Tag: copyright

For You and Me or Private Property?: Evaluating the Copyright Claim in Woody Guthrie’s “This Land Is Your Land”

Post author By Joshua Grove
Post date April 25, 2023

By Jason Lee Guthrie

For the Center for Intellectual Property x Innovation Policy blog, in fulfillment of obligations for the Thomas Edison Innovation Law and Policy Fellowship

Al Aumuller, Woody Guthrie, half-length portrait, facing slightly left, holding guitar 1943

In early 1940, Woody Guthrie was on the road to New York City, and he was tired. Tired of traveling. Tired of the cold. Tired of having to hobo and hitchhike his way across America (again). He nearly froze to death in a Pennsylvania snowstorm along the way. He eventually made it to New York, though, alive but exhausted.

He was also tired of hearing Kate Smith’s patriotic anthem “God Bless America” on the radio. It had been an instant hit since its debut more than a year prior, but its ubiquity bothered Guthrie as did its use of religious imagery to inspire nationalist feeling. He was so tired of hearing it that when he finally got to New York he wrote his own song in response. Entitled “God Blessed America,” the song’s first three verses were an artistic rendering of his recent travels across “golden valleys” and “diamond deserts.” The fourth verse shifted somewhat in tone, though, and perhaps revealed something about Guthrie’s philosophical outlook:

Was a big high wall there / That tried to stop me
A sign was painted / Said: Private Property
But on the back side / It didn’t say nothing
God blessed America for me

“This Land” in Court

This song would eventually replace the line “God blessed America for me” with “This land was made for you and me” and change its title to “This Land Is Your Land.” The song’s development has been discussed in previous scholarship.[1] Here, I’ll focus on revisions only insofar as they relate to its copyright claim. The validity of this claim has received significant scholarly attention in recent years and even spilled over into public discourse as the copyright has been challenged in court. Research that I conducted while completing a Thomas Edison Innovation Law and Policy Fellowship revealed important details that can reframe scholarly discourse about the copyright in “This Land,” and may inform legal arguments if it is challenged again.[2]

As of this writing, the most recent litigation occurred in 2016 when the law firm of Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz filed a complaint on behalf of the band Satorii against The Richmond Organization (TRO), current publishers of “This Land” and other Guthrie works.[3] In 2015, the same firm successfully litigated a high profile case against Warner/Chappell Music, Inc. that established “Happy Birthday” in the public domain.[4] Buoyed by this success, the firm hoped to similarly invalidate the copyright claim in both “This Land” and the civil rights anthem “We Shall Overcome.”[5] While the cases involving “Happy Birthday” and “We Shall Overcome” were relatively clear-cut, the facts of the copyright claim in “This Land” are more complicated and warrant an in-depth look.

Writing – and Protecting – “This Land”

Having a song undergo several rounds of revision was a normal part of Guthrie’s creative process. Also common to Guthrie’s process was the practice of pairing original lyrics with an established melody.[6] “This Land” is an example of this practice as the melody line and chord progression are based on an old Carter Family song entitled “Little Darling, Pal of Mine,” which itself was based on a gospel hymn entitled “Oh My Loving Brother.”[7]

The original lyric sheet for “This Land” evidences its evolution as lines from the first draft are crossed out and replaced with new ones.[8] The earliest known recording of the song was made in the mid-1940s with producer Moe Asch, and by that time the references to “God Bless America” had been dropped.[9] It was recorded again in the late 1940s and a third time in 1951.[10] As initiates into the byzantine world of music copyright will know, however, copyright in these specific sound recordings is distinct from a copyright in the words and music of the song itself.

“This Land” debuted on the radio in the mid 1940s as merely one song in Guthrie’s vast repertoire. One of the ways that musical acts on the radio generated income at this time was to sell songbooks to listeners that contained the sheet music for tunes they heard on the air.[11] Guthrie had been creating such songbooks for years by this point, and in 1945 he created one that included “This Land” along with other titles. Mimeographed from a handmade manuscript and advertised at a selling price of 25 cents, this document included an explicit copyright claim on both its cover and first page.[12] Such a notice met the basic requirements for claiming copyright at the time. Moreover, Guthrie was generally aware of these requirements and had made efforts to comply with them before.[13]

Card Catalog Entry for Woody Guthrie, “This Land is Your Land,” March 30, 1956

Yet, “This Land” was not officially registered with the Copyright Office until 1956. By this time, Guthrie was profoundly debilitated by Huntington’s Disease. Management of his affairs was handled by his second wife, Marjorie Mazia Guthrie, and her designees. It is possible that when they submitted the application for copyright registration they were unaware of the songbook’s existence. In the mid-1950s, “This Land” was just beginning to achieve the popular recognition it would eventually enjoy, and a hastily drawn songbook he had made a decade prior would likely not even register on their radar as they worked to untangle the myriad contracts and assignments of rights Guthrie had signed since he arrive in New York.[14]

The question of the copyright claim’s legitimacy hangs on a comparative evaluation of the 1945 manuscript and the 1956 registration. Records in the archives of the Woody Guthrie Center demonstrate that the successive entities who managed the copyright, including TRO, believed the 1956 registration to be valid.[15] Yet, when the copyright was challenged in 2004, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) discovered the 1945 manuscript and positioned it as evidence of “first publication.”[16] That case, like the one in 2016, eventually settled without ruling on the validity of the copyright claim, but the question of first publication will be important if suit is filed again in the future. TRO correctly filed for an extension of the 1956 registration in the twenty eighth year timeframe required at the time (i.e. pre-1976 Copyright Act). If the copyright clock legally began with the publication of the 1945 manuscript, however, the extension window was missed and the song would have fallen into the public domain twenty eight years later in 1973.

Conclusion

Ultimately, if a ruling is made, it will come down to a judge’s decision on whether the 1945 manuscript should count as first publication. When I began this research, I had hoped to produce a definitive recommendation similar to what Robert Brauneis was able to do with his work on “Happy Birthday.”[17] While I am not able to say definitively whether or not the copyright claim in “This Land” is valid, I do believe the case for its validity is stronger than many previous commentators have suggested.

It does not take a professional musicologist to note several differences in the sheet music from 1945 and 1956. They are in different keys and different time signatures. The melodies notated are both recognizable as “This Land,” but they have differences that even an untrained ear can easily distinguish. There are differences in the lyrics as well. For example, the 1945 manuscript has “Canadian Mountain” in place of the more familiar “Redwood Forest” in the first verse, and that difference is just one of many. Even the title on the 1945 manuscript is simply “This Land” rather than the full “This Land Is Your Land.” These discrepancies suggest a strong case that the manuscript accompanying the 1956 registration can reasonably be considered an updated arrangement or version deserving of its own unique copyright. If a judge were to rule the 1956 registration valid, then the current copyright claim would stand as legitimate.

The stakes of “This Land”’s copyright legitimacy are not insignificant. Nora Guthrie, Woody’s daughter and President of Woody Guthrie Publications, has stated explicitly why the claim is still asserted: “Our control of this song has nothing to do with financial gain. . . . It has to do with protecting it from Donald Trump, protecting it from the Ku Klux Klan, protecting it from all the evil forces out there.”[18] In my research, I did not find any scholarship that advocated for “This Land” to become public domain that also seriously addressed the ramifications of that outcome. The copyright claim may be disputed, but it is the only thing currently keeping the song from being appropriated into any number of commercial or political purposes that would have been anathema to Guthrie. It would be ideal, perhaps, if there were a mechanism other than copyright to restrict harmful use of “This Land,” but absent such a mechanism copyright is, in this case, the only thing helping to prevent appropriation and commodification.

References

[1] Most biographies of Guthrie have a section that covers the composition of “This Land Is Your Land.” See Robert Santelli, This Land Is Your Land: Woody Guthrie and the Journey of an American Folk Song (Philadelphia: Running Press, 2012) for an accurate yet accessible narrative. See John Shaw, “The Textual History of ‘This Land Is Your Land” in This Land That I Love: Irving Berlin, Woody Guthrie, and the Story of Two American Anthems (New York: PublicAffairs, 2013), 211-218 for a more detailed analysis.

[2] Jason Lee Guthrie, “This Copyright Kills Fascists: Debunking the Mythology Surrounding Woody Guthrie, ‘This Land is Your Land,’ and the Public Domain,” Information & Culture 58, no. 1 (2023): 17-38.

[3] Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF No. 6, Saint-Amour et al v. The Richmond Organization, Inc. (TRO Inc.), June 15, 2016, (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (No. 16 Civ. 4464).

[4] Christine Mai-Duc, “All the ‘Happy Birthday’ song copyright claims are invalid, federal judge rules,” Los Angeles Times, September 22, 2015, https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-happy-birthday-song-lawsuit-decision-20150922-story.html.

[5] Niraj Chokshi, “Who Owns the Copyright to ‘This Land Is Your Land’? It May Be You and Me,” New York Times, June 17, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/18/business/media/this-guthrie-song-is-your-song-a-lawsuit-claims.html

[6] See, for example, Alonzo M. Zilch’s own Collection of Original Songs and Ballads (Songbook), April 1935, Item 87, Woody Guthrie Notebooks (Diaries), Woody Guthrie Center Archives, Tulsa, Oklahoma (hereafter WGC), Guthrie’s earliest known songbook, which included the quote: “At times I cannot decide on a tune to use with my words for a song. Woe is me! I am then forced to use some good old, family style tune that hath already gained a reputation as being liked by the people.”

[7] Ed Cray, Ramblin’ Man: The Life and Times of Woody Guthrie (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004), 165-166.

[8] https://www.rollingstone.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/This-Land-v1.jpg?w=1280

[9] Woody Guthrie, “This Land Is Your Land (Alternate Version),” c. mid-1940s, on Woody at 100: The Woody Guthrie Centennial Collection, Smithsonian Folkways, 2012.

[10] See Woody Guthrie, “This Land Is Your Land”, c. late-1940s, on This Land Is Your Land: The Asch Recordings, Vol. 1, Smithsonian Folkways, 1997; and Woody Guthrie, “This Land Is Your Land,” 1951, on This Land Is My Land: American Work Songs: Songs to Grow On, Vol. 3, Smithsonian Folkways Archival, 2007.

[11] Peter La Chapelle, I’d Fight the World: A Political History of Old-Time, Hillbilly, and Country Music (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2019), 165-166.

[12] “‘Ten Songs of Woody Guthrie’ 1945 Pamphlet,” Electronic Frontier Foundation, June 29, 2007, https://www.eff.org/document/ten-songs-woody-guthrie-1945-pamphlet.

[13] See, for example, Copyright Office to Woody Guthrie, September 22, 1937, Series 4, Box 6, Folder 3, Maxine Crissman “Woody and Lefty Lou” Radio Show Collection, WGC; and Copyright Office to Woody Guthrie, n.d., Series 4, Box 6, Folder 4, Maxine Crissman “Woody and Lefty Lou” Radio Show Collection, WGC.

[14] Joe Klein, Woody Guthrie: A Life, 2^nd ed. (New York: Random House, 1999), 430-432.

[15] See, for example, Harold Leventhal to Woody Guthrie, August 27, 1956, Series 2, Box 2, Folder 13, Woody Guthrie’s Correspondence Collection, WGC; Harold Leventhal to Cisco Houston, November 25, 1958, Series 3, Box 1, Folder 10, Harold Leventhal Collection, WGC; Al Brackman to Harold Leventhal, January 13, 1959, Series 1, Box 1, Folder 16, Harold Leventhal Collection, WGC; Jay Mark to Harold Leventhal, December 7, 1959, Series 3, Box 1, Folder 8, Harold Leventhal Collection, WGC; Al Brackman to Harold Leventhal, December 22, 1959, Series 1, Box 1, Folder 16, Harold Leventhal Collection, WGC; and Howard S. Richmond to Harold Leventhal, December 28, 1959, Series 3, Box 1, Folder 8, Harold Leventhal Collection, WGC.

[16] Fred von Lohmann, “This Song Belongs to you and Me,” Electronic Frontier Foundation, August 24, 2004, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2004/08/song-belongs-you-and-me; and Parker Higgins, “This Song (Still) Belongs to You and Me,” Electronic Frontier Foundation, February 2, 2015, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/02/song-still-belongs-you-and-me.

[17] Robert Brauneis, “Copyright and the World’s Most Popular Song,” Journal of the Copyright Society of the U.S.A 56, no. 2–3 (Winter-Spring 2009): 335–426.

[18] Ben Sisario, “A Fight to Make ‘We Shall Overcome’ and ‘This Land is Your Land’ Copyright Free,” New York Times, July 12, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/business/media/happy-birthday-is-free-at-last-how-about-we-shall-overcome.html. For an interesting account of the relationship between Woody Guthrie and Donald Trump’s father Fred, see Will Kaufman, “Woody Guthrie, ‘Old Man Trump’ and a real estate empire’s racist foundations,” The Conversation, January 21, 2016, https://theconversation.com/woody-guthrie-old-man-trump-and-a-real-estate-empires-racist-foundations-53026. For a recent example of appropriation, see Daniel Desrochers, “Woody Guthrie’s family to Josh Hawley: Stop using his lyrics, ‘insurrectionist’,” The Kansas City Star, March 13, 2023, https://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/article272998185.html.

Trump Interview Lawsuit Exposes Uncertainty in a Corner of Copyright Law

Post author By Joshua Grove
Post date April 19, 2023

Will Donald Trump’s lawsuit against Bob Woodward and publisher Simon & Schuster[1] finally resolve the question of who owns the copyright over interviews? While the complaint has other challenges, it calls out a surprisingly muddled and unresolved area of copyright law.

One might assume that the copyright ownership of interviews is a settled question. But two major questions have never been resolved:

1. Are interviewee’s responses to an interviewer’s questions copyrightable?
2. If they are, then who owns that copyright?

C-IP² 2022-2023 Edison Fellow Mary Catherine Amerine presciently identified and analyzed these issues in a 2017 article in the Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review.[2] We relied on her article and current expertise in producing this blog post.

Courts were considering the first question as early as the 1960s, when the estate of Ernest Hemingway claimed that Papa Hemingway, a book that included lengthy quotes from conversations between Hemingway and an interviewer, infringed the estate’s copyright over the interviews themselves.[3] The court ruled on an implied license theory and thus dodged the copyrightability of Hemingway’s conversational statement as captured in an audio recording. In dicta, the court speculated that an interviewee would need to make some clear statement bracketing parts of their extemporaneous responses to an interviewer’s questions “to mark off the utterance . . . from the ordinary stream of speech, . . . to adopt it as a unique statement and that he wished to exercise control over its publication.”[4]

A decade later, a different court employed different reasoning to rule against Jerry Falwell’s copyright infringement claims for republication of interviews in Penthouse Magazine.[5] Whereas the Hemingway dicta suggests that copyrightability turns on an objective manifestation by the interviewee that a particular oral statement has the requisite authorial intent and thus is not mere extemporizing, the Falwell holding turns on whether the content of the particular oral statement is “concrete” enough to indicate authorial intent.[6] This holding then curiously (albeit perhaps unintentionally) imports patent law’s exclusion of “abstract ideas” from patent eligibility into copyright law: “However different or unique plaintiff’s thoughts or opinions may be, the expression of those opinions or thoughts is too general and abstract to rise to the level of a literary or intellectual creation . . . .”[7]

Courts have followed this reasoning ever since, distinguishing off-the-cuff extemporizing typical of unrehearsed oral responses to media questions from the sort of carefully planned oral statements of executives of publicly traded companies on analysts’ earnings calls.[8] At the same time, some courts have upheld copyright in the interviewer for interview quotes as a compilation (which avoids ownership of individual quotations).[9]

While the exact contours of whether there is copyright in any particular interview source material are still not clear, the question of who holds that copyright, should it exist, is even less certain. Trump’s Complaint requests a declaratory judgment for his ownership of the entirety of the interview’s sound recordings,[10] audiobook, and all derivative works, or, in the alternative, “copyright in his responses . . . . ”[11] Trump’s ownership of the entire copyright in the interviews would be unprecedented; no court has held that an interviewee could own the copyright over an entire interview. But the question of ownership of the copyright to an interview—in whole or in part—turns on three other questions:

1. Can the interviewer seek to claim copyright of all contents of the interview on the theory that they directed and recorded the interview?
2. Can neither party own copyright to the other’s statements because they did not create or make them, and hence each owns only their own contribution (“divided copyright”)?
3. Should the entirety be viewed as a work of joint authorship by the interviewer and interviewee?

The court in Suid v. Newsweek Magazine, addressing a reporter’s attempt to claim the entirety of copyright in interviews he conducted, adopted “B” and divided copyright: “The author of a factual work may not, without an assignment of copyright, claim copyright in statements made by others and reported in the work because the author may not claim originality as to those statements.”[12] By contrast, the court in Foundation for Lost Boys v. Alcon Entertainment, LLC was inclined to adopt “C” when it held that interviewee plaintiffs had pled facts sufficient to support a finding of joint authorship with interviewer defendants. Ruling on defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court rejected the argument that plaintiffs’ interview responses were not copyrightable, as telling “personal stories in response to questions designed to elicit material” likely rose to the required level of creativity. Further, the court held that “[T]he interplays between prompts and responses in the Interviews necessarily merged the respective contributions of the [Plaintiffs and interviewers] into inseparable parts of a whole,” even though the refugees had not specifically asserted that they had intended to create a joint work.[13] However, the case settled, leaving the interview copyright ownership question unanswered.

A final wrinkle in interview copyright cases arises when the party asserting copyright does not have physical custody of the interview materials and so cannot register the copyright with the U.S Copyright Office. Parties in similar circumstances have attempted to skirt this issue by positioning their claims as declaratory judgment actions rather than directly claiming infringement, as copyright registration is a requirement for filing a copyright infringement lawsuit. These declaratory judgment actions have generally requested that the court grant an injunction requiring defendants to provide copies of the work in question to allow the plaintiffs to register their copyright. So far, courts have been divided on whether this strategy is a permissible circumvention of the copyright registration requirement.

In Johnson v. Magnolia Pictures LLC, the court granted a motion to dismiss by a producer who created a movie about comedian Gilda Radner based on recorded interviews found in an attic. The court ruled that a declaratory judgment is not an independent cause of action that could survive without the underlying copyright infringement claim, which was itself dismissed for lack of copyright registration.[14] Similarly, in Whistleblower Productions, LLC v. St8cked Media LLC, the court dismissed a copyright infringement case because even as plaintiff claiming ownership of the interview footage used to make a documentary, they did not possess the footage and hence had been unable to register the copyrights.[15] But in Lost Boys, the Sudanese refugees case, the court stated that if the refugees proved facts sufficient to show copyright infringement in a trial on the merits, then they would be entitled to an injunction compelling defendants to turn over the interview materials needed for the plaintiffs to register the copyrights.[16]

Trump’s lawsuit faces a similar registration challenge: the Complaint conspicuously fails to plead that Trump has a copyright registration. According to Trump’s attorney, he was unable to register the copyright because he does not have the interview tapes.[17] Thus, similar to the cases above, he does not plead copyright infringement directly, but instead seeks a declaratory judgment that he owns the interview copyright, in whole or in part. However, distinct from the above cases, Trump does not currently seek an injunction to obtain the interview materials copyright registration. Further, because Trump has filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida, where no local or circuit decisions bind the court on these issues, it is unclear whether the court will allow the suit to proceed as an action for declaratory judgment, or whether the lack of copyright registration will be fatal.

If Trump’s suit survives the likely motion to dismiss for lack of copyright registration, then the court would still need to decide whether to find no copyright, divided copyright, sole copyright owned by either Trump or Woodward (or Simon & Schuster), or joint authorship. Trump has already sought to reject the latter, pleading in the Complaint that “President Trump never sought to create a work of joint authorship, and in the hours of the Interviews, there is neither allusion to nor confirmation of such.”[18] The Lost Boys decision indicates that this lack of intent does not necessarily preclude joint authorship, as interview questions and responses may be “inseparable or interdependent parts” that create a “unitary whole.”[19] However, this is the only case that has directly addressed the possibility of joint authorship of an interview in these circumstances. It remains to be seen whether the court would find this reasoning persuasive or would return to earlier decisions to hold either that interview responses cannot be copyrighted at all, or that interview questions and responses are protected by two separate copyrights owned by the interviewer and interviewee, respectively.[20]

Regardless of the outcome of Trump’s case, this high-profile lawsuit has made it impossible to ignore the unsettled nature of a copyright question that has been long overlooked.

[1] Trump v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., Case No. 3:23-cv-02333-RV-ZCB (Dkt. 1, Complaint, Jan. 30, 2023).

[2] 21 Marq. Intell. Prop. Rev. 159 (2017) available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2878800. Drafts of the article won both AIPLA’s Robert C. Watson National Writing Award and the Virginia State Bar Intellectual Property Section’s Student Writing Competition. Amerine is currently an associate at Shearman & Sterling.

[3] Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250 (N.Y. 1968). While this and the Falwell case discussed below were brought under common-law copyright, the courts’ analyses are still relevant to the copyright of interviews under the Copyright Act of 1976.

[4] Id. at 256.

[5] Falwell v. Penthouse Intern., Ltd., 521 F. Supp. 1204 (W.D. Va. 1981).

[6] “There is nothing concrete which distinguishes his particular expression of his ideas from the ordinary.” Id. at 1208.

[7] Id. Notwithstanding, the court also relied in part on the reasoning of the Hemingway dicta: “the actual dialogue, including the unprepared responses of plaintiff, was spontaneous and proceeded in a question and answer format. There is no defined segregation, either by design or by implication of any of plaintiff’s expressions of his thoughts and opinions on the subjects discussed which would aid in identifying plaintiff’s purported copyrighted material.” Id.

[8] Compare Taggart v. WMAQ Channel 5 Chicago, No. 00-4205-GPM, 2000 WL 1923322 at *5 (S.D.

Ill. Oct. 30, 2000) (“comments during the interview were unprepared and spontaneous responses,” and therefore “simply do not rise to the level of a literary or intellectual creation enjoys the protection of the copyright law.”) with Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 808 F. Supp. 2d 634, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (oral statements of executives “possess the requisite creativity to qualify for copyright protection.”).

[9] Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 554 (D.D.C. 1981).

[10] The question of sound recordings adds a layer of complexity beyond the scope of this post. It will be addressed in a subsequent post.

[11] Trump v. Simon & Schuster, supra Note 1 at ¶¶ 64-65.

[12] Suid v. Newsweek Mag., 503 F. Supp. 146, 147 (D.D.C. 1980).

[13] Foundation for Lost Boys v. Alcon Ent., LLC, No. 1:15-CV-00509-LMM, 2016 WL 4394486 at *2-4 (N.D. Georgia Mar. 22, 2016).

[14] Johnson v. Magnolia Pictures LLC, No. 18 CV 9337, 2019 WL 4412483, at * 1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2019) (reconsideration denied, Johnson v. Magnolia Pictures LLC, No. 18 CV 9337, 2019 WL 5569610 (Oct. 29, 2019). The interviews formed the basis of the film Love, Gilda.

[15] Whistleblower Prods., LLC v. St8cked Media LLC, No. 18-CV-5258, 2019 WL 3082482 (E.D.N.Y. July 15, 2019)

[16] Found. for Lost Boys and Girls of Sudan, Inc. et al v. Alcon Ent. at *9.

[17] Kyle Jahner, Trump’s Woodward Lawsuit Called Flawed, Intriguing by IP Lawyers, Bloomberg News, Feb. 3, 2023, available at https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ip-law/trumps-woodward-lawsuit-called-flawed-intriguing-by-ip-lawyers#:~:text=Trump’s%20Woodward%20Lawsuit%20Called%20Flawed%2C%20Intriguing%20by%20IP%20Lawyers,-By%20Kyle%20Jahner&text=Former%20President%20Donald%20Trump’s%20copyright,property%20rights%20over%20recorded%20interviews.

[18] Trump v. Simon & Schuster, supra Note 1 at ¶ 47.

[19] Found. for Lost Boys and Girls of Sudan, Inc. et al v. Alcon Ent. at *8.

[20] A fourth alternative, not yet adopted by courts but proposed by Amerine in her article, is that the journalist own copyright over the entire interview as the “mastermind” who controls the project and can be considered the “author” under the Ninth Circuit’s authorship analysis in Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227 (9^th Cir. 2000). Supra note 2 at 182-184.

Tags Bob Woodward, copyright, Donald Trump, Ernest Hemingway, Gilda Radner, interview, Jerry Falwell, joint authorship, Lost Boys, Mary Catherine Amerine, Papa Hemingway, Penthouse Magazine, Simon & Schuster, U.S. Copyright Office

Conferences Copyright

C-IP2 2022 Fall Conference Panel Discusses Copyright Under Pressure

Post author By Joshua Grove
Post date October 26, 2022

The following post comes from Cala Coffman, a 2L at Scalia Law and Research Assistant at C-IP².

At the recent C-IP² conference entitled IP on the Wane: IP on the Wane: Examining the Impacts as IP Rights Are Reduced, one panel discussed the current state of copyright law, the pressures it has come under in recent years, and their differing perspectives on how the digital world is shaping copyright. Topics of discussion included enforcement techniques, trends in fair use, and the impact of evolving technology on copyright.

Panelists were Clark Asay (Professor of Law at Brigham Young University J. Reuben Clark Law School), Orit Fischman-Afori (Professor of Law at The Haim Striks School of Law, College of Management Academic Studies (COLMAN)), Terry Hart (General Counsel, Association of American Publishers (AAP)), and Karyn A. Temple (Senior Executive Vice President & Global General Counsel, (Motion Picture Association)), and the session was moderated by Sandra Aistars (Clinical Professor, George Mason University, Antonin Scalia Law School; Senior Fellow for Copyright Research and Policy; and Senior Scholar at C-IP²).

Professor Fischman opened the panel by proposing a reconsideration of criminal enforcement for copyright claims. After reviewing current avenues for civil copyright enforcement, including the newly established Copyright Claims Board in the Copyright Office, Digital Millennium Copyright Act, and civil enforcement in federal court including the opportunity for statutory damages, Professor Fischman suggested that criminal copyright enforcement actions seem to be on the decline and should not be a focus of enforcement efforts. Rather, greater attention should be devoted to civil enforcement. Recently, the U.S. Sentencing Commission reported that criminal Copyright and Trademark cases have dropped from 475 cases in 2015 to 137 cases in 2021.

Over the past two decades, several enforcement mechanisms have been introduced to address the challenges authors face enforcing their copyrights in the digital world. These include the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in 1998, the Digital Theft Deterrence Act of 1999, and the Copyright Alternatives in Small-Claims Enforcement Act of 2020, which improved access to enforcement for small creators by creating a new administrative forum with simplified proceedings in the Copyright Office. Small copyright claims can be pursued there with or without the assistance of counsel. While these civil enforcement mechanisms are effective, they have not been without criticism.

Ultimately, Professor Fischman argued that the combination of civil and criminal enforcement frameworks creates a powerful enforcement mechanism for author’s rights. As we consider the current state of IP rights, criminal enforcement is becoming less meaningful overall, in her opinion.

Next, Professor Asay presented three recent empirical studies examining trends in copyright litigation.

The first study indexed fair use cases from 1991 to 2017. In this study, Professor Asay examines the scope of fair use analysis in copyright infringement cases and finds a “steady progression of both appellate and district courts adopting the transformative use paradigm, with modern courts relying on it nearly ninety percent of the time.” The study finds that at the Federal Circuit Court level, in cases where transformative use was asserted, 48% were found to be transformative, and 91% of transformative uses were found to be fair use. Professor Asay states that “fair use is copyright law’s most important defense to claims of copyright infringement,” but as courts increasingly apply transformative use doctrine, he finds that “it is, in fact, eating the world of fair use.”

The second study Professor Asay presented analyzed over 1000 court opinions from between 1978 and 2020 that used a substantial similarity analysis. In this study, Professor Asay finds first that courts rely on opinions from the Second and Ninth circuits “more than any other source in interpreting and applying the substantial similarity standard.” The study also breaks down trends within the two-step substantial similarity analysis. On the first step, Professor Asay finds that “courts mostly decide this first prong . . . as a matter of whether defendant’s had access to the plaintiff’s work, and they mostly favor plaintiffs.” On the second step, he finds “significant heterogeneity” in analyzing improper appropriation of a plaintiff’s work. He states that “no dominant means exist for resolving this question” and “the data also suggest that one of the keys to winning, for either defendants or plaintiffs, is the extent to which the court engages with and discusses copyright limitations.”

The third study, which is forthcoming, examines DMCA Section 1201 litigation. DMCA Section 1201 prohibits attempts to circumvent technological measures used to control access to a copyrighted work.17 U.S.C. § 1201. This study encompasses 205 cases and 209 opinions, and Professor Asay said during the panel that “the most interesting finding in this study is that there’s not much section 1201 litigation.” Although the DMCA has been in force for nearly twenty-five years, less than one appellate decision is made per year on average. The study also finds that “the most litigated subject matter” (over every other subject matter the study coded for) is software.

Ms. Temple discussed how new technologies, techniques, and distribution methods are constantly requiring courts to re-evaluate how authorship rights function in a digital landscape. She likewise commented on the challenges courts seem to face in appropriately drawing distinctions between derivative uses of copyrighted works that should require a license from the author, and transformative uses that are permissible under the affirmative defense of fair use.

Ms. Temple cited the numerous briefs in Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith (including the Motion Picture Association’s) that note that the transformative use test is becoming the sole criteria courts use to determine fair use. Indeed, the MPA’s brief cited to Professor Asay’s study on transformative use (Is Transformative Use Eating the World?) to support the petitioner’s assertion that “in practice, the transformativeness inquiry is virtually always dispositive of the fair use question.” In closing, Ms. Temple stated that although we may be “waning” in how courts see fair use, Warhol presents a chance to correct the fair use analysis and steer it away from infringing on the derivative work rights of authors.

Finally, Mr. Hart presented on potential threats to authorship rights and the concomitant harms to consumer interests in the e-book arena. Mr. Hart’s perspective was that as businesses, copyright industries legitimately have profit-motivated goals, but happily, their ability to meet these goals is directly tied to the “ultimate goal” of promoting science and the useful arts and thus is beneficial to society as a whole. Mr. Hart stated that “the good news, if we think copyright [protections are] waxing, is that . . . the legal framework both in the United States and internationally recognizes [the] principles” that allow copyright owners to take advantage of and divide their exclusive rights. However, digitization may pose a threat to the ability to license rights as the copyright owner desires, as digital copying and transmission greatly increases risk of infringement of e-books.

The e-book market is unique, according to Mr. Hart, in that authors may be particularly vulnerable to digital threats when “digital copies are completely indistinguishable from the originals, and so they would be competing directly with the copyright owner’s primary markets.” Furthermore, he stated that “threats to the ability of copyright owners . . . to pursue rational choices in how they market and distribute their works can be just as harmful as straight up piracy.”

Mr. Hart characterized the e-book market as a thriving, sustainable economy. E-books have been popular for over a decade now, and there are a “variety of licensing models [available] . . . that continue to evolve to meet both the needs of publishers and libraries.” Mr. Hart stated, “the evidence shows that this is a well-functioning market.” He said that “Overdrive, which is the largest e-book aggregator, reported that in 2021 there was over half a billion check-outs of library e-books worldwide, and the pricing is, in my view, fair and sustainable.” Additionally, Mr. Hart said, “Overdrive also reported . . . that the average cost per title for libraries declined in 2021, and libraries have been able to significantly grow their e-book collections . . . with collection budgets that, when you’ve adjusted for inflation, have essentially been flat the entire time.”

One of the major threats to authorship rights in the e-book market, in Mr. Hart’s view, is the rise of Controlled Digital Lending (CDL). While this theory is currently being litigated in Hachette Book Group v. Internet Archive, Mr. Hart posits that we are only a few steps from a full-blown digital first-sale doctrine, which could have widespread harms throughout copyright for many types of authors. Many amicus briefs in the Internet Archive case have identified this potential harm, as well. According to Hart, the Copyright Alliance brief, for example, stated that a ruling in favor of CDL would have extremely widespread economic harms for authors.

The second threat Mr. Hart identified comes from recent propositions at the state level that would introduce compulsory licenses for e-books. These proposed laws would outlaw limitations on e-book licenses offered to libraries and allow states to dictate what states believe are “reasonable” pricing for e-book licenses. A flaw in both the arguments for CDL and for compulsory e-book licensing, as Mr. Hart sees it, is that both approaches treat the mere exercise of a copyright owner’s exclusive right as unfair and, if accepted, would be dangerous encroachments on authorship rights.

Ultimately, while the panelists identified significant concerns in the existing copyright regime, they were hopeful about the future of authorship rights, reflecting that even if the protections for copyright law had “waned” in certain respects in recent years, and certain rights remain in peril, there are opportunities for education as courts confront the significant changes that accompany an increasingly digital landscape.

Paradise Rejected: A Conversation about AI and Authorship with Dr. Ryan Abbott

Post author By Joshua Grove
Post date March 23, 2022

This post comes from Sandra Aistars, Clinical Professor and Director of the Arts & Entertainment Advocacy Clinic at George Mason University, Antonin Scalia Law School, and Senior Fellow for Copyright Research and Policy & Senior Scholar at C-IP².

2022 Paradise Rejected event flyer — Click on image for full-size PDF flyer.

On March 17, 2022, I had the pleasure to discuss Artificial Intelligence and Authorship with Dr. Ryan Abbott, the lawyer representing Dr. Stephen Thaler, inventor of the “Creativity Machine.” The Creativity Machine is the AI that generated the artwork A Recent Entrance to Paradise, which was denied copyright registration by the United States Copyright Office. Dr. Abbott, Dr. Thaler, and his AI have exhausted all mandatory administrative appeals to the Office and announced that they would soon sue the Office in order to obtain judicial review of the denial. You can listen to the conversation here.

Background:

Dr. Thaler filed an application for copyright registration of A Recent Entrance to Paradise (the Work) on November 3, 2018. For copyright purposes, the Work is categorized as a work of visual art, autonomously generated by the AI without any human direction or intervention. However, it stems from a larger project involving Dr. Thaler’s experiments to design neural networks simulating the creative activities of the human brain. A Recent Entrance to Paradise is one in a series of images generated and described in text by the Creativity Machine as part of a simulated near-death experience Dr. Thaler undertook in his overall research into and invention of artificial neural networks. Thaler’s work also raises parallel issues of patent law and policy which were beyond the scope of our discussion.

The registration application identified the author of the Work as the “Creativity Machine,” with Thaler listed as the claimant as a result of a transfer resulting from “ownership of the machine.” In his application, Thaler explained to the Office that the Work “was autonomously created by a computer algorithm running on a machine,” and he sought to “register this computer-generated work as a work-for-hire to the owner of the Creativity Machine.”[i]

The Copyright Office Registration Specialist reviewing the application refused to register the claim, finding that it “lacks the human authorship necessary to support a copyright claim.”[ii]

Thaler requested that the Office reconsider its initial refusal to register the Work, arguing that “the human authorship requirement is unconstitutional and unsupported by either statute or case law.”[iii]

The Office re-evaluated the claims and held its ground, concluding that the Work “lacked the required human authorship necessary to sustain a claim in copyright” because Thaler had “provided no evidence on sufficient creative input or intervention by a human author in the Work.”[iv]

37 CFR 202.5 establishes the Reconsideration Procedure for Refusals to Register by the Copyright Office. Pursuant to this procedure Thaler appealed the refusal to the Copyright Office Review Board comprised of The Register of Copyrights, The General Counsel of the Copyright Office and a third individual sitting by designation. The relevant CFR section requires that the applicant “include the reasons the applicant believes registration was improperly refused, including any legal arguments in support of those reasons and any supplementary information, and must address the reasons stated by the Registration Program for refusing registration upon first reconsideration. The Board will base its decision on the applicant’s written submissions.”

According to the Copyright Office, Thaler renewed arguments from his first two unsuccessful attempts before the Office that failure to register AI created works is unconstitutional, largely continued to advance policy arguments that registering copyrights in AI generated works would further the underlying goals of copyright law, including the constitutional rationale for protection, and failed to address the Office’s request to cite to case law supporting his assertions that the Office should depart from its reliance on existing jurisprudence requiring human authorship.

The Office largely dismissed Thaler’s second argument, that the work should be registered as a work made for hire as dependent on its resolution of the first—since the Creativity Machine was not a human being, it could not enter into a “work made for hire” agreement with Thaler. Here, the Office rejected the argument that, because corporations could be considered persons under the law, other non-humans such as AIs should likewise enjoy rights that humans do. The Office noted that corporations are composed of collections of human beings. The Office also explained that “work made for hire” doctrine speaks only to who the owner of a given work is.

Of course, both Dr. Abbott and the Copyright Office were bound in this administrative exercise by their respective roles: the Copyright Office must take the law as it finds it—although Dr. Abbott criticized the Office for applying caselaw from “the Gilded Age” as the Office noted in its rejection “[I]t is generally for Congress,” not the Board, “to decide how best to pursue the Copyright Clause’s objectives.” Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003). The Board must apply the statute enacted by Congress; it cannot second-guess whether a different statutory scheme would better promote the progress of science and useful arts.”[v] Likewise, Dr. Abbott, acting on behalf of Dr. Thaler was required to exhaust all administrative avenues of appeal before pursuing judicial review of the correctness of the Office’s interpretation of constitutional and statutory directives, and case law.

Our lively discussion begins with level setting to ensure that the listeners understand the goals of Dr. Thaler’s project, goals which encompass scientific innovation, artistic creation, and apparently—legal and policy clarification of the IP space.

Dr. Abbott and I additionally investigate the constitutional rationales for copyright and how registering or not registering a copyright to an AI-created work is or is not in line with those goals. In particular, we debated utilitarian/incentive-based justifications, property rights theories, and how the rights of artists whose works might be used to train an AI might (or might not) be accounted for in different scenarios.

Turning to Dr. Thaler’s second argument, that the work should be registered to him as a work made for hire, we discussed the difficulties of maintaining the argument separately from the copyrightability question. It seems to me that the Copyright Office is correct that the argument must rise or fall with the resolution of the baseline question of whether a copyrightable work can be authored by an AI to begin with. The other challenging question that Dr. Abbott will face is how to overcome the statutory “work made for hire” doctrine requirements in the context of an AI-created work without corrupting what is intended to be a very narrow exception to the normal operation of copyright law and authorship. This is already a controversial area, and one thought by many to be unfavorable to individual authors because it deems a corporation to be the author of the work, sometimes in circumstances where the human author is not in a bargaining position to adequately understand the copyright implications or to bargain for them differently. In the case of an AI, the ability to bargain for rights or later challenge the rights granted, particularly if they are granted on the basis of property ownership, seems to be dubious.

In closing the discussion, Dr. Abbott confirmed that his client intends to seek judicial review of the refusal to register.

[i] Opinion Letter of Review Board Refusing Registration to Ryan Abbot (Feb. 14, 2022).

[ii] Id. (Citing Initial Letter Refusing Registration from U.S. Copyright Office to Ryan Abbott (Aug. 12, 2019).)

[iii] Id. (Citing Letter from Ryan Abbott to U.S. Copyright Office at 1 (Sept. 23, 2019) (“First Request”).)

[iv] Id. (Citing Refusal of First Request for Reconsideration from U.S. Copyright Office to Ryan Abbott at 1 (March 30, 2020).)

[v] Id at 4.

In Opposition to Copyright Protection for AI Works

This response to Dr. Ryan Abbott comes from David Newhoff.

On February 14, the U.S. Copyright Office confirmed its rejection of an application for a claim of copyright in a 2D artwork called “A Recent Entrance to Paradise.” The image, created by an AI designed by Dr. Stephen Thaler, was rejected by the Office on the longstanding doctrine which holds that in order for copyright to attach, a work must be the product of human authorship. Among the examples cited in the Copyright Office Compendium as ineligible for copyright protection is “a piece of driftwood shaped by the ocean,” a potentially instructive analog as the debate about copyright and AI gets louder in the near future.

What follows assumes that we are talking about autonomous AI machines producing creative works that no human envisions at the start of the process, other than perhaps the medium. So, the human programmers might know they are building a machine to produce music or visual works, but they do not engage in co-authorship with the AI to produce the expressive elements of the works themselves. Code and data go in, and something unpredictable comes out, much like nature forming the aesthetic piece of driftwood.

As a cultural question, I have argued many times that AI art is a contradiction in terms—not because an AI cannot produce something humans might enjoy, but because the purpose of art, at least in the human experience so far, would be obliterated in a world of machine-made works. It seems that what the AI would produce would be literally and metaphorically bloodless, and after some initial astonishment with the engineering, we may quickly become uninterested in most AI works that attempt to produce more than purely decorative accidents.

In this regard, I would argue that the question presented is not addressed by the “creative destruction” principle, which demands that we not stand in the way of machines doing things better than humans. “Better” is a meaningful concept if the job is microsurgery but meaningless in the creation or appreciation of art. Regardless, the copyrightability question does not need to delve too deeply into the nature or purpose of art because the human element in copyright is not just a paragraph about registration in the USCO Compendium but, in fact, runs throughout application of the law.

Doctrinal Oppositions to Copyright in AI Works

In the United States and elsewhere, copyright attaches automatically to the “mental conception” of a work the moment the conception is fixed in a tangible medium such that it can be perceived by an observer. So, even at this fundamental stage, separate from the Copyright Office approving an application, the AI is ineligible because it does not engage in “mental conception” by any reasonable definition of that term. We do not protect works made by animals, who possess consciousness that far exceeds anything that can be said to exist in the most sophisticated AI. (And if an AI attains true consciousness, we humans may have nothing to say about laws and policies on the other side of that event horizon.)

Next, the primary reason to register a claim of copyright with the USCO is to provide the author with the opportunity, if necessary, to file a claim of infringement in federal court. But to establish a basis for copying, a plaintiff must prove that the alleged infringer had access to the original work and that the secondary work is substantially or strikingly similar to the work allegedly copied. The inverse ratio rule applied by the courts holds that the more that access can be proven, the less similarity weighs in the consideration and vice-versa. But in all claims of copying, independent creation (i.e., the principle that two authors might independently create nearly identical works) nullifies any complaint. These are considerations not just about two works, but about human conduct.

If AIs do not interact with the world, listen to music, read books, etc. in the sense that humans do these things, then, presumably, all AI works are works of independent creation. If multiple AIs are fed the same corpus of works (whether in or out of copyright works) for the purpose of machine learning, and any two AIs produce two works that are substantially, or even strikingly, similar to one another, the assumption should still be independent creation. Not just independent, but literally mindless, unless again, the copyright question must first be answered by establishing AI consciousness.

In principle, AI Bob is not inspired by, or even aware of, the work of AI Betty. So, if AI Bob produces a work strikingly similar to a work made by AI Betty, any court would have to toss out BettyBot v. BobBot on a finding of independent creation. Alternatively, do we want human juries considering facts presented by human attorneys describing the alleged conduct of two machines?

If, on the other hand, an AI produces a work too similar to one of the in-copyright works fed into its database, this begs the question as to whether the AI designer has simply failed to achieve anything more than an elaborate Xerox machine. And hypothetical facts notwithstanding, it seems that there is little need to ask new copyright questions in such a circumstance.

The factual copying complication raises two issues. One is that if there cannot be a basis for litigation between two AI creators, then there is perhaps little or no reason to register the works with the Copyright Office. But more profoundly, in a world of mixed human and AI works, we could create a bizarre imbalance whereby a human could infringe the rights of a machine while the machine could potentially never infringe the rights of either humans or other machines. And this is because the arguments for copyright in AI works unavoidably dissociate copyright from the underlying meaning of authorship.

Authorship, Not Market Value, is the Foundation of Copyright

Proponents of copyright in AI works will argue that the creativity applied in programming (which is separately protected by copyright) is coextensive to the works produced by the AIs they have programmed. But this would be like saying that I have claim of co-authorship in a novel written by one of my children just because I taught them things when they were young. This does not negate the possibility of joint authorship between human and AI, but as stated above, the human must plausibly argue his own “mental conception” in the process as a foundation for his contribution.

Commercial interests vying for copyright in AI works will assert that the work-made-for-hire (WMFH) doctrine already implicates protection of machine-made works. When a human employee creates a protectable work in the course of his employment, the corporate entity, by operation of law, is automatically the author of that work. Thus, the argument will be made that if non-human entities called corporations may be legal authors of copyrightable works, then corporate entities may be the authors of works produced by the AIs they own. This analogizes copyrightable works to other salable property, like wines from a vineyard, but elides the fact that copyright attaches to certain products of labor, and not to others, because it is a fiction itself whose medium is the “personality of the author,” as Justice Holmes articulated in Bleistein.

The response to the WMFH argument should be that corporate-authored works are only protected because they are made by human employees who have agreed, under the terms of their employment, to provide authorship for the corporation. Authorship by the fictious entity does not exist without human authorship, and I maintain that it would be folly to remove the human creator entirely from the equation. We already struggle with corporate personhood in other areas of law, and we should ask ourselves why we believe that any social benefit would outweigh the risk of allowing copyright law to potentially exacerbate those tensions.

Alternatively, proponents of copyright for AI works may lobby for a sui generis revision to the Copyright Act with, perhaps, unique limitations for AI works. I will not speculate about the details of such a proposal, but it is hard to imagine one that would be worth the trouble, no matter how limited or narrow. If the purpose of copyright is to proscribe unlicensed copying (with certain limitations), we still run into the independent creation problem and the possible result that humans can infringe the rights of machines while machines cannot infringe the rights of humans. How does this produce a desirable outcome which does not expand the outsize role giant tech companies already play in society?

Moreover, copyright skeptics and critics, many with deep relationships with Big Tech, already advocate a rigidly utilitarian view of copyright law, which is then argued to propose new limits on exclusive rights and protections. The utilitarian view generally rejects the notion that copyright protects any natural rights of the author beyond the right to be “paid something” for the exploitation of her works, and this cynical, mercenary view of authors would likely gain traction if we were to establish a new framework for machine authorship.

Registration Workaround (i.e., lying)

In the meantime, as Stephen Carlisle predicts in his post on this matter, we may see a lot of lying by humans registering works that were autonomously created by their machines. This is plausible, but if the primary purpose of registration is to establish a foundation for defending copyrights in federal court, the prospect of a discovery process could militate against rampant falsification of copyright applications. Knowing misrepresentation on an application is grounds for invalidating the registration, subject to a fine of up to $2,500, and further implies perjury if asserted in court.

Of course, that’s only if the respondent can defend himself. A registration and threat of litigation can be enough to intimidate a party, especially if it is claimed by a big corporate tech company. So, instead of asking whether AI works should be protected, perhaps we should be asking exactly the opposite question: How do we protect human authorship against a technology experiment, which may have value in the world of data science, but which has nothing to do with the aim of copyright law?

About the IP Clause

And with that statement, I have just implicated a constitutional argument because the purpose of copyright law, as stated in Article I Clause 8, is to “promote science.” Moreover, the first three subjects of protection in 1790—maps, charts, and books—suggest a view at the founding period that copyright’s purpose, twinned with the foundation for patent law, was more pragmatic than artistic.

Of course, nobody could reasonably argue that the American framers imagined authors as anything other than human or that copyright law has not evolved to encompass a great deal of art which does not promote the endeavor we ordinarily call “science.” So, we may see AI copyright proponents take this semantic argument out for a spin, but I do not believe it should withstand scrutiny for very long.

Perhaps, the more compelling question presented by the IP clause, with respect to this conversation, is what it means to “promote progress.” Both our imaginations and our experiences reveal technological results that fail to promote progress for humans. And if progress for people is not the goal of all law and policy, then what is? Surely, against the present backdrop in which algorithms are seducing humans to engage in rampant, self-destructive behavior, it does seem like a mistake to call these machines artists.

Tags A Recent Entrance to Paradise, AI, artificial intelligence, authorship, Bleistein, copyright, Copyright Office, Creativity Machine, David Newhoff, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., Ryan Abbott, Sandra Aistars, Stephen Carlisle, Stephen Thaler, USCO

Recap of the Supreme Court’s Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P.

Post author By Joshua Grove
Post date March 15, 2022

The following post comes from Sabren H. Wahdan, a 3L at Scalia Law and a Research Assistant at C-IP².

In one of his final majority opinions before announcing his retirement, Justice Steven Breyer penned a nuanced ruling that carefully threads the policy needle on copyright registration issues. The case pitted fabric designer Unicolors against fast fashion company H&M, but it was ultimately a victory for creators of art, fashion, music, dance, literary works, and others who rely on copyright registrations to protect their rights but lack the means to hire an attorney to ensure that their registration applications are legally and factually perfect. As a result of the ruling, they can register their works without fear that their registration could be invalidated by a good-faith mistake.

Unicolors v. H&M answers a narrow question of copyright law: what is the requisite level of knowledge to invalidate copyright registration? Justice Stephen Breyer’s majority (6-3) opinion holds that actual knowledge of either a factual or legal mistake is required before a registration is invalidated. This makes good sense because copyright registration applications are often completed by creators who are not lawyers. Some background on the case is useful.

The District Court

In 2016, Unicolors sued H&M for copyright infringement in the United States District Court for the District of Central California, alleging that H&M sold apparel, specifically a jacket and skirt, with a design remarkably similar to a Unicolors-copyrighted design. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Unicolors.[i] Subsequently, H&M filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that Unicolors’ copyright registration was invalid because Unicolors knowingly submitted inaccurate information in its application for registration.[ii] The U.S. Copyright Office has established an administrative procedure that allows an applicant to register multiple works that were physically packaged or bundled together as a single unit and first published on the same date.[iii] However, under 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(4), an applicant cannot use this provision if the works were published in different units or first distributed as separate, individual works.

Unicolors had filed an application with the Copyright Office seeking a collective copyright registration for thirty-one of its designs in 2011. H&M contended that Unicolors could not do so because it had sold some of the patterns separately to different customers at different times, invalidating Unicolors’ registration.[iv] The District Court denied H&M’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, holding that a registration may be valid even if it contains inaccurate information, provided the registrant did not know the information was inaccurate.[v] H&M had to show Unicolors had knowledge and intent to defraud in order to invalidate the registration. H&M appealed.[vi]

The Ninth Circuit Decision

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court’s judgment holding that invalidation under 17 U.S. Code § 411 does not require a showing that the registration applicant intended to defraud the Copyright Office.[vii] In other words, knowing about the inclusion of inaccurate facts and law in an application is enough to warrant invalidation. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit stated that Unicolors had failed to satisfy 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(4) – the single unit of publication requirement.[viii] The Court found that Unicolors’ registration was inaccurate because Unicolors registered all thirty-one of its designs together as a single unit with the same publication date, when in fact, the designs were not all published as a single unit. Some designs were available to the public, while others were confined designs only available to particular exclusive customers.[ix] The Court determined that Unicolors knew the designs would not be released together at the same time; therefore, they knew that the registration information was inaccurate.[x] Consequently, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings.[xi]

The Supreme Court Reverses the Ninth Circuit Decision

In 2021, Unicolors filed a petition to the Supreme Court asking whether the Ninth Circuit erred in determining that §411(b)(1)(A) required referral to the Copyright Office on any inaccurate registration information, even without evidence of fraud or material error in conflict with other circuit courts and the Copyright Office’s own findings on §411(b)(1)(A). The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Justice Breyer’s Majority Opinion

Justice Breyer is well known for his use of analogies to probe the arguments of parties appearing before the Court. Likewise, in Unicolors, the majority opinion relied not only on statutory construction, legislative history, and the plain language of the statute as informed by dictionary definitions, but also on analogies––both to adjacent provisions of the code, and to analogies involving birdwatching––to reach its conclusion, in the end finding that §411(b)(1)(A) does not distinguish between a mistake of law and a mistake of fact and thus excuses inaccuracies in registration applications premised on either mistakes of fact or law.

To explain employing Justice Breyer’s birdwatching analogy, Breyer imagines a man who sees a flash of red in a tree and mistakenly says it is a cardinal when the bird is actually a scarlet tanager: “[A man] may have failed to see the bird’s black wings. In that case, he has made a mistake about the facts.” Alternatively, if said man saw “the bird perfectly well, noting all of its relevant features,” it is possible that, “not being much of a birdwatcher, he may not have known that a tanager (unlike a cardinal) has black wings.” For Breyer, that is a “labeling mistake” because the man “saw the bird correctly, but does not know how to label what he saw” (analogous to a mistake of law).[xii] A business person in the arts may know specific facts about her business; however, she may not be cognizant of how the law applies to it and applies the law to those facts inaccurately. §411(b)(1)(A) states that a certificate of registration satisfies the requirements of section 411 and section 412, regardless of whether the certificate contains any inaccurate information–—unless the inaccurate information was included on the application for copyright registration with knowledge that it was inaccurate.

The plain language of the text does not support an interpretation that would read constructive knowledge of how legal requirements bear on the facts at issue into the standard. To reach this conclusion, the majority opinion analyzed not only the plain language of the text but also “case law and the dictionary to find that “knowledge” means an applicant’s understanding of the relevant law that applies to the submitted information.[xiii] Therefore, an applicant who believes information submitted on a registration application is accurate cannot have acted with knowledge that the information was inaccurate.

The Majority also examined other provisions in the Copyright Act that refer specifically to circumstances where an individual should have been aware that a particular legal requirement is implicated (e.g., “‘reasonable grounds to know . . .,’” “‘reasonable grounds to believe . . .,`” ”‘not aware of facts or circumstances from which . . . is apparent’” and concluded that §411(b)(1)(A) does not contain any such analogous language.[xiv]

According to the majority, “the absence of similar language in the statutory provision before us tends to confirm our conclusion that Congress intended ‘knowledge’ here to bear its ordinary meaning.” When Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another, there is a presumption that Congress intended a difference in meaning.[xv]

Finally, the majority considered the legislative history of the Copyright Act. The Court understood that Congress wanted to make it easier, not more difficult, for artists and nonlawyers to obtain valid copyright registrations. Congress did not intend for good-faith errors to invalidate registrations, whether those errors were in issues of fact or issues of law. Invalidating copyright registration when a copyright owner was unaware of or misunderstood the law undermines the purpose of the Copyright Act. The Court dismissed the often-cited legal maxim that ignorance of the law is not an excuse by stating that it does not apply to civil cases concerning the scope of a statutory safe harbor that arises from ignorance of collateral legal requirement.[xvi]

Justice Thomas’ Dissent

Careful readers will note that the question the majority opinion answers is somewhat different from that granted certiorari. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch, arguing primarily that the majority decided a question not properly presented to the Court. The question originally taken up by the Court was whether fraud was necessary to invalidate a registration. The majority found that the knowledge question is close enough to the question presented in the petition to qualify as a “subsidiary question fairly included” in the question presented.[xvii]

Justice Thomas, not joined by Justice Gorsuch, further dissents from the majority view that ignorance of the law is not an excuse.[xviii] He would have ruled that individuals are responsible for knowing the law, whether that be in the context of criminal or civil cases.

Conclusion

Based on the ruling, a mistake in an application for copyright registration is excusable so long as the copyright registrant or claimant lacked actual knowledge of the inaccuracy. The more complex issue perhaps is the proof issue––proving the relevant knowledge or lack of knowledge. While some may worry that there is a risk that claimants will falsely argue lack of knowledge, courts are well-versed in evaluating truthfulness and parsing evidence, including when they must evaluate subjective viewpoints and experiences.

The majority opinion demonstrates a sensitive balancing of the interest in promoting accurate registration with the understanding of the challenges faced by artists, creators, and other non-lawyers who may unintentionally make errors in filing registrations. Importantly, this decision gives little shelter to copyright lawyers if they register works and make a mistake; on the contrary, it should serve as a warning to copyright lawyers to be careful when filing a copyright registration lest they face potential validity challenges in the future.

The case is going back down to the Ninth Circuit on remand, and the question is: what facts and law did Unicolors know when it filed these registration applications?

[i] Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P., 959 F.3d 1194, at 1195* (2020).

[ii] Id at 1197.

[iii] See U.S. Copyright Office, Circular No. 34: Multiple Works (2021).

[iv] Unicolors, 959 F.3d 1194, at 1195 (2020).

[v] Id at 1197.

[vi] Id.

[vii] Id at 1200.

[viii] Id.

[ix] Id at 1197.

[x] Id.

[xi] Id.

[xii] Unicolors Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz L.P., No. 20-915, 2022 WL 547681, at 4* (2022).

[xiii] Unicolors, WL 547681, at 4*(2022) (citing Intel Corp. Investment Policy Comm. v. Sulyma, 589 U. S. 140 S.Ct. 768, 776, 206 L.Ed.2d 103 (2020)).

[xiv] Unicolors, WL 547681, at 5*(citing §121A(a), §512(c)(1)(A), §901(a)(8), §1202(b) and §1401(c)(6)).

[xv] Unicolors, WL 547681, at 5* (2022) (citing Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 430 (2009)).

[xvi] Unicolors, WL 547681, at 8*(2022) (citing Rehaif v. United States, 588 U. S. (2019)).

[xvii] Unicolors, WL 547681, at 8*(2022).

[xviii] Id.

Tags copyright, Copyright Act, H&M, Justice Clarence Thomas, Justice Neil Gorsuch, Justice Samuel Alito, Justice Steven Breyer, Sabren H. Wahdan, Supreme Court, U.S. Court of Appeals, Unicolors, Unicolors v. H&M

Photography, Portrait Subjects, and Copyright Law

Post author By Joshua Grove
Post date March 14, 2022

By Molly Stech*

*The blog post below and the law review article it links to are the individual thoughts and views of the author and should not be attributed to any entity with which she is currently or has been affiliated.

In a forthcoming article in the Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law, I review the law and jurisprudence concerning joint authorship and provide an analysis of it with specific emphasis on photographers and portrait subjects. I wrote and edited this paper in conjunction with the George Mason University Scalia School of Law’s 2021-2022 Thomas Edison Innovation Law and Policy Fellowship, and am very grateful for the thoughtful comments I received from Senior Commentators and scholars involved with the Fellowship.

A recent string of litigation in this space, and the general question of ownership interests in one’s own likeness, are what prompted my interest. Paparazzi have filed lawsuits against models and other celebrities for reposting images of themselves on their social media feeds, without permission from or compensation for the photographer. Some celebrities have countersued, but many of these cases settle out of court. In a best-case scenario, paparazzi and their subjects enjoy a mutually-beneficial relationship, but these lawsuits highlight a problematic legal space. It is accepted domestically and abroad that copyright subsists in the vast majority of photographs and that the copyright belongs to the photographer. The bar to copyrightability is notoriously low; it requires only a modicum of creativity.

Photographers have a wide range of creative choices they can highlight to showcase where their authorship lies in a given photograph, including the camera and film used, the angle, the lighting, and the backdrop. What I explore in this paper is the possibility that subjects of photographs may also contribute copyrightable authorship to a given photograph, and may therefore be eligible to be deemed co-authors of certain photographs with the photographer. Copyright law aims to reward creative expression. Nothing in the statute can be read to proactively deny a subject co-authorship. I point out that copyright law is accustomed to doing the hard work of factual analysis (see, e.g., the fair use doctrine) and that any given work, including a photograph, should be considered on its own for purposes of correctly identifying authorial contribution. In some cases, a subject will contribute copyrightable expression by posing her limbs, arranging her facial expression, selecting her garments, or even arranging how her garments fall. So long as the contribution is adequately creative, co-authorship should be hers.

Joint (or Contributing) Authorship: Roadblocks

Two barriers to overcome in reaching this conclusion include some courts’ emphasis on joint authors’ intent; and some courts’ prerequisite that every contribution to a jointly-authored work be independently copyrightable. I address each of these problems in turn and underline that the statute itself does not make these requirements. Admittedly, in U.S. law, these are not easily surmountable obstacles. But, in taking copyright law back to its first principles, I believe the correct answer can be found in reemphasizing creative contribution. A recent case in the United Kingdom demonstrates an admirable flexibility that tailors an assignment of authorship to the degree of authorial contribution. An apportionment of authorship can be discerned from analyzing works one at a time. As mentioned, U.S. copyright law is no stranger to a work-by-work analysis in its fair use doctrine; another example is the idea-expression dichotomy, which provides that the more a work merges with its inevitable expression, the thinner its depth of copyright protection.

Other Thinking on These Issues

Any timely issue is likely to invite the contributions of other scholars, and this topic is no different. Other scholars have suggested sui generis rights for paparazzi subjects; separate types of exclusive rights for social media; and a personality-based right that could stretch copyright-like rights from covering “works” to people themselves. Another scholar argued persuasively for paparazzi subjects to receive an implied license to use photographs of themselves in certain ways. My analysis remains proscribed within copyright law itself, with the baseline argument that authorial creativity, whatever its guise, should be rewarded with rights.

There are other interesting avenues that are being explored to solve a similar problem, and I will follow them with interest. The right of privacy, a fascinating and complex legal discipline, may also offer solutions in the future. My paper mostly sidesteps the phenomenon of revenge porn, for example, and while a copyright argument could be made in the average scenario (no matter who pushes “record,” there are two people potentially offering creative expression to the final film), privacy law may be a more logical solution to protecting those subjects than copyright law. Another related argument that works in my favor, I believe, is rooted in freedom of expression. If copyright law is the engine of free expression, so should it contribute to people having a legal stake in their photographic likeness in order to control or at least contribute to the narrative attached to that photograph.

The paper is available in draft form at SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4049946

And it will be available in late 2022 from Vanderbilt’s JETLaw website: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/jetlaw/

Bettman Archive, Mikhail Baryshnikov, Eliot Feld’s
Santa Fe Saga, April 14, 1978. © Getty Images

Examples

While a revenge porn video may not make the best example for my analysis, I believe that selfies and photographs of dancers onstage do help demonstrate my view. A selfie is probably a copyrightable work. But in analyzing a given selfie to ascertain where the creativity lies, it will likely be in the pose, the facial expression, and the garments (the subject’s choices) as much as it will be in the framing, the backdrop, and the angle (the photographer’s choices). The photographer and the subject are of course the same person in the case of the selfie, but in deconstructing a photograph and searching for its authorial qualities, an argument certainly exists for the former forms of authorship as much as for the latter. And for a dancer onstage, his or her pose, facial expression, turnout, limb extension, jump arc, makeup, and any number of other attributes cannot reasonably be the result of the photographer’s efforts or talent, although the resulting photograph will of course likely benefit from them.

Conclusion

Co-authorship may exist in certain photographic portraits. It is essential that copyright law reexamine its interpretation of joint authorship in order to better capture and reward the contributions of the parties who offer creative expression to any given copyrightable work.

Tags authorship, copyright, Edison, Molly Stech, photography, Thomas Edison Innovation Law and Policy Fellowship

Healthcare International Law

A View from Both Sides: COVID-19, the TRIPS Waiver, IP Rights, and How to Increase the Supply of Vaccines

Post author By Joshua Grove
Post date June 22, 2021

Issue

The United States and other wealthy nations have access to plenty of COVID-19 vaccine doses and thus are beginning to get the pandemic under control, while less affluent countries do not have access to adequate doses and are still struggling with rising cases. In October 2020, India and South Africa proposed addressing this problem by waiving certain portions of the TRIPS Agreement, the most comprehensive agreement on intellectual property (IP) aspects of international trade among the WTO’s 164 member states. The waiver cites “an urgent call for global solidarity, and the unhindered global sharing of technology and know-how in order that rapid responses for the handling of COVID-19 can be put in place on a real time basis.” While this proposal broadly applies to any COVID-19-related technology, much of the conversation is currently focused on vaccines.

The proposal would temporarily suspend patent rights covering COVID-19 vaccines and possibly also be used to compel the transfer of trade secret “know-how” and “show-how.” Proponents say this would allow any manufacturer to begin production—boosting vaccine supply while slashing prices—to end the surge of cases in less developed nations. Critics argue that the reality is more complicated: the waiver will be ineffective, even harmful, and it would have a devastating impact on our readiness for future health crises.

In Support of the Waiver

For supporters of the waiver, the answer is clear: cases are rising in many nations because they still don’t have the vaccines they need. It’s only reasonable to make exceptions to our ordinary system of business incentives during times of global crisis.

The Biden Administration

That is essentially what U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai stated when the Biden Administration announced its support for the waiver: “This is a global health crisis, and the extraordinary circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic call for extraordinary measures. The Administration believes strongly in intellectual property protections, but in service of ending this pandemic, supports the waiver of those protections for COVID-19 vaccines.”

It affects all of us

WHO Director-General Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus says that the “me-first approach” among powerful nations “is self-defeating and will lead to a protracted recovery with trade and travel continuing to suffer.” Under this rationale, even purely self-interested parties should support the waiver, if only because modern commerce is so globally connected.

Dropping IP barriers will facilitate greater collaboration

Many say the threat of IP litigation prevents the kind of collaboration needed to quickly ramp up production and development, and that a waiver can remove that threat. The president of Médecins Sans Frontières, Dr. Christos Christou, says that “[t]he waiver proposal offers all governments opportunities to take action for better collaboration in development, production and supply of COVID medical tools without being restricted by private industry’s interests and actions, and crucially would give governments all available tools to ensure global access.”

Patents were not meant to impede emergency action

A recent editorial in the journal Nature argues that patents are designed to protect ordinary commercial interests, not to hinder global cooperation against a common threat: “A pandemic is not a competition between companies, but a race between humanity and a virus. Instead of competing, countries and companies need to do all they can to cooperate to bring the pandemic to an end.”

It solves an immediate need without setting a troubling precedent

While opponents of the waiver argue that it will weaken future drug patent protection, Imron Aly and Ahmed M.T. Riaz of Schiff Hardin LLP call those concerns “unfounded” in their post at IPWatchdog. Not only is the current proposal limited specifically to COVID-19, but it was also not created carelessly. Instead, it “has taken substantial international efforts and official international law amendments.” Aly and Riaz say this exceptional action is appropriate if it can succeed where our IP system has yet to do so: “The TRIPS waiver simply allows countries the option to suspend patent enforcement to encourage COVID-19 vaccine production, which makes sense for those countries where current investment has not resulted in vaccine access.”

Even if the waiver doesn’t work, it might work

University of Houston Law Center Professor Sapna Kumar acknowledges a number of functional issues with the waiver approach but notes that it may still have a positive effect on the pandemic: “Overall, the greatest benefit of the Biden Administration’s support for the waiver is that it signals a departure from the prior approach of punishing countries facing health crises and that it might spur pharmaceutical companies to voluntarily increase out-licensing and donations of vaccines.” Her prediction was borne out by a recent pledge to donate 2.3 billion doses by Pfizer/BioNTech, Johnson & Johnson, and Moderna.

Opposed to the Waiver

Opponents of the waiver argue that it will not be effective because it fails to address the real problems. Further, it could actually be detrimental to quality control and supply chains in the present crisis, while quite possibly affecting how pharmaceutical companies choose to allocate investment dollars in the future.

It’s a long process that requires much more than a temporary waiver of licenses

Vaccines are not like other drugs. Writing for Foreign Affairs, Peter J. Hotez, Maria Elena Bottazzi, and Prashant Yadav say that we can’t compare the current situation to similar actions on HIV treatments, and that most nations are not prepared to make use of the patented technology: “Producing vaccines—particularly those as technologically complex as the messenger RNA (mRNA) inoculations against COVID-19—requires not only patents but an entire infrastructure that cannot be transferred overnight.” The authors state that “[t]he effective transfer of such complex technology requires a receiving ecosystem that can take years, sometimes decades, to build.”

We need another way

Professor Yogesh Pai of the National Law University Delhi says that simply waiving trade secret protection won’t automatically disclose everything a manufacturer needs to know. Accessing “hard tacit knowledge of manufacturing/quality control measures for production and clinical data required for regulatory clearances” could require forced technology transfer (FTT) by national governments. He recalls how detrimental such efforts were to India’s economy when it tried FTT with Coca-Cola in the 1970s, prompting the company to leave the country altogether.

Prof. Pai instead recommends efforts to encourage voluntary cooperation: “Where blunt legal instruments don’t work, using track-1 and track-2 diplomacy to place moral coercion on western governments to nudge firms to actively engage in technology licensing may still work wonders.”

“China First” policy?

Sixteen U.S. senators issued a sharply worded letter to the executive branch, questioning the true motives of “China and other countries which regularly steal American intellectual property—like India and South Africa,” and expressing shock that an American president would go along with it: “These nations are falsely claiming that granting such a waiver would speed the development of new vaccine capacity. Nothing could be further from the truth.” Instead, the senators are suggesting that the waiver is being used as a means to unfairly to acquire trade secrets that took massive resources and time to develop.

Reuters reports that “some U.S. officials fear the move would allow China to leapfrog years of research and erode the U.S. advantage in biopharmaceuticals” and quotes a senior U.S. official as saying that the country “‘would want to examine the effect of a waiver on China and Russia before it went into effect to ensure that it’s fit for purpose.’”

IP is not the Issue

A waiver on patent rights, even with the corresponding trade secrets, can only give permission to manufacture. But Eva Bishwal of Fidus Law Chambers writes that the real problems in India “are state inaction, dearth of raw materials and low production capacity.”

According to Patrick Kilbride of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Global Innovation Policy Center, and as cited in Pharmaceutical Technology, “[p]roposals to waive intellectual property rights are misguided and a distraction from the real work of reinforcing supply chains and assisting countries to procure, distribute and administer vaccines to billions of the world’s citizens.”

Low-quality vaccines could do more harm than good

Former USPTO Director Andrei Iancu voiced concern recently at a World IP Day event, asking, “if we waive IP rights, and exclude the original manufacturers, how are we going to control the quality of the vaccines that go into people’s arms? How are we going to control for the fake vaccines? Just last week we saw fake Pfizer vaccines.” And as Philip Thompson points out for IPWatchdog, when investigators are forced to “determine if adverse events or sub-par effectiveness originate from ‘real’ vaccines or fake doses, we should expect global production starts and stops to become much more frequent.”

It will discourage investment in the most critical areas

Pharmaceutical developers invest unfathomable amounts of money into bringing drugs to market. The path to success is long, expensive, and highly uncertain. But what is certain is that successful drugs can yield a profit that covers the loss from failures. Now critics are deeply worried that this waiver will skew future cost-benefit analyses against important classes of medicine. All other things being equal, a developer has a better chance at a positive return by investing in drugs that pose no risk of seizure during a global emergency. As Amanda Glassman of the Center for Global Development writes, the waiver sends the wrong message to innovators and investors: “don’t bother attacking the most important global problems; instead, throw your investment dollars at the next treatment for erectile disfunction, which will surely earn you a steady return with far less agita.” The scramble amongst pharmaceutical giants to develop a vaccine was an all-out race, with good reason, and that’s exactly how it should be. If those companies believe that forfeiture is waiting at the finish line next time around, we might see fewer contestants.

Even “no-profit” vaccine makers appear to oppose the waiver

Pfizer CEO Albert Bourla laid out everything the company has done to combat the vaccine in an equitable manner and argued that “waiver of IP rights could only derail this progress.” And while Pfizer and Moderna are selling their vaccines at a profit, Johnson & Johnson and AstraZeneca have pledged not to do so during the pandemic.

However, it appears that even those companies oppose the waiver. As reported in The Wall Street Journal, the trade group PhRMA, which represents Johnson & Johnson and AstraZeneca among many others, is “lobbying members of Congress to oppose the Biden administration’s support for the waiver.” Johnson & Johnson’s Chief IP counsel Robert DeBerardine says that patent rights are responsible for the breakneck pace of development and that the drug’s makers are the best-equipped people to continue the fight: “What we’re able to do, because we have control of the IP, is to pick the best companies to help us supply the world. If you were to give everything to everybody, you may see a flood of vaccines, but you would have no idea if they’re safe and effective.”

Conclusion

While we share the concerns of other organizations that effective, affordable, and accessible vaccines be made available to all persons regardless of location or wealth, we do not believe that upending longstanding U.S. patent policy for a solution that will do little if anything to increase the vaccine supply is advisable. Strong IP rights remain the best way to incentivize innovation and ultimately increase the supply of life-saving medicines. The Biden administration’s unprecedented support of the proposed WTO IP waiver, while well intended, is likely to create long-term harm and unlikely to have much of an impact on global vaccine supplies. Ultimately, encouraging companies to license IP and engage in voluntary knowledge transfer, along with the sharing of excess doses that are being produced, are methods far more likely to alleviate the vaccine supply issues than waiving IP rights and would be a better path forward out of the current crisis.

Just What Is the Case with the CASE Act? A Brief Overview

Post author By Joshua Grove
Post date June 14, 2021

The following post comes from Ryan Reynolds, a 3L at Scalia Law and Research Assistant at CPIP.

By Ryan Reynolds

The phrase “creators have rights, but no remedies” is likely familiar to those aware of the current landscape of copyright protection for individual creators and small businesses (“Creators”). While the Copyright Act of 1976 grants a bundle of rights to Creators for the protection of their works, for years Creators have faced an uphill battle enforcing those rights against infringers. There are many who are optimistic, however, that things might soon change with the passage of “The Copyright Alternative in Small-Claims Enforcement Act of 2020” (CASE Act).

Signed into law as part of H.R. 133, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, [for Fiscal Year] 2021 (“CAA”), the CASE Act creates a Copyright Claims Board (“CCB”) within the Copyright Office to handle small copyright claims (small only in the sense of their relatively modest economic value). As there is some time before the CCB comes into operation, the earliest being December 21, 2021, and the latest June 2022, now is a good time to provide an overview of just what the CASE Act does. Before venturing fully into the mechanics of the CASE Act, however, it is important to first highlight why its supporters felt it was needed.

Why Is It Needed?

Copyright cases are almost exclusively an area of federal jurisdiction, meaning that copyright infringement cases must be brought in a federal rather than state court; however, litigating a copyright infringement case in federal court is anything but easy. First, the average cost of litigating a copyright infringement claim has been estimated at $397,000—a cost that often greatly outweighs any potential recovery for Creators’ works. It is for this reason that many attorneys are simply unwilling to take Creators’ copyright infringement cases, leaving many Creators feeling disenfranchised.

Second, the complexity of the federal court system is often overwhelming for Creators. As stated in the Copyright Office’s 2013 Copyright Small Claims report, “Small copyright owners, who frequently lack experience with federal courts, often find federal litigation too difficult . . . and may be unable to navigate ‘the often complex procedural rules that govern federal litigation . . . .’” As highlighted in the report, even the Copyright Act’s registration requirement—the gateway requirement to launch a copyright infringement claim—can be problematic for Creators. It requires that a copyright owner successfully register, or receive a rejection of registration, from the Copyright Office before launching an infringement claim. Moreover, for a Creator to qualify for statutory damages and attorney’s fees, the Copyright Act requires the registration of the work within three months of its publication, or if unpublished, before the act of infringement. The failure to register within the required time is critical, as without the potential recovery of statutory damages (which can range up to $150,000 per work infringed), a Creator’s recovery would not likely overcome the legal fees incurred litigating the case.

As stated in the report, the result of this cost and complexity is that “federal court is effectively inaccessible to copyright owners seeking redress for claims of relatively low economic value, especially individual creators who are of limited resources.” Enter the CASE Act, which aims to create a less expensive and less procedurally complex alternative to the current system by creating the CCB within the Copyright Office. But how will the CCB operate?

How Will It Operate?

When the CCB becomes operational, a party will have the choice of commencing a copyright infringement proceeding in either federal court or the CCB. In contrast to federal court, and as will be discussed in more detail later, proceedings in the CCB are completely voluntary. Another way in which the CCB differs from federal court is in its authority over copyright infringement claims only where the total damages sought do not exceed $30,000. As to the CCB’s structure, it will be composed of three full-time Copyright Claims Officers. Each of the Officers must have seven years of legal experience; two of them must also have extensive copyright adjudication experience, while one must have extensive alternative dispute resolution experience. The Librarian of Congress will appoint these Officers to staggered six-year terms, and they will be supported by at least two full-time Copyright Claims Attorneys with at least three years of experience.

To make the CCB more accessible to Creators, the CCB’s proceedings aim to be more streamlined and user friendly than federal courts. A proceeding before the CCB begins when the claimant files a claim to the CCB that includes the proper filing fee and a statement of the material facts. In contrast to federal court, the CASE Act only requires a completed application for registration of the claimant’s work(s), rather than a certificate of registration or refusal of registration by the Copyright Office to commence the claim. After the claim is approved for compliance with the law and applicable regulations by a Copyright Claims Attorney, the claimant has 90 days to complete service. After receiving service, the respondent then has 60 days to opt out of the proceeding before it becomes “active”; however, in the “interests of justice,” the CCB can extend this window another 60 days.

The user-friendly goal of the CCB is best exhibited by the Act’s requirement that the proceedings take place solely “by means of written submissions, hearings, and conferences carried out through internet-based applications.” The only exception to this convenience is when there is “material” “physical or other nontestimonial evidence” that otherwise the CCB cannot review. Further, proceedings before the CCB will be more informal than in federal court. There is no requirement for representation by an attorney, there is limited discovery, and the formal rules of evidence do not apply. If the parties do not settle, at the close of the proceeding the CCB must make factual findings based on the preponderance of the evidence and issue a publicly available written determination.

With regard to remedies, the CCB has the authority to award either actual damages, and the respondent’s profits, or statutory damages. If the CCB awards statutory damages, it “may not make any finding that, or consider whether, the infringement was committed willfully,” and if timely registration has been made with the Copyright Office, the CCB can award up to $15,000 for each work infringed, though this is subject to a $30,000 maximum. In an important shift from existing law, however, even if the work was not timely registered, the CCB may still award up to $7,500 for each work infringed to a maximum total of $15,000 in a single proceeding.

Within 30 days of the issuance of the final determination of the CCB, a party can request reconsideration by the CCB. After giving the other parties an opportunity to respond, the CCB may either deny the request or amend the determination. If the CCB denies the request for reconsideration, a party then has 30 days to request the Register of Copyrights to review the CCB’s determination. After giving the other parties time to respond, the Register may deny or remand the proceeding to the CCB for reconsideration. Finally, within 90 days of the final determination, or the post-determination reconsideration, a party can appeal to a U.S. District Court. It is also in federal district court where a party can seek enforcement of the CCB’s determination if the other parties to the matter refuse to abide by its determination. For a visual representation of this process, the Copyright Alliance has put together an informative flowchart.

The CASE Act requires that three years after the CCB becomes operational the Register of Copyrights make assessment of its effectiveness. While whether the CASE Act will create the change hoped for by its supporters is yet to be seen, in my view, the attention given to address the challenges to Creators is critically important.

Tags CASE Act, Consolidated Appropriations Act, copyright, Copyright Act of 1976, Copyright Alliance, Copyright Alternative in Small-Claims Enforcement Act, Copyright Claims Board, court, creators, Librarian of Congress, Register of Copyrights, Ryan Reynolds, small claims

Professor Justin Hughes on “Restating Copyright Law’s Originality Requirement”

Post author By Joshua Grove
Post date May 20, 2021

The following post comes from Ryan Reynolds, a 3L at Scalia Law and Research Assistant at CPIP.

By Ryan Reynolds

In the 89 years following the publishing of the first Restatement of Law in 1932, the American Law Institute’s (ALI) Restatements have become an important tool for those in the legal community to better understand different bodies of law. Despite the success of the Restatements, however, their expansion into different areas of law has not always been received with open arms. Such is the case with the Restatement of Copyright. Since the project was revealed in 2015, many have voiced their skepticism of the project, questioning both its utility and whether its supporters truly want to restate the law or instead reform it. It is against this backdrop that Professor Justin Hughes’ forthcoming article, Restating Copyright Law’s Originality Requirement, finds itself situated.

In his forthcoming article, Prof. Hughes provides a detailed review of the draft Restatement’s treatment of one of the threshold requirements for copyright protection: the “originality” requirement. This requirement is established per §102(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976, which states that “[c]opyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship [emphasis added].” To determine whether a work is sufficiently original to be copyrightable, however, the Supreme Court created a two-pronged test in its seminal 1991 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. opinion. First, the work must be “independently created by the author,” which means that the author created the work without knowingly copying another’s work; second, the work must possess a “modicum of creativity”—which, by all accounts, is a very low bar.

Prof. Hughes concludes that, despite the inspiration for the project “by academics who felt the pace of reform of copyright law . . . has been too slow, [and] in the wrong direction,” the draft Restatement “stick[s] to a centrist, sometimes minimalist, narrative of Feist’s two-step framework.” This notwithstanding, Prof. Hughes notes that there are several “occasional missteps” and “a few points of genuine concern” with the current draft Restatement.

The Draft Restatement’s Treatment of The “Originality Requirement”

As noted by Prof. Hughes, the draft Restatement follows the general framework of Feist with § 5 “‘Originality: In General,’” stating in 5(b) that, “‘[f]or a work to be original, the work must be independently created by its author, as discussed in § 6, and must embody expression that is at least minimally creative, as discussed in § 7.’”

In his review, Prof. Hughes examines § 6 and § 7 respectively, beginning first with § 7’s treatment of Feist’s modicum of creativity requirement.

§ 7’s Treatment of the Modicum of Creativity Requirement

Describing it as the “true heart of the draft Restatement’s originality exercise,” Prof. Hughes commends the draft Restatement for what it does well while also criticizing it on several grounds. As for what he believes it does well, Prof. Hughes approves of the language shift from 7(a)’s, which focuses on “expression that is…minimally creative,” to 7(b) and 7(c)’s, which focuses on the author’s “choices.” While acknowledging that others have criticized the section for “this sleight of hand,” Prof. Hughes believes that this properly reflects the “shift from what courts are supposed to do to what courts actually do [emphasis in original].” As explained by Prof. Hughes, while Feist directs courts to look for a modicum of creativity, the Supreme Court’s 1903 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co. decision prohibits judges from making “aesthetic judgments” on what is and is not creative. To resolve this tension, Prof. Hughes explains that courts look to the creative choices in the creation of a work to determine minimal creativity. Therefore, Prof. Hughes believes the draft Restatement’s focus on author’s “choices” accurately reflects the practice of courts; however, as it barely mentions Bleistein, it does not adequately explain to the reader what it is doing.

Further, Prof. Hughes criticizes § 7 for not following its treatment of author’s “choices” consistently where 7(c) is concerned. The relevant language of 7(c) says that “‘[t]he minimal-creativity requirement is not satisfied by choices . . . (such as . . . the tools used to produce the work . . . ).’” Prof. Hughes argues that this provision is incorrect, as “[t]he artist’s choice of which tools to use is part of the creative process. The sculptor’s choice of which chisel to pick up—width of blade, angle of blade, hardness of steel, etc.––may be an expressive choice.”

Another problem Prof. Hughes identifies with the draft Restatement of § 7 is that “Section 7(b) clearly seems intended to limit ‘selection, coordination, and arrangement’ as possible bases for original expression to ‘compilation’ works.” While the current draft of 7(b) states that, “In the case of a compilation [emphasis in original], choices regarding the selection, coordination, or arrangement of elements can satisfy the minimal creativity requirement even if those elements are not themselves original,” the 2018 version “did not have this limitation and was more open-ended.” As expressed by Prof. Hughes, “This intent to limit selection, coordination, and arrangement of bases for minimal creativity to the category of ‘compilation’ works is not an accurate reflection of case law [emphasis in original].”

Prof. Hughes also criticizes the draft Restatement both for what it chooses to say and chooses not to say about creativity. As to the former, while comments to § 7 do not provide a definitive definition of what is or is not original, they do provide a list outlining what minimal creativity requires. While to Prof. Hughes this list is helpful, it is also imperfect and raises concerns. One concern he highlights is its potential to raise the minimal-creativity bar, thereby narrowing copyright’s protections. To this point, Prof. Hughes highlights that, in the draft Restatement’s list, it provides that creativity must be “‘making non-obvious choices from more than a few options.’” As Prof. Hughes breaks down, “[t]hat appellate court dictum is directly contradictory to the Supreme Court’s statement in Feist . . . that the minimal-creativity requirement . . . can be met by ‘some creative spark, ‘no matter how crude, humble, or obvious’’[emphasis in original].”

As to what the draft Restatement chooses not to say about creativity, Prof. Hughes first believes that, to improve, the draft Restatement should “includ[e] . . . a discussion of how choices that manifest individual personality,” such as the decisions of photographers on how they take pictures, are “protectable original expression.” To this point, Prof. Hughes believes that “the most serious shortcoming” of § 7 is the Reporters’ decision not to address Bleistein—which, in the cited words of Prof. Barton Beebe, “‘directly connected ‘originality’ with personal expression.’” Second, Prof. Hughes believes that § 7 should acknowledge “‘intellectual’ choices” as “part of the minimal-creativity equation.”

§ 6’s Treatment of The Independent Creation Requirement

Moving onto his review of § 6, Prof. Hughes first points to its language: “A work meets the independent-creation criterion for originality if the author has contributed some expression to the work without copying that expression from any preexisting work.” While Prof. Hughes believes that the “formulation is ok,” he quickly points out issues he sees with the section’s comments and Reporters’ Notes. First, Prof. Hughes notes that Comment a’s statement “that ‘[f]or expression to be independently created, it must come from the mind of the author’ . . . arguably conflates the two Feist prongs”—a conflation he notes Comment b also likely commits. As Prof. Hughes explains, “the independent production requirement is that the expression be made or brought into the world by a person who had not experienced the same expression previously [emphasis in original],” and therefore “[i]t is not necessary that it ‘come from the mind of the author.’” As Prof. Hughes illustrates, “If a person throws a set of dice one hundred times and writes down the resulting dice totals from each roll on a list, that list was ‘independently-created’ under Feist.”

Prof. Hughes is also critical of the discussion of “novelty” in Comment b, which says that “‘the expression need not be novel or unique.’” While he believes the Reporters’ Notes make an important point, he sees the use of the word “novelty” as simply “too loaded with patent law baggage.” As he explains, the independent-creation standard for Copyright is different from patent law’s “novelty” standard, as “[c]opyright’s independent-creation requirement does not mean that the thing cannot already exist in the world.” Therefore, as there may be confusion in using the word “novelty,” Prof. Hughes recommends removing it altogether.

Lastly, Prof. Hughes also questions the amount of attention the Comments and Reporters’ Notes to § 6 dedicate to nonhuman authorship. After providing an overview of the current limited case law surrounding this issue, he concludes that, while “[t]hese issues are fun conjecture for academics, . . . [they] are so rarefied as to wonder why the draft Restatement discusses them at all.”

Tags ALI, American Law Institute, Barton Beebe, copyright, creativity, Justin Hughes, Restatement of Copyright, Ryan Reynolds, Supreme Court

Artist Roundtable Presented by the Mason Sports & Entertainment Law Association and the Arts & Entertainment Advocacy Clinic

Post author By Joshua Grove
Post date May 5, 2021

The following post comes from Austin Shaffer, a 2L at Scalia Law and a Research Assistant at CPIP.

By Austin Shaffer

On April 6th, the Mason Sports & Entertainment Law Association, in conjunction with the Arts & Entertainment Advocacy Clinic, hosted its Artist Roundtable event. Moderated by Professor Sandra Aistars of Scalia Law, the panel featured musician and producer David Lowery, filmmaker and photographer Stacey Marbrey, and author and director David Newhoff. To kick off the event, Prof. Aistars invited each of the panelists to introduce themselves and highlight any ongoing projects.

About the Panelists

Stacey Marbrey is an award-winning film director, producer, and internationally recognized editorial photographer and has programmed numerous film festivals. Previously, she acted as Program Director for an international film exchange under the auspices of the U.S. Department of State in concert with both the President’s Committee on the Arts and Humanities and the American Film Institute.

David Lowery is an American guitarist, vocalist, songwriter, mathematician, and activist. He is the founder of alternative rock band Camper Van Beethoven and co-founder of the traditional rock band Cracker. Throughout his career in the music industry, Mr. Lowery has worked in nearly every role imaginable, from both the business and music perspectives. Recently, he worked on a small project with limited online CD sales to experiment with a new revenue stream and business model. Mr. Lowery frequently posts at the popular blog “The Trichordist.”

David Newhoff is a writer and copyright advocate. He recently finished his first book, Who Invented Oscar Wilde? The Photograph at the Center of Modern American Copyright. He lives in New York’s Hudson River Valley, where he is currently working on his next book. Mr. Newhoff also writes the popular copyright blog “The Illusion of More.”

How do creative roles intersect with legal issues? What can lawyers do a better job of understanding when engaging with creators?

Mr. Lowery highlighted the importance of the intersection between the arts and legal roles. Unfortunately, he noted, there is a stigma in the artistic community regarding the use of legal action. He commented that, while you should generally attempt to resolve disputes internally, you cannot be afraid to use the legal system to enforce your rights. Even the legally savvy artists can misjudge the scope of the rights to which they are entitled. Mr. Lowery emphasized the need to provide artists with an “intervention”: register your works with the Copyright Office, guarantee your revenue streams with the Mechanical Licensing Collective, and enforce your rights.

On a similar note, Mr. Newhoff echoed the notion that some artists do not fully appreciate the scope of their rights and––perhaps more importantly—their obligations. It is not uncommon, he explained, for creators to assume that their publisher will handle all the legal responsibilities that go into creating a work (i.e., clearing photographs, obtaining permission to publish interviews, etc.). That assumption, however, leaves the author subject to potential liability for copyright infringement. Rather than taking that risk, Mr. Newhoff argued, creators should be proactive in fulfilling their legal obligations.

Commenting on Mr. Newhoff’s observations, Ms. Marbrey remarked that, in many cases, creators wear many different hats and serve in various roles throughout the course of creating a work. Particularly in the film industry, it can be difficult for creators to keep their various duties and obligations separated and organized. Ms. Marbrey argued that this is one problem that lawyers can help to solve. By taking the time to understand the numerous roles in which a single creator may serve, lawyers can help to ensure that creators are getting maximum value out of their efforts.

The Stigma Against Contracts

The panelists each made unique observations on the use of contracts and how their respective industries tend to perceive them. Prof. Aistars pointed out a concerning trend: creators tend to have a negative view towards contracts and consequently refrain from using them. She commented that, in general, no one wants to be the person to involve lawyers in otherwise “friendly deals.”

The panelists shared stories from their careers that demonstrated this stigma. Ms. Marbrey, for example, worked on a collaborative project involving multiple SAG actors. The parties declined to set up a contractual framework to properly address various SAG-AFTRA requirements for actors. Consequently, the production was later paused to renegotiate deals with the actors after the film was already completed. Due to this misstep, the release of the project was delayed.

The panelists concluded that, while it may force some uncomfortable conversations at the onset of a project, creators should become more liberal with their use of contracts. Doing so allows for a mutual understanding between all parties before any time is invested into the creative process.

Current Trends to Watch in Copyright Law

This portion of the discussion offered a unique insight into the development of copyright law from creators’ perspectives. While the conversation was wide-ranging, there were several common topics that the panelists found especially significant.

The panelists came to a consensus that the general agenda of weakening copyright law could cause devastating effects to the creative community. Mr. Newhoff pointed specifically to the ongoing work being done by the American Law Institute (ALI) on a potential Restatement of Copyright. He argued that broadly speaking, the academic world tends to take an anti-copyright law stance. The panelists agreed that this should generate concern from the creative community and that individual creators should strive to have their voices heard as this project continues.

In general, creators tend to have difficulties understanding the scope of fair use. Especially given the recent Supreme Court decision in Google v. Oracle, there is an element of amorphousness to the fair use doctrine. The panelists concurred that, without legal assistance, creators will likely continue to struggle in determining what constitutes fair use and what requires a license to use.

The event concluded with a discussion on how creators can adapt to and update with the digital age. As a threshold matter, Mr. Newhoff argued that it is hard to fit 20th-century copyright doctrine into the 21st-century landscape. Moving forward, some of the copyright laws may need to be updated (or at least monitored) to better facilitate the production of creative works. Optimistically, Ms. Marbrey noted that the “streaming takeover” is exciting for filmmakers. Although streaming can pose tricky and previously unconsidered issues surrounding copyright law, it offers a new way for creators to showcase their works and opens the door to innovative revenue streams.

Tags artists, Arts & Entertainment Advocacy Clinic, Austin Shaffer, contracts, copyright, David Lowery, David Newhoff, event, fair use, film, Google v. Oracle, Mason Sports & Entertainment Law Association, music, panel, Sandra Aistars, Stacey Marbrey, streaming, Supreme Court

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