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Copyright

Ninth Circuit Clarifies Transformative Fair Use in Dr. Seuss v. ComicMix

a gavel lying on a desk in front of booksThis past Friday, the Ninth Circuit handed down its opinion in Dr. Seuss v. ComicMix, a closely watched transformative fair use case. The decision marks an important milestone in the development of the fair use doctrine, especially as applied to mash-ups—where two or more preexisting works are blended together to create a new work. However, the court’s careful explanation of what constitutes transformativeness is not limited to mash-ups, and it will surely be influential for years to come. In this post, I’ll look at the various views expressed by the parties, amici, and courts as to what it means for a use to be transformative, and I’ll explain how the Ninth Circuit’s new guidance on transformativeness reins in some of the overly broad positions that have been urged. This decision should be welcome news for those who worry that a copyright owner’s right to make derivative works has been excessively narrowed by ever-expanding notions of transformative use.

In Dr. Seuss v. ComicMix, the plaintiff, Dr. Seuss Enterprises L.P. (Seuss), was the assignee of the copyrights to the works by Theodor S. Geisel, the late author who wrote under the pseudonym “Dr. Seuss.” Seuss sued the defendants, ComicMix LLC and three individuals (collectively, ComicMix), for copyright infringement over, inter alia, ComicMix’s mash-up of Seuss’ iconic Oh, the Places You’ll Go! (Go!) with a Star Trek theme, entitled Oh, the Places You’ll Boldly Go! (Boldly). The Boldly mash-up featured slavish copies of the images and overall look and feel of Go!, but with the Seussian characters replaced with the crew of the Enterprise from Star Trek and the text and imagery reinterpreted for Trekkies.

ComicMix admitted that it copied Go! to create Boldly, and the issue on appeal was whether its use was fair. The district court held that it was fair use, finding in particular that ComicMix’s mash-up was “highly transformative.” After the decision was appealed to the Ninth Circuit, there were amicus briefs filed for both sides. Some argued that Boldly was transformative, and others argued that it was not. In the opinion for the unanimous Ninth Circuit panel by Judge McKeown, the court held that Boldly wasn’t transformative at all. This decision gives us what is perhaps the clearest explanation of what it means to be a transformative use to date by an appellate court. And the fact that it comes from the Ninth Circuit—the “Hollywood Circuit” as Judge Kozinski once called it—makes it all the more interesting and important.

The issue of transformativeness is primarily analyzed under the first fair use factor, i.e., the purpose and character of the use, but it also weighs heavily on the other three factors. If the use is transformative, courts often ignore the creativeness of the original work, give the copyist more leeway when assessing the amount and substantiality of the use, and overlook the copyist’s effect on the potential market for the original work. As some have observed, in a transformative use case, the fair use analysis tends to collapse into a single factor: Is the use transformative? Indeed, Jiarui Liu published a study last year showing that “transformative use appears to be nearly sufficient for a finding of fair use.” Once the dispositive decisions included in the study found transformative use, they eventually held that there was fair use 94% of the time.

District Court Finds Boldly Is “Highly Transformative”

In the district court, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, with ComicMix claiming fair use. The court had assessed fair use earlier in the litigation when denying ComicMix’s motion to dismiss. There, the court rejected ComicMix’s contention that Boldly was a parody, reasoning that it did not comment on or criticize the original work. Parodies juxtapose the original work for comedic effect, and the necessity of referencing the original justifies the copying. However, the court found that there was no such juxtaposition here, instead noting that Boldly merely used the “illustration style and story format as a means of conveying particular adventures and tropes from the Star Trek canon.” Nevertheless, the court found that Boldly was “no doubt transformative” since it “combine[d] into a completely unique work the two disparate worlds of Dr. Seuss and Star Trek.” Even though many elements were copied, the court reasoned that Go! had been “repurposed” because ComicMix added “original writing and illustrations” that transformed its Seussian pages into “Star-Trek-centric ones.”

The district court ultimately denied the motion to dismiss as it had to take Seuss’ allegations of market harm in the complaint as true and there was no evidence to the contrary in the record. Lacking evidence of market harm, the court found a “near-perfect balancing of the factors” and held that ComicMix’s “fair use defense currently fails as a matter of law.” However, once the court turned to the summary judgment motions, it had a developed record from which to work. On market harm, the court placed the burden on Seuss—despite fair use being an affirmative defense—and found that it failed to demonstrate likely harm to Go! or its licensed derivatives. On the issue of transformativeness, the court adopted and then expanded on its reasoning when addressing the motion to dismiss.

Suess had asked the district court to reassess its fair use analysis given the intervening Federal Circuit decision in Oracle v. Google. In that case, it was not fair use when Google copied computer code verbatim and then added its own code. The court here distinguished Oracle, reasoning that ComicMix did not copy the text or illustrations of Go! verbatim. While ComicMix “certainly borrowed from Go!—at times liberally—the elements borrowed were always adapted or transformed,” and that made Boldly “highly transformative.” Furthermore, the court found that Go! and Boldly served different purposes, with the former aimed at graduates and the latter tailored towards Trekkies. And to Seuss’ argument that Boldly was a derivative work, the court responded that derivative works can be transformative and constitute fair use.

Strangely, when addressing the motion to dismiss and the summary judgment motions, the district court failed to cite the holding of Dr. Seuss v. Penguin Books—even though that binding precedent involved the same plaintiff making similar arguments about a similar mash-up (there, Dr. Seuss and the O.J. Simpson murder trial). In Penguin Books, the Ninth Circuit held that the accused mash-up, The Cat NOT in the Hat! A Parody by Dr. Juice, was neither parody nor fair use. Rather than ridiculing the Seussian style itself, the court held that it merely copied that style “to get attention” or perhaps “to avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh”—as the Supreme Court put it in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose. Indeed, because the mash-up failed to conjure up the substance of the original work by focusing readers instead to the O.J. Simpson murder trial, the court held that there was “no effort to create a transformative work with ‘new expression, meaning, or message’” as required by Campbell.

Amicus Briefs Offer Differing Views on Transformativeness

Once the case was appealed to the Ninth Circuit, amicus briefs were filed on both sides addressing the transformativeness issue. Some argued that Boldly epitomized transformative fair use, and others argued that it was the antithesis. It is difficult to exaggerate the doctrinal gulf between the views of these amici.

The Motion Picture Association (MPA) amicus brief, by Jacqueline Charlesworth, argued that ComicMix’s use was not transformative since it failed to comment on or add new meaning to Go! and instead merely used it as a vehicle to achieve the same purpose—entertaining and inspiring readers. Moreover, ComicMix admitted that it could have used a different book on which to base its mash-up, thus defeating any claim of necessity. The MPA brief explained that Boldly was indeed a derivative work (the district court had expressively reserved the point) as defined by the Copyright Act since it transformed or adapted a preexisting work. The district court had dismissed Suess’ argument that Boldly was a derivative work by pointing out that it transformed and adapted Go!, but the MPA brief called this “troubling logic” since it conflated derivativeness with transformativeness and presumably would make every derivative work a transformative fair use.

Peter Menell filed an amicus brief, joined by Shyam Balganesh and David Nimmer, taking issue with the district court’s “categorical determination” that mash-ups generally are “highly transformative” as it would “undermine[] the Copyright Act’s right to prepare derivative works.” The Menell brief argued that Boldly “might well strike a lay observer as clever, engaging, and even transformative in a common parlance sense of the term,” but this misunderstands the transformativeness inquiry, which turns on whether it “serves a different privileged purpose” such that it survives the “justificatory gauntlet.” The question was whether Boldly “merely supersede[d] the objects of the original” or instead used the copied material “in a different manner or for a different purpose.” Here, the Menell brief concluded, Boldly drew on Go!’s popularity to follow its same general entertaining purpose while adding little “new insight and understanding.”

Sesame Workshop filed an amicus brief by Dean Marks distinguishing transformativeness for derivative works from transformative use under the first fair use factor and arguing that the district court conflated the two. The Sesame brief explained that Boldly was only transformative in the fair use sense if it, per Campbell, added “something new, with a further purpose or different character” as “commentary” and provided “social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work.” While Boldly did add new material, it did not add “any new meaning or message” or “provide any new insight or commentary on Go!.” It instead delivered “the exact same inspirational message” to appeal to Seuss’ “existing market.” The danger of the district court’s logic, the Sesame brief concluded, is that it “could stand for the proposition that all mash-ups constitute fair use, a holding that would greatly diminish the derivative work right.”

An amicus brief by Erik Stallman on behalf of a group of IP professors, including Mark Lemley, Jessica Litman, Lydia Loren, Pam Samuelson, and Rebecca Tushnet, took a broad view of transformative fair use, arguing that the district court properly did not require Boldly to criticize, comment on, or parody Go! itself. It also claimed that fair use is not an affirmative defense such that the district court properly put the burden on Seuss to show market harm. The crux of the IP professor brief was that, even though on a high level of abstraction both works had the same entertainment purpose, there were nonetheless “differences in expressive meaning or message” that made Boldly transformative. As there were such differences at a lower level of abstraction—e.g., Go! had a “hyper-individualistic character” while Boldly focused on “institutional structures that promote discovery through” combined “efforts”—the IP professor brief concluded that it was transformative in the fair use sense.

Finally, an amicus brief by Mason Kortz on behalf of the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), Organization for Transformative Works, Public Knowledge, and others concluded that “Boldly is a significantly transformative work” that “recasts, recontextualizes, and adds new expression or meaning to Go! in order to create a new, significant work of creative expression.” The EFF brief argued that uses can be transformative even if “they fail to comment on or parody the original” so long as they have different “expressive content and message.” Here, Boldly was transformative because it “adapt[ed] the stylistic, visual, and rhyming elements from Go! to create new expression” and added “new meanings that speak with particularity to the themes of Star Trek beloved by its community of fans.”

Ninth Circuit Holds that Boldly Is Not Transformative

Turning back to the parties, Seuss argued on appeal that ComicMix’s “use was exploitative and intended to grab the attention of potential buyers, not transformative,” since it added no “new purpose or meaning.” ComicMix answered that its use was “highly transformative,” with a “radically distinct purpose and effect,” that crafted “new meanings from the interplay between Star Trek’s and Seuss’s creative worlds.” Judge McKeown, writing for the unanimous Ninth Circuit panel, sided completely with Seuss: While the “fair use analysis can be elusive,” if not metaphysical, “[n]ot so with this case.” The court held that “Boldly is not transformative” and that all of the fair use “factors decisively weigh against ComicMix.”

Quoting Campbell, the court started with the premise that a transformative work “adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message,” and a work that “merely supersedes the objects of the original creation” is not transformative. It also noted Campbell’s explanation that commentary with “no critical bearing on the substance or style of the original” and which is used “to get attention or to avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh” has less—if any—claim to fair use. The court then cited to its previous holding in Dr. Seuss v. Penguin Books (mentioned above as having been ignored by the district court below despite the glaring similarities) that the mash-up at issue there merely copied the Seussian style without critiquing it. The court there held that the defendant was only trying “to get attention,” and the court here found that the same result holds true. ComicMix’s “post-hoc characterization” that it was “criticizing the theme of banal narcissism of Go!” or “mocking the purported self-importance of its characters falls flat.”

The court then turned to ComicMix’s argument that, even if Boldly was not a parody or a critique, it was nonetheless transformative since it substituted Seussian characters and elements with Star Trek themes. The court rejected this framing as foreclosed by Penguin Books, noting that it “leverage[s] Dr. Seuss’s characters without having a new purpose or giving Dr. Seuss’s works new meaning.” And without “new expression, meaning or message” that alters Go!, ComicMix merely added “Star Trek material on top of what it meticulously copied” and failed to engage in transformative use. Helpfully, the court laid out three “benchmarks of transformative use,” which it gleaned from Campbell and Ninth Circuit precedent, to explain why Boldly was not transformative: “Boldly possesses none of these qualities; it merely repackaged Go!.”

First, the “telltale signs of transformative use” include a “‘further purpose or different character’ in the defendant’s work, i.e., ‘the creation of new information, new aesthetic, new insights and understanding.’” The court found that Boldly had neither a further purpose nor a different character since it paralleled the purpose of Go! and propounded its same message. Without a “new purpose or character” that would make it transformative, the court found that Boldly “merely recontextualized the original expression by ‘plucking the most visually arresting excerpt[s].”

The second of the “telltale signs” looks for “‘new expression, meaning, or message’ in the original work, i.e., the addition of ‘value to the original.’” The court found that ComicMix likewise failed to do this: “While Boldly may have altered Star Trek by sending Captain Kirk and his crew to a strange new world, that world, the world of Go!, remains intact.” The court’s focus was on whether Boldly changed Go! itself or merely repackaged it into a new format. Here, “Boldly does not change Go!,” and ComicMix’s admission that it could have used another work as the basis of its mash-up indicated that “Go! was selected ‘to get attention or to avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh,’ and not for a transformative purpose.”

The last of the “telltale signs” considers “the use of quoted matter as ‘raw material,’ instead of repackaging it and ‘merely supersed[ing] the objects of the original creation.’” The court, embedding several side-by-side images into the opinion to demonstrate the point, found that Boldly merely repackaged Go!. For the illustrations, the “Star Trek characters step into the shoes of Seussian characters in a Seussian world that is otherwise unchanged.” And for the text, rather than “using the Go! story as a starting point for a different artistic or aesthetic expression,” ComicMix instead matched its structure in a way that “did not result in the Go! story taking on a new expression, meaning, or message.” Since Boldly “left the inherent character of the [book] unchanged, it was not a transformative use of Go!.”

The court concluded that, “[a]lthough ComicMix’s work need not boldly go where no one has gone before, its repackaging, copying, and lack of critique of Seuss, coupled with its commercial use of Go!, does not result in a transformative use.” The first fair use factor thus “weigh[ed] definitively against fair use,” and the court went on to find that the other three factors favored Suess as well—without transformativeness to drive the analysis, ComicMix could not get the court to put its thumb on the scale in favor of fair use. Importantly, the court also rejected the holding below that the burden of proving likely market harm rested on Seuss: “the Supreme Court and our circuit have unequivocally placed the burden of proof on the proponent of the affirmative defense of fair use.” Additionally, the court chastised ComicMix for failing to address the “crucial right” of “the derivative works market,” noting that Boldly would likely “curtail Go!’s potential market for derivative works,” especially given that Seuss had “engaged extensively for decades” in this area.

Conclusion

All-in-all, the Ninth Circuit’s decision is a welcome development to the doctrine of fair use. Since Campbell was handed down over one-quarter of a century ago, the notion of transformativeness has taken on a central role—one that appears to be shrinking the exclusive right to prepare derivative works while expanding what it means to be transformative fair use. The accused work at issue here—Boldly—used the original work to create new expression, but lacking was any justification for the taking. ComicMix could have used any number of works for its mash-up, and the same nontransformative repackaging would have occurred because ComicMix’s purpose would not be tied to the particular work onto which it transposed the Star Trek universe. Thankfully, the Ninth Circuit was able to distinguish the transformative nature of a derivative work from the transformativeness that constitutes fair use. And given the prevalence of mash-ups in today’s culture, one suspects that this opinion will be cited and expanded upon for many years.

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Copyright

Copyright Office Questions Legality of Internet Archive’s National Emergency Library

the word "copyright" typed on a typewriterOn March 24, the Internet Archive (Archive) unveiled what it called the “National Emergency Library” (NEL) in order to “address our unprecedented global and immediate need for access to reading and research materials.” The announcement specified that Archive would suspend the waitlist for 1.4 million books in its unlicensed “lending library” until at least June 30, thus allowing an unlimited number of people to download electronic copies of the same book at the same time. Archive had previously employed a controlled digital lending (CDL) model where the number of downloads was tied to the number of physical copies Archive or its partners possessed. With the waitlist suspended, Archive temporarily abandoned the CDL model that it had relied on since 2011.

Archive’s release of 1.4 million copyrighted works without a license certainly caught people’s attention. The Authors Guild quickly condemned the move, claiming that Archive “has no rights whatsoever to these books, much less to give them away indiscriminately without consent of the publisher or author.” Maria Pallante, President and CEO of the Association of American Publishers, likewise denounced Archive’s announcement: “We are stunned by the Internet Archive’s aggressive, unlawful, and opportunistic attack on the rights of authors and publishers in the midst of the novel coronavirus pandemic.” Archive then responded in a blog post explaining that it had suspended its waitlist due to the “tremendous and historic outage” in the nation’s libraries caused by the pandemic and arguing that fair use is the “legal doctrine underlying” its CDL model “during normal times.”

A couple of weeks later, on April 16, Senator Tom Udall (D-NM) sent a letter to Acting Register of Copyrights Maria Strong asking the Office “to examine the National Emergency Library that has been organized by the Internet Archive which is operating without typical library licenses and is causing authors in New Mexico concern about the integrity of their copyrights.” In particular, Sen. Udall asked the Office to “include a legal analysis of the Internet Archive’s National Emergency Library” under Section 107 and to “recommend any corrective action that you deem necessary to comply with copyright law and protect authors.”

On May 15, Acting Register Strong submitted a detailed response to Sen. Udall, noting that “it is not the Office’s general practice to provide legal advice about specific factual scenarios” and that the “Office is particularly cautious about weighing in on circumstances or disputes between private parties.” Nevertheless, the Office provided a general analysis of how copyright law applies to libraries and then looked at how that analysis applies to “the Internet Archive’s recent activities.” Notably, the Office ultimately concluded that it “would have been beneficial for the Internet Archive to engage with writers and publishers prior to launching the National Emergency Library to discuss the contemplated parameters for the project and determine their willingness to participate.”

On June 1, a couple of weeks after the Office submitted its response to Sen. Udall, four major publishers, including Hachette, HarperCollins, Penguin Random House, and Wiley, filed suit against Archive for copyright infringement in the Southern District of New York. The complaint, which includes 127 works-in-suit, alleges that Archive’s CDL and NEL models infringe on their works, both directly and indirectly. This blog post does not address that dispute, though the publishers do raise many of the same issues in their complaint that the Office raised in its response to Sen. Udall. This blog post merely summarizes the Office’s reasoning on the fair use analysis of Archive’s National Emergency Library. It is worth noting that, even though Archive announced on June 10 that it was shutting down its NEL, the legality of the NEL is still a live issue in the publishers’ lawsuit.

Fair Use Under Section 107

Looking at the first fair use factor under Section 107 generally, the Copyright Office notes that while the “goals of promoting scholarship and education are explicitly identified in the statute as favored purposes,” it “is generally understood that many uses of copyrighted works by schools and universities must be licensed.” Citing Oracle v. Google and Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, the Office points out that “reproducing the text of physical books in digital format is not transformative unless the change in format results in new uses for the work.” Moreover, it explains that using educational materials for educational purposes “would not serve a different purpose than the original.”

Turning to the NEL specifically, the Office takes issue with Archive’s claim that “the vast majority” of the books it makes available “do not have a commercially available ebook” that would be publicly available given that libraries are closed. On the contrary, the Office states that “Archive does not appear to have verified if any of the works in its collection were available to the public in digital formats prior to including those books in its collection or removing its waiting lists” and that the NEL “includes many books for which ebooks are available commercially” at local libraries. Thus, the argument that Archive was making available works that were otherwise unavailable “does not apply to any books that were available in digital formats at the time of the copying.”

The Office notes that the NEL is available to the public for free such that Archive’s use is noncommercial. However, it emphasizes that Archive’s stated purpose of promoting scholarship and education “alone does not establish fair use.” Indeed, the Office points out that “at least some” of the 1.4 million works, such as “Stephen King thrillers and joke books,” are “likely to be accessed for entertainment rather than educational purposes.” Even for the educational books that are not available in digital formats, the Office explains that the noncommercial purpose must be weighed against “the non-transformative nature of the use.” Given that educational works are “originally intended to educate,” Archive’s use of these works “is not transformative.” And given that Archive does not provide “search functionality,” it does not fit within the “digitization cases” that were “deemed transformative,” such as Google Books and HathiTrust.

On the second factor, the Office cites Campbell v. Acuff-Rose for the proposition that “some works are closer to the core of intended copyright protection than others” and Harper & Row v. Nation for the point that the “law generally recognizes a greater need to disseminate factual works than works of fiction or fantasy.” The Office also notes that there may be “more justification” for reproducing previously published works that are “currently unavailable in the marketplace.” Nevertheless, it explains that the existence of organizations to provide copies of such works is relevant to this factor, and it mentions that the case law on a “work’s print status under the second factor is mixed.”

Applying this to the NEL, the Office clarifies that the analysis of the second factor is necessarily “fact-specific” and that each work or category of works “would need to be evaluated independently.” For example, “creative works” would be analyzed differently than “factual or informational works.” And while the unavailability of certain works might favor fair use “in some circumstances,” the Office notes that this does not appear to have been Archive’s focus. Archive instead focused on whether the books were available in digital form, making no “mention of the works’ overall availability.”

The key to the third factor, the Office explains, is “whether the secondary use employs more of the copyrighted work than is necessary, and whether the copying was excessive in relation to any valid purposes asserted under the first factor.” Moreover, while “copying an entire work often weighs against a finding of fair use,” the factor “would not weigh against a finding of fair use” if “it were necessary to copy the entire copyrighted work to achieve the purpose of the secondary use.”

The Office notes that the CDL White Paper, upon which Archive relies, “argues that it is necessary to copy the entire book to achieve the purpose of providing digital access to the work, such that the copying is not excessive in relation to the library’s purpose.” The CDL White Paper also argues that “the library prevents users from making additional copies of or further distributing the book and limits the duration for which a user can access a book.” In response, the Office points out that the courts in Google Books and HathiTrust “emphasized that the defendants had not made the full text of the copied works visible to the public” and how the Office itself (see here, here, and here) has “consistently expressed doubt that providing digital access to complete works can be considered a fair use.”

Quoting Harper & Row, the Office notes that the fourth factor, which is “undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use,” turns on “whether widespread conduct similar to the conduct of the alleged infringer ‘would adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work.’” The Office explains that, under Google Books and HathiTrust, the third and fourth factors are linked: “the risk that the digitized version will serve as a market substitute for the original work increases as the amount of the work that is made accessible to the public increases.” In both of those cases, the copying of entire works was permissible because it enabled transformative search functionality without serving as a market substitute by making the entire works available.

Turning to the NEL, the Office acknowledges a “disagreement among stakeholders over whether the analysis of market harm under the fourth fair use factor should consider the Internet Archive’s activities as roughly analogous to physical lending by libraries, or whether the markets for physical lending and ebook licensing to libraries are distinct.” The Office points out that no court has embraced the former approach and that “the Second Circuit squarely rejected it” in Capitol Records v. ReDigi. Moreover, the Office cites its own report noting that there are “significant differences” between lending physical copies and digital ones. And it points out that the NEL “lacks the controls cited by the CDL White Paper as necessary to mitigating market harm” since it allows “an unlimited number of users to borrow any given title simultaneously.”

On the latter approach, which holds that the market for ebook licensing is distinct from that of physical lending, the Office states that there is already “an established market” where “publishers and authors license their works to libraries for the purpose of digitally ‘lending’ them to patrons.” The fourth factor analysis here “might focus on whether the creation and distribution of digital versions of these works would affect this market, and also how, if such conduct became widespread, it would affect this market.” If digital versions of some works were not available in the marketplace, the Office concludes, “this factor might favor fair use for some, but not necessarily all, of the works contained in the National Emergency Library.”

The Office also examines how “exigent circumstances” related to the pandemic may factor into a fair use analysis. The Office notes that there “is undoubtedly a strong public interest in ensuring continued access to educational materials in this unprecedented time, which could weigh in favor of fair use.” However, while Archive’s goal “may be laudable, so is respect for copyright.” The Office states that it “would be imprudent to excuse widespread copying due to a national emergency without considering the possible repercussions on copyright law and copyright owners” since there “is also a strong public interest in ensuring that authors are able to financially survive the coronavirus crisis to be able to continue to produce creative works.” And it concludes by noting that a “court would almost certainly also take into account” Archive’s effect “on writers and publishers.”

Conclusion

The Copyright Office ultimately suggests that Archive may wish to “explore opportunities for collaboration with writers and publishers” such as by “allowing them to opt into making digital versions of their works publicly available.” While the Office never explicitly says that any particular work is being infringed, its analysis does indicate that, in its opinion, Archive cannot claim that it is engaging in fair use for all of the works made available with its National Emergency Library. Furthermore, the Office explains why other statutory limitations, such as the first sale doctrine under Section 109, would not apply to Archive’s activities. All in all, it seems clear that the Office is quite skeptical of the NEL’s legality under the fair use doctrine. Though, it remains to be seen whether the Southern District of New York will agree with the Office’s analysis.