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Innovation Inventors Legislation Patent Law Uncategorized

No Consensus That Broad Patent ‘Reform’ is Necessary or Helpful

Here’s a brief excerpt of an op-ed by Adam Mossoff & Devlin Hartline that was published in The Hill:

Two recent op-eds published in The Hill argue that broad patent legislation—misleadingly labeled “reform”—is needed because the U.S. patent system is fundamentally broken. In the first, Timothy Lee contends that opponents “cannot with a straight face” argue that we don’t need wide-sweeping changes to our patent system. In the second, Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine maintain that there is “consensus among academic researchers” that the system is “failing.”

Both op-eds suggest that there are no principled reasons, whether legal or economic, to object to the overhaul of the patent system included in the Innovation Act. Both op-eds are wrong.

To read the rest of this op-ed, please visit The Hill.

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Economic Study Innovation Inventors Legislation Patent Law Uncategorized

How Patents Help Startups Grow, Innovate, and Succeed

Many academic studies of the patent system focus on the negative, extrapolating from anecdotes about a few bad actors to make the case that our patent system is broken and to bolster cries for legislation weakening patent rights. Precious few studies focus on the countless honest and hardworking patent owners whose inventive labors benefit us all. But understanding how patents support inventive enterprises is a crucial part of the equation, especially at a time when Congress is considering legislation that would make it extremely difficult for startups and individual inventors to enforce their patent rights.

In a newly-published working paper, The Bright Side of Patents, CPIP Edison Fellow Deepak Hegde, along with co-authors Joan Farre-Mensa and Alexander Ljungqvist, take a look how patents help startups grow. They show that, contrary to the claims made by several academics and activists, startups are not victims of the patent system. On the contrary, patents help startups become more successful and innovative.

The study finds that “patent approvals help startups create jobs, grow their sales, innovate, and eventually succeed.” When a startup’s first patent application is approved, its employment growth increases by 36% and its sales growth increases by 51% on average over the next five years. First-patent approval also has a strong causal effect on a startup’s continued ability to innovate, increasing the number of subsequent patent grants by 49% and increasing the quality of those patents by 27%. In fact, a startup with first-patent approval is twice as likely to end up listed on a stock exchange—a common indication of success for a startup.

Negatively affecting startups are delays in the patent application process and ultimate application rejections. For every year an ultimately-approved patent application is delayed, the startup’s employment growth decreases by 21% and its sales growth decreases by 28% on average over the following five years. Furthermore, each year a patent application is delayed, the average number of subsequent patents granted decreases by 14% while the quality of those patents decreases by 7%. And for each year of delay, the probability that a startup will go public is cut in half.

One big reason why patents help startups is that they make it easier to access capital from external investors. The authors find that patents serve to mitigate frictions in information between potential investors and startups. Patents play an important role by alleviating startups’ concerns about having their inventions misappropriated by investors and by alleviating investors’ concerns about the credibility, quality, and monetary future of the startups. Having access to capital in turn sets startups on a path of growth where they can turn ideas into products and services, generate jobs, increase revenue, and undertake further innovation.

What makes this study unique is its unprecedented access to the USPTO’s internal databases, which allowed the authors to evaluate detailed review histories of both approved and rejected patent applications. Prior studies only focused on approved applications, thus making it impossible to accurately separate out the economic and innovative effects. The authors here are able to demonstrate the direct benefits of patent protection with causal evidence from a large-sized sample—45,819 first-time patent applications filed by startups.

There is a surprising amount of criticism of the patent system today. Some claim that patents are a waste of time and resources for startups, useful only for defensive purposes. Others claim that patents actually harm startups. The authors here show that startups that secure patent protection are in fact more likely to succeed. As Congress considers yet another round of large-scale patent legislation, lawmakers need to understand the role that enforceable patent rights play in enabling startups to grow and succeed. This study is a great step in adding some much needed clarity to the ongoing patent policy debates.

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Administrative Agency Copyright Legislation Uncategorized

Principles and Priorities to Guide Congress’s Ongoing Copyright Review

Last week, CPIP published a new white paper, Copyright Principles and Priorities to Foster a Creative Digital Marketplace, by Sandra Aistars, Mark Schultz, and myself, which draws from the testimonies and scholarly writings of CPIP Senior Scholars in order to guide Congress as it continues its comprehensive review of the Copyright Act. The white paper discusses the constitutional origins of copyright protection and offers principles and priorities for Congress to consider as it moves forward with the copyright review process.

The current copyright review began in early 2013, when Register of Copyrights Maria Pallante threw down the gauntlet in her Horace S. Manges lecture by urging Congress to create “the next great copyright act.” While noting that minor legislative tweaks certainly have their place, Register Pallante suggested that it’s time for Congress to do something far more sweeping. Since then, Congress has embarked on a comprehensive review of our copyright laws, conducting over twenty hearings since mid-2013.

CPIP Senior Scholars have been actively engaged in that hearing process. Prof. Sandra Aistars (while she was CEO of the Copyright Alliance) testified on the creative community’s contributions to innovation and suggested several principles for the review process. Prof. Mark Schultz offered testimony on the scope and subject matter of copyright, and Prof. Sean O’Connor gave testimony on the failure of the DMCA’s notice-and-takedown regime.

As we discuss in the white paper, the premise of our copyright system is that copyrights are more than just incentives to create—they’re also rewards to authors for their productive labors. The Founders understood that authors’ rights and the public good are complementary, and they knew that public interests are best served when individual interests are properly secured. That understanding has proved quite prescient, as copyright today drives many innovations that provide remarkable benefits to our economy, society, and culture.

In the white paper, we propose the following organizing principles for any further work reviewing or revising the Copyright Act:

    A. Stay True to Technology-Neutral Principles and Take the Long View
    B. Strengthen the Ability of Authors to Create and to Disseminate Works
    C. Value the Input of Creative Upstarts
    D. Ensure that Copyright Continues to Nurture Free Speech and Creative Freedom
    E. Rely on the Marketplace and Private Ordering Absent Clear Market Failures
    F. Value the Entire Body of Copyright Law

We then note that these principles in turn suggest that Congress prioritize the following areas for action:

    A. Copyright Office Modernization
    B. Registration and Recordation
    C. Mass Digitization and Orphan Works
    D. Small Claims
    E. Notice and Takedown
    F. Streaming Harmonization

The ball is still rolling with the copyright review process. The House Judiciary Committee began a listening tour this fall that kicked off in Nashville and then traveled to Silicon Valley and Los Angeles. Moreover, those who testified at the earlier hearings have been invited back to meet with Committee staff and discuss any further input they might have. And the Committee is open to “any interested party” coming in to discuss their interests.

All told, this lengthy review process places Congress in a good position to take the next step in bringing us closer to Register Pallante’s “next great copyright act.” And to that end, we hope that our white paper will help Congress keep the constitutional premise of copyright protection in mind as it chooses where we go from here.

To read the full white paper, please click here.

Categories
Innovation Legislation Trade Secrets Uncategorized

Debunking Myths About the Proposed Federal Trade Secrets Act

By Mark Schultz

Today, CPIP is proud to release a paper authored by the nation’s preeminent expert on trade secret law, James Pooley. Mr. Pooley’s paper explains the arguments in favor of the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015 (“DTSA”), which is currently being considered by Congress. To download the paper, please click here.

The DTSA would create a federal cause of action for trade secret misappropriation. The legislation has been proposed via identical House (H.R.3326) and Senate (S.1890) bills. While trade secret theft has been a federal crime since 1996 pursuant to the Economic Espionage Act, civil claims have been left to state laws. The new bill would provide nationwide federal jurisdiction, while retaining the parallel state laws.

Trade secrets have become increasingly important at the same time they have become more vulnerable. Research in the US and Europe shows that trade secrets are the kind of IP most widely and universally relied upon by businesses. They are particularly important to small businesses. However, they can be stolen more easily than ever. Vital proprietary information that once would have resided in file cabinets and that would have taken days to copy now can be downloaded at the speed of light.

The DTSA is needed to improve the speed and efficiency of trade secret protection in the US. By some measures, as my own research for the OECD with my co-author Doug Lippoldt showed, the US has the strongest laws protecting trade secrets in the world. However, the multi-jurisdictional approach taken by the US presents a unique challenge to enforcing trade secrets quickly and efficiently. Investigating claims, conducting discovery, and enforcing claims in multiple states takes time. In an ordinary tort or contract case, such delays are usually manageable. In a trade secret case, even small delays can make the difference between rescuing a multi-million dollar secret and seeing its value destroyed utterly.

The proposed DTSA has enjoyed broad support from a coalition of large and small businesses. The bill has been largely uncontroversial, except among some legal academics. We have become accustomed to reflexive academic skepticism of improving IP rights, but some of the arguments against the DTSA have been truly puzzling.

The most puzzling academic argument against the bill is the claim that adding federal jurisdiction to trade secret enforcement will give rise to a new class of trade secret “troll.” It’s hard to see this claim as anything other than a mere rhetorical attempt to piggyback on the (largely specious) patent “troll” issue. According to research conducted for the European Commission, as well as widespread anecdotal evidence, firms routinely forego litigating trade secret claims for fear of revealing their proprietary information. It is thus hardly credible that they would expose their secrets in order to “troll,” especially merely because they now have easier access to federal courts.

Mr. Pooley’s paper explains the benefits of the DTSA while carefully refuting the “troll” myth and other arguments against the bill. The article includes a timely response to an academic letter released today expressing opposition to the DTSA.

Categories
Innovation Legislation Patent Law Uncategorized

Will Increasing the Term of Data Exclusivity for Biologic Drugs in the TPP Reduce Access to Medicines?

The following guest post comes from Philip Stevens, Director of the Geneva Network, a research and advocacy organization working on international health, trade, and intellectual property issues. The original research note can be found here.

By Philip Stevens

scientist looking through a microscopeIn the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations, the U.S. and Japan have proposed that TPP partners increase their period of regulatory data protection (RDP) for biologic medicines to align with practice in other countries. These proposals have been strongly opposed by a number of academics, who claim that such a move would significantly increase public spending on medicines, thereby potentially limiting access.[1], [2]

Past experiences in Canada and Japan, which lengthened their respective terms of RDP some years ago, however, indicate that these fears of budget increases are unlikely to materialise.

Canada and Japan increased RDP[i] substantially but did not experience increases in expenditures for medicines

Like several TPP countries, the governments of Canada and Japan have national health insurance systems, and cover most health care costs, including medicines. Unlike other TPP countries, Canada and Japan have in the past decade adopted substantially longer terms of RDP. Their experiences, captured in the data provided below, show that expenditures on medicines did not change appreciably from previous trends.

In 2006 Canada changed its regulations in a way that effectively increased their RDP term from 0 years to 8 years.[ii] As shown in Figure 1 (based on 2014 OECD data[iii]), pharmaceutical spending as a percentage of total health spending has actually decreased since then.

Figure 1: Pharmaceutical expenditure as a percentage of Canada’s healthcare expenditure (2005-2011)

Canada - OECD Health Data 2014. Pharma spend as % of total health spend. 2005: 17.2. 2006: 17.4 (Note: RDP Increased). 2007: 17.2. 2008: 17.0. 2009: 17.0. 2010. 16.6. 2011: 17.1.

As indicated in Figure 2 below, over the same period (2005-2011) pharmaceutical expenditure as a percentage of GDP (blue bars) remained relatively stable after RDP was increased in Canada in 2006, whereas overall health spending as a percentage of GDP in Canada has gradually increased (red bars).

Figure 2: Health and pharmaceutical expenditure as a percentage of Canada’s GDP (2005-2011)

Canada - OECD Health Data 2013. Red=Health spend as % of GDP. Blue=Pharma spend as % of GDP. 2005: Red, 9.8; Blue, 1.69. 2006: Red: 10.1; Blue 1.73. 2007: Red: 10.0; Blue: 1.73. 2008: Red: 10.3; Blue: 1.74. 2009: Red: 11.4; Blue: 1.93. 2010: Red: 11.4; Blue: 1.89. 2011: Red, 11.2; Blue: 1.86.

Similarly, Japan increased data protection in 2007 from 6 to 8 years (effectively 9 years).[iv] As indicated by Figure 3, fluctuations in expenditures after that time have been in line with growth in health care spending as a percentage of GDP. In fact, in 2010 pharmaceutical spending decreased in a year where health care spending increased.

Figure 3: Pharmaceutical expenditure as a percentage of Japan’s health care expenditure (2005-2010)

Japan - OECD Health Data 2014. Pharma spend as % of total health spend. 2005: 19.7. 2006: 19.5. 2007: 19.9 (Note: RDP Increased). 2008: 19.7. 2009: 20.7. 2010. 20.3.6. 2011: 20.8.

Figure 4 shows that the gradual increases in pharmaceutical expenditure as a percentage of GDP in Japan between 2005 and 2010 (blue bars) was in line with the overall increase in health spending as a percentage of GDP in Japan over the same period (red bars).

Figure 4: Health and pharmaceutical expenditure as a percentage of Japan’s GDP (2005-2010)

Japan - OECD Health Data 2013. Red=Health spend as % of GDP. Blue=Pharma spend as % of GDP. 2005: Red, 8.2; Blue, 1.62. 2006: Red: 8.2; Blue 1.60. 2007: Red: 8.2 (Note: RDP increased); Blue: 1.63. 2008: Red: 8.6; Blue: 1.70. 2009: Red: 9.5; Blue: 1.97. 2010: Red: 11.4; Blue: 1.89. 2011: Red, 9.6; Blue: 1.94.

Conclusion

The past experiences of Canada and Japan described above indicate that increases in RDP terms do not result in meaningful increases in health care expenditures or expenditures on medicines relative to overall health care spending. There could be many explanations for this result, ranging from changes in procurement policies, to increases in the number of medicines whose patent terms have expired. The evidence presented above, however, suggests that those concerned about access to medicines and the financial sustainability of public healthcare systems should focus their attention on policies other than Regulatory Data Protection for medicines.


[1] Moir et al, (2014) “Proposals for extending data protection for biologics in the TPPA: Potential consequences for Australia”, Submission to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, available at http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/tpp/submissions/Documents/tpp_sub_gleeson_lopert_moir.pdf

[2] Gleeson, D, Lopert, R, and Reid, P, (2013), “How the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement could undermine PHARMAC and threaten access to affordable medicines and health equity in New Zealand”, Health Policy, 116:2-3

[i] Japan has a “post marketing surveillance system” which we consider a surrogate for RDP and use the term RDP in this paper to include Japan’s approach.

[ii] Canada’s 5-year data protection term was made ineffective by a 1998 Federal Court interpretation of regulations. Bayer Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 84 C.P.R. (3d) 129, aff’d 87 C.P.R. (3d) 293, leave to appeal to SCC refused, [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 386. The Federal Court held that RDP protection in Canada was not triggered if a generic applicant could demonstrate bioequivalence without requiring the Health Minister to consult the data submitted by the innovative company. Because that was a common occurrence, RDP rarely applied under the pre-2006 regulations.

[iii] 2013/14 OECD data on Canada and Japan is found at: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/health-key-tables-from-oecd_20758480;jsessionid=k26q30wbgljb.x-oecd-live-02.

[iv] Japan’s system prevents filing applications for follow-on approval for eight years after the innovator’s approval. An additional year after that is required for the regulatory approval process to conclude.

Categories
Commercialization Copyright Copyright Licensing History of Intellectual Property Innovation Internet Legislation Uncategorized

Making Copyright Work for Creative Upstarts

The following post is by CPIP Research Associate Matt McIntee, a rising 2L at George Mason University School of Law. McIntee reviews a paper from CPIP’s 2014 Fall Conference, Common Ground: How Intellectual Property Unites Creators and Innovators.

By Matt McIntee

cameraIn Making Copyright Work for Creative Upstarts, recently published in the George Mason Law Review, Professor Sean Pager demonstrates how the current copyright system can be improved to better support creative upstarts. Pager defines “creative upstarts” to include “independent creators and producers who (a) are commercially-motivated; (b) operate largely outside the rubric of the mainstream commercial content industries; and (c) therefore lack the kind of copyright-related knowledge, resources, and capabilities that mainstream players take for granted.” Though these upstarts depend on their copyrights to make a living, they often find it difficult to effectively navigate the copyright system.

Pager explains how the copyright system generally benefits sophisticated users. For example, the Copyright Act contains hyper-technical language that can be difficult for naïve users to traverse. Pager pilots through this strikingly complex legal regime and determines that there are ample opportunities to afford better copyright protection to creative upstarts without diluting the copyrights held by others. He offers several proposals geared towards protecting the interests of creative upstarts, and he explains how the copyright system was designed without these features in mind.

One of Pager’s proposals is that we lower copyright registration costs, which potentially deter creative upstarts from registering their works. He notes that registration, obtaining accurate copyright information, and clearing copyrights are among the chief costs associated with obtaining copyright protection. A $35 registration fee may seem insignificant due to the benefits that come with it, but these costs can add up quickly for creative upstarts who generate large volumes of works. For example, graphic artists typically create many original works in order to build their portfolios, and the registration costs could be prohibitive.

Pager also notes that the Copyright Office’s searchable database increases costs for creative upstarts by adding valuable time to the process. The database is supposed to be complete and catalogued so that persons can easily search for accurate copyright information, but unfortunately this is not always the case. As a result, many creative upstarts have to spend precious time sifting their way through incomplete records and clearing copyrights instead of spending their time creating.

Tracing the history of the current regime, Pager explains how the copyright system assumes that artists seeking copyright protection have ample resources, such as lawyers, production facilities, manufacturers, and money. When the system was designed, policymakers structured it to support a “capital intensive process” that required significant investment and risk. But as Pager notes, the industry has shifted, and creative upstarts now form the bulk of content creators. A copyright system designed for artists recording on 8-track tapes is no longer appropriate in the digital age.

Pager offers a number of incremental steps to reform copyright law with the goal of making it more favorable to creative upstarts while still protecting the other players in the field. Though he acknowledges that there is no “magic bullet” solution, Pager argues that “improvements must come through a combination of substantive, procedural, and institutional reforms that yield incremental improvements across the entire copyright system.” And with such a comprehensive approach, he notes that certain tradeoffs will have to be made.

Substantively, Pager discusses how reducing systemic complexity is “deceptively simple.” While replacing “fuzzy standards with bright-line rules” would to some degree enhance certainty, Pager notes that “bright lines quickly become blurred” in a “world of fast-changing technologies and business practices.” He proposes instead that a “more realistic fallback goal would be to couple open-ended standards with clear safe harbor provisions or explicit examples.” Under this system, “standards would have room to evolve” while “their core meaning would be anchored as a starting point.”

Regarding procedural reforms, Pager suggests a “small claims dispute resolution” mechanism to drastically reduce costs for creative upstarts by providing them with a quick way to pursue infringement claims. Right now, copyright claims are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the federal district courts, an impractical and expensive route for independent artists. The Copyright Office has put forth a proposal for such a mechanism, but Pager argues that there is a “fatal flaw” since the process “would only be available on a voluntary basis.” By allowing “better-resourced adversaries” to opt out, the Office’s proposal leaves creative upstarts vulnerable.

Pager proposes that the Section 512 notice-and-takedown procedures could be improved to better support creative upstarts. Currently, creators are burdened by both the number of takedown notices required and the lack of access to the “trusted sender” facilities available to major participants. As Pager notes, the House Judiciary Committee addressed these issues as recently as March of 2014, but questions remain concerning who will bear the costs and how the transition will be implemented.

Turning to the registration system, Pager suggests three reforms that would benefit creative upstarts. First, having a single registry for authors to register their works, rather than a multitude of public and private registries, would reduce administrative burdens. Second, registration records would be more efficiently maintained through a tiered-fee system that charges more to larger content creators in order to subsidize the costs of smaller upstarts. Lastly, removing the timely registration requirement for enhanced damages, coupled with small claims dispute resolution reform, would provide cost-effective enforcement mechanisms.

Finally, Pager explains how technology can play a pivotal role in helping creative upstarts. One example is updating the Copyright Office website to provide more basic information about the copyright system. This information is currently scattered all over the Internet, and it could be organized to make it more user-friendly and less “lawyerly.” Another example is implementing software similar to TurboTax that actively assists authors when registering their copyrights. There would first have to be substantive changes in the law to allow for such software, but Pager believes that this technology would be incredibly helpful to those navigating the registration system.

Creative Upstarts is a fascinating look into the world of creative upstarts. With their interests and the interests of the larger copyright ecosystem in mind, Pager skillfully traverses our complicated copyright regime and identifies ample opportunities to improve copyright protections for creative upstarts. The twenty-first century is a digital age, and creators and innovators have the technological ability to produce creative works right on their laptops. Pager’s hope is the Copyright Act will be updated to address the realities of this modern world for creative upstarts.

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Administrative Agency Antitrust Commercialization Economic Study FTC Innovation Inventors Legislation Patent Law Patent Licensing Patent Litigation Uncategorized

How Rhetorical Epithets Have Led the FTC Astray in its Study of Patent Licensing Firms

We’ve all heard the narrative about patent licensing firms, often referred to pejoratively as “patent trolls.” These patent owners, who choose to license their innovations rather than build them, are the supposed poster-children of a “broken” patent system. It’s as if commercializing one’s property, just like a landlord leases his land for another to use, is suddenly a bad thing. Nevertheless, the power of this “troll” rhetoric cannot be denied. Many provisions in 2011’s Leahy-Smith America Invents Act were aimed at starving out these “trolls,” and no less than five bills currently under consideration in the House and Senate seek to further deflate their sails.

Another example of the powerful appeal of the “patent troll” rhetoric is that the agencies charged with enforcing antitrust law have also been convinced that there is something amiss with the commercial licensing of patented innovation in the marketplace. This has been a key feature of the deployment of patented inventions in America’s innovation economy since the early nineteenth century, as scholars have shown. Last year, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) instigated its own investigative study of what it calls “patent assertion entities” (PAEs), which is merely a more formal and neutral-sounding synonym for the popularized “patent troll” epithet.

In a new paper published in the George Mason Law Review, Sticks and Stones: How the FTC’s Name-Calling Misses the Complexity of Licensing-Based Business Models, CPIP Senior Scholar Kristen Osenga takes a closer look at the FTC’s ongoing study of PAEs and finds that it is destined to fail for two simple, yet inescapably obvious, reasons.

The first is the basic definitional problem of the FTC’s characterization of PAEs, which puts all patent licensing firms in the same boat. Failing to take a more nuanced approach, Osenga warns, “fires up the rhetoric but obscures thoughtful discussion and debate about the issue.” Building upon her previous work, she explains:

[T]he real problem is that patent licensing firms are treated as a homogenous category, with no attention paid to the wide range of business models that exist under the patent licensing firm umbrella. The categorical determination of patent licensing firms as “problems” imputes to a large, diverse group of firms the negative actions and qualities of a small number of bad actors.

Since not all “trolls” are alike, Osenga cautions, it’s “naïve and inaccurate” to lump them all together. And when the FTC makes this mistake, it leads to a situation “where words actually can hurt, much more so than sticks and stones.” The FTC’s study is explicitly “premised on a one-size-fits-all conception of patent licensing firms.” Rather than shedding much-needed light on the complex innovation ecosystem, the study promises to squander the opportunity by failing to recognize that not all “trolls” are the same.

Osenga notes that the FTC is uniquely situated to obtain nonpublic information about how these patent licensing firms operate using its investigative power under Section 6(b) of the FTC Act. Unfortunately, however, the study is premised on the faulty notion that the only upside of patenting licensing firms is to “compensate inventors.” But this focus on patents-as-incentives misses the forest for the trees, Osenga urges, as it fails to account for the larger patent-commercialization network:

[T]here are many steps between invention and the introduction of an actual product to the market and consumers. These steps include transforming an idea in to a marketable embodiment, developing facilities to produce the marketable embodiment, creating distribution channels to bring the embodiment to the consumer, and making the consumer aware of the new product. Each of these steps requires its own additional resources in the form of both capital and labor.

The FTC study, like many patent skeptics, fails to consider the benefits of the division of labor that patent licensing firms represent. Not every inventor is willing or able to bring an invention to the marketplace. Osenga’s point is that patent licensing does more than simply compensate inventors for their troubles; it creates liquid markets and solves problems of asymmetrical actors and information. These exchanges increase innovation and competition by playing the role of match-maker and market-maker, and they place valuable patents into the hands of those who are better positioned to exploit their worth.

Osenga points out that there are indeed possible negative effects with patent licensing firms. For example, they sometimes engage in ex post licensing, waiting to offer licenses until after the would-be licensee has already adopted the technology. These firms can be better positioned litigation-wise since their potential exposure is typically less than that of the infringers they sue. Finally, patent aggregators tend to have greater market power, and it can be difficult to judge the quality of any given patent that’s asserted when they offer to license their entire portfolio.

As with all things, Osenga stresses, there’s both good and bad. The problem is figuring out which is greater. The FTC could conduct a study that reveals a “detailed understanding of the complex world of patent licensing firms,” she laments, but that’s not what the FTC is doing:

[T]he configuration of the study is slanted in such a way that only part of the story will be uncovered. Worse still, the study has been shaped in a way that will simply add fuel to the anti-“patent troll” fire without providing any data that would explain the best way to fix the real problems in the patent field today.

This leads to the second problem with the FTC study, which follows as a necessary, logical consequence from the first definitional problem: There are serious methodological problems with the study that will undermine any possible empirical conclusions that the FTC may wish to draw.

Osenga says that the FTC’s study is simply not asking the right questions. Painting a complete picture of complex licensing schemes requires more than just counting the number of patents a firm has and adding up the attempts to negotiate license deals. To really get to the bottom of things, she contends, the FTC should be asking why patentees sell their patents to licensing firms and why licensing firms buy them from patentees. Better still, ask them why they decided to become patent licensing firms in the first place.

This insight is powerful stuff. It’s not enough to simply ask these firms what they’re doing; to really understand them, the FTC must ask them why they’re doing it. And the results are likely to be varied:

Some, of course, begin with this business model in mind. Others invent new technology but are unable to successfully commercialize it themselves, despite making efforts to do so. Still others exist as practicing entities for years or decades before something changes—supply change issues, rampant infringement by competitors, and regulatory initiatives—and they are no longer able to exist as a viable practicing entity.

Similarly, the FTC could ask them what kind of firms they are, and these answers are also likely to be diverse. Osenga’s point is that the FTC’s questions aren’t designed to showcase the vast differences between the various types of patent licensing firms. If the FTC wants to get to the bottom of how these firms affect innovation and competition, the first step should be to realize that they’re not all the same. The FTC’s study is as clumsy as those who refer to all such firms as “patent trolls,” and the lack of nuance going in will unfortunately produce a study that lacks nuance coming out.

In the end, Osenga agrees that deterring abusive behavior is a good thing, and she worries about innovation and competition. However, unlike many in patent policy debates, she is also concerned that the rhetoric is having an undue influence on policymakers. Throwing all patent licensing firms under the “patent troll” bus will not get us the narrowly-tailored reforms that we need. Sadly, the FTC’s approach with its ongoing study appears to have swallowed this rhetoric wholesale, and it seems unlikely that the results will be anything but more fuel for the “patent troll” pyre.

Categories
Administrative Agency Biotech High Tech Industry Innovation Intellectual Property Theory Inventors Legislation Patent Law Patent Litigation Patent Theory Software Patent Statistics Supreme Court Uncategorized

The One Year Anniversary: The Aftermath of #AliceStorm

The following post, by Robert R. Sachs, first appeared on the Bilski Blog, and it is reposted here with permission.

It’s been one year since the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank. On its face the opinion was relatively conservative, cautioning courts to “tread carefully” before invalidating patents, and emphasizing that the primary concern was to avoid preemption of “fundamental building blocks” of human ingenuity. The Court specifically avoided any suggestion that software or business methods were presumptively invalid. But those concerns seem to have gone unheeded. The Court’s attempt to side step the tricky problem of defining the boundary of an exception to patent eligibility—”we need not labor to delimit the precise contours of the ‘abstract ideas category in this case'”—has turned into the very mechanism that is quickly “swallow[ing] all of patent law.” The federal courts, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, and the USPTO are using the very lack of a definition to liberally expand the contours of abstract ideas to cover everything from computer animation to database architecture to digital photograph management and even to safety systems for automobiles.

Let’s look at the numbers to present an accurate picture of the implications of the Supreme Court’s decision. My analysis is a data-driven attempt to assess the implications of Alice one year out. It is with an understanding of how the Supreme Court’s decision is actually playing out in the theater of innovation that we can better project and position ourselves for what the future holds.

Alice at Court

Table 0 Fed Courts

As of June 19, 2015 there have been 106 Federal Circuit and district court decisions on § 101 grounds, with 76 decisions invalidating the patents at issue in whole or in part. In terms of patents and claims, 65% of challenged patents have been found invalid, along with 76.2% of the challenged claims.

The success rate of motions on the pleadings (including motions to dismiss and judgments on the pleadings) is extremely impressive: 67% of defense motions granted, invalidating 54% of asserted patents. There has never been a Supreme Court ruling that the presumption of validity does not apply to § 101—only the Court’s use of the originally metaphorical notion that eligibility is a “threshold” condition. Given that, and the general rule that to survive a motion to dismiss the patentee (historically) need only show that there was a plausible basis that the complaint states a cause of action— there is a plausible basis that the patent claim is not directed to an abstract idea, law of nature, or natural phenomena. One would be forgiven for thinking, as did former Chief Judge Rader in Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC that a “Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal for lack of eligible subject matter will be the exception, not the rule.” Apparently the rules change in the middle of the game.

Turning specifically to the Federal Circuit, the numbers are stark:

Table 00Fed Circuit

Of the 13 decisions, 11 are in software or e-commerce and only two are in biotech. The one case where the court held in favor of the patentee, DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P. appeared to offer a narrow avenue for patentees to avoid invalidation. However, only nine district court opinions have relied upon DDR to find patent eligibility, with over 30 court opinions distinguishing DDR as inapplicable. Even more interesting is the fact that in DDR the Federal Circuit essentially held that creating a website that copies the look and feel of another website is patent eligible. In the Silicon Valley, that’s called phishing, and it’s not a technology in which most reputable companies invest.

Alice at the Office

The impact of Alice is similarly impacting practitioners before the USPTO. In December, 2014 the Office issued its Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, providing guidance to patent examiners as to how to apply the Alice, Mayo, and Myriad decisions along with various Federal Circuit decisions, to claims during prosecution. Importantly, the Guidance noted that “the Supreme Court did not create a per se excluded category of subject matter, such as software or business methods, nor did it impose any special requirements for eligibility of software or business methods,” and it reminded examiners that “Courts tread carefully in scrutinizing such claims because at some level all inventions embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea.” Alas, most patent examiners are acting as if the patent applications before them are the exceptions to these cautionary instructions.

With the assistance of Patent Advisor, I compiled a dataset of almost 300,000 office actions and notice of allowances sampled in two week periods during 2013, 2013, 2014 and early 2015, and all actions during March, April and May 2015, across all technology centers:

Table0 Number of Apps

About 100,000 actions were notices of allowances, leaving about 200,000 office actions. Each office action was coded as to whether it included rejections under §§ 101, 102 and 103. For each office action the art unit and examiner was identified as well, and the status of the application (abandoned, pending or patented) as of the date that the data was obtained. I then analyzed the data for office actions rejections based on § 101, allowance rates, and examiner rejection rates. Here’s what I found.

Percent of all Actions with § 101 Rejections

Table2

Here, we have the percentage of all actions in each period that received a § 101 rejection, considering both rejections issued and notices of allowances. The black line separates pre-Alice from post-Alice data. For example, in TC 1600, the biotech area, in January, 2012 6.81% of all actions issued (counting both office actions and notices of allowances) were office actions with § 101 rejections; by May 2015 that percentage almost doubled to 11.86% of actions.

Overall, data shows that in 2012 subject matter rejections were mainly in the computer related Tech Centers (2100, 2400) and began declining thereafter, while escalating in biotechnology (1600) and so-called “business methods” Tech Center, TC 3600, following Mayo and Alice. Other technology centers such as semiconductors and mechanical engineering had essentially low and constant rejection rates. But that’s not because there are no software patents in these technology centers: you find plenty of software patents in these groups. Rather, my view is that it is because examiners in these groups treat software patents as they do any other technology.

The rejection rates in Tech Center 3600 in the 30-40% range are higher than any other group, but they also mask what’s really going on, since TC 3600 covers more than business methods. Tech Center 3600 has nine work groups:

Percent of all Actions with § 101 Rejections in TC 3600 Work Groups

Table3 Ecomm Rej

In TC 3600 most of the work groups handle good old-fashioned machines and processes, such as transportation (3610), structures like chairs and ladders (3630), airplanes, agriculture, and weapons (3640), wells and earth moving equipment (3670), etc. Three work groups handle e-commerce applications: specifically, 3620, 3680 and 3690. Here we see that these groups have significantly higher § 101 rejections than the rest of TC 3600. But let’s drill down further.

Each of work groups 3620, 3680 and 3690 have between five and 10 individual art units that handle specific types of e-commerce technologies, but they are not all under the same work group. For example business related cryptography is handed by both art units 3621 and 3685; healthcare and insurance is handled by art units 3626 and 3686; operations research is handled in 3623, 3624, 3682 and 3684. If we consolidate the data according to technology type and then look at rates of § 101 rejections we get the following:

Percent of all Actions with § 101 Rejections in E-Commerce Art Units by Technology Type

Table3 Ecomm Rej

What’s going on? After Bilski in 2010, the § 101 rejections were running between 17% and 50%. Not great but tolerable since these were mostly formal and were overcome with amendments adding hardware elements (“processor,” “memory”) to method claims or inserting “non-transitory” into Beauregard claims.

But after Alice, everything changed and § 101 rejections started issuing like paper money in a hyperinflation economy. If your perception as a patent prosecutor was that the every application was getting rejected under § 101, this explains your pain. Here’s another view of this data, in terms of actual number of § 101 rejections per sample period:

Number of Office Actions with § 101 Rejections in E-Commerce Art Units by Technology Type

Table4 Ecomm Rej Nos

Notice here that the number of office actions in March, 2015 fell dramatically, and then in April the flood gates opened and hundreds of actions issued with § 101 rejections. This is consistent with the Office’s statements in January 2015 that it was training examiners in view of the 2014 Interim Guidance, so office actions were being held until the training was completed. Apparently, the training skipped the part about no per se exclusions of business methods.

Now let’s consider notice of allowance rates. First with respect to all Tech Centers.

Percent of Actions that Are Notices of Allowance

Table5 All TCs NOA

This data reflects, of all the actions that were issued in a given period, the percentage that were notices of allowances. (Note here that contrary to the preceding tables, red cells are low percentage, and green cells are high since notices of allowance are good things, not bad things). The numbers look good, with a general increasing trend over time.

Now consider what’s happening in TC 3600’s business methods art units.

Percent of Actions that Are Notices of Allowance in Business Methods

Table6 NOAs in Ecomm

Now the picture is quite different. The rate of NOAs drops dramatically after Alice, especially in finance and banking and operations research. If it seemed that you were no longer getting a NOAs, this is why. The zero percent rate in March, 2015 is a result of the Office holding up actions and NOAs in view of the Interim Guidance training, as mentioned above.

Patents issued in the business methods art units typically are classified in Class 705 for “Data Processing.” I identified all patents with a primary classification in Class 705 since January, 2011, on a month by month basis, to identify year over year trends. Again the black line separates pre-Alice from post-Alice data.

Table7 Class 705 Patents

This table shows a precipitous decline in the number of business method patents issued following Alice, especially year over year. The lag between the June, 2014 Alice decision and the drop off in October 2014 is an artifact of the delay between allowance and issuance, as well as the USPTO’s unprecedented decision to withdraw an unknown number of applications for which the issue fee had already been paid, and issue § 101 rejections. It’s an interesting artifact, as well, that the number of Class 705 patents issued peaked in the month after Alice: you have to remember that these patents were allowed at least three months, and as much as a year, before the Alice decision; it just took a long time to actually get printed as a patent.

Next, we’ll consider abandonment rates, on a comparative basis, looking at the percentages of applications that were ultimately abandoned in relationship to whether or not they received a § 101 rejection. We’ll compare the data from January 2012 to July 2014. Again, consider the entire patent corps:

Percent of Abandoned Applications with Prior § 101 Rejection

Table8 Abandon all TCs

Here we see that of the applications that were abandoned during the respective sample periods, the vast majority did not have a prior § 101 rejection. Only in TC 3600 did the majority shift after Alice with 51.83% applications that received § 101 rejections in July 2014 being subsequently abandoned by May 31, 2015. Again, let’s drill down into the business method art units in TC 3600:

Percent of Abandoned Applications with Prior § 101 Rejection

Table9 Ecomm Abandon

First, prior to Alice, abandonments in the business method units appeared to result more frequently from other than § 101 rejections, typically prior art rejections. This is shown by the fact that the Jan. 2012 “No” column (no prior 101 rejection) is greater than the Jan. 2012 “Yes” column. Then after Alice, there is a huge shift with the vast majority of applications that were abandoned having § 101 rejections, as shown by the July, 2014 “Yes” column. The vast majority of abandonments, upwards of 90%, followed a 101 rejection. That’s applicants essentially giving up over what only a few years ago was a relatively minor hurdle. That’s what happens when you change the rules in the middle of the game. Second, there is also significant differential behavior in the business method areas as compared to the rest of the technology centers after Alice.

Here’s my personal favorite.

Rates of Examiner § 101 Rejections in TC 3600

Table12 Examiner Rates

This table shows the numbers of examiners in the business method art units with respect to the percentage of applications in which they issued § 101 rejections after Alice. The first row shows that during the sampled periods since Alice, 58 business methods examiners issued § 101 rejections in 100% of their applications, for a total of 443 applications. Twenty examiners issued § 101 rejections for between 90% and 99% of their cases, covering 370 applications. In short, 199 examiners issued § 101 rejections more than 70% of the time, covering 3,304 applications or about 70.6% of all applications. This is not “treading carefully.”

We find similar, though less dramatic, trends and variations in TC 1600 which handles biotechnology, pharma, and chemistry.

Percent of all Actions with § 101 Rejections in TC 1600 Work Groups

Table10 1600 101 Rej Rate

The red line separate pre-Mayo/Myriad data from post-Mayo/Myriad, and the increase in the post-period is significant. Here too, the various work groups mask the more significant rejection rates in specific technology areas, with the rejection rate in microbiology first jumping up to 34.6% post-Mayo and steadily climbing to the current 53.2%.

Percent of all Actions with § 101 Rejections in TC 1600 by Technology

Table11 1600 Tech Type Rej

This table breaks down the work groups into technology types, and then these are sorting average rejection rate over the past four months. Following Alice, we see a significant increase in eligibility rejections in bioinformatics related applications–inventions that rely on analysis and identification of biological and genetic information, and which are frequently used in diagnostics and drug discovery. This is especially disconcerting because bioinformatics is critical to the development of new diagnostics, therapies and drugs.

Note as well the enormous spike in rejections for plant related applications from 0% between July 2015 and April 2015, to 50% in May 2015. This is likely a result again of the USPTO’s Interim Guidance which essentially instructed examiners to reject any claim that included any form of a natural product.

At least pesticides and herbicides are safe from Alice, since we definitely need more of those. The irony is that the more pesticides and herbicides that come to market, the more we need bioinformatics inventions to identify and treat conditions potentially resulting from these products.

Alice at the Board

The Patent Trial and Appeal Board has been even more hostile to software and business methods patents under the Covered Business Method review program:

Total Petitions

Petitions Granted

Percent Invalid

PTAB CBM Institution on § 101

72

64

89%

PTAB Final Decisions on § 101

27

27

100%

Covered Business Method review is available for patents that claim “a method, apparatus, or operation used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service.” The Board takes a very broad view of what constitutes a financial product or service: if the patent specification happens to mention that the invention may be used in a financial context such as banking, finance, shopping or the like, then that’s sufficient. The Board has found CBM standing in 91% of petitions, and instituted trial in 89% of petitions asserting § 101 invalidity. Once a CBM trial has been instituted, the odds are heavily in the petitioner’s favor: of the 27 final CBM decisions addressing § 101, the Board has found for the petitioner 100% of the time.

Finally, we look at the Board’s activity in handling ex parte appeals from § 101 rejections for the period of March 1, 2015 to May 30, 2015:

  • 32 Ex Parte Decisions on § 101, with 15 in TC 3600.
  • 28 Affirmances overall, 13 in TC 3600
  • Two Reversals on § 101, both in TC 3600
  • Four New Grounds of Rejection for § 101

Following suit with how the Board is handling CBMs, they are also heavily supporting examiners in affirming § 101 rejections. More disconcerting is the trend of new grounds of rejection under § 101. While only four were issued in this period, there have been several dozen since Alice. In this situation, the applicant has appealed, for example, a § 103 rejection. The Board can reverse the examiner on that rejection, but then sua sponte reject all of the claims under § 101. What are the odds that the examiner will ever allow the case? Close to zero. What are the odds that an appeal back to the Board on the examiner’s next § 101 rejection will be reversed? If the Board’s 100% rate of affirming its CBM institution decisions on § 101 is any indication, then you know the answer.

Conclusions

Looking at the overall context of the Alice decision, it’s my view that Supreme Court did not intend this landslide effect. While they were certainly aware of the concerns over patent trolls and bad patents, they framed their decision not as a broadside against these perceived evils, but as simple extension of Bilski and the question of whether computer implementation of an abstract idea imparts eligibility. At oral argument, the members of the Court specifically asked if they needed to rule on the eligibility of software and they were told by CLS and the Solicitor General that they did not. To the extent that there is broad language in that opinion, it is the cautionary instructions to the courts to avoid disemboweling the patent law from the inside, and the emphasis on preemption of fundamental ideas—not just any ideas—as the core concern of the exclusionary rule. The evidence above shows that these guideposts have been rushed past quite quickly on the way to some goal other than the preservation of intellectual property rights.

If the present trends hold, and I see no reason to suggest that they will not, we will continue to see the zone of patent eligibility curtailed in software (not to mention bio-technology after Mayo and Myriad). Indeed, the more advanced the software technology—the more it takes over the cognitive work once done exclusively by humans, the more seamless it becomes in the fabric of our daily lives—the less patent eligible it is deemed to be by the courts and the USPTO. What technologies will not be funded, what discoveries will not be made, what products will never come to market we do not know. What we do know is this: there is only one law that governs human affairs and that is the law of unintended consequences.

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Innovation Intellectual Property Theory Inventors Legislation Patent Law Patent Litigation Patent Theory Uncategorized

Unintended Consequences of “Patent Reform”: The Customer Suit Exception

U.S. Capitol buildingIn the last two weeks, the House and Senate Judiciary Committees marked up wide-ranging patent legislation ostensibly aimed at combating frivolous litigation by so-called “patent trolls.” But while the stated purpose of the House and Senate bills—H.R. 9 (the “Innovation Act”) and S. 1137 (the “PATENT Act”), respectively—is to combat abusive litigation, a closer look at the actual language of the bills reveals broad provisions that go far beyond deterring frivolous lawsuits. This far-reaching language has raised concerns in the innovation industries that, instead of curbing ambulance-chasing patentees, Congress is preparing to fundamentally weaken the property rights of all inventors, emboldening patent infringers in the process.

The “customer suit exception” or “customer stay” provisions that appear in both bills are particularly troubling. These provisions direct courts to stay patent infringement suits against “retailers” and “end users” in favor of suits involving manufacturers higher up the supply chain. While the basic idea makes sense—we’ve all heard stories of coffee shops being sued for patent infringement because of the Wi-Fi routers they used—the provisions are drafted so broadly and inflexibly that they invite abuse and gamesmanship by infringers at the expense of legitimate patent owners.

Both the Innovation Act and the PATENT Act provide that “the court shall grant a motion to stay at least the portion of the action against a covered customer” that relates “to infringement of a patent involving a covered product or covered process” if certain conditions are met. The first condition in both bills is that the “covered manufacturer” must be a party to the same action or to a separate action “involving the same patent or patents” related to “the same covered product or covered process.” In other words, so long as the manufacturer is challenging the patentholder, the customer is off the hook.

The two main problems here are that (1) the definition of “covered customer” in both bills is exceedingly broad, such that almost any party can claim to be a “customer,” and (2) the provisions leave the courts no discretion in deciding whether to grant a stay, forcing them to halt proceedings even when it’s not warranted.

Both bills define “covered customer” as “a retailer or end user that is accused of infringing a patent or patents in dispute.” “Retailer,” in turn, is defined as “an entity that generates” its “revenues predominantly through the sale to the public of consumer goods and services,” and it explicitly excludes “an entity that manufactures” a “covered product or covered process” or “a relevant part thereof.” Thus, a “retailer” is a “customer,” but a “manufacturer” is not.

This language is far broader than necessary to achieve the stated purpose of protecting downstream retailers and end users. The Senate’s section-by-section breakdown of the PATENT Act claims that the “customer stay is available only to those at the end of the supply chain.” But the actual definitions in both bills are so broad that almost any entity in the supply chain would be eligible for a mandatory stay. This is so because almost all manufacturers are also retailers of other manufacturers; that is, almost all manufacturers could claim to be a “customer.”

Take, for example, a smartphone company that sources its components from a third-party manufacturer. If the smartphone company were sued for patent infringement over a component, it could claim to be a “covered customer” under both bills. Many smartphone companies generate “revenues predominantly through the sale to the public of consumer goods and services,” and they would not be considered “an entity that manufactures” the component. As a “retailer,” the smartphone company would be entitled to a mandatory stay, even though it’s nothing like the mom-and-pop coffee shop the customer stay provisions are designed to help. A district court would be forced to grant the stay, even if doing so hampered a legitimate patentholder’s ability to enforce its property right.

Against this backdrop, it’s important to keep in mind that the decision to stay proceedings has historically been left to the discretion of judges. Sometimes there are indeed good reasons to grant a stay, but each case is unique, and courts frequently weigh many factors in deciding whether a stay is appropriate. Instead of recognizing this dynamic, the Innovation Act and the PATENT Act mandate a one-size-fits-all solution to an issue that is best determined on a case-by-case basis. In effect, the bills tie the hands of district court judges, forcing them to stay suits even when the equities dictate otherwise.

While in some cases a manufacturer may be the more appropriate party to litigate a patent suit, it is not always true that efficiency or justice dictates staying a suit against a customer in favor of litigation involving the manufacturer. Courts generally balance several factors, such as convenience, availability of witnesses, jurisdiction over other parties, and the possibility of consolidation, when deciding whether to grant a stay. Courts consider whether the stay will lead to undue prejudice or tactical disadvantage, and they examine whether it will simplify the issues and streamline the trial. The decision to stay involves an extensive cost-benefit analysis for both the court itself and the litigants.

The Supreme Court has often emphasized the importance of judicial discretion in deciding whether a stay is warranted. As Justice Cardozo wrote for the Court in 1936, the decision to stay “calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance.” Justice Cardozo warned that the judiciary “must be on our guard against depriving the processes of justice of their suppleness of adaptation to varying conditions.” In the patent law context, Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court in 1952, declared: “Necessarily, an ample degree of discretion, appropriate for disciplined and experienced judges, must be left to the lower courts.”

The problem with the House and the Senate bills is that they take away this important “exercise of judgment” and threaten to remove much-needed flexibility and adaptation from the litigation process. The customer stay provisions take the “ample degree of discretion,” which is “appropriate for disciplined and experienced judges,” and place it into the hands of the alleged infringers. Infringers are not likely to be motivated by important notions of efficiency or justice; they’re likely to be motivated by self-interested gamesmanship of the system to their own advantage.

The proponents of the customer stay provisions claim that they’re necessary to help the little guy, but the provisions in both bills just aren’t drafted like that. Instead, they’re drafted to tie the hands of judges in countless cases that have nothing to do with small-time retailers and end users. The courts already have the power to stay proceedings when the equities tip in that direction, but these bills disrupt the judicial discretion on which the patent system has long depended. Customer stays certainly have their place, and that place is in the hands of judges who can take into account the totality of the circumstances. Judges should not be forced to make the important decision of whether to grant a stay based on overbroad and inflexible statutory language that goes far beyond its stated purpose.

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Copyright Internet Inventors Legislation Patent Law Uncategorized

CPIP Supports Guidelines for the Protection of Fundamental IP Rights

U.S. Capitol buildingFebruary 2, 2015

The Center for the Protection of Intellectual Property (CPIP) is proud to join today’s open letter to Congress providing a set of guidelines for considering laws and regulations governing intellectual property.

The letter outlines some of the fundamental economic and moral considerations that underscore the benefits of strong intellectual property rights. Framed by the following guidelines, the letter also highlights the need to respect and protect our intellectual property rights.

  • Intellectual Property Rights Are Grounded in the Constitution
  • Intellectual Property Rights Are a Fundamental Property Right Deserving the Same Respect as Physical Property
  • Intellectual Property Rights Promote Free Speech and Expression
  • Intellectual Property Rights Are Vital to Economic Competitiveness
  • Intellectual Property Rights Must Be Protected Internationally Through Effective IP Provisions in Trade Agreements
  • Intellectual Property Rights Are Integral to Consumer Protection and National Security
  • Intellectual Property Rights Must Be Respected and Protected on the Internet
  • Voluntary Initiatives to Address Intellectual Property Theft Are Positive

The letter, signed by 67 scholars, think tanks, advocacy groups, and other experts, concludes by noting that the “Founding Fathers understood that by protecting the proprietary rights of artists, authors, entrepreneurs, innovators, and inventors, they were promoting the greater public welfare. The continued protection of these fundamental rights is essential to American innovation and competitiveness.”

Read the letter in its entirety here