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Copyright

Copyright Notebook: The Importance of Artists’ Agency

the word "copyright" typed on a typewriterI am looking forward to hosting a keynote conversation with Grammy-winning composer, performer, songwriter, best-selling author, and essayist Rosanne Cash this week at CPIP’s The Evolving Music Ecosystem conference. One part of Rosanne Cash’s “music ecosystem” is the Artist Rights Alliance (ARA), where she serves as a member of the board. Preparing for that conversation, I am thinking a lot about the importance of artists’ agency. Over the summer, the ARA “rebooted,” relaunching itself with a powerhouse music council of artists and experts. The ARA is “an alliance of working musicians, performers, and songwriters fighting for a healthy creative economy and fair treatment for all creators in the digital world. [They] work to defend and protect artists, guided by [their] Artists’ Bill of Rights, which outlines fundamental principles for today’s music economy.”

Those principles:

The Right to Control Our Work
The Right to Economic and Artistic Freedom
The Right to Attribution and Acknowledgment
The Right to a Music Community
The Right to Competitive Platforms
The Right to Information and Platform Transparency
The Right to Political Participation

 

All share one core attribute—an artist’s agency—over their work, their livelihood, their community, themselves. That the ARA found it necessary to relaunch this summer is not surprising. The triple threat of a pandemic decimating artists’ livelihoods, the surging power of technology platforms, and the challenges of ensuring one’s work is not distorted by others or used to send disagreeable political messages has heightened awareness among artists about the issues for which ARA stands.

Several notable lawsuits have also brought these issues to the forefront this summer that may shape the nature of artists’ agency over their work for years to come. Here are some thoughts about why they are significant and some issues you may not have noticed.

Hachette Book Group et al. v. Internet Archive

On June 1, 2020, four of the world’s preeminent publishing houses sued Internet Archive (IA) for willful mass copyright infringement. The IA styles itself an online library, open to anyone to borrow books, music, and other works. It scans millions of copyrighted as well as public domain works and makes them available to “borrowers” for free. It had previously operated under an already controversial policy of “controlled digital lending” (more on that below), but in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, dropped even these minimal restrictions on its distribution of works. As the Authors Guild put it in an open letter to the IA:

[B]y declaring a spurious “copyright emergency” and making a massive trove of copyrighted books available for free without any restrictions, Internet Archive has demonstrated a shocking disrespect for the rule of law—the cornerstone of our civil, democratic society—at a time when we most need it to prevail. You cloak your illegal scanning and distribution of books behind the pretense of magnanimously giving people access to them. But giving away what is not yours is simply stealing, and there is nothing magnanimous about that. Authors and publishers—the rights owners who legally can give their books away—are already working to provide electronic access to books to libraries and the people who need them. We do not need Internet Archive to give our works away for us.

 

In their complaint, the publishers argue that IA’s assertion that it should not be liable for infringement is based on “an invented theory called ‘Controlled Digital Lending’ (‘CDL’)—the rules of which have been concocted from whole cloth and continue to get worse.” As the complaint sets forth:

[A]t first, under this theory IA claimed to limit the number of scanned copies of a title available for free download at any one time to the number of print books of that title in its collection—though no provision under copyright law offers a colorable defense to the systematic copying and distribution of digital book files simply because the actor collects corresponding physical copies. Then, in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, IA opportunistically seized upon the global health crisis to further enlarge its cause, announcing with great fanfare that it would remove these already deficient limitations that were purportedly in place. Today, IA offers an enormous universe of scanned books to an unlimited number of individuals simultaneously in its “National Emergency Library.” IA’s blatant, willful infringement is all the more egregious for its timing, which comes at the very moment that many authors, publishers, and independent bookstores, not to mention libraries, are both struggling to survive amidst economic uncertainty, and planning deliberatively for future, changing markets.

 

The publishers’ lawsuit is important because it is the first “live” judicial challenge to the legal theory of “controlled digital lending”—a legal theory which was announced by certain academics and internet advocates in 2018. They argue that it should be fair use for libraries to scan or obtain scans of physical books they own and lend them electronically, provided certain restrictions are applied, such as limitations that attempt to emulate the limitations of lending in the physical world (e.g., limits on lending periods and on numbers of copies that can be loaned at a given time).

I refer to this as the first “live” judicial challenge because, while it is the first time CDL has been challenged in the courts, the supporters of CDL sought and failed to receive the blessing of the Second Circuit for IA’s original Open Library service when that court was reviewing the decision in Capitol Records v ReDigi. Unsurprisingly, the court declined to do so. In an opinion written by Judge Leval, the Second Circuit rejected ReDigi’s and its amici’s fair use argument because market harm would be likely since the sales of ReDigi’s digital files would compete directly with those of Capitol Records. Because “used” digital files do not deteriorate like used physical media, there would be no reason for customers to buy new licenses from Capitol Records if they could obtain the files from ReDigi at a lower price.

One imagines that the impact of free CDL on e-book sales would only be worse—first, because it is free, rather than merely a reduced price for “used” files, and second, because it would be usurping a valuable market authors and publishers have continued to actively develop and license for several years since the ReDigi decision. This includes licensing to libraries for free lending via services like OverDrive. It is likewise significant that the “Emergency Library” at issue in the publishers’ case against IA is far less restricted than the version of IA’s “Open Library” the amici sought and failed to have blessed by the Second Circuit in ReDigi.

Maria Schneider et. al. v. YouTube

Another case to watch is the class action lawsuit filed by composer and jazz performer Maria Schneider against YouTube and its parent companies Google and Alphabet in July. The lawsuit alleges that “YouTube has facilitated and induced [a] hotbed of copyright infringement [on its website] through its development and implementation of a copyright enforcement system that protects only the most powerful copyright owners such as major studios and record labels.” Because members of the class are denied access to the copyright management tool YouTube offers its corporate partners—Content ID—the lawsuit alleges that rather than preventing repeat infringements of works, the tool “actually insulates the vast majority of known and repeated copyright infringers from YouTube’s repeat infringer policy, thereby encouraging its users’ continuing upload of infringing content.”

This is all part of a deliberate strategy, according to the complaint:

Defendants Alphabet, Google, and YouTube reap billions of dollars annually from the online hosting of videos, including millions of works that infringe on the exclusive copyrights of Plaintiffs and the Class. Defendants permit and facilitate this infringement because it furthers their growth and revenue strategies and because they have determined that Plaintiffs and the Class—unlike YouTube’s preferred Content ID partners—lack the resources and leverage necessary to combat copyright infringement on the scale at which it is perpetuated on YouTube.

 

Maria Schneider argues many of the same things she and other artist advocates have asserted before Congress, the U.S. Copyright Office, and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office in hearings and roundtable proceedings exploring the provisions of Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA):

Faced with litigation by major music studios and other significant rights holders, Defendants have crafted distinct and disparate systems of copyright “enforcement” on their platform. For those entities with vast stores of copyright material and thus the leverage to require Defendants to appease their copyright management concerns, YouTube created its Content ID program, which allows qualifying copyright owners automatically to identify and manage their content on YouTube. . . . Smaller rights holders, including [Schneider], are, however, denied access to Content ID and thus are relegated to vastly inferior and time-consuming means of trying to police and manage their copyrights such as scanning the entirety of YouTube postings, searching for keywords, titles, and other potential identifiers.

 

They must then send notices identifying infringements URL by URL, filling out cumbersome webforms, often laden with advertising, struggle with captcha codes, and contend with requests for additional information or challenges from employees reviewing the requests.

While many artists have neither the pocketbook nor the backbone to stand up to an adversary like YouTube in federal court, this lawsuit seems particularly well-timed given that the ongoing focus on Section 512 in multiple government venues over the past decade has developed a solid record articulating the scope and the magnitude of the problem, as well as that the complaints against YouTube and other web platforms by individual artists seem to be almost universally shared.

Regardless of Maria Schneider’s lawsuit, the Senate and the U.S. Copyright Office are not done considering the issue. The Copyright Office released its much-anticipated Section 512 Report earlier this May and engaged in a subsequent exchange of letters with Senators Thom Tillis and Patrick Leahy regarding additional statutory clarifications that the Senate might consider and other approaches that could improve the operation of the DMCA without legislative amendment. Among the issues addressed in that letter is a request from the Senators to the Copyright Office to conduct stakeholder meetings to identify and adopt standard technical measures (STMs) as was anticipated in Section 512(i) of the DMCA. It is notable that Maria Schneider has herself been an active participant in the Copyright Office’s Section 512 proceedings, and in February of 2017, she submitted comments to the Copyright Office urging that Content ID be recognized as a STM under the DMCA and that all creators be granted access to it in order to be able to more efficiently police YouTube’s platform. The Copyright Office did not take up her suggestion.

In answer to the Tillis/Leahy request, on June 29, 2020, the Copyright Office responded in part that it will convene virtual meetings in late summer/early fall “focused on identifying any potential obstacles to the identification of potential STMs, as well as the requirements that must be met in order to adopt and implement an STM,” and to “begin identifying the kinds of technologies that may meet the statutory definition. Once the bounds of potential qualifying technologies have been identified, the Office would then convene further discussion to evaluate whether individual technologies meet the other requirements of section 512(i), including discussions to learn more about the terms upon which the technologies are offered in the marketplace.”

To date, hypothetical discussions (as well as lawsuits and licensing) have focused on digital fingerprinting technologies. Such technologies are designed to identify content by taking a “fingerprint” of a file that is being or has been uploaded to a platform and matching it to a database of sample content submitted by copyright owners. Regardless of the technology identified as an STM, the challenge may come not from choosing the technology, but rather in applying it. What one copyright owner is willing to tolerate in the name of marketing and fan word of mouth, another will not be. What a technology platform may set the technology to overlook, a filmmaker on the eve of a festival premiere will consider a “match.” Hence the importance of artists’ agency. Or as the ARA would have it: the right to competitive platforms and the right to information and platform transparency. Unless artists are informed about the STMs platforms apply and how they apply them, and unless they have the ability to keep their work from platforms that don’t meet their requirements, identifying an STM on its own won’t make much of a difference. Without artists’ agency and the right to control what happens to their creative output, we may just have the digital fingerprint version of the notice-and-takedown “whack-a-mole” game.[1]

Neil Young v. Donald J. Trump for President

Musicians have perpetually battled with political campaigns over the unauthorized use of their music at rallies and other campaign events. Given the particularly heated nature of this year’s presidential contest, it is perhaps not surprising that Neil Young has sued the Trump campaign for copyright infringement for publicly performing his musical works Rockin’ in the Free World and Devil’s Sidewalk at numerous campaign rallies and events, including one in Tulsa, Oklahoma. The complaint alleges: “The Campaign has willfully ignored Plaintiff’s telling it not to play the Songs and willfully proceeded to play the Songs despite its lack of a license and despite its knowledge that a license is required to do so.”

Neil Young is not the only musician battling the Trump campaign. Leonard Cohen’s estate is considering whether to file suit for the campaign’s use of Halleluiah during the last night of the Republican National Convention, and the Rolling Stones are working with ASCAP and BMI to persuade the Trump campaign to stop playing You Can’t Always Get What You Want at rallies. Campaigns typically assert that they are permitted to play any songs included in the Performing Rights Organizations’ political entities licenses, from which artists may seek to exclude their works if they object to use at political rallies. The allegations by Neil Young, the Cohen estate, and the Stones seem to be that the particular uses by the Trump campaign have gone beyond what a venue license for a political gathering envisions and that the campaign is instead using the songs to either distort their meaning or suggest an endorsement by the artist.

As the members of the Artist Rights Alliance wrote to all of the Republican and Democratic National Campaign Committees this July: “Like all other citizens, artists have the fundamental right to control their work and make free choices regarding their political expression and participation. Using their work for political purposes without their consent fundamentally breaches those rights—an invasion of the most hallowed, even sacred personal interests.”

These lawsuits are interesting because, until now, due to a combination of the veneer of protection offered by the venue licenses, and the time constraints imposed by campaign season, the only viable mechanism for discouraging unwanted uses of an artist’s work by a campaign has been public shaming via social media or statements by the artist publicly disowning and rejecting the candidate. Consequently, neither the moral rights or right of publicity-like qualities of the complaints nor the availability of damages for the infringing use have been explored. Since the Trump campaign is unlikely to settle a lawsuit, this case may define the boundaries of political entities licensed uses or add a new tool to musicians’ arsenals in ensuring they are not unwillingly conscripted into the service of a campaign they do not support.

RIP Matt Herron[2]

A civil rights era photographer I admired and came to know when I was CEO of the Copyright Alliance—Matt Herron—recently passed. Matt was inspiring on many levels. He described himself as an “activist with a camera,” and he covered some of the most meaningful moments in the effort to gain voting rights for Black people in the 1960s—including the Selma to Montgomery march.

“I photograph things I believe in. I try to photograph the things that are important in my life,” said Herron during a panel I moderated in 2011. He felt so strongly about what he saw happening in the 1960s south that he picked up his family and moved from Philadelphia to Mississippi because he thought they could be more relevant there. In doing so, through his photographs, he gave countless generations a front row seat to history. He described the five days he spent documenting the march from Selma to Montgomery:

As photographers, we are mostly voyeurs. We stand a little bit aside from an event. Part of our mind is clicking through F Stops and the rest of it is trying to figure out where images and angles are. But sometimes something happens that sucks us in and we lose that voyeuristic element and become part of the event itself. Certainly for me, the Selma March—five  days of walking in rain and sunshine and all kinds of conditions—was one of those moments. I have no memory of where I slept, what I ate, how I handled any of my basic physical problems. All I remember is the camera, the walking, and the faces.

 

Matt Herron lived by the copyright of his photographs and used them to further education about the social causes he covered. Besides the Selma march, he shot whaling protests by Greenpeace and the AIDS quilt. He explained that copyright laws help him keep collections of his images together and allow him to present them for the benefit of the causes covered:

I’ve put some effort into making not just single photographs but collections. I have historical collections and copyright allows me to decide how these images will be presented and how these historical moments can be disseminated. If I didn’t own the copyright some of these pictures of Martin Luther King might be used to advertise shoes. As it is, I can disseminate these images in ways that add to our national heritage, in educational ways for school children and to preserve a piece of history. Copyright allows me to retain this control not so I can keep them to myself but present them to the world in a way that’s coherent.

 

Matt Herron’s lifetime of work demonstrates in a way that is perhaps clearer this summer than any in recent memory why ensuring that artists are guaranteed agency over their creative output—whether they be photographers chronicling our history, musicians expressing our yearning, or authors giving words to our conscience—is crucial to democracy.

[1] Although it is approximately a decade old, this article, The (Im)possibility of “Standard Technical Measures” for UGC Websites, written by then student, now partner at Wilson Sonsini, Lauren Gallo, is the most thorough, balanced, and articulate examination of the issues the USCO is undertaking to date. Gallo notes that already in 2011 when her note was published, rights owners and UGC service providers were deploying fingerprinting technology to protect copyrighted works on the internet and operate repeat infringer policies. She writes: “In light of the widespread use of this successful technology and Congress’ mandate that ‘standard technical measures’ be developed ‘expeditiously,’ individual or infrequent holdouts should not obstruct the consensus necessary to define the term. . . . [F]ingerprinting technology should qualify as ‘standard technical measures’ under section 512(i), so that right holders and service providers may be on notice of their statutory obligations and may continue to develop ‘best practice’ applications for that technology.”

Ms. Gallo’s current practice focuses on novel legal questions online, involving among other issues, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, and she has represented Google and YouTube in cases challenging their decisions regarding whether or not to remove or limit access to online content.

[2] Portions of this section appeared as a blog post in June of 2011 on the Copyright Alliance website, when I was CEO of that organization.

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Copyright Internet Uncategorized

Attacking the Notice-and-Staydown Straw Man

Ever since the U.S. Copyright Office announced its study of the DMCA last December, the notice-and-staydown issue has become a particularly hot topic. Critics of notice-and-staydown have turned up the volume, repeating the same vague assertions about freedom, censorship, innovation, and creativity that routinely pop up whenever someone proposes practical solutions to curb online infringement. Worse still, many critics don’t even take the time to look at what proponents of notice-and-staydown are suggesting, choosing instead to knock down an extremist straw man that doesn’t reflect anyone’s view of how the internet should function. A closer look at what proponents of notice-and-staydown are actually proposing reveals that the two sides aren’t nearly as far apart as critics would have us believe. This is particularly true when it comes to the issue of how well notice-and-staydown would accommodate fair use.

For example, Joshua Lamel’s recent piece at The Huffington Post claims that “innovation and creativity are still under attack” by the “entertainment industry’s intense and well-financed lobbying campaign” pushing for notice-and-staydown. Lamel argues that the “content filtering proposed by advocates of a ‘notice and staydown’ system . . . would severely limit new and emerging forms of creativity.” And his parade of horribles is rather dramatic: “Parents can forget posting videos of their kids dancing to music and candidates would not be able to post campaign speeches because of the music that plays in the background. Remix culture and fan fiction would likely disappear from our creative discourse.” Scary stuff, if true. But Lamel fails to cite a single source showing that artists, creators, and other proponents of notice-and-staydown are asking for anything close to this.

Similarly, Elliot Harmon of the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) argues that “a few powerful lobbyists” are pushing for notice-and-staydown such that “once a takedown notice goes uncontested, the platform should have to filter and block any future uploads of the same allegedly infringing content.” Harmon also assumes the worst: “Under the filter-everything approach, legitimate uses of works wouldn’t get the reasonable consideration they deserve,” and “computers would still not be able to consider a work’s fair use status.” Like Lamel, Harmon claims that “certain powerful content owners seek to brush aside the importance of fair use,” but he doesn’t actually mention what these supposed evildoers have to say about notice-and-staydown.

Harmon’s suggestion that the reliance on uncontested takedown notices gives inadequate consideration to fair use is particularly strange as it directly contradicts the position taken by the EFF. Back in October of 2007, copyright owners (including CBS and Fox) and service providers (including Myspace and Veoh) promulgated a list of Principles for User Generated Content Services. These Principles recommend that service providers should use fingerprinting technology to enact notice-and-staydown, with the general caveat that fair use should be accommodated. Two weeks later, the EFF published its own list of Fair Use Principles for User Generated Video Content suggesting in detail how notice-and-staydown should respect fair use.

The EFF’s Fair Use Principles include the following:

The use of “filtering” technology should not be used to automatically remove, prevent the uploading of, or block access to content unless the filtering mechanism is able to verify that the content has previously been removed pursuant to an undisputed DMCA takedown notice or that there are “three strikes” against it:

1. the video track matches the video track of a copyrighted work submitted by a content owner;
2. the audio track matches the audio track of that same copyrighted work; and
3. nearly the entirety (e.g., 90% or more) of the challenged content is comprised of a single copyrighted work (i.e., a “ratio test”).

If filtering technologies are not reliably able to establish these “three strikes,” further human review by the content owner should be required before content is taken down or blocked.

Though not explicitly endorsing notice-and-staydown, the EFF thinks it’s entirely consistent with fair use so long as (1) the content at issue has already been subject to one uncontested takedown notice, or (2) the content at issue is at least a 90% match to a copyrighted work. And the funny thing is that supporters of notice-and-staydown today are actually advocating for what the EFF recognized to be reasonable over eight years ago.

While Harmon never explicitly identifies the “powerful lobbyists” he accuses of wanting to trample on fair use, he does link to the Copyright Office’s recently-announced study of the DMCA and suggest that they can be found there. Reading through that announcement, I can only find three citations (in footnote 36) to people advocating for notice-and-staydown: (1) Professor Sean O’Connor of the University of Washington School of Law (and Senior Scholar at CPIP), (2) Paul Doda, Global Litigation Counsel at Elsevier, and (3) Maria Schneider, composer/conductor/producer. These three cites all point to testimonies given at the Section 512 of Title 17 hearing before the House Judiciary Committee in March of 2014, and they show that Harmon is attacking a straw man. In fact, all three of these advocates for notice-and-staydown seek a system that is entirely consistent with the EFF’s own Fair Use Principles.

Sean O’Connor seeks notice-and-staydown only for “reposted works,” that is, “ones that have already been taken down on notice” and that are “simply the original work reposted repeatedly by unauthorized persons.” His proposal only applies to works that “do not even purport to be transformative or non-infringing,” and he specifically excludes “mash-ups, remixes, covers, etc.” This not only comports with the EFF’s recommendations, it goes beyond them. Where the EFF would require either a previously uncontested notice or at least a 90% match, O’Connor thinks there should be both an uncontested notice and a 100% match.

The same is true for Paul Doda of Elsevier, who testifies that fingerprinting technology is “an appropriate and effective method to ensure that only copies that are complete or a substantially complete copy of a copyrighted work are prevented or removed by sites.” Doda explicitly notes that filtering is not suitable for “works that might require more detailed infringement analysis or ‘Fair Use’ analysis,” and he praises YouTube’s Content ID system “that can readily distinguish between complete copies of works and partial copies or clips.” Doda’s vision of notice-and-staydown is also more protective of fair use than the EFF’s Fair Use Principles. While the EFF suggests that a previously uncontested notice is sufficient, Doda instead only suggests that there be a substantial match.

Unlike O’Connor and Doda, Maria Schneider is not a lawyer. She’s instead a working musician, and her testimony reflects her own frustrations with the whack-a-mole problem under the DMCA’s current notice-and-takedown regime. As a solution, Schneider proposes that creators “should be able to prevent unauthorized uploading before infringement occurs,” and she points to YouTube’s Content ID as evidence that “it’s technically possible for companies to block unauthorized works.” While she doesn’t explicitly propose that there be a substantial match before content is filtered, Schneider gives the example of her “most recent album” being available “on numerous file sharing websites.” In other words, she’s concerned about verbatim copies of her works that aren’t possibly fair use, and nothing Schneider recommends contradicts the EFF’s own suggestions for accommodating fair use.

Lamel and Harmon paint a picture of powerful industry lobbyist boogeymen seeking an onerous system of notice-and-staydown that fails to adequately account for fair use, but neither produces any evidence to support their claims. Responses to the Copyright Office’s DMCA study are due on March 21st, and it will be interesting to see whether any of these supposed boogeymen really show up. There’s little doubt, though, that critics will continue attacking the notice-and-staydown straw man. And it’s really a shame, because advocates of notice-and-staydown are quite conscious of the importance of protecting fair use. This is easy to see, but first you have to look at what they’re really saying.

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Copyright Innovation Internet Uncategorized

Notice-and-Staydown and Google Search: The Whack-A-Mole Problem Continues Unabated

After my last post discussing the necessity for notice-and-staydown to help copyright owners with the never-ending game of whack-a-mole under the DMCA, I was asked to clarify how this would work for Google Search in particular. The purpose of my post was to express the need for something better and the hope that fingerprinting technologies offer. But, admittedly, I did not do a good job of separating out how notice-and-staydown would work for hosting platforms as compared to search engines. I think the whack-a-mole problem with hosting sites is indeed different than with search engines, and while fingerprinting may work well for the former, it’s probably ill-suited for the latter.

It’s clear enough how fingerprinting technologies can be applied to hosting platforms, and the simple fact is that they are already being deployed. YouTube uses its own proprietary technology, Content ID, while other platforms, such as Facebook and SoundCloud, use Audible Magic. These technologies create digital fingerprints of content that are then compared to user-uploaded content. When there’s a match, the copyright owner can choose to either allow, track, mute, monetize, or block the uploaded content.

There isn’t a lot of publicly-available information about how accurate these fingerprinting technologies are or how widely copyright owners utilize them. We do know from Google’s Katherine Oyama, who testified to Congress in early 2014, that “more than 4,000 partners” used Content ID at the time and that copyright owners had “‘claimed’ more than 200 million videos on YouTube” with the technology. She also acknowledged that “Content ID is not perfect, sometimes mistakenly ascribing ownership to the wrong content and sometimes failing to detect a match in a video.” Despite these imperfections, the scale of which she didn’t spell out, YouTube continues to offer Content ID to copyright owners.

Oyama also indicated that Content ID does not “work for a service provider that offers information location tools (like search engines and social networks) but does not possess copies of all the audio and video files that it links to.” This scenario is clearly different. When a site hosts content uploaded by its users, it can easily match those uploads to the content it’s already fingerprinted. When a site links to content that’s hosted elsewhere, it may not be possible to analyze that content in the same way. For example, the linked-to site could simply prevent automated crawling. Of course, not all sites block such crawling, but more would probably start doing so if fingerprinting were used in this way.

For Google Search, notice-and-staydown would likely not depend upon fingerprinting technology. Instead, the changes would come from: (1) delisting rogue sites, (2) promoting legitimate content, (3) improving auto-complete, and (4) ceasing to link to the very links that have already been taken down. These suggestions are not anything new, but it’s clear that Google has not done all it can to make them effective. This is not to say that improvements haven’t been made, and Google is to be commended for the work that it’s done so far. But it can and should do more.

Sticking with the example of The Hateful Eight from my prior post, it’s easy to see how Google Search promotes piracy. Using a fresh installation of Chrome so as not to skew the results, I need only type “watch hat” into Google Search before its auto-complete first suggests I search for “watch hateful 8 online.” After following this suggestion, the first seven results are links to obviously-infringing copies of the film. The first link points to the film at the watchmovie.ms site. A quick glance at that site’s homepage shows that it offers numerous (if not only) films that are still in theaters, including Spectre, Star Wars: The Force Awakens, Creed, and The Hateful Eight. In other words, Google’s first search result from its first suggested search term points me to an illicit copy of the film on a site that’s obviously dedicated to infringement.

I’ve never heard of watchmovie.ms, so I checked its WHOIS data. The site was registered on October 14th of last year, and Google’s Transparency Report indicates that it started receiving takedown notices for it just a few days later. To date, Google has received 568 requests to remove 724 infringing links to watchmovie.ms, but its search engine dutifully continues to crawl and index “about 39,000 results” at the site. And, for reasons I simply cannot fathom, Google prefers to send me to that pirate site rather than point me to Google Play (or to any number of other sites) where I can pre-order the film and “watch hateful 8 online” legally.

Making matters worse, at the bottom of the first page of search results for “watch hateful 8 online,” Google links to four DMCA takedown notices it received from copyright owners that resulted in five links being removed from the first page of results. These four notices, in turn, contain a combined total of 499 illicit links to The Hateful Eight that Google has already taken down. This truly boggles the mind. Google takes down five infringing links from one page of search results, consistent with the DMCA, but then it links to those five links along with 494 more such links. And these linked-to links are even better for infringers, since they’ve been vetted by Google as being worthy of taking down.

As the producer of The Hateful Eight, Richard Gladstein, relayed to The Hollywood Reporter, Google told him that it is “not in a position to decide what is legal and what is illegal online.” This is a cop out. In other venues, Google contends that it’s doing a lot to fight piracy. It submitted comments to the U.S. Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator this past October explaining how “changes made to [its] algorithm have been highly effective in demoting sites receiving a high number of takedown notices.” This shows that it is indeed in a position to determine what is “illegal online” and to take action against pirate sites. But simply demoting these sites is not enough—they should be delisted altogether.

Everyone knows that The Pirate Bay is a pirate site, yet Google indexes “about 914,000 results” from just one of its domains. As of today, Google has received 187,540 requests to remove 3,628,242 links to that domain, yet Google doesn’t choose to delist the site from its results. Nor does it even appear to be demoting it. The top three search results for “thepiratebay hateful 8” are links to infringing copies of the film on The Pirate Bay. It’s clear that these links are infringing, yet Google makes copyright owners continue playing whack-a-mole for even the most obvious infringements.

This isn’t how the DMCA is supposed to work. Congress even envisioned this whack-a-mole scenario with search engines when it wrote the DMCA. The legislative history provides: “If, however, an Internet site is obviously pirate, then seeing it may be all that is needed for the service provider [i.e., search engine or other information location tool] to encounter a ‘red flag.’ A provider proceeding in the face of such a ‘red flag’ must do so without the benefit of a safe harbor.” The Pirate Bay is “obviously pirate,” and Google knows as much even without the 3.6 million takedown notices it’s received. It knows the same thing about lots of pirate sites, including the other domain names contained in its list of greatest hits.

Google could be doing more to help copyright owners with the whack-a-mole problem, but so far, it’s only taken a few baby steps. And when defending its refusal to delist obvious pirate sites, Google contends that it’s defending freedom of speech:

[W]hole-site removal sends the wrong message to other countries by favoring over-inclusive private censorship over the rule of law. If the U.S. embraces such an overbroad approach to address domestic law violations (e.g., copyright), it will embolden other countries to seek similar whole-site removal remedies for violations of their laws (e.g., insults to the king, dissident political speech). This would jeopardize free speech principles, emerging services, and the free flow of information online globally and in contexts far removed from copyright.

Delisting The Pirate Bay from Google Search isn’t about favoring “censorship over the rule of law.” It’s about Google favoring the rule of law over blatant criminal infringement and doing its part to be a good citizen in the digital economy where it plays no small role. The comparison of the conduct of criminal infringers to the speech of political dissidents rings hollow, and delisting the most obvious and egregious sites does not threaten free speech. Google already claims to demote pirate sites, yet that doesn’t “jeopardize free speech principles.” Neither will delisting them. And as long as Google consciously decides to index known pirate sites with its search engine, the whack-a-mole problem will only continue unabated for copyright owners.

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Copyright Innovation Internet Uncategorized

Endless Whack-A-Mole: Why Notice-and-Staydown Just Makes Sense

Producer Richard Gladstein knows all about piracy. As he recently wrote for The Hollywood Reporter, his latest film, The Hateful Eight, was “viewed illegally in excess of 1.3 million times since its initial theatrical release on Christmas Day.” Gladstein is not shy about pointing fingers and naming names. He pins the blame, in no small part, on Google and (its subsidiary) YouTube—the “first and third most trafficked websites on the internet.” While acknowledging that fair use is important, Gladstein argues that it has become “an extremely useful tool for those looking to distract from or ignore the real copyright infringement issue: piracy.” His point is that it’s simply not fair use when someone uploads an entire copyrighted work to the internet, and claims that service providers can’t tell when something is infringing are disingenuous.

Gladstein questions why Google and YouTube pretend they are “unable to create and apply technical solutions to identify where illegal activity and copyright infringement are occurring and stop directing audiences toward them.” In his estimation, “Google and YouTube have the ability to create a vaccine that could eradicate the disease of content theft.” While Gladstein doesn’t mention the DMCA or its notice-and-takedown provisions specifically, I think what he has in mind is notice-and-staydown. That is, once a service provider is notified that the copyright owner has not authorized a given work to be uploaded to a given site, that service provider should not be able to maintain its safe harbor if it continues hosting or linking to the given work.

No small amount of ink has been spilled pointing out that the DMCA’s notice-and-takedown provisions have led to an endless game of whack-a-mole for copyright owners. Google’s own transparency report boasts how its search engine has received requests to take down over 63 million URLs in the past month alone. And it helpfully tells us that it’s received over 21 million such requests over the past four years for just one site: rapidgator.net. Google’s transparency doesn’t extend to how many times it’s been asked to remove the same work, nor does it tell us anything about takedown requests for YouTube. But there’s no reason to think those numbers aren’t equally as frustrating for copyright owners.

The question one should ask is why these numbers aren’t frustrating for Google and YouTube, as they have to deal with the deluge of notices. Apparently, they don’t mind at all. According to the testimony of Google’s Senior Copyright Policy Counsel, Katherine Oyama, the “DMCA’s shared responsibility approach works.” Oyama notes that Google has spent tens of millions of dollars creating the infrastructure necessary to efficiently respond to the increasing number of takedown notices it receives, but many (if not most) copyright owners don’t have those kinds of resources. For them, it’s daily battles of manually locating infringements across the entire internet and sending takedown notices. For Google, it’s mostly-automated responses to take down content that otherwise brings ad-based revenue.

These struggles hit individual authors and artists the hardest. As the U.S. Copyright Office noted in its recently-announced study of the DMCA, “[m]any smaller copyright owners . . . lack access to third-party services and sophisticated tools to monitor for infringing uses, which can be costly, and must instead rely on manual search and notification processes—an effort that has been likened to ‘trying to empty the ocean with a teaspoon.’” What makes the process so frustrating—and futile—is the fact that the same works get uploaded to the same platforms time and time again. And any time spent sending the same takedown notice to the same service provider is time that is not spent honing one’s craft and creating new works.

Gladstein is correct: Service providers like Google and YouTube could be doing more. And, somewhat ironically, doing more for copyright owners would actually mean that both sides end up doing less. The obvious solution to the whack-a-mole problem is notice-and-staydown—it just makes sense. There’s simply no reason why a copyright owner should have to keep telling a service provider the same thing over and over again.

Those who object to notice-and-staydown often point out that the DMCA process is susceptible to abuse. Indeed, there are some who send notices in bad faith, perhaps to silence unwanted criticism or commentary. But there’s no reason to think that such abuse is the rule and not the exception. Google’s own numbers show that it complied with 97% of notices in 2011 and 99% of notices in 2013. That’s still a potentially-significant amount of abuse from notice-senders, but it’s also certainly a ton of intentional abuse from infringers whose conduct generated the legitimate notices in the first place. And the vast majority of those infringers won’t get so much as a slap on the wrist.

Turning back to Gladstein’s theme, discussions about fair use or takedown abuse are beside the point. The simple fact is that garden-variety copyright infringement involves neither issue. As CPIP Senior Scholar Sean O’Connor testified to Congress, “for many artists and owners the majority of postings are simply straight-on non-transformative copies seeking to evade copyright.” It’s this simple piracy, where entire works are uploaded to the internet for all to take, that concerns copyright owners most. Gladstein cares about the 1.3 million illicit distributions and performances of The Hateful Eight that are obviously infringing, not the commentary of critics that would obviously be fair use. And takedown notices sent because of these illicit uploads are anything but abusive—the abusers are the infringers.

The technology to make notice-and-staydown work already exists. For example, Audible Magic and YouTube both have the technology to create digital fingerprints of copyrighted works. When users later upload these same works to the internet, the digital fingerprints can be matched so that the copyright owner can then control whether to allow, monetize, track, or block the upload altogether. This technology is a great start, but it’s only as good as its availability to copyright owners. The continued proliferation of infringing works on YouTube suggests that this technology isn’t being deployed properly. And Google has no comparable technology available for its search engine, leaving copyright owners with little choice but to continue playing endless whack-a-mole.

Fortunately, the tides have been turning, especially as the technology and content industries continue to merge. And strides are being made in the courts as well. For example, a Court of Appeal in Germany recently held that YouTube has the duty to both take down infringing content and to make sure that it stays down. A quick search of YouTube today shows that The Hateful Eight, which is still in theaters, is legitimately available for pre-order and is illicitly available to be streamed right now. One wonders why YouTube chooses to compete with itself, especially when it has the tool to prevent such unfair competition. Regardless, there is real hope that Gladstein’s call for a “vaccine that could eradicate the disease of content theft” will be just what the doctor ordered—and that “vaccine” is notice-and-staydown.

[Update: This post unintentionally generated confusion as to whether I think notice-and-staydown means that fingerprinting technologies should be used with search engines. I do not think that would work well. I explain how search engines could do more to help copyright owners with the whack-a-mole problem in this follow-up post.]