Tag: Adam Mossoff

Categories
Innovation Inventors Patents

New “Invalidated” Documentary Highlights the Problems With the PTAB: Free Screening on October 26

a lit lightbulb hanging next to unlit bulbsBy Devlin Hartline and Aditi Kulkarni*

The “Invalidated” documentary will be screened this Friday, October 26, at 5:30 PM in Washington, D.C. To register for this free event, which features a presentation by Bunch O Balloons inventor Josh Malone among others, please click here.

Imagine that you’re a father of eight children who puts everything on the line to bring your invention to the marketplace. After a successful Kickstarter campaign that brings in close to $1 million, you protect your invention by securing several patents on the innovative technology. Your invention is a huge market success, and sales exceed your wildest dreams. When the copycats come along, you think your patent rights will protect you. After all, that’s what the patent system is for. But you quickly realize that the system is stacked against you, the lone inventor, and it instead favors the large companies that willingly violate your rights for profit.

While this horror story may sound farfetched, it’s exactly what happened to Josh Malone, the inventor of Bunch O Balloons. And the unfortunate reality is that Malone is not the only inventor to be let down by the patent system that is meant to protect inventors from unscrupulous infringers. Thankfully, Malone is not taking things lying down. Not only is he fighting for his rights in the courts and at the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office—the very Office that granted him the rights in the first place—but he also has become a vocal activist fighting to reform the patent system. In fact, Malone is now telling his story in a new documentary entitled “Invalidated.” The full video, which prominently features CPIP Founder Adam Mossoff and runs about 50 minutes long, is available at both iTunes and Amazon.

You can watch the trailer here:

Inspired by childhood memories, Josh Malone invented Bunch O Balloons to solve a real-world problem. His invention allows anyone to fill and tie around 100 water balloons in just one minute. As a child, he spent days filling up hundreds of water balloons to play with his friends. Though he eventually stopped playing with balloons, the idea of finding a better way to play never left him. His idea finally materialized through a method to save his children’s time by filling several balloons at once. Malone burned the midnight oil perfecting his invention, and his family also invested their time and efforts backing his venture. After failing through several experiments and exhausting their savings, Malone finally succeeded with Bunch O Balloons.

Patent figure for Bunch O Balloons: fluid source leading to balloons

Ready with the product’s final prototype embodying his invention, Malone shot a video for a Kickstarter campaign to advertise his product and to raise some much-needed funds. The campaign was a hit, bringing in close to $1 million. Malone was even interviewed on the Today Show, where he got into an impromptu water balloon fight with Carson Daly. The purchase orders then started pouring in from toy manufacturers and big retailers like Walmart. They were all interested in profiting from the competitive advantage they would get from Malone’s novel—and fun—invention.

On realizing his invention’s strength and wanting to protect it from potential infringers, Malone filed several patent applications with the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO). While the patent applications were pending, Malone came to know that a product nearly identical to his own was being advertised and sold in the marketplace under the name, “Balloon Bonanza.” Investigating further, Malone realized that Telebrands, the marketing company that originated the “As Seen On TV” advertisements, had stolen his idea and begun selling knock-off versions of his invention.

Image comparison of Bunch O Balloons versus Balloon Bonanza

Malone sued Telebrands in the Eastern District of Texas, seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent the marketer from further infringing his rights. The district court granted the injunction, agreeing with Malone that his patent was likely valid and infringed. Telebrands fought back, appealing the injunction to the Federal Circuit and again challenging the validity of Malone’s patent on indefiniteness and obviousness grounds. The Federal Circuit sided with Malone, holding that it was not clear error for the district court to conclude that he was likely to succeed on the merits. The Court of Appeals rejected Telebrands’ arguments as failing to raise a substantial question concerning the validity of Malone’s patent.

Telebrands also challenged the validity of Malone’s patent before the Patent Trial & Appeal Board (PTAB) in a post-grant review (PGR) proceeding. During the pendency of Telebrands’ appeal to the Federal Circuit on the preliminary injunction, the PTAB rendered its final written decision: Telebrands had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Malone’s patent was invalid as indefinite. Of course, had the issue been decided in the district court, the mere preponderance standard would have been insufficient to overturn the presumably valid patent. But in the PTAB, the rules are different, and they favor challengers such as Telebrands that use the additional venue to game the system.

The Federal Circuit was well aware of the PTAB’s decision to the contrary when it upheld the district court’s determination that Malone was likely to succeed on merits in assessing the propriety of the preliminary injunction. In fact, it mentioned the PTAB proceedings in a footnote, noting that its decision was not binding and that it was nevertheless unpersuasive. When Malone subsequently appealed the PTAB loss, the Federal Circuit finally got its chance to directly address the PTAB’s decision on the merits. The Court of Appeals held that, even applying the PTAB’s more relaxed standard, Malone’s claims were not unpatentable for indefiniteness. The Federal Circuit thus made good on the earlier indications from both itself and the district court that Malone’s patent was indeed valid.

While Malone ultimately has been victorious so far, he’s been forced to spend millions of dollars protecting his rights. He reported in July of 2017 that he’d already spent $17 million, and that it might grow to as much as $50 million before it’s all through. That’s an insane amount of money for most lone inventors, and Malone is fortunate enough to have made enough revenue in sales to be able to afford it. Most people aren’t so lucky. And the battle for inventors is certainly far from over, especially when infringers with deep pockets can repeatedly play the game and wear down their victims in multiple forums. As Malone laments, “the PTAB simply encourages infringers like Telebrands to double down on the expense of litigation, rather than acquiescing to the adjudication by the District Court.”

It’s no wonder that, in his dismay, Malone joined other frustrated inventors to symbolically burn their patents outside of the USPTO in the summer of 2017. Malone’s story is a stereotype example of how the big infringers attempt to overwhelm the little guy by simply outspending them should they dare to challenge the wrong. Such gamesmanship at the expense of inventors is not the purpose of the PTAB. As Professor Mossoff notes in the documentary: “The original argument for why we needed the PTAB is that, every once in a while, there will be a mistakenly issued patent they shouldn’t have issued, and that these patents can clog the gears of the innovation economy. Unfortunately, what Congress created was a completely unrestrained, unrestricted agency whose job is to cancel patents.”

America’s Founders recognized that a stable and effective patent system is vitally important for the innovation ecosystem to thrive. American inventors like Josh Malone have made a significant difference in people’s lives, and the patent system exists to reward them for their efforts. Inventors should be able to trust that the patent system will be there to protect them when others trample on their rights. They need those rights to be meaningful in order to recoup their investments and to realize their just rewards. The Founders understood that benefiting inventors through such private gains would redound to the public benefit. But as Malone’s story demonstrates, we will need to make some changes to the patent system before the Founders’ vision can be fully realized.

*Aditi Kulkarni is working towards an LLM Degree in Intellectual Property at Antonin Scalia Law School, and she works as a Research Assistant at CPIP.

Categories
Innovation Patent Licensing

IP for the Next Generation of Mobile Technology: How IEEE’s Policy Changes Have Created Uncertainty for Innovators

In advance of our Sixth Annual Fall Conference on IP for the Next Generation of Technology, we are highlighting works on the challenges brought by the revolutionary developments in mobile technology of the past fifteen years.

hand holding a phone with holographs hovering over the screenEarlier this year, CPIP’s Adam Mossoff and Kevin Madigan detailed an in-depth empirical study on the troubling repercussions of policy changes at the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers-Standards Association (IEEE).

In a rigorous study tracking the activity of creators and owners of technologies incorporated into standards by the IEEE, Kirti Gupta and Georgios Effraimidis show how policy shifts at the IEEE have required patent owners to effectively relinquish their legal right to stop the deliberate and unauthorized uses of their property. Unfortunately, as Gupta and Effraimidis explain, the current unbalanced nature of standard setting at the IEEE is resulting in inefficient licensing negotiations and delayed standards development, and it’s threatening the development of new and innovative consumer products at a crucial time for mobile technologies.

The full Gupta & Effraimidis study is available here, and the synopsis by Adam Mossoff and Kevin Madigan can be found here.

Categories
Press Release

CPIP Announces Leadership Transitions

CPIP logoARLINGTON, Virginia – August 22, 2018 – The Center for the Protection of Intellectual Property (CPIP) announced today that Matthew Barblan, CPIP’s Executive Director, will leave the center this month to join the Association of American Publishers (AAP) as Vice President, Public Policy. “It has been an amazing journey working with such wonderful colleagues to build CPIP from the ground up over the past five years,” said Barblan. “I’m deeply grateful to my friends at CPIP and Scalia Law for making the center’s success possible, and I look forward to following CPIP’s growth and influence for years to come.”

Beginning on August 27, 2018, CPIP founder Adam Mossoff will become Executive Director of the center. “As a founding member of CPIP’s leadership team, Matt was absolutely essential to the success of the center over the last five years,” said Mossoff. “I will miss very much my day-to-day interactions with Matt at Scalia Law, but I’m looking forward to continuing to engage with him at future CPIP events on IP policy in his new role in representing the publishing industry.”

As part of the transition, longtime CPIP friend and senior scholar Sean O’Connor has joined CPIP as Director of International Innovation Policy. O’Connor will be an integral part of CPIP’s leadership team, focusing on law and policy issues regarding innovation and entrepreneurship, with a particular focus on international contexts.

“I’m excited about the future of CPIP, and it is a great pleasure to welcome Sean to the team,” said Henry N. Butler, Dean of Antonin Scalia Law School. “On behalf of the Scalia Law community, I also want to thank Matt for everything he has done over the past five years to take CPIP from idea to reality and build it into the successful center that it is today. Matt has been a great colleague and friend to the law school, and we wish him all the best in his new role at AAP.”

About the Center for the Protection of Intellectual Property

The Center for the Protection of Intellectual Property (CPIP) at Antonin Scalia Law School is dedicated to the scholarly analysis of intellectual property rights and the technological, commercial, and creative innovation they facilitate.

CONTACT:
Devlin Hartline
jhartli2@gmu.edu
703-993-8086

Categories
Innovation Patent Licensing

Study Finds IEEE’s 2015 Patent Policy Sowing Uncertainty and Slowing Innovation

dictionary entry for the word "innovate"By Kevin Madigan & Adam Mossoff

As the world prepares for the game-changing transition to 5G wireless systems, the high-tech industry must continue to efficiently develop and implement technologies and networks that work together across different platforms and devices. Few people are aware of how this happens, because it occurs solely between the companies who develop and implement technological products and services in the marketplace, such as Qualcomm, InterDigital, Microsoft, Apple, and others. These companies participate in private standard setting organizations, which develop technological standards agreed upon by these companies, such as three-prong electrical plugs, USB drives, hard disk storage drives, and even communications technologies such as Wi-Fi and 2G, 3G, and 4G.

In sum, the development of standards is a key part of how new technological innovations are efficiently sold and used by consumers and work for everyone. The reason standard setting organizations came into existence is because the alternative is neither efficient nor good for consumers. A standards “war” between companies in the marketplace leads to years of incompatible devices being sold while consumers wait for one company to establish (private) market dominance with its products and services such that everyone else must use that standard, such as what happened between VHS and Betamax in the 1980s or the market fight between Blu-ray Disc and HD DVD in the 1990s, to name just two examples. Standard setting organizations preempt this unnecessary and wasteful commercial war by bringing together the innovators and implementers of new technology to agree beforehand on a standard so that new standardized products and services can get into the hands of consumers faster.

Unfortunately, some standard setting organizations are changing their rules for the companies that invest hundreds of millions of dollars in long-term R&D to create groundbreaking technologies like those used in our smartphones. These new rules create uncertainty for these innovators. As a result, this uncertainty is threatening investments in new high-tech products and the ongoing growth in the U.S. innovation economy.

Detailing this troubling trend is a recently released, in-depth, and rigorous study by Kirti Gupta and Georgios Effraimidis, which tracks the changes in the rules for the creators and owners of the technologies incorporated into technological standards by one of the largest and more influential organizations—the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers-Standards Association (IEEE). In 2015, the IEEE adopted a new policy governing how owners of patents on technologies incorporated into its technological standards can protect and secure their investments via their legal rights to their patents. This shift in policy required patent owners effectively to relinquish their legal right to stop deliberate and unauthorized uses of their property and thus made it harder for them to license reasonable royalties for the use of their technology equally among all industry stakeholders.

As Gupta and Effraimidis show through detailed analyses, the IEEE’s new policy has distorted the longstanding market processes and licensing negotiations that have led to billions of smartphones being sold to consumers at relatively low cost around the world over the past decade. This is a vitally important study, because it brings key data to the policy discussions about technological standards, patents, and the incredible products and services made possible by them and on which everyone relies on today.

A Quick Summary of Standard Setting Organizations and Patented Technologies

A traditional requirement of the IEEE and several other standard setting organizations is that innovators commit to license equally their patented technologies that are incorporated into an agreed-upon standard for all companies implementing this standard in products and services. The law already provides that a patent owner will receive a “reasonable royalty” as damages for any past unauthorized uses of a patented technology, and thus standard setting organizations added the contractual requirement that this reasonable royalty also be non-discriminatory. To create a pleasant-sounding acronym, the phrase used is that licensing rates for patented technologies incorporated into market standards must be fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND). The goal of FRAND is to ensure that all companies creating products and services that are sold to consumers in the marketplace pay the same rates for incorporating the necessary standardized technologies into these products and services, such as the standardized 4G transmission technology used by everyone’s smartphones.

About a decade ago, some professors and lawyers posited a theory based on an abstract, economic model that owners of patents on technologies incorporated into these standards could exploit their ability to seek injunctions for violations of their patents and thus impose unduly higher costs on the companies implementing these standards in things like smartphones, laptop computers, tablets, and other devices and services. It was a simple story about property owners “holding up” people who wished to use their technologies, cashing in on the ubiquitous knowledge that any property owner can post a sign that says “no trespassing.” Based on this “patent holdup” theory, which deduced from an abstract model that patent owners would demand inordinately high royalties from the companies that need to incorporate agreed-upon technological standards into their products and services, these academics argued for “reforms” in the law to stop “patent holdup.”

But the “patent holdup” theory is just that—a theory. More than a decade of rigorous empirical studies have not only failed to confirm the “patent holdup” hypothesis of systemic market failures in the patent-intensive high-tech industry, and instead have found market conditions that directly contradict the core claim of “patent holdup” theory (see here for a letter to Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim summarizing this research and listing many of the studies). One study has shown that the average royalty rate for key technologies used in smartphones is only 3.4%, which is contrary to the 67% royalty rate predicted by “patent holdup” theory. Another study, among others, found significant quality-adjusted drops in consumer prices of smartphones and increasing entry of new manufacturers of smartphones, as well as other market conditions in the smartphone industry, that directly contradict the predictions of “patent hold” theory.

Unfortunately, in response to lobbying and the successful pushing of the “broken patent system” narrative in Washington, D.C., antitrust regulators forged ahead at the DOJ to push for policy changes at standard setting organizations on the basis of this unproven “patent holdup” theory. (Thankfully, recent antitrust regulators have returned back to evidence-based, balanced policy-making.) Several years after the first article propounding the “patent holdup” theory was published in 2007, implementers began pushing this theory at the IEEE to effect changes in its internal patent policy, which ultimately responded to this effort by revising its patent policy in 2015.

IEEE Policy Changes for Owners of Patents on Technological Standards

As Gupta and Effraimidis explain, the IEEE’s new patent policy has been highly controversial and generated much discussion among academics and industry practitioners. Separate from what they disclose in their article, there have been allegations that the internal process at the IEEE in changing its patent policy was initially cloaked in secrecy and was not open to all IEEE members as to when meetings were held and as to what the substantive decision-making processes were at these meetings. One commentator referred to it politely as an “opaque decision-making process” by the IEEE. If true, this is very troubling given that this violates the exemption accorded to the IEEE under the antitrust laws for operating as a standards setting organization.

Essentially, the IEEE patent policy was changed in 2015 in two key ways that impacted innovators. First, the new policy prohibits a patent owner seeking an injunction until all efforts at obtaining a license fee have been exhausted, including suing and litigating to a final judicial decision awarding a reasonable royalty. This of course incentives purported licensors to drag out licensing negotiations while they are infringing the patent, imposing large costs on patent owners in having to file lawsuits and pursue their legal remedies in court for many years and who have no choice but to allow the unauthorized use of their property during this time.

Extending these negotiations then allows licensors to take advantage of the second major rule change by the IEEE in its patent policy: the policy shifts licensing rates from the longstanding, market-based licensing of the technology given the value of the consumer device to the component level of the value of the chip itself. Of course, a smartphone without 4G or Wi-Fi is a beautiful 1995 cell phone with a very pretty, colorful screen and nothing more, which is why the free market settled on the value added to the entire smartphone for the basis of the licensing rate for this standardized technology. Moreover, calculating royalty rates based on the very cheap computer chips that contain the valuable technology fails to account for the hundreds of millions of dollars in R&D investments in developing the technology in the first place. Again, this is why the arrangement first reached in the free market between innovators and implementers was a balanced approach in device-level licensing rates that accounted for the costs of R&D and the costs of manufacturing the smartphones that contained the technology derived from this R&D. As a recent empirical study has shown, this is approximately 3.4% per smartphone, which is anything but an example of a massive payment to patent owners on 4G or Wi-Fi, especially for these core technologies that make a cell phone a “smartphone.”

Why then did IEEE change its patent policy? Consistent with the concerns about the “opaque decision-making process” at the IEEE, economist Greg Sidak has identified how the new rules were drafted by an ad hoc committee at the IEEE dominated almost entirely by implementers who license the patented technologies from the innovators who develop and contribute these technologies to the standard-setting process. In effect, the licensees strategically dominated the process and used their clout to push through a policy change that devalued the patented technologies, because they were seeking to lower their own manufacturing costs in implementing this technology in the consumer products and services they manufacture and sell in the marketplace. As evidence, Sidak shows that comments submitted in opposition to the new rules were rejected at nearly double the rate of those in support, reflecting a process that betrayed the IEEE’s core principles of openness, consensus, and the right to appeal. Instead of alleviating any alleged problems caused by patent owners, the IEEE’s rule changes actually facilitated collusion among implementers and resulted in “buyer-side price-fixing” of the patented technologies.

Negative Impact on Contributions of New Technology to Standards at the IEEE

The heart of the Gupta and Effraimidis article is not the theoretical and empirical background to the “patent holdup” dispute, but a detailed empirical study of the impact the new IEEE patent policy has had on the standard development process. Focusing on IP-intensive standards related to the development of Wi-Fi and Ethernet networks, the study first looks into the number of Letters of Assurances (LoAs) submitted to the IEEE in the years before and after the patent policy change took effect.

(LoAs are documents submitted by inventing companies who contribute new technological innovation in the standard-setting process. These technology contributors have patents on these innovations, and in these LoAs, they identify what patents may be essential to the standard that is being developed and they identify the terms under which they’re willing to license this technology if it ends up being incorporated into the standard that is ultimately set by the standard setting organization. An LoA is labeled “positive” if the contributor agrees to license its technology under the patent policy set by the standard setting organization or “negative” if the contributor declines to commit to these terms.)

The Gupta and Effraimidis study found that the number of positive LoA submissions has dropped a whopping 91% since IEEE changed its patent policy in 2015 and the number of negative LoAs rose to an all-time high in 2016. Gupta and Effraimidis explain:

The results suggest that many [patent] owners are reluctant to license their patent portfolio on the new FRAND terms. More importantly, the uncertainty on implementers’ side has increased, as new standards . . . have been approved despite the presence of negative and/or missing LoAs . . . .

Their article also tracks changes in the duration of the comments period that takes place before a new standard is approved—this is the period of time during which IEEE members discuss, debate, and resolve any concerns about a standardized technology before it is ultimately adopted as an official standard by the IEEE. Before the IEEE’s new patent policy went into effect in 2015, the average duration of the first two rounds of comments was 233 days. After the new patent policy took effect, Gupta & Effraimidis found a 42.5% increase in the comment period duration, resulting in an average resolution time of 332 days. This increase by almost half in the standard-setting process, especially in an industry marked by rapid development of new smartphones, laptops, and other high-tech consumer products and services, is concerning, to say the least. These delays are wasting private as well as public resources and impeding the commercial development of important IP-intensive technologies.

Finally, the Gupta and Effraimidis study analyzes the change in the number documents submitted at the IEEE that trigger the development of a new standard technology, which is a proxy for the development of new standards by the IEEE. Here, Gupta and Effraimidis’ findings contradict another recent study that alleged a high number of submissions in 2016 reflected a positive impact of the IEEE’s new patent policy. Gupta and Effraimidis reveal that hundreds of the submissions counted in the prior study either came from standards for which no patented inventions were contributed or were for standards of little or no value. Focusing properly on submissions for technologies that have significant value and produce an overwhelming majority of IEEE standards, they find submissions of new standards documents have in fact declined by 16% since 2015.

In sum, the changes in the internal standard-setting process at the IEEE since it adopted its new patent policy in 2015 represent a concerning shift following a strategic and collusive effort by implementers to devalue the patented technology created by innovators and contributed to standard setting organizations like the IEEE. The evidence is slowly building, showing that the IEEE’s new patent policy has devalued the innovative activity of technological innovators based on a purely theoretical and unproven claim that there is a systemic problem with so-called “patent holdup” in the smartphone and other high-tech industries. Unfortunately, in leaping into action on the basis of unproven theories, the IEEE has contributed to pervasive uncertainty and weakened incentives in the development and commercial implementation of innovative technologies, as is increasingly being documented and discussed by legal scholars and economists.

Moving Forward

The Gupta and Effraimidis study analyzes for the first time empirical data in fully detailing the effects of the IEEE’s new patent policy on the standard setting process. Their study shows that innovators are unwilling to continue to contribute the technologies they develop to the standard setting process under onerous terms requiring them effectively to give up their legal rights to their patents, and that these policies are having a perverse effect in creating inefficient licensing negotiations and delayed standards development. Their findings may sound intuitive to patent lawyers and innovators, but it is imperative to bring data into the public policy debates after ten years of concerted efforts to implement unproven theories, such as “patent holdup” theory, in both law and in the policies of private organizations like IEEE.

Gupta and Effraimidis conclude that a proper patent policy for a standard setting organization like the IEEE “should enhance incentives of technology contributors to innovate, while ensuring unlimited access to the new technology standards.” In considering its key role as a long-time professional association for the high-tech industry reaching back to Nikola Tesla and Thomas Edison, as well as its key role as standard setting organization in the innovation economy, the IEEE hopefully will reconsider its patent policy in light of actual economic and legal evidence. It should return back to the balanced patent policy that successfully promoted the computer and mobile revolutions of the past four decades. The future of new and innovative consumer products is at stake, such as the 5G technology that was first being developed many years ago and will start to be introduced into consumer products in the coming year.

Categories
Patent Law

The Value of Public Data: Update to “Turning Gold to Lead”

files labeled as "patents"By Kevin Madigan & Adam Mossoff

A key value in the empirical work done in the social sciences and in the STEM fields is that data is made public and available for review, testing, and confirmation. Humans are neither infallible nor omniscient, and thus this standard practice in empirical research has evolved as a way to ensure that mistakes are identified and corrected. All scholars should ensure that their data is accessible, their analysis is understandable, and the means by which they draw their conclusions in both content and method is independently verifiable. As scholars, we embrace these principles.

Thanks to our making the data publicly available, we recently discovered that we made a mistake in listing a patent application number in an essay we published on a dataset of patent applications. In Turning Gold to Lead: How Patent Eligibility Doctrine Is Undermining U.S. Leadership in Innovation, George Mason Law Review, vol. 24 (2017), pp. 939-960, we reported on a dataset compiled by David Kappos and Bob Sachs of 17,743 patent applications “that received a § 101 rejection in initial or final office actions and then were abandoned between August 1, 2014 and September 27, 2017” (p. 941, footnote 10). The Kappos-Sachs dataset, as we detail in our article, identifies 1,694 patent applications among these 17,743 applications that received initial or final rejections and were ultimately abandoned in the United States, but patents were granted on the same inventions by the European Patent Office, China, or both.

We used the Kappos-Sachs dataset in our essay to highlight a “disturbing trend” in the U.S. patent system today in comparison to other countries. Our essay does not draw statistical inferences about this dataset, but rather reports on it and contextualizes it within the changes in patent eligibility jurisprudence recently wrought by the U.S. Supreme Court. We compare the more restrictive approach in patent eligibility doctrine in the U.S. today with historically a more open and accessible patent system for cutting-edge innovation in the U.S. The earlier approach led commentators to refer to the U.S. patent system as the “gold standard” compared to the rest of the world. Thus the title of our essay, “Turning Gold to Lead.”

In our essay, we listed twelve patent applications that exemplified this new disturbing trend of the closing of the U.S. patent system to cutting-edge innovation, as compared to other countries (pp. 957-958). In accord with publicly accessible data standards, we identified these twelve applications in a table with their patent application numbers, the titles of the inventions in the applications, the publication dates of the applications, and the assignees of the now-abandoned U.S. applications.

We have since learned that we made a mistake in one of the patent application numbers listed in this table. The invention, “Method for Growing Plants,” is listed as application number US12/139,753. This was a “parent” application that was ultimately rejected on novelty (§ 102) and nonobviousness (§ 103) grounds, but it was not rejected for lack of § 101 patent eligibility. We should have instead listed patent application US12/968,726, which has the same title, “Method for Growing Plants,” and is the “child” application of the mistakenly listed “parent” application.

(For non-patent-law geeks, a “parent” is a patent application during which, while its examination is still pending, the applicant files another patent application on a related invention that is linked to the “parent” in order to receive the earlier invention/filing date of the parent. These patent applications are also linked in the database of applications in the USPTO. This related “child” application is a new application that may disclose new features of or adds new claims to the original “parent.” These additional, related applications are expressly permitted under § 120 and § 121 of the Patent Act.)

We would also like to make clear that our essay reports on the Kappos-Sachs dataset, which comprises patent applications that have been abandoned by the applicants after an initial or final rejection on § 101 patent eligibility grounds. A typo at the end of footnote 10 on p. 941 leaves out the “initial,” and this could be confusing given the earlier sentence in the footnote that refers to both “initial or final rejections.” An example of an initial rejection for lack of § 101 patent eligibility is a patent application in our table on pp. 957-958: patent application US13/746,180, titled “Methods For Diagnosing and Treating Prostate and Lung Cancer.” This patent application received an initial rejection based on § 101 for lack of patent eligibility, but the applicant continued to pursue the application at the USPTO, revising and resubmitting the application in the hope it would be granted. This patent application was ultimately abandoned, just like all the others in the dataset, and the very last rejection before this abandonment was one in which the examiner argued that it was not patentable given its obviousness (§ 103) and a lack of proper disclosure (§ 112).

Pursuant to the terms of the Kappos-Sachs dataset, there was an initial rejection under § 101 for patent application US13/746,180 and it was ultimately abandoned. In fact, given the extensive confusion now in the courts and at the USPTO between the legal standards of § 101 and § 103, as many scholars and others have widely recognized, it is completely unsurprising to find an initial rejection under § 101 morph into a rejection under § 103 after which the applicant then abandoned it (while the corresponding patent for the same invention was granted in other countries where it was not similarly rejected and abandoned).

We regret any confusion that may arise from the dynamic and evolving examination histories of the patent applications in the Kappos-Sachs dataset, and we especially regret listing the wrong “parent” application number instead of the “child” application number.

This is just the start of data collection on the nature and impact of the overly restrictive approach to patent eligibility in the U.S. in the past several years. We hope that scholars trained in rigorous statistical analysis will start to scrutinize the Kappos-Sachs dataset. As we state in the conclusion of our essay:

This Essay highlights empirical data about extensive invalidations of patents by the courts and by the PTO, and hundreds of patent applications rejected in the U.S. but granted for the same or similar inventions in Europe and China. This data reflects a very disturbing trend that portends darkly for the future of the U.S. innovation economy. The data deserves to be mined further with rigorous statistical analysis, investigating more closely issues like technology classes and other relevant variables, but this is beyond the scope of this conference Essay.

Our essay is short and so we invite any interested parties to consider it for themselves. Also, as we said, the dataset is on the Internet and available to all (unlike empirical claims made by others in the patent policy debates that are based in secret, proprietary data and infected with basic methodological problems in statistical analysis).

In conclusion, we wish to express (again) our profound appreciation to David Kappos and Bob Sachs for sharing their dataset with us. We were honored that they gave us permission to report on it. We apologize for any confusion caused by our “scrivener’s error” in listing the wrong patent application number and any confusion caused by an applicant’s ongoing attempts at trying to obtain a U.S. patent before abandoning it after receiving an initial § 101 patent eligibility rejection.

One final minor update is necessary. In our essay, we expressly state that if anyone has questions about the dataset, they should contact Robert Sachs, but the email address is at his old law firm and is now defunct. Bob can now be contacted at rsachs@patentevaluations.com.

Categories
Legislation Patent Law

The STRONGER Patents Act: The House Receives Its Own Legislation to Protect Our Innovation Economy

U.S. Capitol buildingToday, Representatives Steve Stivers (R-OH) and Bill Foster (D-IL) introduced the Support Technology & Research for Our Nation’s Growth and Economic Resilience (STRONGER) Patents Act of 2018. This important piece of legislation will protect our innovation economy by restoring stable and effective property rights for inventors. This legislation mirrors a bill already introduced in the Senate, which I have previously discussed.

The STRONGER Patents Act accomplishes three key goals to protect innovators. First, the Act will make substantial improvements to post-issuance proceedings in the USPTO to protect patent owners from administrative proceedings run amok. Second, it will confirm the status of patents as property rights, including restoring the ability of patent owners to obtain injunctions as a matter of course. Third, it will eliminate fee diversion from the USPTO, assuring that innovators are obtaining the quality services they are paying for.

First and foremost, the STRONGER Patents Act aims to restore balance to post-issuance review of patents administered by the USPTO’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). The creation of the PTAB was a massive regulatory overreach to correct a perceived problem that could have been better addressed by providing more resources towards initial examination. While the USPTO has long been responsible for issuing patents after a detailed examination, it has recently taken on the role of killing patents the same USPTO previously issued. What the USPTO gives with the one hand, it takes with the other.

Data analyzing PTAB outcomes demonstrates just how dire the situation has become. Coordinated and repetitive challenges to patent validity have made it impossible for patent owners to ever feel confident in the value and enforceability of their property rights. In some cases, more than 20 petitions have been filed on a single patent. Although recent headway has been made to address this issue in the administrative context, it only listed factors to be used when evaluating serial petitions. A more complete statutory solution that prohibits serial petitions except in limited circumstances is necessary to fully protect innovators and provide certainty that these protections will continue.

The kill rate of patents by the PTAB is remarkable. In only 16% of final written decisions at the PTAB does the patent survive unscathed. The actual impact on patent owners is far worse. Disclaimer and settlement are alternate ways a patent owner can lose at the PTAB prior to a final written decision. Thus, the fact that only 4% of petitions result in a final written decision of patentability is more reflective of the burden patent owners faced when dragged into PTAB proceedings.

For these reasons, the PTAB has been known as a “death squad.” This sentiment has been expressed not only by those who are disturbed by the PTAB’s behavior, but also those—such as a former chief judge of the PTAB—who are perpetuating it. The list of specific patents that have been invalidated at the PTAB is mind-boggling, such as an advanced detector for detecting leaks in gas lines.

There are even examples where the PTAB has invalidated a patent that had previously been upheld by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. One recent examination further found that there have been at least 58 patents that were upheld in federal district courts that were invalidated in the PTAB on the same statutory grounds. The different results are not mere happenstance but are the result of strategic behavior by petitioners to strategically abuse the procedures of PTAB proceedings.

It has been well known that the procedures have been stacked against patent owners from day one. We and others have noted how broadly construing claims, multiple filings against the same patent by the same challengers, and the inability to amend claims, among other abuses, severely disadvantage patent owners in PTAB proceedings.

With the STRONGER Patents Act, these proceedings will move closer to a fair fight to truly examine patent validity. There are many aspects to this legislation that will improve the PTAB, such as:

  • Harmonizing the claim construction standard with litigation, focusing on the “ordinary and customary meaning” instead of the broadest interpretation a bureaucrat can conceive. This will promote consistent results when patents are challenged, regardless of the forum, by assuring that a patent does not mean different things to different people. Sections 102(a) and 103(a).
  • Confirming the presumption of validity of an issued patent will apply to the PTAB just as it does in litigation. This will allow patent owners to make investments with reasonable security in the validity of the patent. Sections 102(b) and 103(b).
  • Adding a standing requirement, by permitting only those who are “charged with infringement” of the patent to challenge that patent. This will prevent the abusive and extortionate practice of challenging a patent to extract a settlement or short a company’s stock. Sections 102(c) and 103(c).
  • Limiting abusive repetitive and serial challenges to a patent. This will prevent one of the most common abuses, by preventing multiple bites at the apple. Sections 102(d), (f) and 103(d), (f).
  • Authorizing interlocutory review of institution decisions when “mere institution presents a risk of immediate, irreparable injury” to the patent owner as well as in other important circumstances. This change will allow early correction of important mistakes as well as provide for appellate review of issues that currently may evade correction. Sections 102(e) and 103(e).
  • Prohibiting manipulation of the identification of the real-party-in-interest rules to evade estoppel or other procedural rules and providing for discovery to determine the real-party-in-interest. Because many procedural protections depend on identifying the real party-in-interest, this change will assure that determining who that real party is can occur in a fair manner. Sections 102(g) and 103(g).
  • Giving priority to federal court determinations on the validity of a patent. Although discrepancies will be minimized by other changes in this Act, this section assures that the federal court determination will prevail. Sections 102(h) and 103(h).
  • Improving the procedure for amending a challenged patent, including a new expedited examination pathway. This section goes further than Aqua Products, prescribing detailed procedures for adjudicating the patentability of proposed substitute claims and placing the burden of proof on the challenger. Sections 102(i) and 103(i).
  • Prohibiting the same administrative patent judges from both determining whether a challenge is likely to succeed and whether the patent is invalid. This section will confirm the original design of the PTAB by assuring that the decision to institute and final decision are separate. Section 104.
  • Aligning timing requirements for ex parte reexamination with inter partes review by prohibiting requests for reexamination more than one year after being sued for infringement. This section will prevent abuses from the multiple post-grant procedures available in the USPTO. Section 105.

Second, the STRONGER Patents Act will make other necessary corrections to allow patents to promote innovation. For example, as Section 101 of the Act confirms, patents are property rights and deserve the same remedies applicable to other kinds of property. In eBay v. MercExchange, the Supreme Court ignored this fundamental premise by holding that patent owners do not have the presumptive right to keep others from using their property. Section 106 of the STRONGER Patents Act will undo the disastrous eBay decision and confirm the importance of patents as property.

Third, the STRONGER Patents Act will once and for all eliminate USPTO fee diversion. Many people do not realize that the USPTO is funded entirely through user fees and that no taxpayer money goes to the office. Despite promises that the America Invents Act of 2011 would end fee diversion, the federal government continues to redirect USPTO funds to other government programs. This misguided tax on innovation is long overdue to be shut down.

Each of the steps in the STRONGER Patents Act will help bring balance back to our patent system. In addition to the major changes described above, there are also smaller changes that will be important to ensuring a vibrant and efficient patent system. CPIP co-founder Adam Mossoff testified to Congress about the harms being done to innovation through weakened patent protection. It is great news to now see Congress taking steps in the right direction.

Categories
Patents Supreme Court

CPIP Scholars Ask Federal Circuit to Fix Patent Eligibility Doctrine in Cleveland Clinic Appeal

files labeled as "patents"Last week, a group of CPIP scholars filed an amicus brief in Cleveland Clinic Foundation v. True Health Diagnostics, a case currently on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The patents at issue cover diagnostic tests used to assess a person’s risk of developing cardiovascular disease. The U.S. Patent & Trademark Office initially found the claims to be unpatentable subject matter under Section 101; however, the claims were eventually allowed as new and unconventional applications of known laboratory techniques. Nevertheless, the district court held the claims unpatentable under Section 101, reasoning that they were ineligible under the Alice-Mayo test.

The amicus brief filed last week, written by CPIP’s David Lund and Adam Mossoff, points out that the diagnostic methods at issue are the very sort of innovations the patent system is meant to encourage. Moreover, given the factual conclusions that must be made in order to determine whether the claims are directed to a natural law or whether the laboratory techniques are routine and conventional, they argue that the procedural posture of the case—a motion to dismiss—precludes proper application of the Alice-Mayo test. They note that misapplication of the patent eligibility test continues to lead courts to reject patent protection for many meritorious inventions—as demonstrated in this very case. The amici urge the Federal Circuit to bring clarity and predictability to Section 101 doctrine by rejecting the district court’s conclusory assertions that were made without proper factual support.

The Summary of Argument from the amicus brief is copied below:

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The district court’s decision in The Cleveland Clinic Foundation v. True Health Diagnostics, LLC, No. 17-cv-198, 2017 WL 3381976 (E.D. Va. Aug. 4, 2017), represents an improper application of 35 U.S.C. § 101. The parties address the relevant innovation covered by Cleveland Clinic’s patents, as well as the application of the Supreme Court’s and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s § 101 jurisprudence; accordingly, amici offer additional insight concerning the legal and policy problems with the trial court’s decision: innovation in improving the assessment of a patient’s risk of developing cardiovascular disease is an invention that the patent system is designed to promote, and thus it should be eligible for patent protection. Barring a properly reasoned, factually-based determination that either a claimed method-of-treatment invention covers a law of nature or, under step two of the Alice-Mayo test, that it would be considered routine or ordinary by a person having skill in the art, a district court should not find claims to be ineligible subject matter under § 101 on a motion to dismiss. See Berkheimer v. HP Inc., __ F.3d at ___, No. 2017-1437 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The district court’s decision in this case conflicts with the Patent Act as an integrated statutory framework for promoting and securing innovation in the life sciences, as construed by both the Supreme Court and this court.

The Supreme Court has recognized that the plain meaning of the language of § 101 indicates that the scope of patentable subject matter is broad. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980). This is why the Supreme Court consistently has held that “[t]he § 101 patent-eligibility inquiry is only a threshold test.” Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602 (2010). Accordingly, this “threshold test” is necessarily followed by the more exacting statutory requirements of assessing a claim as a whole according to the standard of a person having skill in the art as to whether it is novel, nonobvious, and fully disclosed as required by the quid pro quo offered to inventors by the patent system. Id.

Unfortunately, courts have been focusing on out-of-context statements in the Supreme Court’s recent § 101 cases that have led those courts to inexorably apply the two-step “Alice-Mayo test” in an unbalanced and legally improper manner. See Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012). Courts are dissecting claims into particular elements and then construing these elements in highly generalized terms with no evidentiary support. Thus, as happened in this case, a district court all too often merely asserts a conclusory finding that the claim— actually, specific elements dissected out of the claim as a whole—covers ineligible laws of nature or abstract ideas.

This has led lower courts to create an unduly stringent and restrictive patent eligibility test under the Alice-Mayo test, as evidenced by the district court’s decision in this case. This contradicts the Supreme Court’s decisions in Chakrabarty and Bilski that § 101 is only a threshold inquiry identifying broad statutory categories of patent-eligible inventions. This improper application of the Alice-Mayo test inevitably leads to § 101 rejections of patentable method inventions, as the district court in this case rejected an innovative invention in the bio-pharmaceutical sector that the patent system is designed to promote.

Furthermore, the improper treatment of the § 101 inquiry as a pure question of law requiring no evidentiary findings whatsoever, especially when the parties expressly dispute as to what a person having skill in the art would consider routine or ordinary, conflicts with the Supreme Court’s and this Court’s decisions that the application of the patentability requirements in the Patent Act present questions of law with underlying questions of fact. See Teva Pharm. USA Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831, 838 (2015) (claim construction); KSR v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (nonobviousness under § 103); Berkheimer, __ F.3d at ___, No. 2017-1437 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (patentable subject matter under § 101); Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 811 F.3d 1334, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (indefiniteness under § 112); Alcon Research Ltd. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 745 F.3d 1180, 1188 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (enablement under § 112). This has sowed indeterminacy in patent eligibility doctrine, as inventors and companies in the innovation industries are left with little predictability concerning when or how courts will dissect claims and make conclusory assertions that they are patent ineligible under § 101.

To read the amicus brief, please click here.

Categories
Antitrust Innovation

Letter to Antitrust Chief Applauds DOJ’s New Evidence-Based Approach to IP Enforcement

hand under a lightbulb drawn on a chalkboardA group of judges, former judges and government officials, law professors and economists with expertise in antitrust law and patent law sent a letter to Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim earlier today applauding his recent announcements that the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) would now take a balanced, evidence-based approach in applying antitrust law to patent licensing, especially to patented innovations that have been contributed to technological standards.

Signatories to the letter include Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg of the D.C. Circuit, former Chief Judge Paul Michel of the Federal Circuit, former FTC Commissioner Joshua D. Wright, and former Director of the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office David Kappos, among others.

A few weeks after his confirmation this past September, AAG Delrahim delivered remarks at a conference held at the USC Gould School of Law in Los Angeles, California. The comments signaled a major shift in intellectual property (IP) policy for the Antitrust Division from the policies pursued by the previous Obama Administration. Indeed, AAG Delrahim pointed out that he is the first head of the Antitrust Division to be a registered patent attorney, and his plans for protecting free market competition in the IP licensing realm reflected a robust understanding of what drives our innovation economy.

AAG Delrahim indicated that antitrust enforcers had “strayed too far” in protecting the interests of implementers of patented technology at the expense of innovators who create the technology in the first place. Such “misapplication of the antitrust laws,” he said, “could undermine the process of dynamic innovation itself.” In particular, AAG Delrahim stated that the recent focus on the “so-called ‘hold-up’ problem,” where innovators threaten to withhold licenses to implementers, fails to recognize the “more serious risk” of the “hold-out problem,” where implementers threaten to use the technology without taking licenses from innovators. AAG Delrahim explained that the “one-sided focus on the hold-up issue” posed a “serious threat to the innovative process.”

Last month, a group of industry representatives sent a letter to AAG Delrahim expressing concerns over the Antitrust Division’s new approach to IP licensing. The letter claimed that “patent hold-up is real, well documented, and harming US industry and consumers,” and it argued that the hold-out problem did not raise similar competition law issues. Remarkably, the industry representatives did not offer one citation to back up their broad claims about the supposed harm from “patent hold-up” or lack of harm from patent hold-out. Given the data connecting stable and effective patent rights and economic growth, the burden should be on the advocates for the “patent hold-up” theory to produce at least some evidence to support their position. Thankfully, AAG Delrahim made clear that he will let the evidence be his guide.

To that end, the letter submitted today by judges, government officials, legal academics, and economists points out the glaring omissions in the letter by the industry representatives: The claims about “patent hold-up” are merely theoretical, and they are “inconsistent with actual market data.” Moreover, today’s letter notes that the implications of the “patent hold-up” theory are testable, and that the empirical studies to date have failed to show that innovators are harming consumers or inhibiting innovation. To bolster its claims, the letter includes an appendix of rigorous empirical studies that directly contradict the “patent hold-up” theory proffered by the industry representatives.

Read the letter below or download it here: Letter to AAG Delrahim

***

February 13, 2018

Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim
Department of Justice Antitrust Division
950 Pennsylvania Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20530-0001

Dear Assistant Attorney General Delrahim,

As judges, former judges and government officials, legal academics and economists who are experts in antitrust and intellectual property law, we write to express our support for your recent announcement that the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice will adopt an evidence-based approach in applying antitrust law equally to both innovators who develop and implementers who use technological standards in the innovation industries.

We disagree with the letter recently submitted to you on January 24, 2018 by other parties who expressed their misgivings with your announcement of your plan to return to this sound antitrust policy. Unfortunately, their January 24 letter perpetuates the long-standing misunderstanding held by some academics, policy activists, and companies, who baldly assert that one-sided “patent holdup” is a real-world problem in the high-tech industries. This claim rests entirely on questionable models that predict that opportunistic behavior in patent licensing transactions will result in higher consumer prices. These predictions are inconsistent with actual market data in any high-tech industry.

It bears emphasizing that no empirical study has demonstrated that a patent-owner’s request for injunctive relief after a finding of a defendant’s infringement of its property rights has ever resulted either in consumer harm or in slowing down the pace of technological innovation. Given the well understood role that innovation plays in facilitating economic growth and well-being, a heavy burden of proof rests on those who insist on the centrality of “patent holdup” to offer some tangible support for that view, which they have ultimately failed to supply in the decade or more since that theory was first propounded. Given the contrary conclusions in economic studies of the past decade, there is no sound empirical basis for claims of a systematic problem of opportunistic “patent holdup” by owners of patents on technological standards.

Several empirical studies demonstrate that the observed pattern in high-tech industries, especially in the smartphone industry, is one of constant lower quality-adjusted prices, increased entry and competition, and higher performance standards. These robust findings all contradict the testable implications of “patent holdup” theory. The best explanation for this disconnect between the flawed “patent holdup” theory and overwhelming weight of the evidence lies in the institutional features that surround industry licensing practices. These practices include bilateral licensing negotiations, and the reputation effects in long-term standards activities. Both support a feed-back mechanism that creates a system of natural checks and balances in the setting of royalty rates. The simplistic models of “patent holdup” ignore all these moderating effects.

Of even greater concern are the likely negative social welfare consequences of prior antitrust policies implemented based upon nothing more than the purely theoretical concern about opportunistic “patent holdup” behavior by owners of patented innovations incorporated into technological standards. For example, those policies have resulted in demands to set royalty rates for technologies incorporated into standards in the smartphone industry according to particular components in a smartphone. This was a change to the longstanding industry practice of licensing at the end-user device level, which recognized that fundamental technologies incorporated into the cellular standards like 2G, 3G, etc., optimize the entire wireless system and network, and not just the specific chip or component of a chip inside a device.

In support, we attach an Appendix of articles identifying the numerous substantive and methodological flaws in the “patent holdup” models. We also point to rigorous empirical studies that all directly contradict the predictions of the “patent holdup” theory.

For these reasons, we welcome your announcement of a much-needed return to evidence-based policy making by antitrust authorities concerning the licensing and enforcement of patented innovations that have been committed to a technological standard. This sound program ensures balanced protection of all innovators, implementers, and consumers. We are confident that consistent application of this program will lead to a vibrant, dynamic smartphone market that depends on a complex web of standard essential patents which will continue to benefit everyone throughout the world.

Sincerely,

Jonathan Barnett
Professor of Law
USC Gould School of Law

Ronald A. Cass
Dean Emeritus,
Boston University School of Law
Former Vice-Chairman and Commissioner,
United States International Trade Commission

Richard A. Epstein
Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law,
New York University School of Law
James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law Emeritus,
University of Chicago Law School

The Honorable Douglas H. Ginsburg
Senior Circuit Judge,
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and
Professor of Law,
Antonin Scalia Law School
George Mason University

Justin (Gus) Hurwitz
Assistant Professor of Law
University of Nebraska College of Law

David J. Kappos
Former Under Secretary of Commerce and Director
United States Patent & Trademark Office

The Honorable Paul Michel
Chief Judge (Ret.),
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Damon C. Matteo
Course Professor,
Graduate School of Economics and Management
Tsinghua University in Beijing
Chief Executive Officer,
Fulcrum Strategy

Adam Mossoff
Professor of Law
Antonin Scalia Law School
George Mason University

Kristen Osenga
Professor of Law
University of Richmond School of Law

David J. Teece
Thomas W. Tusher Professor in Global Business
Haas School of Business
University of California at Berkeley

Joshua D. Wright
University Professor,
Antonin Scalia Law School
George Mason University
Former Commissioner,
Federal Trade Commission

 

Appendix

 

Richard A. Epstein & Kayvan Noroozi, Why Incentives for Patent Hold Out Threaten to Dismantle FRAND and Why It Matters, Berkeley Tech. L. Rev. (forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2913105

Anne Layne-Farrar, Why Patent Holdout is Not Just a Fancy Name for Plain Old Patent Infringement, CPI North American Column (Feb. 2016), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/North-America-Column-February-Full.pdf

Anne Layne-Farrar, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Theory and Evidence: Where Do We Stand After 15 Years of History?, OECD Intellectual Property and Standard Setting (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/WD%282014%2984&doclanguage=en

Alexander Galetovic & Stephen Haber, The Fallacies of Patent Holdup Theory, 13 J. Comp. L. & Econ., 1 (2017), https://academic.oup.com/jcle/article/13/1/1/3060409

Alexander Galetovic, Stephen Haber, & Lew Zaretzki, An Estimate of the Average Cumulative Royalty Yield in the World Mobile Phone Industry: Theory, Measurement and Results (Feb. 7, 2018), https://hooverip2.org/working-paper/wp18005

Alexander Galetovic, Stephen Haber, & Ross Levine, An Empirical Examination of Patent Hold-Up (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21090, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21090.pdf

Douglas H. Ginsburg, Koren W. Wong-Ervin, & Joshua Wright, The Troubling Use of Antitrust to Regulate FRAND Licensing, CPI Antitrust Chronicle (Oct. 2015), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/Uploads/GinsburgetalOct-151.pdf

Douglas H. Ginsburg, Taylor M. Ownings, & Joshua D. Wright, Enjoining Injunctions: The Case Against Antitrust Liability for Standard Essential Patent Holders Who Seek Injunctions, The Antitrust Source (Oct. 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2515949

Gerard Llobet & Jorge Padilla, The Optimal Scope of the Royalty Base in Patent Licensing, 59 J. L. & Econ. 45 (2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2417216

Keith Mallinson, Theories of Harm with SEP Licensing Do Not Stack Up, IP Fin. Blog (May 24, 2013), http://www.ip.finance/2013/05/theories-of-harm-with-sep-licensing-do.html

Jorge Padilla & Koren W. Wong-Ervin, Portfolio Licensing to Makers of Downstream End-User Devices: Analyzing Refusals to License FRAND-Assured Standard-Essential Patents at the Component Level, 62 The Antitrust Bulletin 494 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X17719762

Jonathan D. Putnam & Tim A. Williams, The Smallest Salable Patent-Practicing Unit (SSPPU): Theory and Evidence (Sept. 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2835617

Gregory Sidak, The Antitrust Division’s Devaluation of Standard-Essential Patents, 104 Geo. L.J. Online 48 (2015), https://georgetownlawjournal.org/articles/161/antitrust-division-s-devaluation-of/pdf

Joanna Tsai & Joshua D. Wright, Standard Setting, Intellectual Property Rights, and the Role of Antitrust in Regulating Incomplete Contracts, 80 Antitrust L.J. 157 (2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2467939

Joshua D. Wright, SSOs, FRAND, and Antitrust: Lessons from the Economics of Incomplete Contracts, 21 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 791 (2014), http://www.georgemasonlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Wright-Website-Version.pdf

Categories
Innovation Patent Law

U.S. Innovation Economy Falls Even Further in Latest GIPC Patent Rankings

hand under a lightbulb drawn on a chalkboardThe Global Innovation Policy Center (GIPC) at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has just released the sixth edition of its International IP Index. Unfortunately, the report finds that the United States is now tied for 12th place in its patent rankings. This is down from 10th place last year, and it’s down from 1st place just two years ago. The recent downward trend of the U.S. innovation economy is rather alarming, and it is further evidence that the U.S. is quickly abandoning its gold standard patent system.

GIPC notes that the U.S. patent system has faltered due to two key indicators: patentability requirements and patent opposition. As to the former, the report cites the Supreme Court’s recent Section 101 jurisprudence, which has created much uncertainty for innovators about what even constitutes a patent-eligible invention. These findings comport with the newly-published paper by CPIP’s Adam Mossoff & Kevin Madigan highlighting the Court’s troublesome approach to patent eligibility and its profound effect on our innovation economy. As to patent opposition, GIPC cites the ease of challenging patents that have already been issued through mechanisms such as inter partes review (IPR). Indeed, several CPIP scholars authored a recent white paper detailing how these IPR proceedings have become an existential threat to the very patent system they were meant to promote.

U.S. falls to 12th place in ranking of patent system strength. 2018 Chamber index marks further from for U.S. Category 1: Patents, Related Rights, and Limitations. 1. Singapore; 2. France; 3. Germany; 4. Ireland; 5. Japan; 6. Netherlands; 7. South Korea; 8. Spain; 9. Sweden; 10. Switzerland; 11. UK; 12. United States / Italy. ("Create," Global Innovation Policy Center, U.S. Chamber International IP Index, Sixth Edition, February 2018))

To read GIPC’s International IP Index, please click here.

Categories
Innovation Patent Law

CPIP Scholars File Amicus Brief Urging Supreme Court to Fix Section 101

dictionary entry for the word "innovate"On December 4, 2017, CPIP Founder Adam Mossoff and CPIP John F. Witherspoon Legal Fellow David Lund filed an amicus brief urging the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in RecogniCorp. v. Nintendo. The amicus brief was joined by several law professors, including Richard Epstein and Michael Risch, as well as CPIP Senior Scholars Chris Holman, Kristen Osenga, Mark Schultz, and Ted Sichelman. Bob Sachs of Robert R. Sachs P.C. served as counsel of record.

The technology at issue involves a method of encoding and decoding composite facial images on a computer. The invention solved the problem of decreased image quality when such images are transmitted digitally. RecogniCorp sued Nintendo for patent infringement, and Nintendo challenged the eligibility of the patent under Section 101. Applying the Mayo-Alice framework, the district court held that invention was ineligible subject matter because it was directed to an abstract idea and lacked an inventive concept. Agreeing with that analysis, the Federal Circuit affirmed.

The amici argue that the Supreme Court should grant certiorari in this case in order to correct the continued misapplication of the Mayo-Alice test by the Federal Circuit, the district courts, and the Patent & Trademark Office. By breaking down claims into individual elements and then generalizing them in broad terms, the lower courts and the PTO are failing to properly consider the claimed invention as a whole.

The Summary of Argument is copied below:

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This Court has repeatedly reminded the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, district courts, and the United States Patent & Trademark Office (“PTO”) that § 101 of the Patent Act is a key requirement in assessing the validity of both patent applications and issued patents. In doing so, this Court set forth a two-part test for assessing whether an invention is patentable subject matter (the “Mayo-Alice test”). See Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). These cases build upon prior cases such as Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), which held that a software-based method for operating a rubber mold is patent eligible under § 101.

Unfortunately, the lower courts and the PTO have misunderstood how to apply the Mayo-Alice test. Specifically, the lower courts and the PTO have adopted an indeterminate and overly restrictive approach, invalidating legitimate patented innovation under § 101 with little predictability for inventors or patent attorneys. This frustrates the constitutional function of the patent system in promoting the “Progress of . . . useful Arts.” U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.

This case exemplifies both of these fundamental problems—indeterminacy and over-restrictiveness—because the lower courts held that a claim is patent ineligible as an “abstract idea” merely because the process was implemented through the use of computer software. These problems undermine inventors’ ability to use the patent system to protect computer-mediated processes that are exactly the kind of innovation that the patent system is designed to promote.

Petitioner details the substantial confusion in the application of the Mayo-Alice test in this case, as well as at the PTO and in the lower courts. Amici here identify a further key insight: when lower courts and the PTO apply the Mayo-Alice test to only individualized elements of a claim, generalizing these elements into a broad, categorical description and not evaluating the claimed invention as a whole, they are using a methodological approach that conflicts with this Court’s existing precedents on determining patent eligibility under § 101.

In this case, the Federal Circuit held that a software-based method of producing images of faces on a computer screen is an “abstract idea.” RecogniCorp, LLC v Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017). It reached this conclusion by dissecting the claim into its separate elements and ignoring other key elements, ultimately finding the claimed invention is ineligible under § 101. By reducing the claim to “encoding and decoding data,” the court ignored the invention as a whole that improves the way computers generate digital representations of faces for display.

This Court can easily remedy this problem by (1) recognizing the role of the patent system in protecting computer-implemented innovation, a key driver of modern technological progress, and (2) providing further instructions to lower courts and to the PTO that they should apply the Mayo-Alice test only to the claimed invention as a whole. This is a predicate legal requirement in assessing novelty under § 102 and in assessing nonobviousness under § 103 of the Patent Act. It is also a fundamental legal requirement for asserting patents for both literal and equivalents infringement under § 271. In all of these other patent doctrines, this Court has maintained the basic requirement of assessing patentability or limiting assertion of patents to the claimed invention as a whole, as this avoids the same policy problems of indeterminacy and over-restrictiveness (or over-inclusiveness, depending on the perspective) in these other patent doctrines. Thus, this Court should grant the petition for certiorari, reverse the Federal Circuit, and provide further instructions for applying the Mayo-Alice test only to the “claimed invention as a whole.”

To read the amicus brief, please click here.