Category: Internet

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C-IP2 Celebrates the Release of Book 5G and Beyond: Intellectual Property and Competition Policy in the Internet of Things[1]

The following post comes from Jack Ring, a 3L at Scalia Law and a Research Assistant at C-IP2.

 On April 15, 2024, C-IP2 scholars and contributors to 5G and Beyond: Intellectual Property and Competition Policy in the Internet of Things met for a live-streamed book launch event.[2] Professor Jonathan Barnett, one of the books two co-editors, described the book as “break[ing] the boundaries between the learning that academics have the luxury of acquiring” while being “informed by the realities of business markets” and “the insights of policy makers.” The book achieved this by purposefully bringing together decades—possibly centuries—worth of knowledge in the standardization field, including pieces from academics, policy makers, and industry practitioners.

The book’s impressive contributors include former USPTO Directors David Kappos and Andrei Iancu, former FTC Commissioner and Acting Chair Maureen Ohlhausen, former ITC Commissioner F. Scott Kieff, and J. Gregory Sidak, all of whom spoke at the event. Professors Jonathan M. Barnett and Seán M. O’Connor, the book’s co-editors, moderated and also gave remarks during the event. Beyond those who participated in a panel at the book release, chapter contributors included Mark A. Cohen, Alexander Galetovic, Thomas D. Grant, Stephen Haber, Bowman Heiden, Fabian Hoffmann, Igor Nikolic, Kristen Osenga, Jorge Padilla, Ruud Peters, Jana I. Seidl, David J. Teece, Nikolaus Thumm, Andrew Tuffin, and Lew Zaretzki. For a full list of all contributors’ titles and organizations, see the book’s “Contributors” page.[3]

The first panel included the Honorable Andrei Iancu[4] and the Honorable F. Scott Kieff.[5] Mr. Iancu, who authored the foreword to the book,[6] began with the observation that innovation in the United States is at a crossroads, with its leadership in technology and innovation being questioned for the first time. He emphasized the need for a robust patent system to incentivize innovation and technology developments. Indeed, his foreword makes this point very directly: “A patent serves little purpose if others can ignore it and the owner cannot practically stop them or secure timely and adequate compensation.”[7] In Mr. Iancu’s view, “[p]atents can and should serve [the] role” of incentivizing and overcoming the risks of innovation.[8] He closed his remarks by noting that the “bottom line is, if the United States is going to continue its technological leadership . . . our leaders absolutely must recognize that that cannot be done here without a robust patent system.” Mr. Iancu also responded to questions about the effects of eBay v. MercExchange during the panel.

Professor Kieff, who co-authored the last chapter of the book,[9] explained his chapter as looking “at concepts like invention; concepts like the difference between a reward system, a prize system, and a patent system; concepts like . . . a more predictable enforcement system and a less predictable enforcement system.” Following his opening remarks, Professor Kieff expanded on a metaphor used in his chapter about the patent system as a beacon. The chapter discusses how, in a commercialization approach to IP, the IP rights are like “‘beacons in the dark,’ drawing to themselves potential complementary users” of the IP.[10] This leads to the bargaining process and “the possibility of striking contracts with one another.”[11] Professor Kieff also responded to an audience-member comment regarding injunction bonds.

The Honorable Maureen Ohlhausen[12] spoke on the second panel about her chapter, which she co-authored with Jana Seidl.[13] Ms. Ohlhausen’s chapter focuses on the geopolitical factors surrounding IP and standards policies, particularly the interplay between IP and antitrust. It traces the roots of IP and antitrust enforcement, largely beginning in the 1970s.[14] But her panel comments focused on the current enforcement landscape by looking to recent executive orders, DOJ policy statements, and speeches by government officials. She suggested that the United States is seeing “movement towards adopting a broader antitrust liability standard across the board,” not just limited to IP. The FTC’s enforcement of IP rights through its unfair methods of competition authority—which, she explained, construes this authority as extremely broad—illustrates this point.

Ms. Ohlhausen touched on the FTC’s unfair competition rulemaking surrounding non-competes, predicting that this same authority—if upheld—would likely be used to bring antitrust and unfair competition lawsuits against SEP holders seeking injunctions.[15] Following her remarks, Ms. Ohlhausen responded to questions about the chilling effects a regulation may have on parties, even if the regulation at issue is unlikely to stand up to a court challenge and to a question about the EU’s regulatory approach.

The final panel included J. Gregory Sidak[16] and the Honorable David Kappos.[17] Mr. Sidak, who authored the book’s fourth chapter, spoke first.[18] His remarks largely focused on good faith, which was one of the two main topics discussed in his chapter. He discussed the differences in the approaches to the FRAND contract between American and European lawyers and judges. This point is well-made in his chapter: “Judicial opinions in SEP cases also refer to the duty to negotiate a FRAND license in good faith, but judges so far have failed to explain that duty’s precise origin or its metes and bounds.”[19] Mr. Sidak’s chapter analyzes the different approaches taken by specific German, English, and American court decisions.[20] More generally, during his remarks, Mr. Sidak discussed the different stopping rules for American and European negotiations. The American approach is brief: “[I]f a good faith offer is made and it’s not accepted, then the game is over.” Conversely, the European approach is a more iterative back-and-forth process. Mr. Sidak emphasized the need for a “stopping rule”—which he referred to as a “closing rule” in his chapter—and analogized this to the Federal Communications Commission’s auctioning of spectrums.[21]

Mr. Kappos, who co-authored a chapter with co-editor Professor Barnett, spoke second.[22] He focused on the “next-best alternative” to a legislative correction in a post-eBay world: enhanced damages. In the chapter, he and Professor Barnett walk through four case studies of efficient infringement in action.[23] The chapter also discusses two forms of enhanced damages, attorney fee shifting and treble damages, both of which already exist.[24] In fact, as the chapter points out, the 1793 patent statute mandated treble damages, even absent a showing of willfulness, and provided judges the authority to impose a higher damages multiplier.[25] The chapter closes by attempting to balance the incentives between implementer and patent holder.

Following Mr. Sidak and Mr. Kappos’s remarks, they fielded questions about private ordering from Professor Barnett and Lew Zaretzki, who also authored a chapter in the book with Stephen Haber and the late Alexander Galetovic.[26] In response to the questions, Mr. Sidak analogized the present incentives to those faced in binding arbitrations under the Telecommunications Act of 1996. He further noted that there is an enormous and successful functioning SEP licensing market. He pointed to the fact that there are no examples of inabilities to license relevant technology. Mr. Kappos suggested that there has already been extensive private ordering, pointing to the Avanci 5G licensing regime.[27]

The book 5G and Beyond: Intellectual Property and Competition Policy in the Internet of Things is available online for free through open access at Cambridge University Press; a hard copy is also available to order at the same link. A recording of the book launch event is available on YouTube.

[1] 5G and Beyond: Intellectual Property and Competition Policy in the Internet of Things (Jonathan M. Barnett & Seán M. O’Connor eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, Dec. 2023). The book is available online through open access at https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/5g-and-beyond/AFF9EE741CD0CF1B28E8B698F985E0C1. Hard copies are available at the same link or from other booksellers.

[2] A recording of the event is available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ir08SXj7Ts.

[3] 5G and Beyond: Intellectual Property and Competition Policy in the Internet of Things ix-x (Jonathan M. Barnett & Seán M. O’Connor eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, Dec. 2023), https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/23B8A5FB02B3C0C8EE9DCC22E562BA52/9781009274272loc_ix-x.pdf/contributors.pdf.

[4] Mr. Iancu’s remarks begin at 5:02. https://youtu.be/6ir08SXj7Ts?si=XLUT2BAlyzP699ic&t=303.

[5] Professor Kieff’s remarks begin at 12:32. https://youtu.be/6ir08SXj7Ts?si=We_AgSyTe2pKlfQi&t=752.

[6] Andrei Iancu, Foreword: Why Patents Are Critical for Standard-Based Technologies, in 5G and Beyond: Intellectual Property and Competition Policy in the Internet of Things xi-xiv (Jonathan M. Barnett and Seán M. O’Connor eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, Dec. 2023), https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/8816915941D08B63BDDD7670A574AB09/9781009274272fwd_xi-xiv.pdf/foreword.pdf.

[7] Id. at xiii.

[8] Id. at xii.

[9] F. Scott Kieff & Thomas Grant, Patents and Competition: Commercializing Innovation in the Global Ecosystem for 5G and the Internet of Things, in 5G and Beyond: Intellectual Property and Competition Policy in the Internet of Things 242-262 (Jonathan M. Barnett and Seán M. O’Connor eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, Dec. 2023), https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/B32E45469995B5649034AAE47660EAE8/9781009274272c11_242-262.pdf/patents_and_competition.pdf.

[10] Id. at 249.

[11] Id.

[12] Ms. Ohlhausen’s remarks begin at 37:46. https://youtu.be/6ir08SXj7Ts?si=W28CIZSO5wQ_M7jr&t=2266.

[13] Maureen Ohlhausen & Jana Seidl, Antitrust Convergence on Substantive Norms for SEP Licensing Negotiations: Should and Could It Be?, in 5G and Beyond: Intellectual Property and Competition Policy in the Internet of Things 33-50 (Jonathan M. Barnett and Seán M. O’Connor eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, Dec. 2023), https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/A97F752332F8BD95A9E98D87E5C9F070/9781009274272c2_33-50.pdf/antitrust_convergence_on_substantive_norms_for_sep_licensing_negotiations.pdf.

[14] See id. at 34-35.

[15] Just over a week after Ms. Ohlhausen made her remarks, the FTC released its final rule on non-competes. See Press Release, FTC Announces Rule Banning Noncompetes, Fed. Trade Comm’n (Apr. 23, 2024).

[16] Mr. Sidak’s remarks begin at 58:33. https://youtu.be/6ir08SXj7Ts?si=REhrf3tx5ufwoGGJ&t=3511.

[17] Mr. Kappos’s remarks begin at 1:03:23. https://youtu.be/6ir08SXj7Ts?si=njsiknZV9UjEQCer&t=4103.

[18] J. Gregory Sidak, The Fair Division of Surplus from a FRAND License Negotiated in Good Faith, in 5G and Beyond: Intellectual Property and Competition Policy in the Internet of Things 79-108 (Jonathan M. Barnett and Seán M. O’Connor eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, Dec. 2023), https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/0FE57AE13642207F55C1DB5FCAE74470/9781009274272c4_79-108.pdf/fair_division_of_surplus_from_a_frand_license_negotiated_in_good_faith.pdf.

[19] Id. at 80.

[20] Id. at 80-81, 86-88.

[21] Id. at 82-86.

[22] Jonathan M. Barnett & David J. Kappos, Restoring Deterrence: The Case for Enhanced Damages in a No-Injunction Patent System, in 5G and Beyond: Intellectual Property and Competition Policy in the Internet of Things 129-52 (Jonathan M. Barnett and Seán M. O’Connor eds., Cambridge University Press, Dec. 2023), https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/7300CC1E1279179F57B099E478E3170F/9781009274272c6_129-152.pdf/restoring_deterrence.pdf.

[23] Id. at 138-42.

[24] Id. at 134-38.

[25] Id. at 144.

[26] Alexander Galetovic, Stephen Haber & Lew Zaretski, Cellular SEP Royalties: What Should Competition Policy Be?, in 5G and Beyond: Intellectual Property and Competition Policy in the Internet of Things 53-78 (Jonathan M. Barnett and Seán M. O’Connor eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, Dec. 2023), https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/8755988D408D15C5BD5F64C7DAFA9696/9781009274272c3_53-78.pdf/cellular_sep_royalties_and_5g.pdf.

[27] Avanci 5G Vehicle, Avanci, https://www.avanci.com/vehicle/5gvehicle/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2024).

Categories
Copyright Internet Uncategorized

Professors Mislead FCC on Basic Copyright Law

U.S. Capitol buildingIn a letter submitted to the FCC late last week defending the Commission’s deeply flawed set-top box proposal,[1] a group of professors make an incredible claim: Everyone is perfectly free to distribute copyrighted works online however they please. No license? No problem! According to these professors, many of whom teach copyright law, copyright owners have no distribution right in cyberspace. If you think this sounds wrong, you’re right! This claim sounds ridiculous because it is ridiculous, and it’s simply amazing—and troubling—that professors would mislead the FCC in this way.

The professors argue that a copyright owner’s “right to distribute encompasses the distribution of physical copies of a work, not electronic transmissions.” In support, they cite no case law whatsoever. There’s a good reason for this: None exists. The reality is that every single court that has ever considered this argument on the merits has rejected it. Time and again, this argument has been summarily dismissed by the courts. As the Nimmer on Copyright treatise puts it: “No court has held to the contrary on this issue[.]” Yet, the professors present this to the FCC as an accurate description of the law, with no equivocation whatsoever.

In their defense, one can make a plausible argument that this follows from certain parts of the Copyright Act. And the professors do in fact cite these parts. They quote Section 106(3), which gives copyright owners the exclusive right “to distribute copies . . . of the copyrighted work to the public,” and Section 101, which says that “copies are material objects.” At first blush, one could question how it’s possible to distribute a “material object” online. Indeed, many academics have questioned this very thing. For example, one professor wrote in 2001 that “transmitting copyrightable works over a computer network such as the Internet do[es] not involve any transfer of such material objects.” On this view, transfers over digital networks are not distributions of material objects.

While some academics may insist that this is the only way to interpret the Copyright Act, the reality is that the courts have uniformly interpreted it differently. Many courts have explicitly rejected the textual argument that there are no digital distributions, and many others have just assumed that such digital distribution rights exist. As the district court in Arista Records v. Greubel noted in 2006, despite “scholarly articles reflecting debate over the scope” of the distribution right, “the courts have not hesitated to find copyright infringement by distribution in cases of file-sharing or electronic transmission of copyrighted works.” The district court then cited opinions by the Supreme Court in New York Times v. Tasini, the Seventh Circuit in In re Aimster, and the Ninth Circuit in A&M Records v. Napster that applied the distribution right in cyberspace without even flinching.

Perhaps the most in-depth analysis of the issue comes from London-Sire v. Doe, where District Judge Nancy Gertner held in 2008 that it “makes no difference that the distribution occurs electronically[.]” Judge Gertner reasoned that “[w]hat matters in the marketplace is not whether a material object ‘changes hands,’ but whether, when the transaction is completed, the distributee has a material object.” Even though the “distributee” has a different “material object”—the hard drive or other storage media where the file resides—Judge Gertner held that a digital distribution has taken place nonetheless. She warned that “an overly literal definition of ‘material object’ . . . ignores the phrase’s purpose in the copyright statutes.”

Other courts have adopted this reasoning. For example, the district court in Capitol Records v. ReDigi cited London-Sire approvingly: “[T]he Court agrees that ‘[a]n electronic file transfer is plainly within the sort of transaction that § 106(3) was intended to reach [and] … fit[s] within the definition of ‘distribution’ of a phonorecord.’” The court then held that the distribution right exists in cyberspace: “Accordingly, the court concludes that . . . the sale of digital music files on ReDigi’s website infringes Capitol’s exclusive right of distribution.” Likewise, just last year, the district court in BMG v. Cox relied on London-Sire in holding that, “[n]ot only can electronic files be ‘material objects,’ but transferring files using a BitTorrent protocol satisfies the transactional element of distribution.”

The fact is that courts have not wavered in finding that the distribution right applies online. As one district court said in 2012, “[i]n the electronic context, copies may be distributed electronically.” The point is so well-settled that it defies logic to claim otherwise, and it’s certainly consistent with other parts of the Copyright Act. For instance, Section 506(a)(1)(B) makes it a crime to “willfully” infringe by “distribution, including by electronic means[.]” And Section 115(c)(3)(A) creates a compulsory license “to distribute . . . by means of a digital transmission[.]” If digital distributions didn’t implicate the public distribution right, it wouldn’t be a crime to distribute “by electronic means,” and one wouldn’t need a license to distribute “by means of a digital transmission.”

To claim that the “right to distribute encompasses the distribution of physical copies of a work, not electronic transmissions,” as the professors do, is simply wrong. There’s certainly an argument that can be made, but it’s not an accurate description of the law—which is how the professors present it. Everyone knows the distribution right exists online, and it’s industry practice to license digital distributions. Do you think iTunes and Amazon pay for distribution licenses because they just feel like it? It’s disturbing that professors would state without any qualification that electronic transmissions don’t implicate the distribution rights of copyright owners. And if they’re willing to say that, it makes you wonder what else they’re willing to say.

[1] My colleagues and I have written extensively about the copyright concerns with the FCC’s set-top box proposal. See, for example, here, here, here, and here. The FCC now claims that a revised version of its proposal addresses these concerns, but the new language has not yet been released. Despite this fact, these professors claim that the yet-to-be-released proposal “does not interfere with any legitimate copyright interests of programmers, and that it is within the Commission’s authority to implement.” We’ll save our analysis of the new proposal for when the text itself is made available.

Categories
Innovation Internet Patent Law Patentability Requirements Software Patent Uncategorized

Federal Circuit Again Finds Computer-Implemented Invention Patent Eligible

dictionary entry for the word "innovate"In Tuesday’s McRO v. Bandai decision, the Federal Circuit has once again reversed a district court’s determination that a computer-implemented invention (aka “software patent”) was not patent eligible under Section 101 of the Patent Act. This continues the Federal Circuit’s recent trend of clarifying the Supreme Court’s two-step patent-eligibility test under Mayo and Alice. The first step asks whether the invention is “directed to” a patent-ineligible concept, such as an abstract idea. If so, the second step then asks whether there is an “inventive concept” that transforms the concept into a patent-eligible invention. While the Supreme Court gave little guidance on what “directed to” and “inventive concept” mean in practice, the Federal Circuit’s recent decisions have made the Mayo-Alice test far less abstract—rather ironic, given that the test itself assesses abstractness.

This past May, the Federal Circuit held in Enfish that, in the software context, the “directed to” inquiry looks at whether “the plain focus of the claims is on an improvement to computer functionality itself.” Since the database claims at issue focused on specific improvements to computer capabilities, they were not “directed to” a patent-ineligible concept under Section 101. Two months later in Bascom, the Federal Circuit stated that an “inventive concept can be found in the non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces.” And even though each software claim, related to filtering content on the internet, was “known in the art” when taken individually, the Federal Circuit held that the claims, in combination, were patent eligible because they transformed “the abstract idea of filtering content into a particular, practical application of that abstract idea.”

Adding to this recent line of cases upholding the patent-eligibility of computer-implemented inventions, the Federal Circuit’s new opinion in McRO v. Bandai sheds even more light on the Section 101 analysis under the Mayo-Alice test. The invention at issue involved automated lip-syncing for computer-generated animation, which the district court held was drafted too broadly to be patent eligible. The Federal Circuit reversed, noting that courts “must look to the claims as an ordered combination,” even under the first step of the Mayo-Alice test. The Court of Appeals thus found that the proper analytical centerpiece was “whether the claims in these patents focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology.” Since the invention constituted a “combined order of specific rules that renders information into a specific format that is then used and applied to create desired results,” the Federal Circuit held it patent eligible under Section 101.

Several commentators have praised the Federal Circuit’s decision. Bob Sachs, who specializes in patentable subject matter as a partner at Fenwick & West, points out that the Federal Circuit, for the first time, has used preemption to find that the invention was not “directed to” patent-ineligible subject matter. The Federal Circuit here looked at preemption as part of the first step of the Mayo-Alice test, finding it relevant to whether the invention was “directed to” a patent-ineligible concept in the first place. As Sachs explains, the Federal Circuit “confirms Enfish’s holding that the improvement provided by the specific claim limitations can be considered” under the first step of the Mayo-Alice test. Moreover, Sachs notes that the “panel here makes clear that a demonstration of meaningful non-preemption is sufficient to establish that a claim is not ‘directed to’ an abstract idea, and thus eligible at step 1.”

Other observers, including Erich Andersen, VP and Deputy General Counsel at Microsoft, and Gene Quinn of IPWatchdog, have applauded the Federal Circuit for making the patent-eligibility analysis even more concrete in light of the Supreme Court’s rather abstract abstractness test in Mayo and Alice. If anything, the Federal Circuit here has not only built upon its prior precedents in Enfish and Bascom, it has tied them together by explaining that ordered combinations are relevant to both the first and second steps of the Mayo-Alice test. In the end, the patent eligibility of a computer-implemented invention appears far more settled than ever before–a great result for inventors of so-called “software patents.” The Federal Circuit’s decision is certainly a far cry from the supposed death-knell for “software patents” predicted by several commentators after the Supreme Court’s opinion in Alice.

Categories
Copyright Copyright Licensing Copyright Theory Infringement International Law Internet Legislation Uncategorized WIPO

European Union Draws a Line on Infringing Hyperlinks

Cross-posted from the Mister Copyright blog.

a gavel lying on a table in front of booksLast week, the European Court of Justice—the judicial authority of the European Union—issued an anticipated decision in the Sanoma hyperlinking case, declaring that commercial linking with knowledge of unauthorized content constitutes copyright infringement. The opinion comes after years of similar cases in Europe stirred debate over whether linking to pirated works was a ‘communication to the public’ and therefore infringing, and provides a sensible test that protects the works of authors and creators while ensuring the internet remains a bastion of free speech.

Sanoma involved the popular Dutch news and gossip site GeenStijl, which ran an article in 2011 that included links to an Australian website where copyrighted Playboy magazine photos were made available. The photos were published on the Australian website without the consent of Sanoma, Playboy’s editor and copyright owner of the photos at issues, but taken down after the site was notified of their infringing nature. Despite similar notifications, GeenStijl refused to remove the hyperlinks and actually provided links to another website hosting the unauthorized photos after the Australian website took them down.

Sanoma brought a copyright infringement claim against GS Media, which operates the GeenStijl website, and the Supreme Court of the Netherlands sought a preliminary ruling from the European Court of Justice on whether hyperlinks represent the communication of a work to the public. According to an earlier EU directive, any communication to the public of works protected by copyright must be authorized by the copyright owner. Due to the ubiquity of links and hyperlinks on the Internet, a ruling classifying them as communications to the public would have major ramifications for anyone linking to unauthorized content.

In its judgment, the European Court of Justice found that the concept of ‘communication to the public’ requires individual assessment and laid out the following three factors that must be considered when determining whether a link or hyperlink qualifies.

1) The deliberate nature of the intervention – According to the Court, “the user makes an act of communication when it intervenes, in full knowledge of the consequences of its actions, in order to give access to a protected work to its customers.”
2) The concept of the ‘public’ covers an indeterminate number of potential viewers and implies a large number of people.
3) The profit-making nature of a communication to the public – The Court explains that when hyperlinks are posted for profit, “it may be expected that the person who posted such a link should carry out the checks necessary to ensure that the work concerned is not illegally published.”

Applying these criteria to Sanoma, the Court found that because GS Media runs a commercial website that makes money from advertising, it is undisputed that they posted the hyperlinks for profit, and that it is also undisputed that Sanoma had not authorized the publication of the photos. It also found that because they were notified by Sanoma and continued to repost links after the original source website took down the content, GS Media was aware of the infringing nature of the photos and “cannot, therefore, rebut the presumption that it posted those links in full knowledge of the illegal nature of that publication.” The Court concluded that by posting the links, GS Media therefor effected a ‘communication to the public.’

The Court goes on to detail its desire to maintain a fair balance between the interest of copyright owners and authors and the protection of the interests and fundamental rights of Internet users, “in particular their freedom of expression and of information, as well as the general interest.” After providing the criteria for assessing whether a link qualifies as a communication to the public, the opinion emphasizes the important role hyperlinks play in the exchange and free flow of information over the internet, and clarifies that linking—even to unauthorized content—is not a communication to the public if there is no profit motive or knowledge of the infringing nature of the linked-to works. Even so, it’s important to note that not-for-profit hyperlinking may still be considered a communication to the public if the person posting the link knew or should have reasonably known that the content was posted without authorization.

Perhaps most surprising about the Court’s decree is the relative approval by both copyright owners and supporters of the rights of those posting links. While it speaks to the reasonable approach the Court has taken in determining what qualifies as a communication to the public, it may also represent a hesitation to condemn or praise the order due to a significant ambiguity. It’s not entirely clear who carries the evidentiary burden of proving whether an individual knew or should have reasonably known certain content was posted on the Internet without authorization. If copyright owners and authors are forced to prove a user knew or should have known content was unauthorized every time they attempt to remove links that can appear online incessantly, it could render the new directives ineffectual in protecting creative works.

Regardless of the uncertainly surrounding this burden of proof, the current test seems to strike a balance that holds commercial websites more accountable, while allowing for some flexibility for the general public. With debates over the effectiveness of notice and takedown intensifying in the United States, the EU’s decision on communications to the public should be recognized as workable approach to dealing with infringing hyperlinks. As the United States Copyright Office admits in its 2016 study on the making available right, jurisprudence in the US regarding offering access to content hosted elsewhere on the Internet through hyperlinking is less developed as some foreign jurisdictions. But the study acknowledges the progress made in the EU, and emphasizes the need to include ‘offers of access’ in the crucial making available right.

Despite semantic differences, the EU and the US are both moving towards systems that will impose greater accountability for posting links to unauthorized works. The EU’s directive makes clear that commercial hyperlinking to unauthorized content is indeed a communication to the public and therefor copyright infringement, while ensuring that the free flow of information through general public linking will not be threatened and the Internet will remain unbroken. It’s an approach that represents the greater goals of copyright law around the world, and other jurisdictions should follow the lead of the EU when crafting copyright policies that address the intricacies of the Internet.

Categories
Copyright Copyright Licensing Copyright Theory Infringement Intellectual Property Theory Internet Reasonable Royalty Uncategorized

Despite What You Hear, Notice and Takedown is Failing Creators and Copyright Owners

cameraIn a recent op-ed in the LA Times, Professors Chris Sprigman and Mark Lemley praise the notice and takedown provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) as “a bit of copyright law worth saving.” They argue that Section 512 of the DMCA continues to serve its purpose of balancing the rights of copyright owners and creators with those of Internet service providers (ISPs), while leaving both sides only “slightly disappointed.” Satisfying these two groups is indeed a difficult charge, but it’s simply disingenuous to suggest that creators and copyright owners are satisfied with a system so clearly in need of an overhaul.

As the Copyright Office embarks on its review of the DMCA, supporters and critics of the nearly twenty-year-old doctrine are weighing in on its effectiveness in addressing online infringement. Sprigman and Lemley claim that the “process has worked well for years,” and that the result of shifting more enforcement burden to ISPs “could be a broken Internet.” But for those creators and copyright owners who have their works resurface online just minutes after they are taken down, the Internet is already “broken.” The fact that piracy continues to intensify, despite incredible efforts to have infringing content taken down, shows that notice and takedown is largely ineffective.

As CPIP Senior Scholar Sean O’Connor testified before Congress, the notice and takedown system is not working for any of its intended beneficiaries. The constant game of whack-a-mole renders the system essentially futile for copyright owners and creators, and it creates significant burdens for ISPs that want to comply—especially small to mid-level companies that can’t afford compliance staff. Worse still, by shielding service providers from liability, the DMCA creates perverse incentives where there’s little downside to ignoring infringing content. In fact, reviewing content could lead to an ISP having knowledge of infringement and losing its safe harbor.

Now that the Copyright Office’s review is underway, it’s somewhat strange to see some supporters claim that all is well. But has anything actually changed since the Office announced its study?  Of course not. The whack-a-mole problem remains, and the knowledge standards are still interpreted broadly to disproportionately favor ISPs. When one side says the system is working and the other side says it’s broken, the truth is that the system is not working well for everyone. Sprigman and Lemley can claim that the DMCA is “worth saving” only by downplaying the true plight of creators and copyright owners.

A concrete example of this struggle comes from the comments filed by Universal Music Group (UMG) as part of the Copyright Office’s study. UMG describes the painstaking efforts devoted to protect just one artist’s creative work. In October of 2014, UMG and Big Machine Records launched a joint offensive to protect Taylor Swift’s “1989.” A staff of UMG employees dedicated 100% of their time and resources to manually search for infringements on YouTube, SoundCloud, and Tumblr, and through March of 2016, they had sent over 66,000 DMCA takedown notices. Despite their considerable efforts, over 500,000 links to the album were identified, and “1989” was illegally downloaded nearly 1.4 million times from torrent sites.

Of course, this type of effort would be impossible to replicate for any works other than those that attract such massive attention. For most artists, the burden of monitoring the Internet and sending takedown notices would fall entirely on their shoulders, with no guarantee of putting a stop to the theft of their works. Sprigman and Lemley ignore these problems, instead claiming that since copyright owners sent “more than 500 million takedown requests just to Google last year,” we know that the “system is a powerful tool against pirated content.” That would be great, if true, but the reality is that those notices barely made a dent.

Sprigman and Lemley claim that the “genius of the DMCA” is that it “enables entertainment companies to turn piracy into legitimate revenue.” They give the example of “YouTube’s Content ID system,” which “gives copyright owners the opportunity to ‘claim’ their work and share in any advertising revenue rather than pull it off the site.” From the perspective of creators and copyright owners, the only “genius” of this system is that YouTube can legally present them with an unfair choice—suffer infringement and get nothing or monetize and get next to nothing.

While Sprigman and Lemley praise the “more than $1 billion” paid out by YouTube, the real question is how much more copyright owners and creators would have been paid in a properly functioning market. YouTube is consistently teeming with infringing videos—one recent report revealed that over 180 million infringing videos had been removed in 2014 alone. And the artists that YouTube’s largess supposedly benefits are loudly complaining about their exploitation. If Content ID is so great, why are so many creators and copyright owners upset with the arrangement? The monetization Google offers to copyright owners and artists is less than half of the royalties paid out by streaming services like Pandora, an amount that artists have denounced as already inequitable.

In her excellent piece on the fictions of the Content ID system, Grammy-winning artist Maria Schneider exposes Content ID as a way for Google to cash in by actually legitimizing and perpetuating piracy. She explains that a majority of creators that opt for monetization realize miserable percentages of ad revenue, and the continued illegal uploading of their music and content drives billions of users to YouTube’s platform. YouTube has turned the weakness of the DMCA into a system that exploits artists while offering embarrassingly lower royalty rates than what would be negotiated in a free market.

The current situation is untenable, and if change means “breaking” the Internet, then we should pull out the pickaxes and get to work. A system of notice and staydown, rather than just takedown, would help alleviate the constant and seemingly ineffectual vigilance required by the current system. By removing all copies of a protected work and blocking inevitable re-postings, ISPs would honor the original purpose of the DMCA while actually doing their part to earn the protection of the safe harbor provisions. Only by ensuring that targeted works do not resurface will ISPs respect the rights of those without whose content they would cease to exist.

How anyone can honestly say that the current notice and takedown system is working for copyright owners and creators is mystifying given the constant calls for reform from creators and the numerous critical comments filed with the Copyright Office. The incredible magnitude of takedown notices sent and the seemingly unstoppable reappearance of infringing works online are a clear signal that the system is completely failing those it was meant to protect. Creators and copyright owners deserve a better chance at protecting the fruits of their labors, and the DMCA needs to be changed so that it truly is a system “worth saving.”

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Copyright Internet Uncategorized

CloudFlare’s Desperate New Strategy to Protect Pirate Sites

a gavel lying on a table in front of booksSan Francisco-based CloudFlare has earned a somewhat dubious reputation in the online world. Website owners can set up CloudFlare in just a few minutes, gaining the performance, security, and privacy benefits the service provides. Traffic routed through CloudFlare’s global content delivery network is cached for faster delivery times and protected from numerous online threats. Pirate sites have flocked to the service because it hides their true identities from copyright owners by default. And it probably doesn’t hurt that CloudFlare CEO Matthew Prince thinks that “censoring the Internet” is “creepy,” even “under a court order.”

Prince practices what he preaches, and CloudFlare has been all-too-ready to lend a helping hand to even the most notorious pirates. When The Pirate Bay rose from the ashes in early 2015, CloudFlare provided the site with services that helped manage its massive server loads. CloudFlare’s encryption technology even made it easy for users in the UK to circumvent the High Court’s ban ordering ISPs to block the pirate site. Amazingly, The Pirate Bay is now back in the United States, using its original thepiratebay.org Virginia-based domain and benefiting from CloudFlare’s robust services to make its criminal enterprise run smoothly worldwide.

Of course, the only reason CloudFlare can get away with supporting the world’s most-visited torrent site is because the DMCA is such a mess. Courts have set the bar so high that CloudFlare wouldn’t likely be found to have red flag knowledge of the massive amounts of infringement it certainly knows its service enables for globally-infamous criminal infringers like The Pirate Bay. Rather than taking the high road and refusing to work with obvious pirate sites, CloudFlare lawyers up when pushed and denies the supportive role that its service provides.

We saw this last year in the Grooveshark case. After the original Grooveshark site was found liable for willful infringement and agreed to shut down, copycat sites sprung up at different top-level domains such as grooveshark.io and grooveshark.pw. The plaintiffs obtained a temporary restraining order against the copycats, which registrars Namecheap and Dynadot promptly complied with by disabling some of the domains. But when the plaintiffs asked CloudFlare to stop providing services to some of the other copycats, they were met with firm resistance. The plaintiffs had to turn to the court for an order clarifying that the injunction against the copycat sites prevented CloudFlare from providing them services.

With the backing of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, CloudFlare put up a big fight. It denied that it was in “active concert or participation” with the copycats, which under Rule 65 would have made it bound by their existing injunction. CloudFlare argued that its services were merely passive and that the domains would still remain accessible even if its services were cut off. The district court rejected CloudFlare’s self-serving arguments, noting that it was in fact aiding and abetting the copycat sites by operating their authoritative domain name servers and optimizing their traffic worldwide. Since CloudFlare had actual notice of the injunction and was in “active concert or participation” with the enjoined copycats, it was also bound by their injunction under Rule 65.

Hit with what must have been the eye-opening reality that, under penalty of contempt, it couldn’t knowingly help its enjoined customer engage in the very wrong the court had ordered it to stop committing, one might think that CloudFlare would have become more respectful of court orders involving its customers. However, as recent developments in the MP3Skull case show, CloudFlare has decided to again take the low road in shirking its responsibility to the court. And its argument here as to why it’s beyond the court’s reach is even more desperate than before.

In April of 2015, several record label plaintiffs sued MP3Skull for copyright infringement, easily obtaining a default judgment when the defendants failed to respond to the suit. Earlier this year, the plaintiffs were granted a permanent injunction, which the defendants quickly flouted by setting up shop under several different top-level domains. Naturally, the common denominator of these multiple MP3Skull sites was that they used CloudFlare. The plaintiffs’ lawyers sent a copy of the injunction against the pirate sites to CloudFlare, asking it to honor the injunction and stop supplying services to the enjoined domains. But, as with Grooveshark, CloudFlare again refused to comply.

The record label plaintiffs have now gone back to the district court, filing a motion requesting clarification that CloudFlare is bound by the injunction against the MP3Skull sites. They argue that the “law is clear that CloudFlare’s continued provision of services to Defendants, with full knowledge of this Court’s Order, renders CloudFlare ‘in active concert or participation’ with Defendants,” and they point to the opinion in the Grooveshark case in support. According to the plaintiffs, the only issue is whether CloudFlare is aiding and abetting the enjoined defendants by providing them services.

CloudFlare opposes the motion, though it noticeably doesn’t deny that it’s in “active concert or participation” with the enjoined defendants. Instead, CloudFlare argues that, since this is a copyright case, any injunction against it must comply with the DMCA:

Section 512(j) prescribes specific standards and procedures for injunctions against service providers like CloudFlare in copyright cases. It places strict limits on injunctions against eligible service providers. 17 U.S.C. § 512(j)(1). It specifies criteria that courts “shall consider” when evaluating a request for injunctive relief against a service provider. 17 U.S.C. § 512(j)(2). And it requires that a service provider have notice and an opportunity to appear, before a party may bind it with an injunction. 17 U.S.C. § 512(j)(3). Plaintiffs ignored those requirements entirely.

The gist of CloudFlare’s argument is that Section 512(j) controls injunctions against service providers like itself, notwithstanding the fact that Rule 65 binds those in “active concert or participation” with an enjoined party. In other words, CloudFlare says that the DMCA gives service providers unique immunity from having to obey court-issued injunctions under the Federal Rules—a remarkable claim requiring remarkable proof. And the case law cited to back up this claim? None. Zip. Nada. CloudFlare fails to produce one single cite showing that any injunctive-relief statute, whether copyright or otherwise, has ever been deemed to preempt the longstanding rule that it’s contempt of court to aid and abet an enjoined defendant. The desperation is palpable.

The reason the DMCA doesn’t apply to CloudFlare is obvious. Section 512(j) states that it “shall apply in the case of any application for an injunction under section 502 against a service provider” that qualifies for the safe harbors. CloudFlare goes on for pages about how it’s a service provider that would qualify for the safe harbor defense if given the chance, but all of this misses the point: CloudFlare is not being enjoined. The only service provider being enjoined is MP3Skull—and that injunction was issued under Section 502 without the limitations set forth in Section 512(j) because MP3Skull didn’t even bother to show up and attempt to claim the safe harbors. But the plaintiffs have not sought an injunction against CloudFlare, which they could only do by naming CloudFlare as a party to the suit.

Since CloudFlare itself isn’t being enjoined under Section 502, Section 512(j) provides it no limitations. The issue is simply whether, under the Federal Rules, CloudFlare is bound by the injunction that has already been issued against the MP3Skull sites. Perhaps not wanting to get bench-slapped again on the aiding and abetting question under Rule 65, CloudFlare is taking an even lower road with this desperate new argument that it’s magically immune to court orders against its customers under the Federal Rules. The district court has yet to rule on the plaintiffs’ motion, but my guess is that it will make short work in reminding CloudFlare of the court’s true power to hold aiders and abettors in contempt.

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Administrative Agency Commercialization Copyright Copyright Licensing Infringement Innovation Internet Legislation Supreme Court Uncategorized

Letter on FCC Set-Top Box Regulation Once Again Confuses the Issue

Washington, D.C. at nightLast week, a group of law professors wrote a letter to the acting Librarian of Congress in which they claim that the current FCC proposal to regulate cable video navigation systems does not deprive copyright owners of the exclusive rights guaranteed by the Copyright Act. The letter repeats arguments from response comments they  filed along with the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), accusing the Copyright Office of misinterpreting the scope of copyright law and once again bringing up Sony v. Universal to insist that copyright owners are overstepping their bounds. Unfortunately, the IP professors’ recurring reliance on Sony is misplaced, as the 30-year-old case does not address the most significant and troubling copyright violations that will result from the FCC’s proposed rules.

In 1984, the Supreme Court in Sony held that recording television shows on a personal VCR was an act of “time-shifting” and therefor did not constitute copyright infringement. The court also ruled that contributory liability requires knowledge, and such knowledge will not be imputed to a defendant based solely on the characteristics or design of a distributed product if that product is “capable of substantial noninfringing uses.” But while this precedent remains good law today, it does not apply to the real concerns creators and copyright owners have with the FCC’s attempt to redistribute their works without authorization.

The FCC’s proposed rules would require pay-TV providers to send copyrighted, licensed TV programs to third parties, even if the transmission would violate the agreements that pay-TV providers carefully negotiated with copyright owners. A different group of IP scholars recently explained to the FCC that by forcing pay-TV providers to exceed the scope of their licenses, the proposed rules effectively create a zero-rate compulsory license and undermine the property rights of creators and copyright owners. The compulsory license would benefit third-party recipients of the TV programs who have no contractual relationship with either the copyright owners or pay-TV providers, depriving creators and copyright owners of the right to license their works on their own terms.

This unauthorized siphoning and redistribution of copyrighted works would occur well before the programming reaches the in-home navigational device, a fact that the authors of the recent letter to the Librarian of Congress either don’t understand, or choose to ignore. Creators and copyright owners are not attempting to “exert control over the market for video receivers,” as the letter suggests. The manufacture and distribution of innovative devices that allow consumers to access the programming to which they subscribe is something that copyright owners and creators embrace, and a thriving market for such devices already exists.

As more consumers resort to cord cutting, countless options have become available in terms of navigational devices and on-demand streaming services. Apple TV, Roku, Nexus Player and Amazon Fire Stick are just a few of the digital media players consumers can choose from, and more advanced devices are  always being released. But while the creative community supports the development of these devices, it is the circumvention of existing licenses and disregard for the rights of creators to control their works that has artists and copyright owners worried.

Sony has become a rallying cry for those arguing that copyright owners are attempting to control and stymie the development of new devices and technologies, but these critics neglect the substantial problems presented by the transmission of digital media that Sony couldn’t predict and does not address. In the era of the VCR, there was no Internet over which television was broadcast into the home. In 1984, once a VCR manufacturer sold a unit, they ceased to have any control over the use of the machine. Consumers could use VCRs to record television or play video cassettes as they pleased, and the manufacturer wouldn’t benefit from their activity either way.

The difference with the current navigation device manufacturers is that they will receive copyrighted TV programs to which they’ll have unbridled liberty to repackage and control before sending them to the in-home navigation device. The third-party device manufacturers will not only be able to tamper with the channel placement designed to protect viewer experience and brand value, they will also be able to insert their own advertising into the delivery of the content, reducing pay-tv ad revenue and the value of the license agreements that copyright owners negotiate with pay-TV providers. The FCC’s proposal isn’t really about navigational devices, it’s about the control of creative works and the building of services around TV programs that the FCC plans to distribute to third parties free of any obligation to the owners and creators of those programs.

The authors of the letter conflate two distinct issues, misleading influential decision makers that may not be as well versed in the intricacies of copyright law. By stubbornly comparing the copyright issues surrounding the FCC’s proposed rules to those considered by the Supreme Court in Sony, they craftily try to divert attention away from the real matter at hand: Not what consumers do with the creative works they access in the privacy of their own homes, but how those works are delivered to consumers’ homes in the first place.

It’s curious that after many rounds of back-and-forth comments discussing the FCC’s proposal, proponents of the rules still refuse to address this primary copyright concern that has been continuously raised by creators and copyright owners in corresponding comments, articles, and letters (see also here, here, here, and here). Perhaps the authors of the recent letter simply do not grasp the real implications of the FCC’s plan to seize and redistribute copyrighted content, but given their years of copyright law experience, that is unlikely. More probable is that they recognize the complications inherent in the proposal, but do not have a good answer to the questions raised by the proposal’s critics, so they choose instead to cloud the issue with a similar-sounding but separate issue. But if they truly want to make progress in the set-top box debate and clear the way for copyright compliant navigational devices, they’ll need to do more than fall back on the same, irrelevant arguments.

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Copyright Infringement Internet Uncategorized

The Dangerous Combination of Content Theft and Malware

Cross-posted from the Mister Copyright blog.

circuit boardMalware, short for malicious software, has been used to infiltrate and contaminate computers since the early 1980s. But what began as relatively benign software designed to prank and annoy users has developed into a variety of hostile programs intended to hijack, steal, extort, and attack. Disguised software including computer viruses, worms, trojan horses, ransomware, spyware, adware, and other malicious programs have flooded the Internet, allowing online criminals to profit from illicit activity while inflicting enormous costs on businesses, governments and individual consumers.

Purveyors of malware target unsavory websites to embed and distribute their programs, often making deals with those in the business of disseminating stolen content. Content theft websites that appear online through legitimate hosting and content delivery systems are frequently riddled with devious malware that infect the computers of users looking to download or stream pirated music, movie and television shows.

Last week, the Digital Citizens Alliance (DCA) published a report detailing how US tech companies are allowing cyber criminals to use their services to perform a myriad of illegal exploits. Enabling Malware focuses on how stolen content is being used as bait to infect users’ computers and how domestic hosting and content delivery companies are permitting online criminals to profit from the spread of dangerous malware.

Employing the expertise of Internet security firm RiskIQ, the report found that 1 in 3 content theft websites expose users to infectious malware and that visitors are 28 times more likely to encounter malware on content theft sites than mainstream, legitimate websites. And although these nefarious websites are usually created and maintained by overseas operators, they rely on North America hosting companies to function.

It’s a tricky partnership because while the hosting companies are not breaking the law by allowing disreputable websites to make us of their services, they are facilitating criminal networks whose activities could have catastrophic consequences. The report likens these service companies to landlords who turn a blind eye to the illegal activity of a renter. The issue is the same one being examined by the Copyright Office in its DMCA 512 study: When does a service provider have the requisite knowledge of illicit activity to trigger a duty to address the problem?

But while Section 512 of the DMCA hopes to combat copyright infringement online, the introduction of malware to content theft sites has consequences more far-reaching and dire than the dissemination of stolen works. Once malware infiltrates a system and hackers are able to take over, the results can be disastrous. The report details a wide range of criminal activity that can result from malware infection including the theft of bank credentials and credit card information that is then subsequently sold online, locking computers and demanding ransoms to return access, and hijacking webcams to film users without consent. The report warns:

[T]hese companies are now contributing to a growing issue for Americans: the threat of computer infections, the rise of identity theft and loss of financial information. The U.S. Department of Justice reports that 16.2 million U.S. consumers have been victimized by identity theft, with financial losses totaling over $24.7 billion.

According to the study, one of the most notorious companies enabling the websites that spread malware is CloudFlare. Marketing itself as a global content protection and security service provider, CloudFlare actually conceals a website’s true hosting information, inserting their network information instead. This allows for notorious content theft websites to mask information related to their actual hosting companies, making it more difficult to identify those complicit in their illegal activity.

Employing CloudFlare’s services are websites like Putlockerr.io, which offers a wide array of pirated movies for download. But when a user attempts to watch a movie via Putlocker, they download more than pirated content. After a user clicks to watch a movie, they are redirected to a new site that prompts them to download a new video player in order to view the content. This download is in fact a mechanism to deliver the malware that will wreak havoc on their system.

One of the worst distributors of malware identified by RiskIQ was watchfreemoviesonline.top. According to the study, the websites malware exposure rate was 32 percent and baited users into downloading the infectious software by offering popular movies like Captain America: Civil War in advance of its theatrical release. Watchfreemoviesonline.top uses Hawk Host, a company offering services similar to CloudFlare, to hide information about their actual hosting affiliations.

The Digital Citizens Alliance contacted both CloudFlare and Hawk Host to inform them of the findings of the RiskIQ report, and received differing responses. After being presented with clear evidence of the shady and illegal activities of watchfreemoviesonline.top, Hawk Host acknowledged that the site violated their terms of service and told the DCA that the site would come down. Hawk Host also agreed to meet with DCA researches to further discuss the RiskIQ report.

Unfortunately, the DCA’s interaction with CloudFlare was not as encouraging. In response to an email informing the company of the findings of the RiskIQ report, CloudFlare responded with a vague comment disclaiming any responsibility for the content of their client websites.

In the past few years, there’s been progress among service companies’ accountability efforts, with many refusing to deal with criminal websites. Payment providers like PayPal and Visa have stopped permitting illicit websites to use their services, and online advertisers have vowed to stop dealing with infamous content theft sites. But in order to eradicate content theft sites and the malware they propagate, the companies that help veil their identities and enable criminal activity must be help accountable.

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Copyright Infringement Internet Uncategorized

Three Years Later, DMCA Still Just as Broken

By Matthew Barblan & Kevin Madigan

cameraIn 2013, CPIP published a policy brief by Professor Bruce Boyden exposing the DMCA notice and takedown system as outdated and in need of reform. The Failure of the DMCA Notice and Takedown System explained that while Section 512 of the DMCA was intended as a way for copyright owners and service providers to work together to fight infringement in the digital age, the notice and takedown system has been largely ineffective in managing the ever-increasing amount of piracy.

Three years later, the DMCA is still just as broken. Since we published the brief, courts have further diminished service providers’ responsibility to cooperate with copyright owners to detect and deter infringement, rendering the DMCA even more fruitless and desperately in need of retooling.

Boyden explained the fundamental problems with the system at the time, beginning with the fact that “despite all the notice, there is precious little takedown to show for it. Unless a site employs some sort of content filtering technology, the same content typically re-appears within hours after it is removed.” The notice and takedown system is particularly unsuited for the twenty-first century, where “infringement is persistent, ubiquitous, and gargantuan in scale. It is a problem that needs to be policed” with more than just takedown notices that don’t give copyright owners “a single day when the content is not available on the most heavily trafficked sites.”

Boyden noted that “even for the largest media companies with the most resources at their disposal, attempting to purge a site of even a fraction of the highest-value content is like trying to bail out an oil tanker with a thimble.” And Boyden pointed out that the courts hadn’t made the situation any better: “The DMCA’s unsuitability as a tool to manage chronic, persistent, and pervasive infringement is particularly apparent after recent decisions from the Second and Ninth Circuit that construed the duty of website owners very narrowly under Section 512.”

To further illustrate his point, Boyden collected data on takedown notices sent by MPAA companies and counter-notices received. Between March and August of 2013, MPAA companies sent takedown notices for over 25 million infringing URLs and received only 8 counter-notices in response. That’s a counter-notice rate of 0.000032%, suggesting that the astronomical volume of notices represents a likewise astronomical volume of infringement rather than overly-aggressive notice-sending.

Grand Totals. Infringing URLs: 25,235,151. URLs Sent to Websites: 13,238,860. URLs Sent to Search Engines: 11,996,291. Counter-Notices Received: 8.

Boyden concluded:

The impossibility of keeping up with new [infringing] uploads means that an online service provider can create a site aimed at and dedicated to hosting infringing copyrighted works, comply with every takedown notice, and still benefit from the safe harbor, as long as its intent remains hidden. If the site has enough users, any popular content removed will be supplanted by new copies almost immediately.

Sadly, three years later the “chronic, persistent, and pervasive” infringement that Boyden described continues, with stolen copyrighted works popping up on sites almost immediately after being taken down. Google Search—one product of one company—has receive nearly 90 million takedown notices this month alone. The situation has gotten so bad that last week a long list of artists, including Paul McCartney and Taylor Swift, signed a digital petition to bring attention to a broken DMCA system that allows companies like YouTube to benefit from infringement at the expense of songwriters and artists.

The artists’ main message: “The existing laws threaten the continued viability of songwriters and recording artists to survive from the creation of music.” They note that “the tech companies who benefit from the DMCA today were not the intended protectorate when it was signed into law nearly two decades ago,” and they ask Congress to “enact sensible reform that balances the interests of creators with the interests of the companies who exploit music for their financial enrichment.”

Recognizing the growing frustration with the DMCA, the U.S. Copyright Office initiated a study earlier this year to examine whether the statute is fulfilling its purpose. We submitted comments to the Copyright Office on behalf of a group of copyright law scholars, noting that courts have disrupted the balance Congress sought to create when it enacted the DMCA. In particular, courts have eliminated any incentive for service providers to work with copyright owners to develop policies and procedures to prevent or curb piracy online. In just one example of how deeply courts have distorted congressional intent, under courts’ current interpretation of the DMCA, search engines can continue to index even obviously infringing sites like The Pirate Bay with no fear of potential of liability.

Adding insult to injury, courts have recently shifted the balance of power even further away from artists and towards service providers, making it easier than ever for companies to enable and profit from infringement while turning a blind eye—or even encouraging—piracy on their sites. In this month’s Capitol Records v. Vimeo decision, for example, the Second Circuit extended the DMCA safe harbor to Vimeo despite smoking-gun evidence that Vimeo employees encouraged users to post stolen works on their site and had viewed the illicit videos at issue in the suit. In a jaw-dropping opinion, the court let Vimeo off the hook simply because the evidence of Vimeo employees encouraging infringement wasn’t directly tied to the specific infringing videos that plaintiffs included in their suit.

CPIP’s Devlin Hartline explains:

After Capitol Records v. Vimeo: A service provider can encourage its users to infringe on a massive scale, and so long as the infringement it encourages isn’t the specific infringement it gets sued for, it wins on the safe harbor defense at summary judgment. This is so even if there’s copious evidence that its employees viewed and interacted with the specific infringing material at issue. No jury will ever get to weigh all of the evidence and decide whether the infringement is obvious. At the same time, any proactive steps taken by the service provider will potentially open it up to liability for having actual knowledge, so the incentive is to do as little as possible to proactively “detect and deal” with piracy. This is not at all what Congress intended. It lets bad faith service providers trample the rights of copyright owners with impunity.

As courts continue to gut the DMCA, making it harder than ever for artists to protect their property and livelihoods, Congress would be wise to heed Bruce Boyden’s advice from three years ago: “It is long past time for a retooling of the notice and takedown regime.”

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Copyright Infringement Internet Uncategorized

Second Circuit Deepens Red Flag Knowledge Circuit Split in Vimeo

a gavel lying on a table in front of booksThe Second Circuit’s recent opinion in Capitol Records v. Vimeo is, to put it mildly, pretty bad. From its convoluted reasoning that copyrights under state law for pre-1972 sound recordings are limited by the DMCA safe harbors, despite the explicit statement in Section 301(c) that “rights or remedies” under state law “shall not be annulled or limited” by the Copyright Act, to its gutting of red flag knowledge by limiting it to the nearly-impossible situation where a service provider actually knows that a specific use of an entire copyrighted work is neither fair nor licensed yet somehow doesn’t also surmise that it’s infringing, it’s hard to see how either result is compelled by the statutes, much less how it was intended by Congress. On the latter point, the Second Circuit in essence has written red flag knowledge out of the statute, reducing the DMCA to a mere notice-and-takedown regime. The reality is that Congress expected red flag knowledge to do far more work, incentivizing service providers to take action in the face of a red flag—even without a notice.

If there’s any good to come from Vimeo, it might only be that the Second Circuit has now deepened the circuit split with the Ninth Circuit in Columbia Pictures v. Fung on two issues related to red flag knowledge. Under the statute, red flag knowledge exists when a service provider is “aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.” The two circuits are already split on the issue of whether red flag knowledge must pertain to the particular works that are being sued over in the suit. And now with Vimeo, the circuits are split on the issue of whether a service provider can gain red flag knowledge just by looking at an infringing work. The deeper the circuit split, the greater the chance an appeal will make it to the Supreme Court, which would hopefully clean up the current red flag knowledge mess.

In Fung, the defendant, Gary Fung, operated several piracy havens, including isoHunt, TorrentBox, Podtropolis, and eDonkey. The district court found Fung liable for inducement under MGM v. Grokster and denied him safe harbor protection under the DMCA. The district court’s decision came in 2009, two years before the Ninth Circuit first held in UMG v. Shelter Capital that red flag knowledge requires “specific knowledge of particular infringing activity.” It also came two-and-a-half years before the Second Circuit held in Viacom v. YouTube that red flag knowledge is only relevant if it pertains to the works-in-suit. Regardless, since the vast majority of content available on Fung’s sites was copyrighted, including specific content that he himself had downloaded, the district court held that Fung hadn’t even raised a triable issue of fact as to whether he had red flag knowledge. The fact that none of the works he had been sued over were the same as the ones he had been found to have red flag knowledge of was irrelevant.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that Fung had red flag knowledge as a matter of law. The opinion came out just one week after the same panel of judges issued a superseding opinion in UMG v. Shelter Capital reiterating that red flag knowledge requires “specific knowledge of particular infringing activity.” Importantly, in applying that standard to Fung, the Ninth Circuit did not say that the specific knowledge had to be of the particular works-in-suit. For whatever reason, Fung had failed to argue otherwise. Google even filed an amicus brief supporting the plaintiffs but nonetheless arguing that “the DMCA’s knowledge standards are specific and focus on the particular material that the plaintiff is suing about.” Apparently unaware that this actually helped his case, Fung filed a supplemental brief calling Google’s argument “fallacious.”

In the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, even though red flag knowledge had to relate to particular infringing activity, that activity did not have to involve the particular works-in-suit. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit held that the “material in question was sufficiently current and well-known that it would have been objectively obvious to a reasonable person” that it was “both copyrighted and not licensed to random members of the public.” Since Fung failed to expeditiously remove the particular material of which he had red flag knowledge, he lost his safe harbor protection across the board. Thus, the Ninth Circuit in Fung held that: (1) red flag knowledge that strips a service provider of its entire safe harbor protection does not have to pertain to the particular works-in-suit, and (2) material can be so “current and well-known” that its infringing nature would be “objectively obvious to a reasonable person.”

The Second Circuit in Vimeo parted ways with the Ninth Circuit on these two holdings. Since the “evidence was not shown to relate to any of the videos at issue in this suit,” the Second Circuit held that it was “insufficient to justify a finding of red flag knowledge . . . as to those specific videos.” The Second Circuit thus applied the red flag knowledge standard on a work-by-work basis, in direct contrast to the Ninth Circuit in Fung. Also, the Second Circuit held that “the mere fact that a video contains all or substantially all of a piece of recognizable, or even famous, copyrighted music” and was “viewed in its entirety” by an “employee of a service provider” was not enough “to sustain the copyright owner’s burden of showing red flag knowledge.” The court added that even “an employee who was a copyright expert cannot be expected to know when use of a copyrighted song has been licensed.” So while the Ninth Circuit said it would have been objectively obvious to Fung that particular works were infringing, the Second Circuit in Vimeo set the bar far higher.

Curiously, the Second Circuit in Vimeo didn’t even mention Fung, despite the fact that it was deepening the circuit split with the Ninth Circuit. One wonders whether the omission was intentional. Either way, the circuit split has only gotten deeper. While in the Ninth Circuit an infringement can be so obvious that a court can find that a service provider had red flag knowledge without even sending it to a jury, the Second Circuit says that courts can’t let a jury decide whether a service provider had red flag knowledge even with the most obvious of infringements. And while in the Ninth Circuit a service provider loses its entire safe harbor for failing to remove an obvious infringement that it hasn’t been sued over, the Second Circuit says that red flag knowledge has to be determined on a work-by-work basis for only the works-in-suit. Given this growing divide between the Second and Ninth Circuits, it seems like only a matter of time before the Supreme Court will weigh in on the red flag knowledge standard. And if the Court does finally weigh in, one hopes it will put common sense back into the DMCA.