courts have eliminated any incentive for service providers to work with copyright owners to develop policies and procedures to prevent or curb piracy online. In just one example of how deeply courts have distorted congressional intent, under courts’ current interpretation of the DMCA, search engines can continue to index even obviously infringing sites like The Pirate Bay with no fear of potential of liability.

Adding insult to injury, courts have recently shifted the balance of power even further away from artists and towards service providers, making it easier than ever for companies to enable and profit from infringement while turning a blind eye—or even encouraging—piracy on their sites. In this month’s Capitol Records v. Vimeo decision, for example, the Second Circuit extended the DMCA safe harbor to Vimeo despite smoking-gun evidence that Vimeo employees encouraged users to post stolen works on their site and had viewed the illicit videos at issue in the suit. In a jaw-dropping opinion, the court let Vimeo off the hook simply because the evidence of Vimeo employees encouraging infringement wasn’t directly tied to the specific infringing videos that plaintiffs included in their suit.

CPIP’s Devlin Hartline explains:

After Capitol Records v. Vimeo: A service provider can encourage its users to infringe on a massive scale, and so long as the infringement it encourages isn’t the specific infringement it gets sued for, it wins on the safe harbor defense at summary judgment. This is so even if there’s copious evidence that its employees viewed and interacted with the specific infringing material at issue. No jury will ever get to weigh all of the evidence and decide whether the infringement is obvious. At the same time, any proactive steps taken by the service provider will potentially open it up to liability for having actual knowledge, so the incentive is to do as little as possible to proactively “detect and deal” with piracy. This is not at all what Congress intended. It lets bad faith service providers trample the rights of copyright owners with impunity.

As courts continue to gut the DMCA, making it harder than ever for artists to protect their property and livelihoods, Congress would be wise to heed Bruce Boyden’s advice from three years ago: “It is long past time for a retooling of the notice and takedown regime.”

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Copyright Infringement Internet Uncategorized

Second Circuit Deepens Red Flag Knowledge Circuit Split in Vimeo

a gavel lying on a table in front of booksThe Second Circuit’s recent opinion in Capitol Records v. Vimeo is, to put it mildly, pretty bad. From its convoluted reasoning that copyrights under state law for pre-1972 sound recordings are limited by the DMCA safe harbors, despite the explicit statement in Section 301(c) that “rights or remedies” under state law “shall not be annulled or limited” by the Copyright Act, to its gutting of red flag knowledge by limiting it to the nearly-impossible situation where a service provider actually knows that a specific use of an entire copyrighted work is neither fair nor licensed yet somehow doesn’t also surmise that it’s infringing, it’s hard to see how either result is compelled by the statutes, much less how it was intended by Congress. On the latter point, the Second Circuit in essence has written red flag knowledge out of the statute, reducing the DMCA to a mere notice-and-takedown regime. The reality is that Congress expected red flag knowledge to do far more work, incentivizing service providers to take action in the face of a red flag—even without a notice.

If there’s any good to come from Vimeo, it might only be that the Second Circuit has now deepened the circuit split with the Ninth Circuit in Columbia Pictures v. Fung on two issues related to red flag knowledge. Under the statute, red flag knowledge exists when a service provider is “aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.” The two circuits are already split on the issue of whether red flag knowledge must pertain to the particular works that are being sued over in the suit. And now with Vimeo, the circuits are split on the issue of whether a service provider can gain red flag knowledge just by looking at an infringing work. The deeper the circuit split, the greater the chance an appeal will make it to the Supreme Court, which would hopefully clean up the current red flag knowledge mess.

In Fung, the defendant, Gary Fung, operated several piracy havens, including isoHunt, TorrentBox, Podtropolis, and eDonkey. The district court found Fung liable for inducement under MGM v. Grokster and denied him safe harbor protection under the DMCA. The district court’s decision came in 2009, two years before the Ninth Circuit first held in UMG v. Shelter Capital that red flag knowledge requires “specific knowledge of particular infringing activity.” It also came two-and-a-half years before the Second Circuit held in Viacom v. YouTube that red flag knowledge is only relevant if it pertains to the works-in-suit. Regardless, since the vast majority of content available on Fung’s sites was copyrighted, including specific content that he himself had downloaded, the district court held that Fung hadn’t even raised a triable issue of fact as to whether he had red flag knowledge. The fact that none of the works he had been sued over were the same as the ones he had been found to have red flag knowledge of was irrelevant.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that Fung had red flag knowledge as a matter of law. The opinion came out just one week after the same panel of judges issued a superseding opinion in UMG v. Shelter Capital reiterating that red flag knowledge requires “specific knowledge of particular infringing activity.” Importantly, in applying that standard to Fung, the Ninth Circuit did not say that the specific knowledge had to be of the particular works-in-suit. For whatever reason, Fung had failed to argue otherwise. Google even filed an amicus brief supporting the plaintiffs but nonetheless arguing that “the DMCA’s knowledge standards are specific and focus on the particular material that the plaintiff is suing about.” Apparently unaware that this actually helped his case, Fung filed a supplemental brief calling Google’s argument “fallacious.”

In the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, even though red flag knowledge had to relate to particular infringing activity, that activity did not have to involve the particular works-in-suit. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit held that the “material in question was sufficiently current and well-known that it would have been objectively obvious to a reasonable person” that it was “both copyrighted and not licensed to random members of the public.” Since Fung failed to expeditiously remove the particular material of which he had red flag knowledge, he lost his safe harbor protection across the board. Thus, the Ninth Circuit in Fung held that: (1) red flag knowledge that strips a service provider of its entire safe harbor protection does not have to pertain to the particular works-in-suit, and (2) material can be so “current and well-known” that its infringing nature would be “objectively obvious to a reasonable person.”

The Second Circuit in Vimeo parted ways with the Ninth Circuit on these two holdings. Since the “evidence was not shown to relate to any of the videos at issue in this suit,” the Second Circuit held that it was “insufficient to justify a finding of red flag knowledge . . . as to those specific videos.” The Second Circuit thus applied the red flag knowledge standard on a work-by-work basis, in direct contrast to the Ninth Circuit in Fung. Also, the Second Circuit held that “the mere fact that a video contains all or substantially all of a piece of recognizable, or even famous, copyrighted music” and was “viewed in its entirety” by an “employee of a service provider” was not enough “to sustain the copyright owner’s burden of showing red flag knowledge.” The court added that even “an employee who was a copyright expert cannot be expected to know when use of a copyrighted song has been licensed.” So while the Ninth Circuit said it would have been objectively obvious to Fung that particular works were infringing, the Second Circuit in Vimeo set the bar far higher.

Curiously, the Second Circuit in Vimeo didn’t even mention Fung, despite the fact that it was deepening the circuit split with the Ninth Circuit. One wonders whether the omission was intentional. Either way, the circuit split has only gotten deeper. While in the Ninth Circuit an infringement can be so obvious that a court can find that a service provider had red flag knowledge without even sending it to a jury, the Second Circuit says that courts can’t let a jury decide whether a service provider had red flag knowledge even with the most obvious of infringements. And while in the Ninth Circuit a service provider loses its entire safe harbor for failing to remove an obvious infringement that it hasn’t been sued over, the Second Circuit says that red flag knowledge has to be determined on a work-by-work basis for only the works-in-suit. Given this growing divide between the Second and Ninth Circuits, it seems like only a matter of time before the Supreme Court will weigh in on the red flag knowledge standard. And if the Court does finally weigh in, one hopes it will put common sense back into the DMCA.

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Copyright Infringement Internet Uncategorized

Advertiser Pledge Sets Example of Accountability in the Fight Against Piracy

Cross-posted from the Mister Copyright blog.

cameraIt should come as no surprise that popular websites make money by hosting advertisements. Anyone surfing the web has undoubtedly been bombarded with ads when visiting certain sites, and for websites that offer free services or user experiences, advertisements are often the only way to generate revenue. Unfortunately, websites that promote and distribute pirated material also attract advertisers to help fund their illicit enterprises, and despite a recent push for awareness and response to these sites, legitimate advertisers, search engines, and domain name registrars continue to enable them to profit from flagrant copyright infringement.

A 2014 study by the Digital Citizens Alliance found that ad-sponsored content theft is a big and growing business. Even after a year that saw the shutdown of some of the most notorious file-sharing websites, an examination of 589 illicit websites found aggregate annual advertising revenues of $209 million. Premium brand advertising also rose from 89 observed brands in 2013 to 132 to in 2014.

The transition from downloading to streaming as the preferred method of consuming entertainment has led to content thieves taking advantage of higher advertising rates, as the cost of advertising during a video stream is far greater than a traditional display ad. Additionally, the Digital Citizens Alliance stresses that websites are easily able to ditch a domain name targeted by authorities and set up shop under a new one, contributing to the never-ending whack-a-mole nature of online piracy:

The content theft industry’s low barriers to entry and the ability of operators to switch domains quickly make it easy for new sites to fill the void left by those that do get shut down, and to evade enforcement.

The presence of recognizable brand advertisements on websites involved in illegal activity does damage far beyond lining the pockets of those distributing the unauthorized works. When users visit a website in search of music, a television show, or movie, and they see the creative work (or links to the work) displayed alongside professional, recognizable advertisements, the advertisements lend legitimacy to the website. This can be especially dangerous for younger or less-informed users who have no idea that downloading or streaming the creative works through one of these websites is copyright infringement that will ultimately harm creators and artists.

The confusion these ad placements create is similar to the misperceptions furthered by search engines and domain name registrars that have made little effort to preclude pirate websites from taking advantage of their services. Despite promises to remove them from their search results, Google continues to display links to pirate websites alongside legitimate links in its results, often displaying the illicit links at the very top of the search results.

Filmmaker and artists’ rights activist Ellen Seidler recently exposed Google’s unwillingness to remove links to websites that distribute unauthorized creative works when she ran a simple Google search for her film And Then Came Lola. As she relates, not only was the film’s official website nowhere to be found among the first page of results, the list was made up of many websites offering pirated versions of the film. Sadly, most people searching for Ellen’s movie would not be able to immediately distinguish between legitimate and illicit links and would likely be steered towards a pirate website.

Domain name registrars have also added to the confusion surrounding the legitimacy of certain infamous pirate sites by allowing them to play domain name musical chairs and evade prosecution. The Pirate Bay—one of the most notorious file-sharing websites—has operated using domain names from 14 different countries, jumping from domain to domain name to stay online in the face of prosecution. Copyright Alliance CEO Keith Kupferschmid warns against providing sanctuary to sites like The Pirate Bay, revealing that the website recently returned to its original .org domain run by the U.S.-based Public Interest Registry (PIR):

It is shocking that a domain name registry in the United States – one that is dedicated to “the public interest” – is allowing a blatantly illegal site to have a home on the .org domain. This is especially disturbing given that the operators of The Pirate Bay have been found guilty of criminal copyright infringement, The Pirate Bay domain names have been seized or suspended around the globe, and even its co-founder, Peter Sunde, has walked away from it.

Despite these alarming trends in the facilitation of pirate websites, there have been some recent initiatives to deter companies from doing business with illicit websites. One notable initiative is the Trustworthy Accountability Group (TAG). A joint effort by the Association of National Advertisers (ANA), the American Association of Advertising Agencies (4A’s), and the Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB), TAG was formed “to create transparency in the business relationships and transactions that undergird the digital ad industry, while continuing to enable innovation.” In 2015, TAG announced the launch of the Brand Integrity Program Against Piracy—an effort to help advertisers and advertising agencies keep their ads off websites that promote or distribute counterfeit goods or pirated content.

TAG’s mission has resonated with both advertisers and ISPs, demonstrated by a recent announcement that dozens of leading ad agencies, as well as Google and GoDaddy, have taken TAG’s Anti-Piracy Pledge. The Pledge includes a vow to curb the placement of digital advertising on websites associated with the unauthorized distribution of materials and lists the following actions that companies can take to ensure compliance:

(i) directly employing the services of validated Digital Advertising Assurance Providers;

(ii) directly employing advertising placement services that carry the TAG logo “Certified Against Piracy”; and/or

(iii) placing online advertisements through Advertising Agencies that do business exclusively with advertising placement services that carry the TAG logo “Certified Against Piracy

TAG created Digital Advertising Assurance Providers (DAAPs) as part of its Brand Integrity Program to help advertisers identify and weed out websites that do not meet their brand standards. The DAAPs are validated technology companies that the advertisers can employ to gauge the level of risk they are comfortable with and then eliminate websites and other properties that do not meet the advertisers’ standards for risk of infringement.

It’s difficult to measure how harmful advertising on illicit websites is to creators and copyright owners, but it’s not a stretch to presume that without ad revenue, many pirate sites would lose their incentive to operate. In her call to action to marketers, Hannibal executive producer Martha De Laurentiis lays out the destructive effect piracy has on the creative community:

It forces companies to either shrink their production budgets or commit to fewer, less risky projects. And ultimately, it harms audiences by limiting the types of stories that creatives can tell.

De Laurentiis explains that these pirate sites bring in millions in advertising dollars a year, and because they don’t pay for distribution rights for the creative works they steal, profit margins are estimated at around 90%. Potential profits of this scale are irresistible to those behind the pirate sites, but with a little vigilance and responsibility these incentives could be eliminated.

The co-chairs of the International Creativity and Theft-Prevention Caucus, Senator Orrin Hatch, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, Congressman Bob Goodlatte, and Congressman Adam Schiff, recently praised TAG for its promotion of the Anti-Piracy Pledge, and it seems like the movement for more responsibility in digital advertising is gaining traction. But domain name registrars and search engine services need to follow the example set by advertisers and establish accountability and awareness in their sectors. Only when these services refuse to aid websites that distribute stolen copyrighted works will real progress be made in the fight against digital piracy.

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Capitol Records v. Vimeo: Courts Should Stop Coddling Bad Actors in Copyright Cases

Here’s a brief excerpt of my new post that was published on IPWatchdog:

Here’s where we are after Capitol Records v. Vimeo: A service provider can encourage its users to infringe on a massive scale, and so long as the infringement it encourages isn’t the specific infringement it gets sued for, it wins on the safe harbor defense at summary judgment. This is so even if there’s copious evidence that its employees viewed and interacted with the specific infringing material at issue. No jury will ever get to weigh all of the evidence and decide whether the infringement is obvious. At the same time, any proactive steps taken by the service provider will potentially open it up to liability for having actual knowledge, so the incentive is to do as little as possible to proactively “detect and deal” with piracy. This is not at all what Congress intended. It lets bad faith service providers trample the rights of copyright owners with impunity.

To read the rest of this post, please visit IPWatchdog.

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IP Scholars to FCC: It’s Not About "The Box"

Washington, D.C. at nightThis past April, we joined other IP scholars in explaining how the FCC’s proposed set-top box rules would undermine the property rights of creators and copyright owners. In reply comments filed last month, the EFF and a group of IP academics argued that the proposed rules would not implicate any copyright owners’ exclusive rights. Yesterday, we filed an ex parte letter with the Commissioners pointing out why this is wrong. The full letter is copied below.

Dear Chairman Wheeler and Commissioners Clyburn, Rosenworcel, Pai and O’Rielly:

On April 22, 2016, the undersigned intellectual property law scholars submitted comments to the FCC in response to the notice of proposed rulemaking in the matter of “Expanding Consumers’ Video Navigation Choices; Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices.” Our comments expressed concerns with the proposed rules’ harmful impact on the property rights of creators and copyright owners. Specifically, we warned that the Commission’s proposed rules would undermine the exclusive property rights guaranteed to copyright owners under the Copyright Act by severely limiting their ability to determine whom to license their property rights to and on what terms. In so doing, the proposed rules risk fundamentally disrupting the vibrant creative ecosystem that those property rights support.

Together with the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), another group of intellectual property law academics submitted reply comments framed as a rebuttal to the many comments that dutifully explained how the Commission’s proposed rules would violate copyright law and imperil the property rights of creators and copyright owners. The EFF/professors offer “observations” on copyright law and conclude that “the proposed rules are consistent with copyright in both letter and spirit.” To reach this conclusion, the EFF/professors broadly defend navigational devices, arguing that “products and services that touch copyrighted works do not infringe copyright, and do not require a license,” and that the “devices and services under the proposed rules” would be non-infringing just like televisions and VCRs.

Surprisingly, despite claiming that the proposed rules are consistent with copyright law, the EFF/professors fail to address the primary copyright concern raised by us and by many other commenters. By focusing on the navigational devices themselves, rather than on how creative works are delivered to those devices, the EFF/professors perform a sleight of hand that masks the real problem. The issue is not what consumers do with the creative works they receive in the privacy of their own homes—the issue is how those creative works are delivered to consumers’ homes in the first place.

The creative works that pay-TV consumers watch on their televisions come from multiple sources, including satellite, cable, and telephony-based transmissions. These transmissions are public performances or public distributions, and as a result, they must be licensed. Ignoring this simple principle of copyright law, the Commission would require pay-TV providers to send copyrighted works to third parties even if doing so exceeds the scope of pay-TV providers’ licenses with copyright owners. By forcing pay-TV providers to exceed the scope of their licenses, the proposed rules would undermine the property rights of creators and copyright owners, effectively creating a zero-rate compulsory license to the benefit of third parties that have no contractual relationship with either copyright owners or pay-TV providers that copyright owners license their works to. Furthermore, the Commission seeks to create this zero-rate compulsory license despite lacking any authority to do so; the Communications Act certainly does not give the Commission authority to amend the Copyright Act and create a new compulsory license for copyrighted works.

The reply comments of the EFF/professors do not address this concern at all. Committing the bulk of their reply to a broad discussion articulating their principles for copyright law, the EFF/professors fail to respond to the distinct copyright issues that inevitably result from this newly-created compulsory license. It is unclear why the EFF/professors do not address this issue, as it was echoed again and again in the comments to which they purport to respond. Because the proposed rules would brazenly undercut copyright owners’ property rights, we believe it is important to call attention to the inability of the EFF/professors to even mention this fundamental problem in their response.

Put simply, the proposed rules would take away the ability of creators and copyright owners to license their works on their own terms. It would give third parties all of the benefits afforded to pay-TV providers by their agreements with copyright owners without the burdens of paying a license or agreeing to the underlying contract terms. This isn’t about “the box,” and it isn’t about what consumers do with the creative works they receive in their homes. The issue is what goes into “the box,” and more importantly, how it gets there. That the EFF/professors ignore this primary issue speaks volumes. The fact that third parties currently need a license from copyright owners to do the very things the proposed rules would countenance demonstrates that the rules would undermine the property rights of creators and copyright owners.

The EFF/professors properly note that the “ultimate goal” of copyright is to benefit the public good. What they fail to understand is that by securing to artists and creators property rights in the fruits of their labors, copyright serves the interests of creators and the public alike, fulfilling its constitutional purpose and forming the bedrock of our creative economy. We urge the Commission to consider and address—as the EFF/professors do not—how the proposed rules inappropriately interfere with the property rights of creators and copyright owners and the damage they stand to cause to our diverse and vibrant creative marketplace.

To download our letter to the FCC, please click here.

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Copyright Infringement Internet Uncategorized

Radiohead Video Makes Unauthorized Use of Fictional Characters

Cross-posted from the Mister Copyright blog.

Last month, Radiohead released their ninth studio album, A Moon Shaped Pool, after a five-year hiatus from recording. In true Radiohead fashion, the album’s release was preceded by a unique succession of mysterious social media postings, teaser artwork and music videos for the singles Burn the Witch and Daydreaming.

The Burn the Witch video was shot in stop-motion animation and features an alarming narrative in which an outsider is welcomed into a seemingly idyllic village, only later to be burned alive inside of a wicker man structure. While the creators of the video have acknowledged that the story is an allegory for the current migrant crisis in Europe, viewers have noticed something suspicious about the video unrelated to the chilling subject matter.

Burn the Witch uses claymation figures to portray its characters and soon after the video’s debut, viewers began recognizing similarities to Trumptonshire, a stop-motion BBC children’s television series from the 1960s. The Trumptonshire series—which includes Trumpton, Camberwick Green and Chigley—depicts daily life in a small, English country town and features recurring characters such as a mayor, doctor and fireman. As a children’s program, the storylines typically involved simple domestic problems that were always resolved in a friendly manner.

Given Radiohead’s popularity and the anticipation surrounding the release of their new album, it wasn’t long before some of those involved with Trumptonshire were made aware of the Burn the Witch video and voiced their displeasure. William Mollett, the son-in-law of creator Gordon Murray, expressed his disgust with the unsettling video and hinted at future legal action for what he believes is a copyright violation.

Radiohead should have sought our consent as we consider this a tarnishing of the brand. It is not something we would have authorized. We consider that there is a breach of copyright and we are deciding what to do next.

While the creators of cheery Trumptonshire may not appreciate an association with the dark Radiohead video, at first glance it’s not a case of clear-cut copyright infringement. The creators of Trumptonshire certainly can’t claim copyright in using claymation characters to express an idea, and the trope of an idyllic small village with a mayor, doctor and fireman would also not be protectable. These elements would be considered scènes à faire, or “scenes that must be done,” in that they are obligatory to a certain genre and one author or creator can’t exclude others from using them.

Where it gets tricky, especially for the Burn the Witch video, is that fictional characters, even if obligatory to a certain genre, can become copyrightable the more distinctly they are expressed. Think of famous literary characters like Sherlock Holmes or James Bond. An eccentric sleuth character or intrepid British spy can’t be copyrighted, as they are too broad to exclude others from employing them in separate creative works. But give the detective a hunting cap and pipe, or the spy a Walther PPK and martini—shaken, not stirred—and now you have characters with distinctive traits, worthy of copyright protection.

A significant case discussing the protectability of fictional characters involved Steven Spielberg’s iconic 1982 film E.T. the Extra-Terrestrial. After the film had become a major box-office hit and financial success, Universal sued a toy maker that was producing and selling dolls that closely resembled the titular alien character. Though the defendant toy company tried to claim that an alien character was not worthy of copyright protection, the court pointed to several distinct features of the E.T. character, which were also featured in the defendant’s doll.

The doll features the oddly shaped head, elongated neck, squat torso, long thin arms, and hunched-over posture of “E.T.”. The defendants’ doll has the distinctive shape and posture of “E.T.” as well as “E.T.”’s disproportionately large head, flat face, wide mouth, pug nose, knobby forehead, and large blue eyes.

A closer look at the Burn the Witch villagers reveals distinct and definite similarities to the inhabitants of Trumptonshire, validating the copyright claims of the Trumptonshire creators. For instance, the mayor of Trumptonshire is depicted as a mustachioed man wearing a tri-corned cap and medallion and is accompanied by a butler-like servant in jacket and tie. While the mayor in Burn the Witch sports a slightly different hat and long sideburns instead of a mustache, the similarities are undeniable.

(Trumptonshire pictured on the left, Burn the Witch on the right)
(Trumptonshire pictured on the left, Burn the Witch on the right)

It’s possible that defenders of the music video would argue that the work is a parody and immune from infringement claims under the fair use doctrine. But contrary to popular belief, not all parodies automatically trigger fair use, and in this case, the Burn the Witch video would not qualify as a parody.

According to the Supreme Court, a parody “is the use of some elements of a prior author’s composition to create a new one that, at least in part, comments on that author’s works.” But the Radiohead video isn’t commenting on Trumptonshire so much as using the Trumptonshire world and characters to comment on and criticize something else, which would classify it as a satire, not a parody. While satire may still be found to be non-infringing, the Supreme Court warns that satires are not as likely to merit a finding of fair use, especially when using a substantial amount of the original work.

Viewing the two works in succession, it’s difficult to deny a similar semblance. Even if Burn the Witch does not appropriate specific characters, the total concept and feel of the Radiohead video is substantially similar to Trumptonshire. A total concept and feel test refers to a subjective assessment of one work considered alongside another and whether both an expert and ordinary person would find them substantially similar.

In 1977, Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp. set the standard for total concept and feel by introducing a two-part extrinsic and intrinsic test for determining substantial similarity. The case involved a copyright infringement claim by a team of puppeteers and television producers against McDonald’s for their “McDonaldland” advertisements. The 9th Circuit evaluated similarity extrinsically by employing an expert to determine certain parallels between the two works.

Such criteria include the type of artwork involved, the materials used, the subject matter, and the setting for the subject. Since it is an extrinsic test, analytic dissection and expert testimony are appropriate. Moreover, this question may often be decided as a matter of law.

The intrinsic test relies on the response of an “ordinary reasonable person” to determine whether there were similarities in the expression of the works, a test that could be completed by a jury. In the Krofft case, the court found that both tests satisfied the similarity analysis, even with the defendants offering a list of differences between the two.

Using the two-part test established by Krofft, the Radiohead video would likely be found substantially similar to Trumptonshire and therefore infringing. Burn the Witch uses the same claymation-style stop-motion animation and features similar characters and settings as Trumptonshire, all factors that weigh in favor of extrinsic substantial similarity. And while the intrinsic test is subjective and may vary from one ordinary reasonable person to the next, it’s not hard to imagine a jury finding the two works substantially similar.

Radiohead has always been on the cutting edge of music technology, and front-man Thom Yorke has been an outspoken critic of a music industry that fails to protect the property rights of artists as their music is routinely stolen on sites like YouTube and the Pirate Bay. And so it’s surprising that they would not ensure that their collaborators had secured permission to use the Trumptonshire characters, given the similarities between the two works. Although the United Kingdom has similar exceptions to copyright law—known as fair dealing—as the United States, the laws are narrower and would likely favor the Trumptonshire creators if a copyright infringement suit is brought. As highly influential band that champions artists’ rights, Radiohead should take better care to practice what they preach.