Categories
Patent Law

Mark Schultz: Weaker Patent Protection Leads to Less Venture Capital Investment

The following post comes from David Ward, a 2L at Scalia Law and a Research Assistant at CPIP.

a lit lightbulb shatteringBy David Ward

Venture capitalists pouring money into a small startup has become a sort of new American Dream for many innovators. The success stories of big American companies starting with nothing more than an idea have pervaded their way into pop culture, inspiring TV shows, movies, and the like. However, CPIP Senior Scholar Mark Schultz has released a new report for USIJ entitled The Importance of an Effective and Reliable Patent System to Investment in Critical Technologies showing that this dream may be harder to attain today due to recent shifts that have weakened the patent system and driven away venture capital investment.

Background

There has been an ongoing debate in the past two decades about whether patents should be stronger or weaker. Proponents of stronger and more effective patents have made the case that they are more valuable, incentivizing investors and innovators to fund and create valuable innovations. On the flip side, critics of the patent system have stated that stronger patents inhibit innovation since they create a web of restrictions and licenses, inhibiting access to important innovations.

This ongoing debate has resulted in several landmark changes to our patent laws and rules in recent years. Prof. Schultz points out several key changes:

These changes have weakened patents by making them easier to challenge, less accessible for smaller companies, and harder to obtain overall. However, with all these changes, there is now data to explore whether weaker patents really do allow for more innovation as patent critics have contended.

Weak Patents Don’t Attract Funding

The short answer is the data doesn’t support the patent critics’ contention that weaker patents clear the way for more innovation because investors no longer see many patent-intensive industries as a good investment. From 2004 to 2017, the share of funding received in patent-intensive industries dropped from over 50% to about 28%. Prof. Schultz is cognizant of the fact that correlation is not causation, but there is an ever-growing pile of evidence that points to one simple explanation: weaker patents result in less funding for innovation.

Patents and intellectual property are critical to venture capitalists (VCs) who want more certainty of a return on their investments. Pending patents that have a lower chance of being granted or patents that could be challenged at any moment create uncertainty for both the patents’ validity and the future costs of litigation. Hence, the weaker patent laws of recent years have led to a decrease in funding for many patent-heavy sectors.

Prof. Schultz’s report doesn’t just rely on the data to reach this conclusion. It also includes several case studies, surveys, and interviews with innovators and investors alike. Perhaps the most telling is a survey by Prof. David Taylor of SMU Law investigating how recent patent cases changed VC and private equity behavior. Of the 475 investors surveyed, 74% said that patent eligibility is an important consideration in firms’ investment decisions, and 62% said that their firms were less likely to invest if patent eligibility changes make patents unavailable. Almost one-third of investors who knew about recent court decisions said it had affected investment decisions away from biotech, medical devices, and pharmaceuticals.

The data again backs this up, as Prof. Schultz’s report shows that those industries have seen some of the biggest loses in VC funding since 2004. In a world where biotech, medical devices, and pharmaceuticals could quite literally be the most important sectors needing innovation and funding to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic, this is less than ideal. Typically, medical treatments cost hundreds of millions of dollars and have a 10-year road ahead of them. The prospect of reaching the end of the road without being able to protect the investment with a strong and effective patent has spooked many investors to other sectors. As a result, there has been less innovation in live-saving treatments, and more of a focus on safer, quality-of-life investments.

Looking Ahead

There is some trend in the positive direction, however. Prof. Schultz notes that USPTO Director Andrei Iancu has demonstrated strong support for the role of patents in the economy with several policy changes aimed at strengthening patent protection. It is also of note that many policymakers are realizing the changes have gone too far, and there are now several pending legislative proposals aimed at fixing these issues. These realizations, coupled with Prof. Schultz’s quantitative and qualitative data, paint a clear picture that all but proves a single point: strong patents promote innovation more than weaker patents. In the words of Prof. Schultz: “Society needs its most successful people working on its most compelling problems. The patent system should support such work.”

To read the report, please click here.

Categories
Innovation Patent Law Uncategorized

Federal Circuit Improperly Extends Abstract Idea Exception to Industrial Machines

a gavel on a table in front of booksAn oil well drilling rig is not an abstract idea. A method of operating an oil well drilling rig is also not an abstract idea. This proposition should be clear to all, but in TDE Petroleum Data Solutions v AKM Enterprise, the Federal Circuit held that a method of operating an oil well drilling rig is directed to the abstract idea of “storing data, receiving data, and using mathematics or a computer to organize that data and generate additional information.”

Section 101 of the Patent Act has been interpreted to prohibit the patenting of abstract ideas, laws of nature, and natural phenomena. Although recent Supreme Court cases have universally found the patents at issue ineligible, Bilski, Alice and Mayo cite approvingly to a previous Supreme Court case, Diamond v. Diehr, which found a process for molding rubber articles with the aid of a computer to be patent eligible.

Alice and Mayo established a now-famous two-part test to determine whether a patent claims ineligible subject matter. The first step of the Alice/Mayo test asks whether the claim is “directed to” one of the prohibited categories. The second step asks whether the claim involves an “inventive concept” sufficient to confer patent eligibility. The Federal Circuit has applied this test with ruthless efficiency to invalidate patents, although sanity is slowly returning as the court has upheld patents improving computer animation of faces and the preservation of liver cells.

Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit rarely compares the facts of the cases before it to controlling Supreme Court precedent. The clear similarity between the claims to operating an oil well drilling rig in TDE and the claims to curing rubber in Diehr show how far off course the Federal Circuit has veered in interpreting section 101.

In Diehr, the claimed method used a computer to precisely control a rubber molding process. The computer allowed the inventors to measure and recalculate the time to cure the rubber while it was in the mold. At the end of the method, a rubber article was produced. In TDE, the claimed method used a computer to control the drilling of an oil well. The computer permitted the inventors to accurately determine the state of the well operation. Different claims provided for different ends of the method, including adjusting the operation of the drill (claim 30) and selecting the state of the well operation (claim 1).

A side-by-side analysis of representative claims from TDE and Diehr at the bottom of this post shows exactly how similar they are. Each claim recites (1) an industrial process that uses (2) initial data combined with (3) newly collected data that is (4) analyzed to (5) improve the output or operation of the industrial process.

It is worth repeating: in both Diehr and TDE, the claims were directed to an industrial process. The general industrial processes existed previously in the art. Molding rubber using the defined equation was well known. Drilling an oil well with consideration of the state of the well operation was known. The contributions in both Diehr and TDE were the addition of data collection and analysis to improve the operation of the industrial process. Neither portion of the Federal Circuit’s analysis in TDE cites to Diehr, let alone analyzes the obvious similarities between the claims at issue and those found patent eligible by the Supreme Court.

In a single paragraph of analysis regarding step one of the Mayo/Alice test, the Federal Circuit held that claim 1 of the TDE patent was directed to the abstract idea of “storing data, receiving data, and using mathematics or a computer to organize that data and generate additional information.” It completely ignored parts of the claim that required the data to be collected from an oil well drilling operation and to be used for the oil well drilling operation. Of course, ignoring these parts of the claim was required to find that the claim was directed to an abstract idea of data manipulation.

Also taking only a single paragraph, the Federal Circuit’s analysis of Mayo/Alice step two was similarly devoid of engagement with the explicit claim requirements of an oil well drilling operation. Instead, it focused only on what the computer was doing in the process, rather than the process as a whole. Diehr, along with many other cases, explicitly requires that the process be considered as a whole in the section 101 analysis.

The Federal Circuit’s error here is worse than it was in Ariosa v. Sequenom. In Ariosa, the court engaged with the closest factual Supreme Court precedent, although it felt bound by Mayo to find the claims ineligible. However, the court in TDE completely ignored and disregarded Diehr, the Supreme Court case that aligns in both law and fact with the claims at issue. Had the court analyzed or considered Diehr, it is likely the outcome would have been different.

To the extent that one asserts the final method of utilizing the data distinguished claim 1 in Diehr from claim 1 in TDE, dependent claim 30 of the patent at issue in TDE cured this defect. Claim 30 recites: “[t]he method of claim 1, further comprising using the state of the well operation to evaluate parameters and provide control for the well operation.” (emphasis added). Thus, the patent in TDE explicitly claimed the actual operation of the industrial machinery, just as the claim in Diehr.

The Federal Circuit stated that it was not considering separately the remaining claims of the patent, ostensibly because TDE did not “distinguish those claims from representative claim 1.” On the contrary, TDE argued claim 30 and related claims separately on precisely the ground that claim 30 “closed [the] loop” and required control of the well.

At this point, it is clear that neither the Federal Circuit nor the Supreme Court are going to step in to fix the wayward path of patent eligibility law. It will therefore be up to Congress to affirm what should be apparent to all: an oil rig is not an abstract idea.


Diehr – Claim 1* (US Application No. 05/602,463) TDE – Claim 1 (US Patent No. 6,892,812) Analysis
1 – Preamble A method of operating a rubber-molding press for precision molded compounds with the aid of a digital computer, comprising: An automated method for determining the state of a well operation, comprising: Both claims are directed to industrial processes where the underlying process (rubber molding or oil well drilling) existed prior to the invention
2 – Initial Data providing said computer with a database for said press, including at least,

natural logarithm conversion data (ln),

the activation energy constant (C) unique to each batch of said compound being molded, and

a constant (x) dependent upon the geometry of the particular mold of the press,

storing a plurality of states for a well operation; Both claims require data to be provided prior to operation of the method to interpret data collected.
3 – New Data Collection initiating an interval timer in said computer upon the closure of the press for monitoring the elapsed time of said closure,

constantly determining the temperature (Z) of the mold at a location closely adjacent to the mold cavity in the press during molding,

constantly providing the computer with the temperature (Z),

receiving mechanical and hydraulic data reported for the well operation from a plurality of systems; Both claims require collecting data from sources that are specific to the machinery being operated. Therefore, both claims require specific machinery, not just a general purpose computer.
4 – Data Analysis repetitively calculating in the computer, at frequent intervals during each cure, the Arrhenius equation for reaction time during the cure, which is

ln v = CZ + x

where v is the total required cure time,

repetitively comparing in the computer at said frequent intervals during the cure each said calculation of the total required cure time calculated with the Arrhenius equation and said elapsed time, and

and determining that at least some of the data is valid by comparing the at least some of the data to at least one limit, the at least one limit indicative of a threshold at which the at least some of the data do not accurately represent the mechanical or hydraulic condition purportedly represented by the at least some of the data; and when the at least some of the data are valid, based on the mechanical and hydraulic data, Both claims analyze the data.

Although not apparent on the face of the claims, the underlying data analysis existed in the art for both claims. The Arrhenius equation was well known. Validating well drilling data against a limit was known in the art although its usefulness was disputed.

5 – Utilizing the Data opening the press automatically when a said comparison indicates equivalence. automatically selecting one of the states as the state of the well operation. Both claims use the data generated in the industrial process. Selecting an individual state of a well operation in a necessary component of operating the well.

*Claim 1 is representative for both the application in Diehr and the patent in TDE.

Categories
Innovation Inventors Patent Law Software Patent Uncategorized

CPIP Scholars File Amicus Brief in Trading Technologies v. CQG

a gavel lying on a table in front of booksEarlier this month, CPIP Senior Scholar Adam Mossoff penned an amicus brief in Trading Technologies v. CQG, currently on appeal to the Federal Circuit. The brief was joined by nine other IP scholars, including CPIP Senior Scholars Mark Schultz and Kristen Osenga.

The amici argue that Trading Technologies’ graphical user interface (GUI) constitutes patentable subject matter under Section 101 of the Patent Act. Noting the Supreme Court’s holding in Bilski v. Kappos that “Section 101 is a dynamic provision designed to encompass new and unforeseen inventions,” the amici urge the Federal Circuit not to interpret Section 101 so narrowly as to “impede the process of future innovation” by “creating unnecessary and innovation-killing ‘uncertainty as to the patentability of software.’”

The recognition that specific computer-implemented technologies are not “abstract” is wholly consistent with the Mayo-Alice test set forth by the Supreme Court in its recent Section 101 decisions, Mayo v. Prometheus Labs and Alice v. CLS Bank. Under the Mayo-Alice framework, Trading Technologies’ GUI is not merely an “abstract idea” incorporating conventional and automatic processes, but rather it exemplifies the technical innovation and “progress of . . . useful Arts” that the patent system is intended to promote.

The Summary of Argument section of the brief is copied below:

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The trial court’s decision represents a proper application of 35 U.S.C. § 101. See Trading Technologies Int’l, Inc. v. CQG, Inc., No. 05-4811, 2015 WL 774655 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 2015). Because the parties address the relevant innovation covered by Trading Technologies’ patents, as well as the application of the Supreme Court’s recent § 101 jurisprudence, amici offer an additional insight that supports the trial court’s decision: the invention of computer-mediated processes is exactly the kind of innovation that the patent system is designed to promote.

As the Supreme Court recognized in Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010), “Section 101 is a dynamic provision designed to encompass new and unforeseen inventions.” Id. at 605 (internal quotations omitted). Thus, this Court should decline the invitation by Appellant to construe § 101 in a crabbed and antiquarian fashion that would limit patent eligibility only to “processes similar to those in the Industrial Age—for example, inventions grounded in a physical or tangible form.” Id. To do so would contravene the Bilski Court’s warning against limiting § 101 to only non-digital inventions, creating thereby unnecessary and innovation-killing “uncertainty as to the patentability of software,” such as Appellee’s graphical-user-interface invention.Id.

To read the full amicus brief, please click here.

Categories
Biotech High Tech Industry History of Intellectual Property Innovation Intellectual Property Theory Inventors Legislation Patent Law Patent Litigation Patent Theory Patentability Requirements Software Patent Supreme Court Uncategorized

Federal Circuit Brings Some Clarity and Sanity Back to Patent Eligibility Doctrine

By Adam Mossoff and Kevin Madigan

closeup of a circuit boardFollowing the Supreme Court’s four decisions on patent eligibility for inventions under § 101 of the Patent Act, there has been much disruption and uncertainty in the patent system. The patent bar and most stakeholders in the innovation industries have found the Supreme Court’s decisions in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank (2014), AMP v. Myriad (2013), Mayo Labs v. Prometheus (2012), and Bilski v. Kappos (2010) to be vague and doctrinally indeterminate. Given the moral panic about the patent system that has been created as a result of ten years of excessive lobbying in D.C. for legislation that weakens patent rights, judges have responded to the excessive discretion they have under these cases by invalidating whole swaths of patented innovation in the high-tech, biotech, and pharmaceutical industries. The Patent Office is also rejecting patent applications at record levels, even for traditional inventions outside of high-tech and life sciences directly affected by the recent § 101 case law.

In Sequenom v. Ariosa, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to bring some clarity to the law of patent eligibility and to reign in some of the judicial and Patent Office excesses, but unfortunately it rejected this opportunity when it denied Sequenom’s cert petition this past June. Fortunately, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is now taking the lead in providing some much-needed legal guidance on patent eligibility to the inventors and companies working in the innovation industries. In two recent decisions, Enfish v. Microsoft and Rapid Litigation Management v. CellzDirect, the Federal Circuit has set forth some important doctrinal guideposts for defining what counts as a patent-eligible invention. Not only do these two decisions bring some reason and clarity back to the law of patent eligibility under § 101, they provide important doctrinal insights on how stakeholders may wish to address this problem if they ultimately choose to seek relief in Congress.

Enfish and the Patentability of Computer-Implemented Inventions (a/k/a “Software Patents”)

At the time it was decided, some commentators believed that the Alice decision was a directive from on high that most, if not all, computer software programs were not patentable inventions. This was a surprising claim if only because the Alice Court did not once use the phrase “software” in its entire opinion. Of course, “software patent” is not a legal term in patent law; the proper term is “computer-implemented invention,” as used by the Alice Court, and so the Court may have been only avoiding vague rhetoric from the patent policy debates. More important, though, this claim about Alice contradicts the Court’s opinion in Bilski just four years earlier, when the Court warned the Federal Circuit not to adopt a bright-line rule that limited § 101 to only physical inventions of the “Industrial Age,” because this created unnecessary and innovation-killing “uncertainty as to the patentability of software.”

Unfortunately, the ambiguities in Alice and in the Court’s prior patentable subject matter decisions, such as Mayo, left enough discretionary wiggle room in applying the generalized patent-eligibility test to permit judges and patents examiners to wage war on computer-implemented inventions. They thus made real again in the twenty-first century Justice Robert Jackson’s famous observation in 1949 that “the only patent that is valid is one which this Court has not been able to get its hands on.” Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). As one commentator remarked several months after Alice was decided, “It’s open season on software patents.” The data over the next several years has borne out the truth of this statement.

The key argument against patents on computer-implemented inventions, such as key components of word processors, programs that run internet searches (like the patented innovation that started Google), and encryption software, is that such inventions are inherently “abstract.” The judicial interpretation of § 101 has long maintained that abstract ideas, laws of natural, and natural phenomena are unpatentable discoveries. In Alice, for instance, the Court held that a complex software program for extremely complex international financial transactions was an “abstract idea” and thus unpatentable under § 101. But beyond claims that something long known is “abstract,” the Court has failed to define with precision what it means for a discovery to be abstract. With little to no specific guidance from the Alice Court, it is no wonder that judges and examiners have succumbed to the recent moral panic about patents and declared “open season” on patents covering computer-implemented inventions.

In this context, the Federal Circuit’s decision in Enfish v. Microsoft is extremely important because it ends the unreasoned, conclusory “I know it when I see it” rejections of patents as “abstract” by judges and examiners.

In Enfish, the Federal Circuit reversed a trial court’s summary judgment that a patent on a computer-implemented invention was an unpatentable abstract idea. The patent covered a type of database management system on computers, a classic incremental innovation in today’s digital world. In its decision, the trial court dissected the invention down into the most basic ideas in which all inventions can be reframed as representing; for example, methods of using internal combustion engines can easily be reframed in terms of the basic laws in thermodynamics. In this case, the trial court asserted that this patent on a computer-implemented invention covered merely the “abstract purpose of storing, organizing, and retrieving” information. The trial court thus easily concluded that the invention was merely “abstract” and thus unpatentable.

The Federal Circuit rejected the trial court’s conclusory assertion about the invention being “abstract” and further held that such assertions by courts are a legally improper application of § 101. With respect to the patent at issue in this case, Judge Todd Hughes’ opinion for the unanimous panel found that

the plain focus of the claims is on an improvement to computer functionality itself, not on economic or other tasks for which a computer is used in its ordinary capacity. Accordingly, we find that the claims at issue in this appeal are not directed to an abstract idea within the meaning of Alice.

More important, the Enfish court cautioned courts against the methodological approach adopted by the trial court in this case, in which “describing the claims at such a high level of abstraction and untethered from the language of the claims all but ensures that the exceptions to § 101 swallow the rule.” The court recognized that adopting a “bright-line” rule that computer-implemented inventions—the “software patents” decried by critics today—are necessarily “abstract” runs counter to both § 101 and the recent Supreme Court cases interpreting and applying this provision: “We do not see in Bilski or Alice, or our cases, an exclusion to patenting this large field of technological progress.”

Further confirming that Enfish represents an important step forward in how courts properly secure technological innovation in the high-tech industry, the Federal Circuit relied on Enfish in its recent decision in BASCOM Global Services Internet Inc v AT&T Mobility LLC. Here, the Federal Circuit again rejected the trial court’s dissection of a patent claim covering a software program used on the internet into an “abstract” idea of merely “filtering content.” The BASCOM court emphasized that courts must assess a claim as a whole—following the Alice Court’s injunction that courts must assess a patent claim as “an ordered combination of elements”—in determining whether it is a patentable invention under § 101. As numerous patent scholars explained in an amicus brief filed in support of Sequenom in its failed cert petition before the Supreme Court, requiring a court to construe a “claim as a whole” or “the invention as a whole” is a basic doctrinal requirement that runs throughout patent law, as it is essential to ensuring that patents are properly evaluated both as to their validity and in their assertion against infringers.

CellzDirect and the Patentability of Discoveries in the Bio-Pharmaceutical Industry

The high-tech industry is not the only sector of the innovation industries that has been hit particularly hard by the recent §101 jurisprudence. The biotech and pharmaceutical industries have also seen a collapse in the proper legal protection for their innovative discoveries of new therapeutic treatments. One recent study found that the examination unit at the Patent Office responsible for reviewing personalized medicine inventions (art unit 1634) has rejected 86.4% of all patent applications since the Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo. Anecdotal evidence abounds of numerous rejections of patent applications on innovative medical treatments arising from extensive R&D, and the most prominent one was the invalidation of Sequenom’s patent on its groundbreaking innovation in prenatal diagnostic tests.

In this light, the decision on July 5, 2016 in Rapid Litigation Management v. CellzDirect is an extremely important legal development for an industry that relies on stable and effective patent rights to justify investing billions in R&D to produce the miracles that comprise basic medical care today. In CellzDirect, the trial court found unpatentable under § 101 a patent claiming new methods for freezing liver cells for use in “testing, diagnostic, and treating purposes.” The trial court asserted that such a patent was “directed to an ineligible law of nature,” because scientists have long known that these types of liver cells (hepatocytes) could be subjected to multiple freeze-thaw cycles.

In her opinion for a unanimous panel, Chief Judge Sharon Prost held that the method in this case is exactly the type of innovative process that should be secured in a patent. Reflecting the same methodological concern in Enfish and BASCOM, the CellzDirect court rejected the trial court’s dissection of the patent into its foundational “laws of nature” and conventional ideas long-known in the scientific field:

The claims are simply not directed to the ability of hepatocytes to survive multiple freeze-thaw cycles. Rather, the claims of the ’929 patent are directed to a new and useful laboratory technique for preserving hepatocytes. This type of constructive process, carried out by an artisan to achieve “a new and useful end,” is precisely the type of claim that is eligible for patenting.

In other words, merely because a patentable process operates on a subject matter that constitutes natural phenomena does not mean the patent improperly claims either those natural phenomena or the laws of nature that govern them. To hold otherwise fails to heed the Mayo Court’s warning that “all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas,” and thus to dissect all patents down into these unpatentable foundations would “eviscerate patent law.” The CellzDirect court was explicit about this key methodological point in evaluating patents under § 101: “Just as in [the industrial process held valid by the Supreme Court in] Diehr, it is the particular ‘combination of steps’ that is patentable here”—the invention as a whole.

Conclusion

The U.S. has long prided itself as having a “gold standard” patent system—securing to innovators stable and effective property rights in their inventions and discoveries. As scholars and economic historians have long recognized, the patent system has been a key driver of America’s innovation economy for more than two hundred years. This is now threatened under the Supreme Court’s § 101 decisions and the “too broad” application of the Court’s highly generalized patent-eligibility tests to inventions in the high-tech and bio-pharmaceutical sectors. The shockingly high numbers of rejected applications at the Patent Office and of invalidation of patents by courts, as well as the general sense of legal uncertainty, are threatening the “gold standard” designation for the U.S. patent system. This threatens the startups, new jobs, and economic growth that the patent system has been proven to support. Hopefully, the recent Enfish and CellzDirect decisions are the first steps in bringing back to patent-eligibility doctrine both reason and clarity, two key requirements in the law that have been sorely lacking for inventors and companies working in the innovation economy.

Categories
Administrative Agency Innovation Inventors Patent Law Patent Litigation Uncategorized

#AliceStorm: When It Rains, It Pours…

The following guest post from Robert R. Sachs, Partner at Fenwick & West LLP, first appeared on the Bilski Blog, and it is reposted here with permission.

By Robert R. Sachs

Last year I christened the post-Alice impact on patents #Alicestorm, riffing on the hashtag #hellastorm used to refer to the Pineapple Express storms the drenched the Bay Area in December 2014. This year we have El Niño bringing day after day of rain, and so too we have Alice decisions coming down in sheets. Here is a comparison of number of decisions per month since Alice.

Table 1 Quarterly Numbers

On average, we’re seeing about eleven Section 101 decisions per month in the federal courts. The overall success rate has been holding in the low 70% range, currently 72.1% (down from 73% in October). Similarly, motions on the pleadings continue with an equally strong success rate of 71.7% (down from 71.9%):

Table 2 Summary

The number of patents invalidated has increased dramatically from 354 as of October 2015 to over 400, while the number of invalidated claims is now over 12,000. The courts routinely invalidate all of the claims of a patent based on a single “representative” claim, including all dependent claims regardless of their level of specificity. This seems entirely contrary to the notion that dependent claims necessarily narrow the broad and presumably abstract independent claims, and likely provide at least some features that are “significantly more” then than the abstract idea, as well as recitations that are non-generic technology that provides some “improvement” over the art. Is it really possible that so many thousands of dependent claims had no merit? If dependent claims are hedges against invalidity under Section 103, why do they have so little bearing under Section 101?

PTAB continues to be the points leader on the board, with the institution rate on Section 101 based Covered Business Method petitions climbing to 84.8% (up from 83.7%) and an unbroken string of 38 final decisions on Section 101 finding the challenged patent ineligible.

The motion analysis remains consistent with what we’ve seen before:

Motions

The most active courts and judges, by number of Section 101 decisions, are in Delaware with 35 decisions (Andrews, Robinson, Stark, Sleet, Burke) and Texas with 29 (Gilstrap, Payne, Mitchell, Schroeder).

Judges

The number of new patent cases filed climbed in 2015, including a large filing spike at the end of November, 2015 due to the elimination of Form 18, which required only the basic allegation that the plaintiff owned the patent and that the defendant infringed, without any substantive allegations. As a result, we expect to see the continued stream of Section 101 motions and ineligibility outcomes.

Categories
Administrative Agency Innovation Inventors Patent Law Patent Litigation Uncategorized

#AliceStorm for Halloween: Was it a Trick or a Treat?

The following guest post from Robert R. Sachs, Partner at Fenwick & West LLP, first appeared on the Bilski Blog, and it is reposted here with permission.

By Robert R. Sachs

Alice has been busy the last two months, continuing to haunt the federal courts and the Knox and Randolph buildings at the USPTO. Here are the latest #AliceStorm numbers through the end of October 2015:

There have been 34 district court decisions in the past two months, but the percentage of invalidity decision is holding constant at 70.5%. The number of patent claims invalidated is now over 11,000, but also holding steady at around 71%.

There have been no new Federal Circuit Section 101 decisions, but we’re going to see a flurry of activity in the next couple of months, as the court has recently heard oral argument in a number of patent eligibility cases, and more are on calendar for November.

Motions on the pleadings have soared, with 23 in the past two months alone, and the success rate is up a tick from 70.1% to 71.4%.

PTAB is a bit mixed: the CBM institution rate is down from 86.2% 83.7%, but the final decision rate is still 100%, with 6 decisions in the past two months invalidating the patents in suit.

Turning to the motion analysis, the motions on the pleadings are the second scariest thing to a patent holder after the specter of attorney fees under Octane Fitness:

The Delaware district court continues as the graveyard of business methods and software patents, with 31 eligibility decisions, up from 19 just two months ago, and their invalidity rate is up from 86.4% to 90.3%.

Jumping into second place is the Eastern District of Texas, with 23 decisions total (up from 16). Contrary to the rest of the rest of the bench, their invalidity rate is 34.8%. The Northern District of California edged up from 75% to 78.9% invalidity, and C.D. Cal is up almost 2%.

And finally, here is the run down on the all district court judges with two or more Section 101 decisions.

With today’s blog, I’m introducing some entirely new types of data, looking at the characteristics of the patents that have been subject to Section 101 motions.

As expected, business method patents are the most heavily litigated and invalidated (click to see full size):

The distribution of patents in terms of earlier priority dates shows a very large fraction of the invalidated patents were first filed in 2000:

Now compare that to the distribution of patent classes with respect to priority year as well:

Here too we see a very large number of the business method patents filed in 2000. I’ve coded all of the software related technologies as blue to group them visually.

Why the cluster around 2000? State Street Bank, which held that there was no rule against business method patents, was decided in mid-1998. As those of us who were practicing them remember, it took about two years before the impact of the decision was widespread. This was also the time of the Dotcom bubble when it seemed that just about everyone was starting up a business on Internet. Those two factors resulted in a surge of patent filings.

Of all the patents that have been thus challenged under Alice, only two have post-Bilski priority dates:

  • 8447263, Emergency call analysis system, filed in 2011, and litigated in Boar’s Head Corp. v. DirectApps, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98502 (E.D. Cal., 7/28/2015). The court granted DirectApps motion to dismiss, finding the patent invalid.
  • 8938510, On-demand mailbox synchronization and migration system, filed in 2010, and litigated in BitTitan, Inc. v. SkyKick, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114082 (W.D. Wash, 8/27/2015). BitTran’s motion for preliminary injunction was denied in part because of SkyKick successfully argued that BitTrans was not likely to succeed on the merits due to Alice problems.
  • 8,604,943; 9,070,295; 9,082,097; 9,082,098 and 9,087,313, all of which claim priority to March, 2012, and were invalidated just last week in MacroPoint LLC v. FourKites Inc., Case. No. 1:15-cv-01002 (N.D. Ohio, Nov. 5, 2015). The court invalided all 94 claims in these patents, as being directed to the abstract idea of “tracking freight.” While the last four patents were issued in June and July, 2015, none of them overcome an Alice rejection, and the court noted that “Nothing in the Reasons for Allowance dictate a finding that these concepts are inventive on the issue of patent-eligible subject matter.”

Over time we’ll see more post-Bilski patents being litigated, and then eventually a true test: a business method patent granted after Alice that overcame an Alice rejection. By my count, there are about 80 such patents thus far, and about another 90 that have been allowed. It will not be too long then before one of these patents is challenged under Section 101.

In my next column, I’ll review some very disturbing decisions by coming out of the Delaware district courts.

Categories
Uncategorized

Federal Circuit Should Reconsider Ariosa v. Sequenom: The Panel Decision Threatens Modern Innovation

Here’s a brief excerpt of a post by Devlin Hartline that was published on IPWatchdog.

In an amicus brief co-authored by Kevin Noonan of McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berghoff LLP and Professor Adam Mossoff of George Mason University School of Law, twenty-three law professors urge the Federal Circuit to take a second look at the innovation-threatening panel decision in Ariosa v. Sequenom. They filed their amicus brief on Thursday, August 27, 2015, in support of Sequenom’s petition for rehearing en banc.

Before turning to the important points made by these amici, I’ll first explain what the Sequenom case is about and how the Federal Circuit panel reached the wrong conclusion in striking down Sequenom’s important innovation for diagnostic testing. . . .

To read the rest of this post, please visit IPWatchdog.

 

Categories
Administrative Agency Biotech High Tech Industry Innovation Intellectual Property Theory Inventors Legislation Patent Law Patent Litigation Patent Theory Software Patent Statistics Supreme Court Uncategorized

The One Year Anniversary: The Aftermath of #AliceStorm

The following post, by Robert R. Sachs, first appeared on the Bilski Blog, and it is reposted here with permission.

It’s been one year since the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank. On its face the opinion was relatively conservative, cautioning courts to “tread carefully” before invalidating patents, and emphasizing that the primary concern was to avoid preemption of “fundamental building blocks” of human ingenuity. The Court specifically avoided any suggestion that software or business methods were presumptively invalid. But those concerns seem to have gone unheeded. The Court’s attempt to side step the tricky problem of defining the boundary of an exception to patent eligibility—”we need not labor to delimit the precise contours of the ‘abstract ideas category in this case'”—has turned into the very mechanism that is quickly “swallow[ing] all of patent law.” The federal courts, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, and the USPTO are using the very lack of a definition to liberally expand the contours of abstract ideas to cover everything from computer animation to database architecture to digital photograph management and even to safety systems for automobiles.

Let’s look at the numbers to present an accurate picture of the implications of the Supreme Court’s decision. My analysis is a data-driven attempt to assess the implications of Alice one year out. It is with an understanding of how the Supreme Court’s decision is actually playing out in the theater of innovation that we can better project and position ourselves for what the future holds.

Alice at Court

Table 0 Fed Courts

As of June 19, 2015 there have been 106 Federal Circuit and district court decisions on § 101 grounds, with 76 decisions invalidating the patents at issue in whole or in part. In terms of patents and claims, 65% of challenged patents have been found invalid, along with 76.2% of the challenged claims.

The success rate of motions on the pleadings (including motions to dismiss and judgments on the pleadings) is extremely impressive: 67% of defense motions granted, invalidating 54% of asserted patents. There has never been a Supreme Court ruling that the presumption of validity does not apply to § 101—only the Court’s use of the originally metaphorical notion that eligibility is a “threshold” condition. Given that, and the general rule that to survive a motion to dismiss the patentee (historically) need only show that there was a plausible basis that the complaint states a cause of action— there is a plausible basis that the patent claim is not directed to an abstract idea, law of nature, or natural phenomena. One would be forgiven for thinking, as did former Chief Judge Rader in Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC that a “Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal for lack of eligible subject matter will be the exception, not the rule.” Apparently the rules change in the middle of the game.

Turning specifically to the Federal Circuit, the numbers are stark:

Table 00Fed Circuit

Of the 13 decisions, 11 are in software or e-commerce and only two are in biotech. The one case where the court held in favor of the patentee, DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P. appeared to offer a narrow avenue for patentees to avoid invalidation. However, only nine district court opinions have relied upon DDR to find patent eligibility, with over 30 court opinions distinguishing DDR as inapplicable. Even more interesting is the fact that in DDR the Federal Circuit essentially held that creating a website that copies the look and feel of another website is patent eligible. In the Silicon Valley, that’s called phishing, and it’s not a technology in which most reputable companies invest.

Alice at the Office

The impact of Alice is similarly impacting practitioners before the USPTO. In December, 2014 the Office issued its Interim Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, providing guidance to patent examiners as to how to apply the Alice, Mayo, and Myriad decisions along with various Federal Circuit decisions, to claims during prosecution. Importantly, the Guidance noted that “the Supreme Court did not create a per se excluded category of subject matter, such as software or business methods, nor did it impose any special requirements for eligibility of software or business methods,” and it reminded examiners that “Courts tread carefully in scrutinizing such claims because at some level all inventions embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea.” Alas, most patent examiners are acting as if the patent applications before them are the exceptions to these cautionary instructions.

With the assistance of Patent Advisor, I compiled a dataset of almost 300,000 office actions and notice of allowances sampled in two week periods during 2013, 2013, 2014 and early 2015, and all actions during March, April and May 2015, across all technology centers:

Table0 Number of Apps

About 100,000 actions were notices of allowances, leaving about 200,000 office actions. Each office action was coded as to whether it included rejections under §§ 101, 102 and 103. For each office action the art unit and examiner was identified as well, and the status of the application (abandoned, pending or patented) as of the date that the data was obtained. I then analyzed the data for office actions rejections based on § 101, allowance rates, and examiner rejection rates. Here’s what I found.

Percent of all Actions with § 101 Rejections

Table2

Here, we have the percentage of all actions in each period that received a § 101 rejection, considering both rejections issued and notices of allowances. The black line separates pre-Alice from post-Alice data. For example, in TC 1600, the biotech area, in January, 2012 6.81% of all actions issued (counting both office actions and notices of allowances) were office actions with § 101 rejections; by May 2015 that percentage almost doubled to 11.86% of actions.

Overall, data shows that in 2012 subject matter rejections were mainly in the computer related Tech Centers (2100, 2400) and began declining thereafter, while escalating in biotechnology (1600) and so-called “business methods” Tech Center, TC 3600, following Mayo and Alice. Other technology centers such as semiconductors and mechanical engineering had essentially low and constant rejection rates. But that’s not because there are no software patents in these technology centers: you find plenty of software patents in these groups. Rather, my view is that it is because examiners in these groups treat software patents as they do any other technology.

The rejection rates in Tech Center 3600 in the 30-40% range are higher than any other group, but they also mask what’s really going on, since TC 3600 covers more than business methods. Tech Center 3600 has nine work groups:

Percent of all Actions with § 101 Rejections in TC 3600 Work Groups

Table3 Ecomm Rej

In TC 3600 most of the work groups handle good old-fashioned machines and processes, such as transportation (3610), structures like chairs and ladders (3630), airplanes, agriculture, and weapons (3640), wells and earth moving equipment (3670), etc. Three work groups handle e-commerce applications: specifically, 3620, 3680 and 3690. Here we see that these groups have significantly higher § 101 rejections than the rest of TC 3600. But let’s drill down further.

Each of work groups 3620, 3680 and 3690 have between five and 10 individual art units that handle specific types of e-commerce technologies, but they are not all under the same work group. For example business related cryptography is handed by both art units 3621 and 3685; healthcare and insurance is handled by art units 3626 and 3686; operations research is handled in 3623, 3624, 3682 and 3684. If we consolidate the data according to technology type and then look at rates of § 101 rejections we get the following:

Percent of all Actions with § 101 Rejections in E-Commerce Art Units by Technology Type

Table3 Ecomm Rej

What’s going on? After Bilski in 2010, the § 101 rejections were running between 17% and 50%. Not great but tolerable since these were mostly formal and were overcome with amendments adding hardware elements (“processor,” “memory”) to method claims or inserting “non-transitory” into Beauregard claims.

But after Alice, everything changed and § 101 rejections started issuing like paper money in a hyperinflation economy. If your perception as a patent prosecutor was that the every application was getting rejected under § 101, this explains your pain. Here’s another view of this data, in terms of actual number of § 101 rejections per sample period:

Number of Office Actions with § 101 Rejections in E-Commerce Art Units by Technology Type

Table4 Ecomm Rej Nos

Notice here that the number of office actions in March, 2015 fell dramatically, and then in April the flood gates opened and hundreds of actions issued with § 101 rejections. This is consistent with the Office’s statements in January 2015 that it was training examiners in view of the 2014 Interim Guidance, so office actions were being held until the training was completed. Apparently, the training skipped the part about no per se exclusions of business methods.

Now let’s consider notice of allowance rates. First with respect to all Tech Centers.

Percent of Actions that Are Notices of Allowance

Table5 All TCs NOA

This data reflects, of all the actions that were issued in a given period, the percentage that were notices of allowances. (Note here that contrary to the preceding tables, red cells are low percentage, and green cells are high since notices of allowance are good things, not bad things). The numbers look good, with a general increasing trend over time.

Now consider what’s happening in TC 3600’s business methods art units.

Percent of Actions that Are Notices of Allowance in Business Methods

Table6 NOAs in Ecomm

Now the picture is quite different. The rate of NOAs drops dramatically after Alice, especially in finance and banking and operations research. If it seemed that you were no longer getting a NOAs, this is why. The zero percent rate in March, 2015 is a result of the Office holding up actions and NOAs in view of the Interim Guidance training, as mentioned above.

Patents issued in the business methods art units typically are classified in Class 705 for “Data Processing.” I identified all patents with a primary classification in Class 705 since January, 2011, on a month by month basis, to identify year over year trends. Again the black line separates pre-Alice from post-Alice data.

Table7 Class 705 Patents

This table shows a precipitous decline in the number of business method patents issued following Alice, especially year over year. The lag between the June, 2014 Alice decision and the drop off in October 2014 is an artifact of the delay between allowance and issuance, as well as the USPTO’s unprecedented decision to withdraw an unknown number of applications for which the issue fee had already been paid, and issue § 101 rejections. It’s an interesting artifact, as well, that the number of Class 705 patents issued peaked in the month after Alice: you have to remember that these patents were allowed at least three months, and as much as a year, before the Alice decision; it just took a long time to actually get printed as a patent.

Next, we’ll consider abandonment rates, on a comparative basis, looking at the percentages of applications that were ultimately abandoned in relationship to whether or not they received a § 101 rejection. We’ll compare the data from January 2012 to July 2014. Again, consider the entire patent corps:

Percent of Abandoned Applications with Prior § 101 Rejection

Table8 Abandon all TCs

Here we see that of the applications that were abandoned during the respective sample periods, the vast majority did not have a prior § 101 rejection. Only in TC 3600 did the majority shift after Alice with 51.83% applications that received § 101 rejections in July 2014 being subsequently abandoned by May 31, 2015. Again, let’s drill down into the business method art units in TC 3600:

Percent of Abandoned Applications with Prior § 101 Rejection

Table9 Ecomm Abandon

First, prior to Alice, abandonments in the business method units appeared to result more frequently from other than § 101 rejections, typically prior art rejections. This is shown by the fact that the Jan. 2012 “No” column (no prior 101 rejection) is greater than the Jan. 2012 “Yes” column. Then after Alice, there is a huge shift with the vast majority of applications that were abandoned having § 101 rejections, as shown by the July, 2014 “Yes” column. The vast majority of abandonments, upwards of 90%, followed a 101 rejection. That’s applicants essentially giving up over what only a few years ago was a relatively minor hurdle. That’s what happens when you change the rules in the middle of the game. Second, there is also significant differential behavior in the business method areas as compared to the rest of the technology centers after Alice.

Here’s my personal favorite.

Rates of Examiner § 101 Rejections in TC 3600

Table12 Examiner Rates

This table shows the numbers of examiners in the business method art units with respect to the percentage of applications in which they issued § 101 rejections after Alice. The first row shows that during the sampled periods since Alice, 58 business methods examiners issued § 101 rejections in 100% of their applications, for a total of 443 applications. Twenty examiners issued § 101 rejections for between 90% and 99% of their cases, covering 370 applications. In short, 199 examiners issued § 101 rejections more than 70% of the time, covering 3,304 applications or about 70.6% of all applications. This is not “treading carefully.”

We find similar, though less dramatic, trends and variations in TC 1600 which handles biotechnology, pharma, and chemistry.

Percent of all Actions with § 101 Rejections in TC 1600 Work Groups

Table10 1600 101 Rej Rate

The red line separate pre-Mayo/Myriad data from post-Mayo/Myriad, and the increase in the post-period is significant. Here too, the various work groups mask the more significant rejection rates in specific technology areas, with the rejection rate in microbiology first jumping up to 34.6% post-Mayo and steadily climbing to the current 53.2%.

Percent of all Actions with § 101 Rejections in TC 1600 by Technology

Table11 1600 Tech Type Rej

This table breaks down the work groups into technology types, and then these are sorting average rejection rate over the past four months. Following Alice, we see a significant increase in eligibility rejections in bioinformatics related applications–inventions that rely on analysis and identification of biological and genetic information, and which are frequently used in diagnostics and drug discovery. This is especially disconcerting because bioinformatics is critical to the development of new diagnostics, therapies and drugs.

Note as well the enormous spike in rejections for plant related applications from 0% between July 2015 and April 2015, to 50% in May 2015. This is likely a result again of the USPTO’s Interim Guidance which essentially instructed examiners to reject any claim that included any form of a natural product.

At least pesticides and herbicides are safe from Alice, since we definitely need more of those. The irony is that the more pesticides and herbicides that come to market, the more we need bioinformatics inventions to identify and treat conditions potentially resulting from these products.

Alice at the Board

The Patent Trial and Appeal Board has been even more hostile to software and business methods patents under the Covered Business Method review program:

Total Petitions

Petitions Granted

Percent Invalid

PTAB CBM Institution on § 101

72

64

89%

PTAB Final Decisions on § 101

27

27

100%

Covered Business Method review is available for patents that claim “a method, apparatus, or operation used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service.” The Board takes a very broad view of what constitutes a financial product or service: if the patent specification happens to mention that the invention may be used in a financial context such as banking, finance, shopping or the like, then that’s sufficient. The Board has found CBM standing in 91% of petitions, and instituted trial in 89% of petitions asserting § 101 invalidity. Once a CBM trial has been instituted, the odds are heavily in the petitioner’s favor: of the 27 final CBM decisions addressing § 101, the Board has found for the petitioner 100% of the time.

Finally, we look at the Board’s activity in handling ex parte appeals from § 101 rejections for the period of March 1, 2015 to May 30, 2015:

  • 32 Ex Parte Decisions on § 101, with 15 in TC 3600.
  • 28 Affirmances overall, 13 in TC 3600
  • Two Reversals on § 101, both in TC 3600
  • Four New Grounds of Rejection for § 101

Following suit with how the Board is handling CBMs, they are also heavily supporting examiners in affirming § 101 rejections. More disconcerting is the trend of new grounds of rejection under § 101. While only four were issued in this period, there have been several dozen since Alice. In this situation, the applicant has appealed, for example, a § 103 rejection. The Board can reverse the examiner on that rejection, but then sua sponte reject all of the claims under § 101. What are the odds that the examiner will ever allow the case? Close to zero. What are the odds that an appeal back to the Board on the examiner’s next § 101 rejection will be reversed? If the Board’s 100% rate of affirming its CBM institution decisions on § 101 is any indication, then you know the answer.

Conclusions

Looking at the overall context of the Alice decision, it’s my view that Supreme Court did not intend this landslide effect. While they were certainly aware of the concerns over patent trolls and bad patents, they framed their decision not as a broadside against these perceived evils, but as simple extension of Bilski and the question of whether computer implementation of an abstract idea imparts eligibility. At oral argument, the members of the Court specifically asked if they needed to rule on the eligibility of software and they were told by CLS and the Solicitor General that they did not. To the extent that there is broad language in that opinion, it is the cautionary instructions to the courts to avoid disemboweling the patent law from the inside, and the emphasis on preemption of fundamental ideas—not just any ideas—as the core concern of the exclusionary rule. The evidence above shows that these guideposts have been rushed past quite quickly on the way to some goal other than the preservation of intellectual property rights.

If the present trends hold, and I see no reason to suggest that they will not, we will continue to see the zone of patent eligibility curtailed in software (not to mention bio-technology after Mayo and Myriad). Indeed, the more advanced the software technology—the more it takes over the cognitive work once done exclusively by humans, the more seamless it becomes in the fabric of our daily lives—the less patent eligible it is deemed to be by the courts and the USPTO. What technologies will not be funded, what discoveries will not be made, what products will never come to market we do not know. What we do know is this: there is only one law that governs human affairs and that is the law of unintended consequences.