Tag: copyright

Twenty Years Later, DMCA More Broken Than Ever

Post author By Joshua Grove
Post date April 24, 2019

With Section 512 of the DMCA, Congress sought to “preserve[] strong incentives for service providers and copyright owners to cooperate to detect and deal with copyright infringements that take place in the digital networked environment.”[1] Given the symbiotic relationship between copyright owners and service providers, Congress meant to establish an online ecosystem where both would take on the benefits and burdens of policing copyright infringement. This shared-responsibility approach was codified in the Section 512 safe harbors. But rather than service providers and copyright owners working together to prevent online piracy, Section 512 has turned into a notice-and-takedown regime where copyright owners do most of the work. This is not what Congress intended, and the main culprit is how the courts have misinterpreted Section 512’s red flag knowledge standards.

Several provisions in Section 512 demonstrate that Congress expected service providers to also play a role in preventing copyright infringement by doing some of the work in finding and removing infringing material. In order to benefit from the safe harbors, service providers must designate an agent to receive takedown notices, respond expeditiously to takedown notices, act upon representative lists, implement reasonable repeat infringer policies, and accommodate standard technical measures. But it’s also clear that service providers have the duty to remove infringing content even without input from copyright owners. As the Senate Report notes, “Section 512 does not require use of the notice and take-down procedure.”[2] And the knowledge provisions in Section 512 reflect this. Absent a takedown notice, service providers must, “upon obtaining . . . knowledge or awareness” of infringing material or activity, “act[] expeditiously to remove . . . the material” in order to maintain safe harbor protection.[3]

Under Section 512, there are two kinds of knowledge that trigger the removal obligation without input from the copyright owner—actual and red flag. For sites hosting user-uploaded content, actual knowledge is “knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on the system or network is infringing”[4] and red flag knowledge is “aware[ness] of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.”[5] Thus, actual knowledge requires knowledge that specific material (“the material”) or activity using that specific material (“activity using the material”) is actually infringing (“is infringing”), while red flag knowledge requires only general awareness (“aware[ness] of facts or circumstances”) that activity appears to be infringing (“is apparent”). There are similar knowledge provisions for search engines.[6]

Importantly, actual knowledge refers to “the material,” and red flag knowledge does not. It instead refers to “infringing activity”—and it’s not the infringing activity, but infringing activity generally.[7] However, with both actual and red flag knowledge, the service provider is obligated to remove “the material.”[8] With actual knowledge, the service provider doesn’t have to go looking for “the material” since it already has actual, subjective knowledge of it. But what about with red flag knowledge where the service provider only knows of “infringing activity” generally? How does it know “the material” to take down? The answer is simple: Once the service provider is subjectively aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity would be objectively apparent[9]—that is, once it has red flag knowledge—it has to investigate and find “the material” to remove.[10]

The examples given in the legislative history, which relate to search engines, show that red flag knowledge puts the burden on the service provider. As the Senate Report notes, merely viewing “one or more well known photographs of a celebrity at a site devoted to that person” would not hoist the red flag since the images might be licensed or fair use.[11] However, sites that are “obviously infringing because they . . . use words such as ‘pirate,’ ‘bootleg,’ or slang terms . . . to make their illegal purpose obvious . . . from even a brief and casual viewing” do raise the red flag.[12] And a search engine “that views such a site and then establishes a link to it . . . must do so without the benefit of a safe harbor.”[13] Thus, Congress didn’t want search engines worrying about questionable infringements on a small scale, but it also didn’t want search engines to catalog sites that are clearly dedicated to piracy. And, most importantly, red flag knowledge kicks in once a service provider looks at something that is “obviously pirate”—even if it’s an entire website.[14]

So how has Congress’s commonsensical plan worked out? Not very well. As of today, Google indexes nearly 1.5 million results from the infamous pirate site, The Pirate Bay.[15] Like the examples in the legislative history, The Pirate Bay has the word “pirate” in its title, and a brief viewing of the site reveals its obvious, infringing purpose. And it’s not like Google hasn’t been told that The Pirate Bay is dedicated to infringement—nor that it needs to be told. According to data from the Google Transparency Report,[16] the search engine has received requests to remove over 4 million URLs from thepiratebay.org domain alone. There are many other related domains, such as thepiratebay.se, that have received millions of requests as well. In fact, Google tells us that it has received requests to remove over 4 billion URLs from its search engine due to copyright infringement, with many domains receiving more than 10 million requests each.

So how is it that Google can index The Pirate Bay and not be worried about losing its safe harbor? The answer is that the courts have construed Section 512 in a way that contradicts the statutory text and Congress’s intent. They’ve all but read red flag knowledge out of Section 512 and placed the burden of policing infringement disproportionately on the copyright owner. And by narrowing the applicability of red flag knowledge, the courts have perversely incentivized service providers to do as little as possible to prevent infringements. Instead of looking into infringing activity of which they are subjectively aware, they are better off doing nothing lest they gain actual, specific knowledge that would remove their safe harbor protection.

A brief traverse through the case law, especially in the Second and Ninth Circuits, shows how the red flag knowledge train has been derailed. In Perfect 10 v. CCBill, the Ninth Circuit held that domains such as illegal.net and stolencelebritypics.com—the very sort of indicia mentioned in the legislative history—were not enough to raise the red flag.[17] According to the court, “describing photographs as ‘illegal’ or ‘stolen’ may be an attempt to increase their salacious appeal, rather than an admission that the photographs are actually illegal or stolen.”[18] While that’s certainly possible, it’s not likely. And it defies common sense. The Ninth Circuit concluded: “We do not place the burden of determining whether photographs are actually illegal on a service provider.”[19] But this misses the point, and it conflates red flag knowledge with actual knowledge.

The Second Circuit in Viacom v. YouTube held that the “difference between actual and red flag knowledge is . . . not between specific and generalized knowledge, but instead between a subjective and an objective standard.”[20] The court arrived there by focusing on the removal obligation, reasoning that “expeditious removal is possible only if the service provider knows with particularity which items to remove.”[21] And it rejected an “amorphous obligation” to investigate “in response to a generalized awareness of infringement.”[22] By limiting red flag knowledge to specific instances of infringement, the Second Circuit severely curtailed the obligations of service providers to police infringements on their systems. The entire point of red flag knowledge is to place a burden on the service provider to investigate the infringing activity further so that the specific material can be removed.[23]

The Ninth Circuit followed suit in UMG Recordings v. Shelter Capital, holding that red flag knowledge requires specificity.[24] The court reasoned that requiring “specific knowledge of particular infringing activity makes good sense” because it will “foster cooperation” between copyright owners and service providers “in dealing with infringement” online.[25] This “cooperation,” according to the Ninth Circuit, would come from takedown notices sent by copyright owners, who “know precisely what materials they own, and are thus better able to efficiently identify” infringing materials than service providers, “who cannot readily ascertain what material is copyrighted and what is not.”[26] Of course, this is not the shared-responsibility approach envisioned by Congress, and it conflates the red flag knowledge standards with the obligation to respond to takedown notices—separate provisions in Section 512.

Perhaps the most significant gutting of red flag knowledge can be found in the Second Circuit’s opinion in Capitol Records v. Vimeo.[27] The district court below had held that it was a question for the jury whether full-length music videos of current, famous songs that had been viewed by the service provider amounted to red flag knowledge.[28] But the Second Circuit disagreed that there was any jury question: “[T]he mere fact that a video contains all or substantially all of a piece of recognizable, or even famous, copyrighted music and was to some extent viewed . . . would be insufficient (without more) to sustain the copyright owner’s burden of showing red flag knowledge.”[29] That this gloss on red flag knowledge “reduces it to a very small category” was of “no significance,” the Second Circuit reasoned, since “the purpose of § 512(c) was to give service providers immunity, in exchange for augmenting the arsenal of copyright owners by creating the notice-and-takedown mechanism.”[30]

The Second Circuit thus held as a matter of law that there was no need for the factfinder to determine whether the material was so obviously infringing that it would raise the red flag. How is this a question of law and not fact? The court never explains. More importantly, this flies in the face of what Congress provided for with red flag knowledge, and it demotes Section 512 to being merely a notice-and-takedown regime where copyright owners are burdened with identifying infringements on URL-by-URL basis. Giving service providers a free pass when confronted with a red flag turns the Section 512 framework on its head. And it enables service providers to game the system and build business models on widespread, infringing content—even if they welcome it—so long as they respond to takedown notices. The end result is that an overwhelming amount of obvious infringements goes unchecked, and there’s essentially no cooperation between service providers and copyright owners as Congress intended.

[1] S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 40 (emphasis added); see also H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(II), at 49.

[2] Id. at 45; see also H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(II), at 54.

[3] 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii); see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(1)(C).

[4] Id. at § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added).

[5] Id. at § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) (emphasis added).

[6] See id. at §§ 512(d)(1)(A)-(B).

[7] See 4-12B Nimmer on Copyright § 12B.04[A][1][b][ii] (“By contrast, to show that a ‘red flag’ disqualifies defendant from the safe harbor, the copyright owner must simply show that ‘infringing activity’ is apparent—pointedly, not ‘the infringing activity’ alleged in the complaint.” (emphasis in original)).

[8] 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii)

[9] S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 44 (“The ‘red flag’ test has both a subjective and an objective element. In determining whether the service provider was aware of a ‘red flag,’ the subjective awareness of the service provider of the facts or circumstances in question must be determined. However, in deciding whether those facts or circumstances constitute a ‘red flag’–in other words, whether infringing activity would have been apparent to a reasonable person operating under the same or similar circumstances–an objective standard should be used.”); see also H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(II), at 53.

[10] Id at 48 (“Under this standard, a service provider would have no obligation to seek out copyright infringement, but it would not qualify for the safe harbor if it had turned a blind eye to ‘red flags’ of obvious infringement.”); see also H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(II), at 57.

[11] Id.; see also H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(II), at 57-58.

[12] Id.; see also H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(II), at 58.

[13] Id. at 48-49; see also H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(II), at 58.

[14] Id. at 49; see also H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(II), at 58.

[15] See The Pirate Bay, available at https://www.thepiratebay.org/.

[16] See Google Transparency Report, available at https://transparencyreport.google.com/.

[17] See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007).

[18] Id. at 1114.

[19] Id.

[20] Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012).

[21] Id. at 30.

[22] Id. at 30-31.

[23] See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(I), at 26 (“Once one becomes aware of such information, however, one may have an obligation to check further.”).

[24] UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013).

[25] Id. at 1021-22.

[26] Id. at 1022.

[27] Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2016).

[28] Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 972 F. Supp. 2d 537, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[B]ased on the type of music the videos used here—songs by well-known artists, whose names were prominently displayed—and the placement of the songs within the video (played in virtually unaltered form for the entirety of the video), a jury could find that Defendants had ‘red flag’ knowledge of the infringing nature of the videos.”).

[29] Capitol Records, 826 F.3d at 94 (emphasis in original).

[30] Id. at 97.

I presented this at the Fordham IP Conference on April 25, 2019. My oral presentation is here, and the accompanying slides are here.

How the Supreme Court Made it Harder for Copyright Owners to Protect Their Rights—And Why Congress Should Fix It

Post author By Joshua Grove
Post date March 7, 2019

U.S. Supreme Court building Earlier this week, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street.com, a case examining the registration precondition to filing a suit for copyright infringement in the federal district courts. While I agree with the Court’s exegesis of the statute at issue, it’s worth noting how the Court’s construction leaves many, if not most, copyright owners in the lurch. Under the Court’s holding, in fact, this very blog post could be infringed today, and there’s very little that could be done to stop it for many months to come. As the Court noted in Harper & Row v. Nation, “copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.” The Court’s holding in Fourth Estate, by contrast, disincentivizes dissemination since it undermines effective copyright protection and prejudices the public interest in the production of, and access to, creative works. Again, I don’t blame the Court for this outcome—in fact, I think it’s correct. The problem, as I’ll explain, lies in the unfortunate fact that nowadays it takes too long to register a copyright claim. And that’s something that Congress needs to fix.

The issue in Fourth Estate is straightforward. Under the first sentence of Section 411(a) of the Copyright Act, “no civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title.” Some courts, like the Ninth Circuit, have applied the so-called “application approach,” finding that “registration . . . has been made” when the copyright owner delivers a complete application to the Copyright Office. Other courts, like the Tenth Circuit, have applied the so-called “registration approach,” where “registration” is not “made” until the Register of Copyrights has acted upon the application (by either approving or rejecting it). Confounding the analysis is the fact that other sections of the Copyright Act alternatively delineate registration as something done by the applicant or by the Copyright Office.

In the decision below, the Eleventh Circuit applied the registration approach, affirming the district court’s dismissal of Fourth Estate’s complaint since the Register of Copyrights had not yet approved or denied its application to register. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision by Justice Ginsburg, affirmed: “We hold . . . that registration occurs, and a copyright claimant may commence an infringement suit, when the Copyright Office registers a copyright.” The issue for the Court was one of pure statutory construction, and the problem for proponents of the application approach is that the second sentence of Section 411(a) clearly indicates that registration is something done by the Copyright Office. It provides, as an exception to the first sentence, that a copyright owner can nevertheless sue for infringement once the application materials “have been delivered to the Copyright Office in proper form and registration has been refused.”

Justice Ginsburg reasoned: “If application alone sufficed to ‘ma[ke]’ registration, § 411(a)’s second sentence—allowing suit upon refusal of registration—would be superfluous.” I’ve always found this to be the better argument, and I’m not surprised to see it front-and-center in the Court’s analysis. Why would applicants need an exception that turns on the subsequent action of the Copyright Office if merely delivering a completed application sufficed? As Justice Ginsburg noted, the application approach “requires the implausible assumption that Congress gave ‘registration’ different meanings in consecutive, related sentences within a single statutory provision.” I think the Court got this one exactly right, and I don’t find arguments to the contrary to be particularly persuasive.

That said, let me now explain why it’s wrong—well, at least why it’s bad for millions of copyright owners and why Congress should fix it ASAP.

The purpose of the registration approach and other similar provisions in the Copyright Act (such as the availability of statutory damages or attorney’s fees) is to incentivize timely registration, which is no longer a prerequisite to copyright protection as it was under the Copyright Act of 1909. Under the current Copyright Act, copyright protection nominally exists once a work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression, and registration is no longer mandatory. (I say “nominally” because the Court’s holding in Fourth Estate ensures that, as a practical matter, countless works with respect to which copyright owners have exclusive rights on paper in fact have no immediate rights in the real world since they can’t actually file suit to quickly stop any ongoing infringement.) However, the incentive-to-register theory makes little sense in the context of the debate over the proper interpretation of Section 411(a) itself as the works being sued upon must be registered under both the application and registration approaches.

With due respect to the Copyright Office, processing a registration application is primarily a ministerial act. The vast majority of applications are granted—97% in 2017 according to the latest available data from the Copyright Office (though 29% of those applications required correspondence with the applicant). Are we really withholding remedies for all copyright owners because of the remaining 3%? And even for the 3% of applications that are denied, the copyright owner can still sue for infringement, asking the district court to reassess the agency’s refusal. No matter what the Copyright Office does with the application, whether it grants or denies, the copyright owner ultimately can sue. And, under the third sentence of Section 411(a), the Register of Copyrights can even “become a party to the action with respect to the issue of registrability of the copyright claim.” So it’s not like the Register can’t have a say should the application be in that slim minority of questionable ones that may merit intervention.

To its credit, the Supreme Court acknowledged that its holding would cause problems for copyright owners—but it also overplayed the exceptions to the registration approach that Congress put in place to alleviate some of these issues. For example, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that Section 408(f) empowers the Register of Copyrights to establish regulations for the preregistration of certain categories of works. Under this regime, as Justice Ginsburg noted, “Congress provided that owners of works especially susceptible to prepublication infringement should be allowed to institute suit before the Register has granted or refused registration.” That’s great for that particular subset of copyright owners, but what about everyone else? And what about authors who publish their works just as soon as they create them? Moreover, Justice Ginsburg’s blithe comment that copyright owners “may eventually recover damages for the past infringement” ignores the fact that injunctive relief to stop the actual, ongoing infringement is unavailable until the registration is processed by the Copyright Office.

The Court laments such policy ramifications: “True, the statutory scheme has not worked as Congress likely envisioned. Registration processing times have increased from one or two weeks in 1956 to many months today.” And this gets to the heart of the problem: The time it takes the Copyright Office to process an application has significantly increased over the years. Just four years after the Copyright Act of 1976 went into effect, the delay was “5 to 6 weeks.” And, as of October 2018, the delay has grown to an “average processing time for all claims” of “7 months.” Indeed, the fastest the Copyright Office processes an application now is one month, and the longest it takes is an incredible 37 months. The following illustration from the Copyright Office breaks this down with more particularity:

To be clear, I don’t think these delays are the Copyright Office’s fault. In fact, I think it’s Congress’s fault for not giving the agency more resources to do the very things that Congress requires it to do. Regardless, the fact remains that even copyright owners who do everything that the Copyright Act expects them to do in order to obtain the greatest protection for their works at the earliest that they can reasonably do so are still left without remedies should—or, perhaps more likely, when—infringement occur once they release their works to the world. The aforementioned constitutional goal of dissemination is thus undercut by the subservient goal of registration, for rational copyright owners would be less motivated to disseminate their works by the right to exclude when that right is in fact illusory. If Congress really wants authors to promote progress via dissemination of new works, it should adjust Section 411(a) to provide for immediate protection to all works, whether registered or not. It can still incentivize registration by limiting the remedies available, but it shouldn’t make it so that there are none.

To see the injustice, one need look no further than this very blog post. According to the Copyright Act, this post was protected the moment it was fixed in a tangible medium of expression (i.e., yesterday evening). Should the copyright owner—presumably the university where I work as this is a work made for hire—have filed for registration as quickly as possible (i.e., this morning), there still would be no way to obtain any injunctive relief while the Copyright Office processes the application. Preregistration was never an option as this post is not a literary work that is protected by the exception for certain works prone to prepublication infringement under Section 202.16 of the CFR. Even if the university had done everything that it was supposed to do as early as it could reasonably have done so to ensure the utmost copyright protection for this post, it could do nothing in the courts to stop an infringer who willfully exploits this post for profit until the Copyright Office acts upon the application—a lifetime for infringement in the digital age. (There is an option to expedite review for $800, but that amount of money is not reasonable for most people.)

Perhaps a takedown notice could be issued under Section 512 of the DMCA, but if there’s a counternotice, the university could not bring suit in the designated 10-14 day window to prevent the service provider from restoring the infringing material since there’s been no registration and thus it cannot sue for infringement. Despite having done everything Congress expected, the university would be powerless to stop the ongoing infringement of its exclusive rights in this post for perhaps several months into the future. And any argument that damages will compensate for infringements occurring before the Copyright Office got around to acting on the application is undercut by the fact that courts routinely grant preliminary injunctive relief precisely because the harm from infringement is irreparable—money damages cannot make the copyright owner whole.

The absurd result of all this is that the promise of exclusive rights in one’s original work of authorship is practically meaningless given the registration approach under Section 411(a). No doubt, Congress intended this disability to act as a stick in order to encourage the carrot of remedies should those rights be infringed. But the reality is that numerous copyright owners who do everything right get the stick and not the carrot—at least until the Copyright Office happens to process their applications. In the meantime, these copyright owners cannot be faulted for thinking twice before disseminating their works. Since enforcement of their rights is precluded through no fault of their own, what else does Congress expect them to do? A right without a remedy is senseless, and given the millions of original works that are created each day, Congress’s promise of copyright protection for new works may be one of the most illusory rights in modern times. Now that the Supreme Court has clarified Section 411(a), it’s time for Congress to fix it.

Tags copyright, Copyright Office, Devlin Hartline, Digital Millennium Copyright Act, DMCA, exclusive rights, Fourth Estate, infringement, registration, Section 411, Section 512, Supreme Court, USCO, Wall-Street.com

Supreme Court Holding on Recoverable Costs Misses the Mark

Post author By Joshua Grove
Post date March 6, 2019

U.S. Supreme Court building On Monday, the Supreme Court issued a decision holding that the “full costs” available to a prevailing party in a copyright dispute are limited to those litigation expenses specified as taxable under federal law. The opinion by Justice Kavanaugh reverses a Ninth Circuit interpretation of 17 USC § 505, which held that any costs incurred in the enforcement (or defense) of a copyright claim are recoverable, including expert witness and jury consultation fees. Unfortunately, most of the twelve-page opinion is dedicated to a cursory analysis of the term “full costs” and does not consider the adverse impact the decision will have on creators and the fundamental aims of copyright law.

The holding in Rimini Street Inc. v. Oracle USA Inc. stems from a 2010 lawsuit Oracle brought against Rimini, a global provider of aftermarket support for Oracle software, for copyright infringement and various other causes of action. Following a verdict in favor of Oracle, the damages awarded included attorneys’ fees, expert fees, consultant fees, and e-discovery costs. Rimini appealed the district court’s decision to the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the Copyright Act limits costs awarded to the taxable costs laid out in 28 USC §§ 1821 and 1920. After the Ninth Circuit found that a successful plaintiff may recover any and all costs incurred in litigation, Rimini filed a petition for cert, claiming that the interpretation of § 505 was in conflict with Supreme Court precedent.

An Incomplete Assessment

Holding that the term “full costs” in § 505 of the Copyright Act means the costs specified in the general costs statutes codified in §§ 1821 and 1920, the Supreme Court focuses its opinion on a hasty statutory interpretation with little regard for the underlying purpose of the copyright law. Recognizing that the term of art “full costs” differs from the term “costs” that appears in many other federal statutes, the opinion proceeds to explore the linguistic qualities of the word “full” and concludes that it cannot be interpreted to mean anything more than the mere “costs” referred to in §§ 1821 and 1920. The opinion does not consider the reasons why the language of the Copyright Act differs from that of other statutes, and it does not address the greater issues raised by amici which explain that the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of § 505 supports the Copyright Act’s mission to reward creators and serve the public interest.

The opinion also dismisses Oracle’s explanation of the historical context of the term “full costs,” claiming that Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., a 1987 Supreme Court case on expert witness fees, “explained that courts should not undertake extensive historical excavation to determine the meaning of costs statutes.” Curiously, just after dismissing the need for historical analysis, the Court gives credence to Rimini’s account of the term “full costs” in copyright decisions between 1831 and 1976. The opinion ends with a brief discussion of the problem of redundancy in a term like “full costs,” with the Court simply stating that “[s]ometimes the better overall reading of the statute contains some redundancy.”

Serving the Purpose of Copyright Law

Allowing parties to recover full costs encourages copyright owners to bring meritorious claims and incentivizes them to litigate a case to the end when the use of technical and specialized experts is critical. This is especially important for creators of limited means who face overwhelming litigation costs when bringing copyright infringement claims in federal court. Without the ability to recoup the non-taxable costs required of the unique challenges associated with fighting infringement in the digital age, these creators are stripped of the incentives to protect their work that copyright law is meant to provide.

But it’s not just claimants who will be disadvantaged by denying the recovery of costs outside of §§ 1821 and 1920. Parties with a meritorious defense often also need specialized experts, e-discovery, and consultants, and the inability to recover costs related to these services would just as likely eliminate incentives to defend against infringement claims. Removing incentives for both plaintiffs and defendants to pursue worthwhile claims and defenses in turn deprives courts the opportunity to develop—and the public the opportunity to understand—the distinctions of copyright law.

The Rimini v. Oracle opinion seems unconcerned with the consequences its interpretation of § 505 will likely have on copyright litigation. At a time when high costs are commonplace in the enforcement of (and defense against) copyright claims, incentivizing parties to see a case through is crucial. As individual creators and parties of limited means attempt to protect their works in the age of online infringement, courts should have the discretion to award costs based on the circumstances of the case.

Denying parties the ability to recover the significant costs will not only deter legitimate claims, but it will embolden wrongdoers who know that plaintiffs are unable to effectively enforce their rights. Removing incentives and thereby tipping the scales in favor of infringers will devalue intellectual property rights and stray from the goals of the Copyright Act. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to explore the fundamental purposes of copyright law and reinforce a system that should encourage meaningful litigation.

Tags copyright, copyright litigation, costs, full costs, Oracle, Rimini, Section 1821, Section 1920, Section 505, Supreme Court

Arts & Entertainment Advocacy Clinic Students File Amicus Brief in Brammer v. Violent Hues

Post author By Joshua Grove
Post date November 20, 2018

a gavel lying on a desk in front of books By Rachelle Mortimer & Grant Ossler*

The Arts & Entertainment Advocacy Clinic at Antonin Scalia Law School recently filed an amicus brief in the Brammer v. Violent Hues case that is on appeal in the Fourth Circuit. The Clinic provides a unique opportunity for students interested in intellectual property and entertainment law. Each semester, students participating in the Clinic are able to gain practical experience working with clients and industry professionals on various projects related to copyright law and policy.

One organization that the Clinic often works with is Washington Area Lawyers for the Arts (WALA), which helps to provide legal services for local artists through volunteer attorneys who take on cases pro bono or at a reduced rate. By working with WALA to hold legal intake Clinics and take on pro bono cases, Clinic students are able to understand how copyright law affects individual artists. It is this understanding that led the Clinic to file the amicus brief in order to protect the rights of artists and prevent a dangerous expansion of the fair use defense to infringement.

Working with local attorneys from Protorae Law, students from the Clinic drafted portions of the amicus brief to explain how the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia eviscerated the meaning and analysis of fair use under the Copyright Act.

Case Background

In 2016, the owner of defendant Violent Hues found a photograph online, copied it, cropped it, and posted it on a website that his organization created for its annual film festival. The photo in question was first posted to the photographer’s personal website, as well as to several online image-sharing websites. Violent Hues created the website to guide festival goers and provide information about the local area for filmmakers and festival attendees.

The owner of Violent Hues claimed he did not see a copyright notice on the photo when he used it, believing the photo was “a publicly available photograph.” Plaintiff Russell Brammer sent a demand letter, and upon receipt of the letter, Violent Hues removed the photo from its website. Brammer brought suit against Violent Hues claiming two causes of action: (1) copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 504(b), and (2) removal and alteration of copyright management information under 17 U.S.C. § 1202.

District Court Decision

Brammer did not respond to arguments regarding count two, therefore the district court considered that claim abandoned. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Violent Hues on count one, deeming the use of the photo was fair use per the Copyright Act. Fair use is codified in the Copyright Act and guides us through four factors of consideration when conducting an analysis to determine whether a use is a fair use. These factors are:

(1) The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature …; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.

17 U.S.C.§ 107.

Unfortunately, the district court eviscerated any meaning to fair use under copyright law. In its examination of purpose and character, the district court determined Violent Hues’ use was “transformative in function and purpose” because Violent Hues’ use of the photo was informational: “to provide festival attendees with information regarding the local area.” The district court distinguished this from Brammer’s use, which was “promotional and expressive.” Additionally, the district court determined the use was non-commercial because the photo was not used for advertising or to generate revenue. Regrettably, this is as far as the transformative analysis went.

In the district court’s analysis of the second factor, fair use weighed in favor of Violent Hues again because the photo was factual in nature and “fair use is more likely to be found in factual works than in fictional works.” The district court acknowledged that Brammer incorporated creative elements in his photo (e.g., lighting and shutter speed), but ultimately held that because it was a “factual depiction of a real-world location,” it was purely factual content. The district court determined this without regard to creativity, though. The photo itself is a time-lapse photo of the Adams Morgan neighborhood of Washington, D.C.

In examining the third factor of fair use, the district court determined that Violent Hues did not use any more of the photo than was necessary, and therefore this factor substantiality weighed in favor of Violent Hues. Keep in mind, though, that the photo in question was merely cropped.

Lastly, the district court concluded that because there was no evidence that Violent Hues’ use had any effect on the potential market for the photo, the fourth factor also weighed in favor of Violent Hues. To support its decision, the district court stated: “The Court’s task is to determine whether the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s works would materially impair the marketability of the works and whether it would act as a market substitute.” The district court arrived at this decision despite Brammer testifying he had been compensated for the photo six times—two times after Violent Hues’ infringement.

And thus, we have summary judgment for Violent Hues under a non-comprehensive fair use analysis.

Amicus Brief Summary and Commentary

The purpose of the Clinic’s amicus brief is to assist the court with regard to a proper, comprehensive fair use analysis, and to prevent the possible harm that an overly broad interpretation of the fair use defense could bring.

In examining the first factor of fair use, “purpose and character”, the district court unfortunately dedicated approximately two sentences to the analysis of why Violent Hues’ use was transformative in “function and purpose.” The district court simply stated that because the use was “informational,” and not “expressive” like Brammer’s use, the use was thus transformative. The proper examination requires looking at whether the new use adds something new “with a further purpose or different character.” As Judge Leval stated in his seminal article, Toward a Fair Use Standard, a different purpose or character, constituting a transformative use, is one that “alter[s] the first with new expression, meaning, or message,” and “employs the quoted matter in a different manner or for a different purpose from the original, thus transforming it.”

The district court failed to understand that Violent Hues’ use merely superseded Brammer’s. Violent Hues cropped the top and bottom of Brammer’s photo then posted it to its website with the purpose of showing the Adams Morgan neighborhood. A “wholesale taking” of the heart of the work, without adding additional value or meaning, is not transformative. The erroneous conclusion reached on this first factor destroys any meaning to transformative use and effectively erodes the exclusive rights held by copyright owners. To further illustrate this point, if the district court’s analysis is upheld, an author who writes a book regarding his life as president and his controversial pardon of a former political figure would have no recourse against a film producer who takes the author’s content verbatim and makes it into a movie. Why? Because the book is merely “informational,” while the film is “expressive” and thus transformative in function and purpose.

The district court’s opinion also addressed the role of “good faith” in a fair use defense and concluded that Violent Hues had acted in good faith when it found Brammer’s photo online because a copyright notice was not attached. This is not the law. Copyright protection under U.S. law is automatic from the moment of creation and notice need not be affixed to the published work for that protection to adhere. The good faith of alleged infringers is not frequently considered in fair use cases because “good faith” is not a statutory factor in the fair use analysis, and this has led to a lack of clear precedent on this point.

We proposed in our brief that if an alleged infringer acts in good faith, the court should neither weigh this factor for or against a finding of fair use. However, if an alleged infringer is shown to have acted in bad faith, using an artist’s work with the purpose of usurping the exclusive rights under 17 U.S.C. § 106, it should be weighed against a finding of fair use. Good faith should not weigh in favor of fair use because the purpose of the fair use defense is to protect First Amendment rights and allow limited uses of copyrighted works. On the other hand, bad faith should be weighed against a finding of fair use because trying to usurp an artist’s rights or using a work without paying for it does not align with the important purposes of the fair use defense.

Violent Hues did not act in good faith, but it also did not act in bad faith. Thus, the good faith factor should not have been considered at all in this case. A copyright notice is not required for a photograph to be protected. If the court allows Violent Hues’ lack of education on copyright law to be considered good faith, this would encourage internet users to remain ignorant of copyright law and infringe upon works more frequently. For these reasons, we asked the Fourth Circuit to clarify the role of the good faith factor in a fair use analysis.

The other factor our amicus brief addressed was the second factor of the fair use analysis. Digging into this factor, we asked that the court to clarify the analytical framework for evaluating the nature of the copyrighted work. In clarifying this framework, parties and other courts will be better able to determine when factual elements of copyrighted works are outweighed by the creative elements of such works. Brammer’s photo, specifically, is an appropriate vehicle for this since it combines creative and factual elements. Our brief articulates that a court can borrow from more familiar concepts of trademark’s nominative fair use and the defense of necessity to the tort of trespass on real property (noting that the prevailing theory of copyright is a property). Such theories provide for a defense on the basis of “necessity.”

In this analysis of necessity, one would believe that content in the factual lexicon would lean strongly toward a finding of fair use for the alleged infringer. However, where the use of the copyrighted work is not necessary to convey the same factual content, the motivation behind copyright law should be preserved—rewarding and protecting creativity. Brammer’s photo was a time-lapse photo of the Adams Morgan neighborhood; it was creative and depicted a factual setting. However, the mere fact that an original, creative work is factual does not imply that others may freely copy it.

The district court improperly analyzed this second factor in light of Violent Hues’ use of the photo, and not the intended use of the content creator, giving greater weight to the fact that the photo depicted a real-world location. We argued that this analysis “sanctions abuse of the fair use defense to appropriate copyrighted material so long as the user can claim that a factual element within the whole was the reason for their unauthorized appropriation.” The appropriate analysis centers on the concept of protecting creative elements while simultaneously not limiting the public’s use of facts. In the case at hand, Violent Hues’ use of Brammer’s photo to convey factual information about Adams Morgan was unnecessary because to convey the same message, and arguably in a more factual manner, Violent Hues could have driven to Adams Morgan to take its own snapshot of the neighborhood.

Finally, the district court’s determination that prior publication weighs in favor of a fair use is erroneous. As Patry on Fair Use provides: “The fact that a work is published does not mean that the scope of fair use is broader.” To state that publishing a copyrighted work broadens the scope of fair use renders the exclusive rights afforded to copyright owners null. Such a holding undermines the “special reward” of copyright protection and discourages creation of works—in stark contrast to the affirmative statements on copyright in the U.S. Constitution. Publication should be viewed as neutral until it can be considered under the fourth factor of the fair use analysis, wherein a court examines the impact of the alleged infringing use on the market for the copyrighted work. The district court’s simplistic approach to its analysis allows for parties to undermine the core purposes of copyright protection and, again, eviscerates a proper fair use analysis.

It is our hope that our amicus brief will help guide the Fourth Circuit as it assesses the extent of the fair use doctrine in the digital age. We are especially thankful to Antigone Peyton and David Johnson of Protorae Law, Terrica Carrington of the Copyright Alliance, and Professor Sandra Aistars of the Arts & Entertainment Advocacy Clinic for the opportunity to work on this important issue. To read our amicus brief, please click here.

*Rachelle Mortimer and Grant Ossler are students at Antonin Scalia Law School, where they study under Professor Sandra Aistars in the Arts & Entertainment Advocacy Clinic.

Tags Arts & Entertainment Advocacy Clinic, Brammer, copyright, Copyright Alliance, fair use, Grant Ossler, Protorae Law, Rachelle Mortimer, Sandra Aistars, Terrica Carrington, Violent Hues

Will the EU Finally Hold Internet Giants Accountable?

Post author By Joshua Grove
Post date July 3, 2018

gold 3D copyright symbol On July 5th, the European Parliament will vote on a draft of the Copyright Directive for the Digital Single Market that has major implications for the future of copyright law in the European Union and beyond. At the center of the debate is Article 13, a provision that would require online platforms that feature user-generated content to screen uploads for infringing material. It’s a measure that represents a significant update to standards of accountability in the digital age, and it’s one that’s now necessary to combat the continual devaluation of creative works and to ensure the survival of essential creative ecosystems.

In the weeks and months leading up to the vote, advocates for Article 13’s defeat have become increasingly vocal in their opposition to the proposal. An overwhelming amount of those attacking Article 13 have resorted to fear-mongering and misinformed hyperbole. Detractors’ claims include everything from the ridiculous—insisting Article 13 will outlaw memes—to the clichéd—that efforts to impose platform accountability amount to censorship and will “break the internet.”

Fixing Outdated Safe Harbors and the YouTube Value Gap

Chief among opponents’ complaints is that Article 13 would destroy the safe harbors that guarantee platforms will not be liable for infringing content uploaded without their knowledge. At the turn of the century, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in the US and E-commerce Directive in Europe included safe harbor immunities as a way to encourage the development of the internet and the companies that were leading the way in online innovation. But these protections were never meant to be sweeping get-out-of-jail-free cards that encourage platforms to ignore infringing activity.

What’s become clear is that the immunities granted to tech giants through safe harbors haven’t properly incentivized them to stop profiting from illegal activity. These once-nurtured companies are now the most powerful and wealthy entities in the world, and business models based on the unauthorized distribution of protected works must be challenged.

Making matters worse is the fact that mechanisms meant to give creators and copyright owners a way to fight infringement have fallen short. Notice and takedown is an ineffective weapon against the incessant uploading of unauthorized content, and safe harbors allow online intermediaries to repeatedly turn a blind eye to—and profit from—massive amounts of copyright infringement occurring on their platforms.

The failure of procedures like notice and takedown are nowhere more apparent than on YouTube, where the futility of artists’ efforts to fight infringement has led to an inability to be fairly compensated for the exploitation of their works. When YouTube rose to prominence as the most popular streaming platform in the world—offering up free illegal streams of thousands of popular songs and movies—copyright owners quickly realized the law left them powerless to hold YouTube accountable for being a clearinghouse of stolen creative works.

This lack of control for creators combined with YouTube’s market dominance has created a “value gap” which leaves artists in a lose-lose predicament where they must choose between the meager compensation YouTube offers and nothing at all. Furthermore, legitimate streaming platforms are forced to compete with YouTube’s enormous and popular black market. Sadly, efforts similar to the current campaign against the EU Copyright Directive have enabled this market dysfunction to persist for over a decade.

A Campaign of Misinformation

Despite the Copyright Directive’s effort to clarify safe harbor qualifications and correct a glaring inequality, opponents of Article 13 insist content filtering provisions will result in censorship and destroy the internet as we know it. It’s a campaign that is recycling the same scare tactics and wild assumptions that seem to arise whenever there is an attempt to inject accountability in cyberspace.

A recent article by a leading European IP law expert takes many of these accusations to task, pointing to language in Article 13 that ensures a balancing of rights and interests through the introduction of exceptions and limitations by Member States “irrespective of whether the value gap proposal is adopted or not.” Article 13 clarifies that systems to prevent misuse or undue limitations to the exercise of exceptions must be adopted by Member States to ensure fundamental rights and freedom of expression are not compromised. The inclusion of carve outs and provisions that empower Member States to prohibit any behavior approaching censorship renders these doomsday “end of the internet” allegations baseless.

Additionally, the article explains that the current legal framework developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has already been moving towards addressing the value gap, and Article 13 “would not represent a dramatic shift from the way in which the law has developed up till now.” The article points out that safe harbor protections under Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive are only available to passive service providers who act as true intermediaries, and that hosting services who make unauthorized communications to the pubic are already precluded from safe harbor immunity.

So why would organizations who support tech giants spread misinformation and falsehoods about the contents of Article 13 and its repercussions? Unfortunately, it’s a strategy they’ve employed again and again whenever there is an initiative to implement responsibility and accountability online. By taking a reasonable bill or legislative effort and painting it as an attack on fundamental rights and freedom of expression, they have been able to drum up hysteria and knee-jerk reactions from those who may not fully understand the issues. It’s a formula that has worked to defeat sensible reform in the past, but it must be called out for what it is.

Accountability and Respect for Creation

Artists and representatives of the creative industries have weighed in on the proposals, explaining that content filtering isn’t just about protecting their livelihoods, but ensuring that the next generation of creators can flourish in a system that values and respects their contributions. A recent article criticizing Article 13 complained that there is no incentive for the public to welcome the implementation of content filtering. But this argument misses the point. Increasing accountability for internet giants who profit from infringement is an opportunity for the public to show that it values creative works, artists, and those responsible for bringing creative content to consumers.

It’s also an opportunity for the public to hold accountable companies and organizations that routinely behave as if they are above the law. When it comes to issues of increased accountability for their actions, internet giants have been able to trick the public in the past with misinformation campaigns similar to the one being waged against the Copyright Directive, but there is a growing tide of frustration with these deceptive practices, and the public should wake up and demand change.

As the European Parliament goes to vote on the Copyright Directive, it’s essential that parliament members, stakeholders, and the public understand what’s at stake. Recent events around the world have challenged notions of what is expected from the tech giants that have become the gatekeepers of the digital age, and it’s past time that they face responsibility for enabling and profiting from the theft of creative works. The future of creativity depends on it.

Tags Article 13, copyright, Copyright Directive, digital single market, E-Commerce Directive, EU, European Parliament, Kevin Madigan, safe harbor, value gap

Despite Professors’ Misleading Rhetoric, CLASSICS is a Big Win for Everyone

Post author By Joshua Grove
Post date May 29, 2018

the word "copyright" typed on a typewriter By Matthew Barblan

America’s music industry is experiencing a historic moment. For the first time ever, stakeholders from across the industry have set aside their differences and come together to find a way to modernize our music licensing system. And what’s more, these diverse stakeholders—ranging from artists and record labels, to songwriters and music publishers, to the technology companies that distribute music throughout the country—have finally agreed on a framework for legislative reform. The resulting bill is the Music Modernization Act of 2018 (H.R. 5447, S. 2823, hereafter “MMA”), which passed the U.S. House of Representatives in April by a vote of 415-0 and is now under consideration in the U.S. Senate.

Nearly everyone sees the bill as the kind of win-win compromise that exemplifies lawmaking at its best. Nobody gets everything they want, but everyone gets something they need, and everyone is better off. Tech companies that distribute music will get relief from an uncertain patchwork of state laws for digital performances of pre-1972 sound recordings and from the difficulty of identifying the songwriters associated with millions of songs available on popular platforms like Spotify. Songwriters and music publishers will get a willing buyer/willing seller royalty rate for use of their songs that more closely resembles a rate negotiated in a free market, along with a brand new licensing collective to distribute royalties. Artists and record labels will get long-overdue recognition of the economic value of music recorded before 1972, which finally will be subject to the same federal licensing scheme for digital performances that applies to post-1972 sound recordings (and the licensing scheme, in turn, will be modified to create platform parity by applying the same royalty rate to all digital platforms).

Importantly, the public will get a healthier music ecosystem that spurs creativity by (1) giving artists and songwriters more confidence that the fruits of their labor will be protected and rewarded, and (2) giving technology platforms and others more confidence to distribute music without risking exposure to uncertain liabilities.

But not everyone is happy. Two weeks ago, a group of professors submitted a letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee complaining about the bill. Specifically, the professors take issue with the section of the bill that creates a federal right and a federal compulsory licensing scheme for the digital public performance of pre-1972 sound recordings. This section, titled Compensating Legacy Artists for their Songs, Service, and Important Contributions to Society (CLASSICS), takes a small step towards correcting a historical injustice inflicted upon artists who recorded their songs before 1972. Unfortunately, instead of acknowledging the importance of correcting this injustice or exploring how CLASSICS will improve artist/songwriter/platform confidence in America’s music ecosystem, the professors make several misleading claims about CLASSICS and ultimately argue that it will harm the public.

This essay provides an important corrective.

The Misleading Term Extension Argument

In their letter to the Senate, the professors accuse CLASSICS of being an unjust extension of copyright term. One of the letter’s signatories—Professor Larry Lessig—further echoed this criticism in a high profile op-ed in Wired, lamenting that “the fight for [copyright] term extension has begun anew.”

It is deeply misleading to characterize CLASSICS as copyright term extension, and lawmakers and the public should not be fooled by this rhetorical ploy. The truth is that CLASSICS does nothing to extend the copyright term of pre-1972 sound recordings. That term is set by a combination of state law and Section 301(c) of the federal Copyright Act, which was enacted long ago and which CLASSICS would not change. Under the existing law of most states, the copyright term for pre-1972 sound recordings is perpetual, but Section 301(c) of the Copyright Act will step in to extinguish state law copyrights for pre-1972 sound recordings in February of 2067. This is the framework now, and this will continue to be the framework if CLASSICS is adopted as law.

CLASSICS does create a new federal cause of action that owners of pre-1972 sound recordings (secured under state copyright law) can use to protect their property from unjust exploitation. Specifically, CLASSICS protects pre-1972 sound recording copyright owners from unauthorized digital public performances of their works. But this new federal cause of action does not extend the copyright term of pre-1972 sound recordings. In fact, with respect to the new cause of action, CLASSICS actually shortens the applicable enforceability period by excluding sound recordings made before 1923. By contrast, when it comes to reproduction, distribution and other rights protected under state copyright law, sound recording copyright owners can sue infringers regardless of how old the sound recordings are.

Furthermore, since the new cause of action would not be retroactive and would not take effect until after the MMA is signed into law, the effective enforceability period for the CLASSICS cause of action will be less than 50 years. If the law takes effect in 2019, it would run for 48 years from 2019 to 2067. This modest enforceability period is a far cry from the “total term of protection of 144 years” that Professor Lessig claims the bill provides.

In this context, to call CLASSICS a copyright term extension defies logic. Rather, the bill would create a new cause of action—attached at the hip to already existing copyrights—that does nothing to affect the already-existing term for those copyrights.

The Misleading Statutory Limitations Argument

Unfortunately, the misleading criticism of CLASSICS does not end with claims of term extension. In the same letter, the professors complain that CLASSICS “arbitrarily exempts pre-1972 sound recordings from almost all the statutory copyright limitations that apply to other types of works.” As an example, the professors note that, under CLASSICS, pre-1972 sound recordings would not be subject to Section 114 of the Copyright Act.

But it takes only a cursory glance at the bill to see that CLASSICS squarely situates pre-1972 sound recordings within Section 114’s compulsory licensing scheme. While CLASSICS prevents digital distribution platforms from profiting off of pre-1972 recording artists’ hard work without providing any compensation in return, CLASSICS does not give pre-1972 sound recording copyright owners a right to negotiate license rates in a free market. Instead, just like for post-1972 sound recordings, digital platforms will still be able to publicly perform pre-1972 sound recordings by simply complying with the terms of the Section 114 license. In light of this, it is truly bizarre to see professors complaining that CLASSICS exempts pre-1972 sound recordings from Section 114.

It is equally bizarre to see Professor Lessig argue in his Wired op-ed that because “there is no registry of [pre-1972 sound recording] owners anywhere,” if CLASSICS were to become law “no public or non-profit website could even begin to bear the cost of assuring they were not committing a crime.” For one thing, the Section 114 compulsory license is not limited to private or for-profit entities, and it does not require the licensee to identify the particular pre-1972 sound recording copyright owner in order to take advantage of the license. CLASSICS also makes the digital public performance of pre-1972 sound recordings subject to the Copyright Act’s statutory limitations for uses by libraries, archives, and educational institutions—limitations that would not otherwise apply to pre-1972 sound recordings. In doing so, CLASSICS makes it easier, not harder, for public and non-profit institutions to publicly perform pre-1972 sound recordings without risking liability.

Additionally, despite Professor Lessig’s suggestion to the contrary, CLASSICS would not create any criminal penalties. Simply reading the first sentence of the first subsection of CLASSICS makes clear that the cause of action is limited to the civil remedies codified in Sections 502 through 505 of the Copyright Act. Unfortunately, once Professor Lessig’s op-ed was published, thousands of Wired readers were potentially misled into thinking that Congress was trying to create new criminal penalties through the MMA.

Furthermore, it is deeply misleading to characterize CLASSICS as “arbitrarily exempting” pre-1972 sound recordings from any of the Copyright Act’s statutory limitations. CLASSICS itself doesn’t include any such exemptions; rather, the Copyright Act’s failure to include pre-1972 sound recordings as federal copyrightable works in the first place is the source of any so-called “exemptions.” In fact, CLASSICS significantly increases the statutory limitations applicable to pre-1972 sound recordings. And far from doing so “arbitrarily,” CLASSICS applies the limitations that are most relevant to the digital public performance of pre-1972 sound recordings. The professors lament that CLASSICS doesn’t make pre-1972 sound recordings subject to the limitations in Section 119 of the Copyright Act. But why would it? Section 119 deals with “secondary transmissions of distant television programming by satellite.” It’s simply not relevant to the new cause of action that CLASSICS would create.

To assert that CLASSICS “arbitrarily exempts” pre-1972 sound recordings from the Copyright Act’s limitations ignores both the fact that CLASSICS provides no such exemptions in the first place and the fact that CLASSICS, for the first time, subjects pre-1972 sound recordings to the most significant limitation in the Copyright Act—statutory licensing.

The Misleading “Purpose of Copyright” Argument

The professors also argue that because CLASSICS “grants new federal protections to old works,” it “does nothing to incentivize the creation of new works,” and as a result it does not serve the purposes of copyright law. Professor Lessig echoes this argument in his Wired op-ed, stating that CLASSICS “has nothing to do with the constitutional purpose of ‘promot[ing] Progress’” because it is a “blatant a gift without any public return as is conceivable.” This argument is misleading for two reasons. First, it implies that the only purpose of copyright law is the direct incentive to create new works. And second, it assumes that giving new protections to old works necessarily does nothing to incentivize the creation of new works. Neither of these assumptions are reasonable.

It is baffling to see scholars of copyright law ignore the fact that copyright serves more than one purpose. Simply looking at the way that copyright operates in the creative industries reveals that in addition to incentivizing the creation of new works, copyright also incentivizes investment in the dissemination and curation of pre-existing works. After all, the public interest—or the “Progress of Science”—isn’t served by the mere existence of creative works. The public interest is served by the existence of creative works that people actually know about and consume—the books and songs and movies and works of art that change our lives and contribute to a flourishing human experience. Like other property rights, copyright is the underlying asset that secures crucial investments in commercializing, marketing, and distributing products (in this case creative works) so that the public actually gets to enjoy them.

By adding clarity to the legal status of digital public performances of pre-1972 sound recordings—and jettisoning an uncertain patchwork of state laws—CLASSICS makes it easier for businesses and other organizations to disseminate these works without facing potential liability under the laws of the various states. Yes, they’ll have to secure a license to do so, but by bringing digital performances of pre-1972 sound recordings into the framework of the Copyright Act, including the provisions of Section 114, CLASSICS also makes it much easier to secure that license than at present. As a result, CLASSICS serves the purposes of copyright by making it easier to license and disseminate pre-1972 sound recordings.

CLASSICS also serves the purposes of copyright by rewarding pre-1972 sound recording artists for their creative labors, the results of which enrich our musical culture to this day. By finally securing to pre-1972 sound recording artists exclusive rights to the digital public performance of their sound recordings, CLASSICS acknowledges that these artists deserve to own the fruits of their hard work, and that doing so will promote a stronger and healthier music ecosystem. Securing property rights to artists for the fruits of their creative labors—and thus facilitating the myriad transactions that enable a thriving creative economy—is a core part of an effective copyright system, and it clearly serves the purposes of copyright.

But even under a narrow theory that copyright’s only purpose is to incentivize the creation of new works, CLASSICS will also help in that effort. By preventing digital platforms from selling access to pre-1972 sound recordings without paying anything to the artists who recorded those songs, CLASSICS will demonstrate to all artists that Congress is capable of correcting injustices that result from unpredictable changes in technology. As a result, CLASSICS will give artists more confidence that the fruits of their creative labors won’t be wrongfully expropriated in the future, and that if new technology makes it possible to unfairly exploit their works without compensating them, there is at least a chance that Congress will change the law to correct the injustice. This confidence will spur more artists to use their time and money (not to mention their hearts and souls) to create new works.

Whether you take a broad view of copyright’s purpose that considers the way that copyright actually functions in the music industry, or a narrow view that focuses solely on new works incentivized, CLASSICS clearly serves the purposes of copyright law.

A Good Result for the Public

So where does the public fit into all of this? Reading the professors’ letter and Lessig’s op-ed, a lay observer might conclude that CLASSICS would rob the public of a precious resource without providing any benefit in return. That simply is not the case.

CLASSICS benefits the public in many ways. For starters, the public has an interest in treating people fairly. By preventing the unjust exploitation of artists who recorded their music before 1972, CLASSICS contributes to a society that rewards people for the fruits of their labor and that closes loopholes that allow multi-million dollar companies to profit off the backs of artists without compensating them. To the extent post-72 artists take note, CLASSICS further benefits the public by increasing artists’ confidence that the laws that govern the music industry will change over time to ensure the industry’s continuing health. CLASSICS also benefits the public by fostering a music ecosystem that enables companies and other organizations to invest in the dissemination of pre-1972 sound recordings without risking exposure to an uncertain patchwork of potential state law liability.

And what is the cost of these benefits? It’s simple. Just like for post-1972 sound recordings, if you want to digitally publicly perform pre-1972 sound recordings, you have to pay. And CLASSICS makes it easy to pay. Last I checked there wasn’t a public shortage of access to sound recordings from 1973 or later. There is simply no reason to believe that CLASSICS will hurt the public’s access to pre-1972 sound recordings.

Despite a few professors’ misleading rhetoric to the contrary, CLASSICS is a big win for everyone.

Matthew Barblan is Executive Director of the Center for the Protection of Intellectual Property and Assistant Professor of Law at Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University, where he teaches copyright and trademark law.

Tags CLASSICS Act, copyright, Matthew Barblan, MMA, Music Modernization Act, public performance, recording artists, streaming

Debunking Criticism of the Copyright Small Claims Act

Post author By Joshua Grove
Post date November 21, 2017

Cross-posted from the Mister Copyright blog.

the word "copyright" typed on a typewriter It’s been six weeks since the Copyright Alternative in Small Claims Enforcement (CASE) Act (H.R.3945) was introduced to Congress by a bipartisan coalition of Representatives, and while there’s an abundance of support among politicians, creators, artists’ rights organizations, and the Copyright Office, some have been critical of the legislation. Although much of the pushback can be chalked up to certain groups who seemingly resist any effort to hold infringers accountable for misappropriation, it’s worth addressing some of the criticisms to show that they’re largely baseless.

The CASE Act would create a Copyright Claims Board (CCB) within the Copyright Office to hear claims brought by individual creators and copyright owners. It aims to provide a venue for these often frustrated parties to address rampant infringement online, empowering a class of rights holders who have limited means and few opportunities for recourse. But some have argued that this system will be tilted in favor of claimants and unfairly burden respondents, and these critics are calling for the bill’s defeat.

One supposed problem with the CCB, according to its critics, is that the three-officer panels overseeing cases will be biased and favor the claimants and copyright owners. It’s a bold assumption, but unfortunately not surprising coming from organizations that routinely accuse the Copyright Office of being “pro-content” or “anti-user”—accusations that remain completely unsubstantiated.

Perhaps anticipating such charges, the CASE Act calls for a panel in which two of the three claims officers must have diverse copyright experience which includes representing the interests of both creators and content users. As Section 1401(b)(3)(A) on officer qualifications explicitly states:

Each Copyright Claims Officer shall be an attorney with no less than 7 years of legal experience. Two of the Copyright Claims Officers shall have substantial experience in the evaluation, litigation, or adjudication of copyright infringement claims and, between them, shall have represented or presided over a diversity of copyright interests, including those of both owners and users of copyrighted works.

The third claims officer is required to be an expert in alternative dispute resolution who also has substantial copyright law experience. Any fear that these officers will render decisions unfairly in favor of claimants is likely a reaction to the realization that the small claims system will finally hold accountable a large number of infringers who have previously flown under the radar.

Another criticism of the CASE Act is that due to appearance requirements and allegedly unfair notice procedures, the Copyright Claims Board will issue a disproportionate amount of default judgments against respondents and thereby violate due process and personal jurisdiction. However, Section 1405(g) establishes clear notice obligations of claimants, including proof of service within 90 days of receiving notice to proceed. Furthermore, there is no rule requiring parties to appear in-person before the Board in Washington, D.C. It’s anticipated that smaller claims will be electronically resolved, while larger disputes will be handled via video conferencing. Section 1405(c) clearly explains:

Proceedings before the Copyright Claims Board shall be conducted at the offices of the Copyright Claims Board without the requirement of in-person appearances by parties or others, and shall take place by means of written submissions and hearings and conferences accomplished via Internet-based applications and other telecommunications facilities.

Critics also claim default judgments would be difficult to overturn, despite section 1407(c) explicitly providing an opportunity to appeal determinations to the District Court of the District of Columbia. Additionally, Section 1407(c)(1)(c) allows for respondents to challenge default determinations “where it is established that the default or failure was due to excusable neglect.”

There have also been arguments that, at $30,000, the damages available to claimants are too high. But while it may seem like a big number compared to what’s available in other small claims courts, it is the absolute ceiling of available damages. The CCB has discretion to award up to $30,000, and that limit is much lower than what an infringer might be on the hook for in federal court.

Making these criticisms of the small claims initiative seem even more absurd is the fact that the proceeding will be completely voluntary, allowing respondents to opt out of the entire system if preferred. While it’s hoped that respondents will choose to resolve claims before the CCB—rather than risk a potentially worse fate in federal court—there is no obligation to participate if they see the process as unfair or burdensome.

The reality is that the notice requirements and damages available represent a system that is no more skewed towards claimants than any other adjudicatory proceeding. Arguments to the contrary reflect a resistance to a system that will finally hold accountable infringing behavior that, because of past difficulty to address it, has become routine in the digital age. It’s time to give small creators and copyright owners a realistic shot at protecting their works, and making the CASE Act law would lead the way in this long-overdue and worthy endeavor.

Tags CASE, CCB, copyright, Copyright Alternative in Small Claims Enforcement, Copyright Claims Board, Copyright Office, Kevin Madigan, smaill claims

CPIP Fall Conference Papers Highlight How Intellectual Property Rights Promote Global Prosperity

Post author By Joshua Grove
Post date November 17, 2017

2016 Fall Conference flyer By Alex Summerton

The George Mason Law Review has just published the papers from our Fourth Annual Fall Conference, Intellectual Property & Global Prosperity, which was held at Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University, in Arlington, Virginia, on October 6-7, 2016. The conference highlighted the importance of IP rights in the global marketplace and discussed how countries that leverage the availability of such protections enjoy creative, technological, and economic benefits far surpassing those that place less value on IP.

The newly-published papers are outlined below:

Kristina M. L. Acri, née Lybecker, Economic Growth and Prosperity Stem from Effective Intellectual Property Rights, 24 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 865 (2017)

Professor Kristina Acri of Colorado College discusses the importance of IP in incentivizing innovation by enabling firms to recuperate development expenditures. She explains how the static loss resulting from the patent system is far offset by the dynamic gains resulting from both increased innovation and public disclosure of knowledge. Acri identifies how countries employing strong IP regimes realize greater benefits in pharmaceutical innovations in the form of more available treatments and earlier implementation than countries with weaker protections. Furthermore, she highlights how robust IP systems encourage both revolutionary and incremental technology developments, promote domestic technology industries, and foster new employment opportunities for domestic labor forces.Key to this analysis are the fundamental economic forces that drive patented innovation. Acri discusses the importance of patents to innovator companies that must bear substantial fixed costs in the form of research and development, while generic competitors need only compete on negligible marginal costs with the innovators. She further explores how countries employing strong patent protections attract innovation businesses, as well as develop investment industries and educated workforces to support such innovation. Finally, Acri analyzes the positive correlation between a country’s rank as an innovative hot spot and the relative strength of its IP protections.

Walter G. Park, Averting a “Tripsxit” From the Global Intellectual Property System, 24 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 883 (2017)

Professor Walter Park of American University examines the benefits that developing countries can realize by implementing stronger IP right systems in the context of the globalized marketplace. He considers the effect the TRIPS Agreement has had on the relationship between developed and developing countries as a function of the grant rates for technologies originating from various countries and the balance of technology imports and exports. Park seeks to explain why certain countries have developed into technological powerhouses in the last few decades, while others have remained behind and lagged in technological production.Park looks at various factors that could have influenced, and in turn have been influenced by, these divergent development paths, such as trade practices, legal and sociological structure, and the flexibility that TRIPS gives member states to set their own schedules. He concludes that countries seeking to move themselves into modern economies can benefit greatly by examining and adjusting their IP regimes to encourage both domestic and foreign innovations and investment in the local territory.

Professor Stan Liebowitz of the University of Texas explores several rationales for copyright, commenting on both economic and moralistic perspectives and discussing how, as a common misconception, many people fail to recognize that the property rights imparted by copyright truly enable economic returns. He focuses heavily on the economic case for copyright, seeking to dispel the myth that copyright is an economic monopoly. Liebowitz notes that popular works enjoy unusually high monopoly-like rents because they are uncommon and disproportionately successful as compared to unpopular works, not because they benefit from any economic monopoly imparted by copyright.Liebowitz discusses the concept of market-determined values of works in contrast to alternative systems such as centralized markets and patronage systems, and he concludes that these alternative systems lack the ability to incentivize the production of either high quality or high quantities of works. Finally, he explores the moral justifications for the remuneration of authors of successful works and discusses several alternative, although morally absurd, repugnant, or questionable, systems for securing payments for authors. Liebowitz posits that copyright enables markets to efficiently set the price of works and facilitates the determination of what society does and does not want produced.

Brett Danaher & Michael D. Smith, Digital Piracy, Film Quality, and Social Welfare, 24 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 923 (2017)

Professors Brett Danaher of Chapman University and Michael Smith of Carnegie Mellon University assess the impact of piracy of copyrighted works on the production, in terms of both quantity and quality, of artistic works, particularly films. They discuss the trade-offs of copyright enforcement versus piracy for consumers and producers, and they outline the expected welfare transfers that occur for both users who would and would not otherwise purchase the consumed media in the absence of piracy. Danaher and Smith also delve into the hidden impact that piracy and the non-enforcement of copyright laws have on markets that traditionally have relied on copyright.Danaher and Smith analyze the origination of high-quality works and examine how the rise of online piracy has caused a depression in the production of award-winning films in countries where copyright is laxly enforced. They further identify the collateral negative effects of the lack of copyright enforcement, including the frustration of attempts to secure funding for riskier projects. Danaher and Smith explain how this potentially robs the world of artistically meritorious, but financially unsafe, projects, thereby decreasing overall social welfare.

Kevin Madigan & Adam Mossoff, Turning Gold Into Lead: How Patent Eligibility Doctrine is Undermining U.S. Leadership in Innovation, 24 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 939 (2017)

CPIP Legal Fellow Kevin Madigan and Professor Adam Mossoff of George Mason University focus on recent developments at the Supreme Court that have made patenting high-technology inventions, particularly in the computer and biotechnology disciplines, more difficult and the consequential danger this poses to the United States’ position as a global innovation leader. They begin by reviewing the late-20th century jurisprudence that placed the U.S. in a position to be a technological force in the new millennium, especially with respect to the patentability of biotech and computer technology. Madigan and Mossoff then review more recent Supreme Court precedents that have led to a recession from a pro-patentability position while providing very little guidance on what could be patentable.Madigan and Mossoff go on to assess how this change in jurisprudence has resulted in a retreat from America’s position as a patent powerhouse. They point to cases where applications were rejected as unpatentable subject matter in the U.S. while the corresponding technologies were found to be patentable in Europe and China. Madigan and Mossoff also discuss the general trend of rejecting applications and invalidating patents with scant actual justification for why those applications and patents were patent ineligible. They conclude that data available from the last few years shows that the U.S. may be receding as a technological center since its patent laws have become unreliable for inventors and investors seeking protection.

Jiarui Liu, The Predatory Effects of Copyright Piracy, 24 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 961 (2017)

Professor Jiarui Liu of the University of San Francisco analyzes strategic behavior in copyright enforcement, particularly in countries that have not yet developed robust copyright industries and that have lessened incentive to invest in effective copyright policy. He discusses the phenomenon in China, where large copyright entities sometimes prefer pirating of their works to enforcement when they cannot expect any return for their work. As Liu explains, expecting the ability to develop a market and later determine how to recover payments for pirated copies, this lax enforcement of copyright policy results in a suppression of domestic industries that would compete with large entities.Liu outlines the reality of copyright enforcement in China, a lackluster effort on the part of the Chinese government that has led to rampant piracy of a wide range of copyrighted works. He explains how the piracy of software products, such as Microsoft Office, has stunted the development of new and competing technologies, a result implicitly approved by the market-dominant copyright owners. Liu compares this behavior of strategic non-enforcement to predatory pricing practices traditionally viewed as part of antitrust law, since it places the product into consumer hands at an initial loss in order to establish market dominance that will later enable the firm to exert monopoly power once its product has become the dominant force. Finally, Liu discusses possible mechanisms of corrective actions, both private and public, to combat non-enforcement as strategic behavior.

Tags 2016 Fall Conference, Adam Mossoff, Brett Danaher, copyright, George MasonLaw Review, Jiarui Liu, Kevin Madigan, Kristina Acri, Michael Smith, patent, Stan Liebowitz, Walter Park

Innovate4Health Innovation

Innovate4Health: Miriam Bridges the Gap Between Developing-World Infrastructure and Cancer Detection

Post author By Joshua Grove
Post date November 7, 2017

This post is one of a series in the #Innovate4Health policy research initiative.

Innovate4Health By Alex Summerton

Originally a disease diagnosed only in developed countries, cancer is now a leading cause of death in the developing world with over half of all new cases annually. The rise in cancer in the developing world is attributed to improving technological, medical, and socioeconomic conditions. People are living longer due to reducing other causes of mortality such as infectious disease, unsanitary conditions, and maternal and infant mortality. The result is populations living long enough to begin seeing end of life diseases like cancer.

However, the advances leading to the higher prevalence of cancer in the developing world have not been accompanied by the advances to fight it. Treatment costs remain prohibitively high. Detection occurs late during the disease’s progression, generally after symptoms begin to present and chances of survival decrease. Underdeveloped infrastructure makes accessibility to screening and treatment difficult. Doctors’ offices can be remote and crowded, and trained oncologists are few and far between, leaving necessary expertise inaccessible to patients.

The overall effect is a developed-world disease outstripping developing-world technology and infrastructure.

Miroculus aims to combat the challenges of cancer screening, in both the developed and developing world, by providing accurate, low-cost, and accessible technologies that can be easily deployed at the earliest stages when treatment is cheaper and more effective. Founded by Alejandro Tocigl, Foteini Christodoulou, and Jorge Soto, Miroculus is developing a method of screening for cancers via microRNA.

The flagship product of Miroculus is Miriam, a cancer detection platform enabling accurate, early screening of cancer. Debuted at TEDGlobal in 2014, Miriam is a non-invasive tool that can rapidly screen for a wide range of cancers. Its design means it can be deployed during routine health examinations, rather than as part of cancer testing once symptoms have presented. Miriam works by assaying blood for the presence of microRNAs. Miroculus’s team has shown that certain microRNAs in a patient’s blood are correlated with specific types of cancer. So far, Miroculus has proven the concept of enabling Miriam to detect pancreatic, lung, breast, and hepatic cancer.

gloved hand holding screening tool Miriam achieves its goals through a simple yet elegant construction, requiring only a camera, computer, and testing substrate in a standard well plate. Each well contains a reactant keyed to a specific microRNA. A patient’s sample is added to each well and tested for the presence of microRNA. When the particular microRNA in the well is present in the patient’s sample, the reaction produces a luminescent effect. Miriam’s camera monitors these reactions by recording the change in luminosity of the wells during testing, sending these images via Miriam’s computer to Miroculus’s cloud computer. Miroculus then analyzes the pattern to determine which microRNAs are present and whether the patient has cancer.

Miriam’s advantageous three piece construction provides low-cost implementation while remaining clinically effective. Driven by Miroculus’s objective to democratize cancer screening technology, a Miriam testing platform can be created using cheap and readily available technologies in the developing world. During Miriam’s first debut, one of the founders showed the technology being deployed via a 3D-printed test chamber and a smartphone. Both 3D printing and smartphones are viewed as platforms for bringing developed-world medical technologies to the developing world. Combining innovative biological science and versatile technology such as 3D printing and smartphones allows Miriam to substitute for complex specialized equipment requiring far more training and resources to implement.

Miroculus is employing a blend of IP protections in the distribution of Miriam. It is combining an open source release of how to construct the Miriam platform, including copyrighted design plans for making the 3D printed device, with patent protection over its microRNA based testing method. Choosing to use this dual IP protection allows Miroculus to ensure a quality product in real world use with sufficient income to both run the company and develop the next generation of technologies.

To test the deployment and efficacy of Miriam, Miroculus has elected to employ open source distribution of Miriam. Instructions for building a fully functional Miriam are currently available on GitHub, including 3D printing instructions and software, firmware, and hardware instructions for a testing computer implemented on Arduino. These documents and code are published under open source licenses. This owner-driven free exercise of rights provides Miroculus with two major advantages. First, Miroculus can enjoy open collaboration and improvement on Miriam’s design and software. Second, making Miriam open source can encourage the adoption of the technology leading to additional economies of scale and providing Miroculus reputational benefits in the marketplace.

Miroculus is also utilizing patent protection for aspects of Miriam that require technical sophistication beyond having access to a 3D printer. It is globally seeking patents for testing wells and the detection system. By patenting the disposable wells, Miroculus can secure a return on its research and investment into Miriam. Because Miroculus views supplying the testing wells as the best income strategy for the technology, with revenue from supplying platforms being only incidental, Miroculus will be able to leverage the low-cost adoption of Miriam afforded by delivering an open source platform.

Miriam is a story of modern technology being used to bridge the gap between the developed and the developing world. Miroculus has a goal of enabling cheap, routine screenings for a wide range of cancers to lower the costs, both economic and human, of the disease. By making its testing device easily available, Miroculus aims to reach its goal of accessibility. And by securing patent protection for its testing wells, Miroculus will be able to ensure a return on its technology. This will allow further development and democratization of the necessary technology for combating the world’s most pressing diseases.

#Innovate4Health is a joint research project by the Center for the Protection of Intellectual Property (CPIP) and the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF). This project highlights how intellectual property-driven innovation can address global health challenges. If you have questions, comments, or a suggestion for a story we should highlight, we’d love to hear from you. Please contact Devlin Hartline at jhartli2@gmu.edu.

Tags Alex Summerton, cancer, copyright, health, healthcare, Innovate4Health, innovation, Miriam, Miroculus, open source, patent

Pulitzer Prize-Winning Author T.J. Stiles Makes the Case for Copyright

Post author By Joshua Grove
Post date October 30, 2017

a shelf full of books On October 12th and 13th, the Center for the Protection of Intellectual Property (CPIP) hosted its Fifth Annual Fall Conference at Antonin Scalia Law School in Arlington, Virginia. The event brought together scholars, industry professionals, and practicing attorneys to discuss recent developments in intellectual property law and to present meaningful policy reform proposals. In addition to panels and presentations of recent scholarship in IP, the conference featured a keynote address by the Pulitzer Prize-winning author and copyright advocate T.J. Stiles in which he discussed his career in writing and made an inspiring case for the rights of creators.

Watch the keynote here:

Stiles, whose works include the award-winning biographies Custer’s Trials: A Life on the Frontier of a New America and The First Tycoon: The Epic Life of Cornelius Vanderbilt, began his speech by detailing his various book projects over the course of his career and explaining how he writes about topics that personally interest and compel him—stories which others authors sometimes overlook. He also made clear from the start that though he writes for creative fulfillment, writing books is his job, and he relies on the money they make to live.

T.J. Stiles speaking on stage Speaking on the distinctions between academic and commercial publishing, Stiles explained that he relies on book sales to expand his audience. He noted that, as a biographer, his books are a unique combination of fact-filled scholarship and non-fiction, artistic prose. It’s a genre of writing that has a broad market, but one with a dwindling number of authors due to diminishing incentives.

Providing a stark overview of the state of the writing profession, Stiles pointed out that the number of full-time authors is down 30% from 2009, and that annual income for full-time authors has dropped from $25,000 to $17,500. Freelance journalist income has fallen from between $1 and $4 a word to between 25 cents and $1.25. Moreover, Stiles explained that, as an author, he is his own employee, and that he is responsible for costs that others may take for granted:

Meanwhile, while we’re struggling with these constraints on income, I’m paying my own health insurance, I am saving for retirement on my own. There is no matching contribution to a retirement fund, and I’m paying self-employment tax.

He also pointed out that, depending on the stage of a book project, his income can vary wildly. While some years his expenses and taxes can be covered by book proceeds and publishing partnerships, other years bring burdensome costs. And though the small royalty streams from his older books may seem to some insignificant, Stiles explained that they are used to cover his mortgage, car payments, and health insurance for a family of four.

Stiles spoke to the importance of controlling the rights in one’s work, noting that sometimes overlooked rights such as the right to perform (as it relates to the recording of audio books) can generate important licensing income. In addition to the costs of living he detailed earlier in his speech, this income is reinvested directly into his current or future projects by paying for research trips and other expenses.

Addressing rampant piracy in the digital age, Stiles noted that though illegal downloading doesn’t affect books as much as music and movies, the unauthorized copying and digitization of books through massive internet archiving projects is devaluing works of authorship and threatening the creative marketplace.

Stiles lamented that in addition to losing money from theft and misappropriation, creators are expected to police the Internet for infringement and enforce their rights on a case-by-case basis, a task that is virtually impossible. Stiles then compared this unrealistic expectation to a scenario in which a shopkeeper is expected to track down and arrest shoplifters, making a persuasive point about the absurdity of private copyright policing.

stack of books at T.J. Stiles speaking event Stiles warned that when authors lose control of their works, it chips away at the incentives that drive independent creation, thereby silencing important voices. This disregard for the rights of creators is part of a larger problem: the degradation of a social compact and understanding that we should pay for something that we want. It’s a troubling trend that could have disastrous consequences in an age when stolen content is available at the click of a mouse.

Cautioning against the embrace of certain large tech companies, Stiles explained that when digital platforms aggregate and distribute huge amounts of content, creators are separated from the income their works are generating. Platforms such as YouTube want to compile as much content as possible, pay as little as possible for it, and then turn a profit by inundating said content with advertisements. Stiles warned that this behavior skews price expectations and ultimately disincentivizes creators.

In closing, Stiles reiterated just how important copyright and creative control is to fostering individual voices:

I think it’s absolutely essential for our culture, for our knowledge, for just the sheer pleasure of living, to maintain these individual voices. But again, it’s our very individuality, our very disaggregation which provides our cultural value, which it also is the limiting factor on the economic, the financial value we get out of our work.

Though it may seem like an obvious construct, the fact that artists and creators rely on the income generated by their works to live is something that is all too often discounted in an era of endless content, and it’s one that needs repeating. T.J. Stiles’ story is one of success in writing, but it’s also a cautionary tale that shows how even acclaimed authors rely on copyright and control of their works to get by. Continuing to incentivize authors and creators and allowing them to make a living is more important now than ever before, and for T.J. Stiles, “that’s what copyright is all about.”

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