Tag: Copyright Claims Board

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Conferences Copyright

C-IP2 2022 Fall Conference Panel Discusses Copyright Under Pressure

The following post comes from Cala Coffman, a 2L at Scalia Law and Research Assistant at C-IP2.

At the recent C-IP2 conference entitled IP on the Wane: IP on the Wane: Examining the Impacts as IP Rights Are Reduced, one panel discussed the current state of copyright law, the pressures it has come under in recent years, and their differing perspectives on how the digital world is shaping copyright. Topics of discussion included enforcement techniques, trends in fair use, and the impact of evolving technology on copyright.

Panelists were Clark Asay (Professor of Law at Brigham Young University J. Reuben Clark Law School), Orit Fischman-Afori (Professor of Law at The Haim Striks School of Law, College of Management Academic Studies (COLMAN)), Terry Hart (General Counsel, Association of American Publishers (AAP)), and Karyn A. Temple (Senior Executive Vice President & Global General Counsel, (Motion Picture Association)), and the session was moderated by Sandra Aistars (Clinical Professor, George Mason University, Antonin Scalia Law School; Senior Fellow for Copyright Research and Policy; and Senior Scholar at C-IP2).

Professor Fischman opened the panel by proposing a reconsideration of criminal enforcement for copyright claims. After reviewing current avenues for civil copyright enforcement, including the newly established Copyright Claims Board in the Copyright Office, Digital Millennium Copyright Act, and civil enforcement in federal court including the opportunity for statutory damages, Professor Fischman suggested that criminal copyright enforcement actions seem to be on the decline and should not be a focus of enforcement efforts. Rather, greater attention should be devoted to civil enforcement. Recently, the U.S. Sentencing Commission reported that criminal Copyright and Trademark cases have dropped from 475 cases in 2015 to 137 cases in 2021.

Over the past two decades, several enforcement mechanisms have been introduced to address the challenges authors face enforcing their copyrights in the digital world. These include the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in 1998, the Digital Theft Deterrence Act of 1999, and the Copyright Alternatives in Small-Claims Enforcement Act of 2020, which improved access to enforcement for small creators by creating a new administrative forum with simplified proceedings in the Copyright Office. Small copyright claims can be pursued there with or without the assistance of counsel. While these civil enforcement mechanisms are effective, they have not been without criticism.

Ultimately, Professor Fischman argued that the combination of civil and criminal enforcement frameworks creates a powerful enforcement mechanism for author’s rights. As we consider the current state of IP rights, criminal enforcement is becoming less meaningful overall, in her opinion.

Next, Professor Asay presented three recent empirical studies examining trends in copyright litigation.

The first study indexed fair use cases from 1991 to 2017. In this study, Professor Asay examines the scope of fair use analysis in copyright infringement cases and finds a “steady progression of both appellate and district courts adopting the transformative use paradigm, with modern courts relying on it nearly ninety percent of the time.” The study finds that at the Federal Circuit Court level, in cases where transformative use was asserted, 48% were found to be transformative, and 91% of transformative uses were found to be fair use. Professor Asay states that “fair use is copyright law’s most important defense to claims of copyright infringement,” but as courts increasingly apply transformative use doctrine, he finds that “it is, in fact, eating the world of fair use.”

The second study Professor Asay presented analyzed over 1000 court opinions from between 1978 and 2020 that used a substantial similarity analysis. In this study, Professor Asay finds first that courts rely on opinions from the Second and Ninth circuits “more than any other source in interpreting and applying the substantial similarity standard.” The study also breaks down trends within the two-step substantial similarity analysis. On the first step, Professor Asay finds that “courts mostly decide this first prong . . . as a matter of whether defendant’s had access to the plaintiff’s work, and they mostly favor plaintiffs.” On the second step, he finds “significant heterogeneity” in analyzing improper appropriation of a plaintiff’s work. He states that “no dominant means exist for resolving this question” and “the data also suggest that one of the keys to winning, for either defendants or plaintiffs, is the extent to which the court engages with and discusses copyright limitations.”

The third study, which is forthcoming, examines DMCA Section 1201 litigation. DMCA Section 1201 prohibits attempts to circumvent technological measures used to control access to a copyrighted work.17 U.S.C. § 1201. This study encompasses 205 cases and 209 opinions, and Professor Asay said during the panel that “the most interesting finding in this study is that there’s not much section 1201 litigation.” Although the DMCA has been in force for nearly twenty-five years, less than one appellate decision is made per year on average. The study also finds that “the most litigated subject matter” (over every other subject matter the study coded for) is software.

Ms. Temple discussed how new technologies, techniques, and distribution methods are constantly requiring courts to re-evaluate how authorship rights function in a digital landscape. She likewise commented on the challenges courts seem to face in appropriately drawing distinctions between derivative uses of copyrighted works that should require a license from the author, and transformative uses that are permissible under the affirmative defense of fair use.

Ms. Temple cited the numerous briefs in Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith (including the Motion Picture Association’s) that note that the transformative use test is becoming the sole criteria courts use to determine fair use. Indeed, the MPA’s brief cited to Professor Asay’s study on transformative use (Is Transformative Use Eating the World?) to support the petitioner’s assertion that “in practice, the transformativeness inquiry is virtually always dispositive of the fair use question.” In closing, Ms. Temple stated that although we may be “waning” in how courts see fair use, Warhol presents a chance to correct the fair use analysis and steer it away from infringing on the derivative work rights of authors.

Finally, Mr. Hart presented on potential threats to authorship rights and the concomitant harms to consumer interests in the e-book arena. Mr. Hart’s perspective was that as businesses, copyright industries legitimately have profit-motivated goals, but happily, their ability to meet these goals is directly tied to the “ultimate goal” of promoting science and the useful arts and thus is beneficial to society as a whole. Mr. Hart stated that “the good news, if we think copyright [protections are] waxing, is that . . . the legal framework both in the United States and internationally recognizes [the] principles” that allow copyright owners to take advantage of and divide their exclusive rights. However, digitization may pose a threat to the ability to license rights as the copyright owner desires, as digital copying and transmission greatly increases risk of infringement of e-books.

The e-book market is unique, according to Mr. Hart, in that authors may be particularly vulnerable to digital threats when “digital copies are completely indistinguishable from the originals, and so they would be competing directly with the copyright owner’s primary markets.” Furthermore, he stated that “threats to the ability of copyright owners . . . to pursue rational choices in how they market and distribute their works can be just as harmful as straight up piracy.”

Mr. Hart characterized the e-book market as a thriving, sustainable economy. E-books have been popular for over a decade now, and there are a “variety of licensing models [available] . . . that continue to evolve to meet both the needs of publishers and libraries.” Mr. Hart stated, “the evidence shows that this is a well-functioning market.” He said that “Overdrive, which is the largest e-book aggregator, reported that in 2021 there was over half a billion check-outs of library e-books worldwide, and the pricing is, in my view, fair and sustainable.” Additionally, Mr. Hart said, “Overdrive also reported . . .  that the average cost per title for libraries declined in 2021, and libraries have been able to significantly grow their e-book collections . . . with collection budgets that, when you’ve adjusted for inflation, have essentially been flat the entire time.”

One of the major threats to authorship rights in the e-book market, in Mr. Hart’s view, is the rise of Controlled Digital Lending (CDL). While this theory is currently being litigated in Hachette Book Group v. Internet Archive, Mr. Hart posits that we are only a few steps from a full-blown digital first-sale doctrine, which could have widespread harms throughout copyright for many types of authors. Many amicus briefs in the Internet Archive case have identified this potential harm, as well. According to Hart, the Copyright Alliance brief, for example, stated that a ruling in favor of CDL would have extremely widespread economic harms for authors.

The second threat Mr. Hart identified comes from recent propositions at the state level that would introduce compulsory licenses for e-books. These proposed laws would outlaw limitations on e-book licenses offered to libraries and allow states to dictate what states believe are “reasonable” pricing for e-book licenses. A flaw in both the arguments for CDL and for compulsory e-book licensing, as Mr. Hart sees it, is that both approaches treat the mere exercise of a copyright owner’s exclusive right as unfair and, if accepted, would be dangerous encroachments on authorship rights.

Ultimately, while the panelists identified significant concerns in the existing copyright regime, they were hopeful about the future of authorship rights, reflecting that even if the protections for copyright law had “waned” in certain respects in recent years, and certain rights remain in peril, there are opportunities for education as courts confront the significant changes that accompany an increasingly digital landscape.

Categories
Copyright Legislation

Just What Is the Case with the CASE Act? A Brief Overview

The following post comes from Ryan Reynolds, a 3L at Scalia Law and Research Assistant at CPIP.

chrome copyright symbolBy Ryan Reynolds

The phrase “creators have rights, but no remedies” is likely familiar to those aware of the current landscape of copyright protection for individual creators and small businesses (“Creators”). While the Copyright Act of 1976 grants a bundle of rights to Creators for the protection of their works, for years Creators have faced an uphill battle enforcing those rights against infringers. There are many who are optimistic, however, that things might soon change with the passage of “The Copyright Alternative in Small-Claims Enforcement Act of 2020” (CASE Act).

Signed into law as part of H.R. 133, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, [for Fiscal Year] 2021 (“CAA”), the CASE Act creates a Copyright Claims Board (“CCB”) within the Copyright Office to handle small copyright claims (small only in the sense of their relatively modest economic value). As there is some time before the CCB comes into operation, the earliest being December 21, 2021, and the latest June 2022, now is a good time to provide an overview of just what the CASE Act does. Before venturing fully into the mechanics of the CASE Act, however, it is important to first highlight why its supporters felt it was needed.

Why Is It Needed?

Copyright cases are almost exclusively an area of federal jurisdiction, meaning that copyright infringement cases must be brought in a federal rather than state court; however, litigating a copyright infringement case in federal court is anything but easy. First, the average cost of litigating a copyright infringement claim has been estimated at $397,000—a cost that often greatly outweighs any potential recovery for Creators’ works. It is for this reason that many attorneys are simply unwilling to take Creators’ copyright infringement cases, leaving many Creators feeling disenfranchised.

Second, the complexity of the federal court system is often overwhelming for Creators. As stated in the Copyright Office’s 2013 Copyright Small Claims report, “Small copyright owners, who frequently lack experience with federal courts, often find federal litigation too difficult . . . and may be unable to navigate ‘the often complex procedural rules that govern federal litigation . . . .’” As highlighted in the report, even the Copyright Act’s registration requirement—the gateway requirement to launch a copyright infringement claim—can be problematic for Creators. It requires that a copyright owner successfully register, or receive a rejection of registration, from the Copyright Office before launching an infringement claim. Moreover, for a Creator to qualify for statutory damages and attorney’s fees, the Copyright Act requires the registration of the work within three months of its publication, or if unpublished, before the act of infringement. The failure to register within the required time is critical, as without the potential recovery of statutory damages (which can range up to $150,000 per work infringed), a Creator’s recovery would not likely overcome the legal fees incurred litigating the case.

As stated in the report, the result of this cost and complexity is that “federal court is effectively inaccessible to copyright owners seeking redress for claims of relatively low economic value, especially individual creators who are of limited resources.” Enter the CASE Act, which aims to create a less expensive and less procedurally complex alternative to the current system by creating the CCB within the Copyright Office. But how will the CCB operate?

How Will It Operate?

When the CCB becomes operational, a party will have the choice of commencing a copyright infringement proceeding in either federal court or the CCB. In contrast to federal court, and as will be discussed in more detail later, proceedings in the CCB are completely voluntary. Another way in which the CCB differs from federal court is in its authority over copyright infringement claims only where the total damages sought do not exceed $30,000. As to the CCB’s structure, it will be composed of three full-time Copyright Claims Officers. Each of the Officers must have seven years of legal experience; two of them must also have extensive copyright adjudication experience, while one must have extensive alternative dispute resolution experience. The Librarian of Congress will appoint these Officers to staggered six-year terms, and they will be supported by at least two full-time Copyright Claims Attorneys with at least three years of experience.

To make the CCB more accessible to Creators, the CCB’s proceedings aim to be more streamlined and user friendly than federal courts. A proceeding before the CCB begins when the claimant files a claim to the CCB that includes the proper filing fee and a statement of the material facts. In contrast to federal court, the CASE Act only requires a completed application for registration of the claimant’s work(s), rather than a certificate of registration or refusal of registration by the Copyright Office to commence the claim. After the claim is approved for compliance with the law and applicable regulations by a Copyright Claims Attorney, the claimant has 90 days to complete service. After receiving service, the respondent then has 60 days to opt out of the proceeding before it becomes “active”; however, in the “interests of justice,” the CCB can extend this window another 60 days.

The user-friendly goal of the CCB is best exhibited by the Act’s requirement that the proceedings take place solely “by means of written submissions, hearings, and conferences carried out through internet-based applications.” The only exception to this convenience is when there is “material” “physical or other nontestimonial evidence” that otherwise the CCB cannot review. Further, proceedings before the CCB will be more informal than in federal court. There is no requirement for representation by an attorney, there is limited discovery, and the formal rules of evidence do not apply. If the parties do not settle, at the close of the proceeding the CCB must make factual findings based on the preponderance of the evidence and issue a publicly available written determination.

With regard to remedies, the CCB has the authority to award either actual damages, and the respondent’s profits, or statutory damages. If the CCB awards statutory damages, it “may not make any finding that, or consider whether, the infringement was committed willfully,” and if timely registration has been made with the Copyright Office, the CCB can award up to $15,000 for each work infringed, though this is subject to a $30,000 maximum. In an important shift from existing law, however, even if the work was not timely registered, the CCB may still award up to $7,500 for each work infringed to a maximum total of $15,000 in a single proceeding.

Within 30 days of the issuance of the final determination of the CCB, a party can request reconsideration by the CCB. After giving the other parties an opportunity to respond, the CCB may either deny the request or amend the determination. If the CCB denies the request for reconsideration, a party then has 30 days to request the Register of Copyrights to review the CCB’s determination. After giving the other parties time to respond, the Register may deny or remand the proceeding to the CCB for reconsideration. Finally, within 90 days of the final determination, or the post-determination reconsideration, a party can appeal to a U.S. District Court. It is also in federal district court where a party can seek enforcement of the CCB’s determination if the other parties to the matter refuse to abide by its determination. For a visual representation of this process, the Copyright Alliance has put together an informative flowchart.

The CASE Act requires that three years after the CCB becomes operational the Register of Copyrights make assessment of its effectiveness. While whether the CASE Act will create the change hoped for by its supporters is yet to be seen, in my view, the attention given to address the challenges to Creators is critically important.

Categories
Copyright

Debunking Criticism of the Copyright Small Claims Act

Cross-posted from the Mister Copyright blog.

the word "copyright" typed on a typewriterIt’s been six weeks since the Copyright Alternative in Small Claims Enforcement (CASE) Act (H.R.3945) was introduced to Congress by a bipartisan coalition of Representatives, and while there’s an abundance of support among politicians, creators, artists’ rights organizations, and the Copyright Office, some have been critical of the legislation. Although much of the pushback can be chalked up to certain groups who seemingly resist any effort to hold infringers accountable for misappropriation, it’s worth addressing some of the criticisms to show that they’re largely baseless.

The CASE Act would create a Copyright Claims Board (CCB) within the Copyright Office to hear claims brought by individual creators and copyright owners. It aims to provide a venue for these often frustrated parties to address rampant infringement online, empowering a class of rights holders who have limited means and few opportunities for recourse. But some have argued that this system will be tilted in favor of claimants and unfairly burden respondents, and these critics are calling for the bill’s defeat.

One supposed problem with the CCB, according to its critics, is that the three-officer panels overseeing cases will be biased and favor the claimants and copyright owners. It’s a bold assumption, but unfortunately not surprising coming from organizations that routinely accuse the Copyright Office of being “pro-content” or “anti-user”—accusations that remain completely unsubstantiated.

Perhaps anticipating such charges, the CASE Act calls for a panel in which two of the three claims officers must have diverse copyright experience which includes representing the interests of both creators and content users. As Section 1401(b)(3)(A) on officer qualifications explicitly states:

Each Copyright Claims Officer shall be an attorney with no less than 7 years of legal experience. Two of the Copyright Claims Officers shall have substantial experience in the evaluation, litigation, or adjudication of copyright infringement claims and, between them, shall have represented or presided over a diversity of copyright interests, including those of both owners and users of copyrighted works.

The third claims officer is required to be an expert in alternative dispute resolution who also has substantial copyright law experience. Any fear that these officers will render decisions unfairly in favor of claimants is likely a reaction to the realization that the small claims system will finally hold accountable a large number of infringers who have previously flown under the radar.

Another criticism of the CASE Act is that due to appearance requirements and allegedly unfair notice procedures, the Copyright Claims Board will issue a disproportionate amount of default judgments against respondents and thereby violate due process and personal jurisdiction. However, Section 1405(g) establishes clear notice obligations of claimants, including proof of service within 90 days of receiving notice to proceed. Furthermore, there is no rule requiring parties to appear in-person before the Board in Washington, D.C. It’s anticipated that smaller claims will be electronically resolved, while larger disputes will be handled via video conferencing. Section 1405(c) clearly explains:

Proceedings before the Copyright Claims Board shall be conducted at the offices of the Copyright Claims Board without the requirement of in-person appearances by parties or others, and shall take place by means of written submissions and hearings and conferences accomplished via Internet-based applications and other telecommunications facilities.

Critics also claim default judgments would be difficult to overturn, despite section 1407(c) explicitly providing an opportunity to appeal determinations to the District Court of the District of Columbia. Additionally, Section 1407(c)(1)(c) allows for respondents to challenge default determinations “where it is established that the default or failure was due to excusable neglect.”

There have also been arguments that, at $30,000, the damages available to claimants are too high. But while it may seem like a big number compared to what’s available in other small claims courts, it is the absolute ceiling of available damages. The CCB has discretion to award up to $30,000, and that limit is much lower than what an infringer might be on the hook for in federal court.

Making these criticisms of the small claims initiative seem even more absurd is the fact that the proceeding will be completely voluntary, allowing respondents to opt out of the entire system if preferred. While it’s hoped that respondents will choose to resolve claims before the CCB—rather than risk a potentially worse fate in federal court—there is no obligation to participate if they see the process as unfair or burdensome.

The reality is that the notice requirements and damages available represent a system that is no more skewed towards claimants than any other adjudicatory proceeding. Arguments to the contrary reflect a resistance to a system that will finally hold accountable infringing behavior that, because of past difficulty to address it, has become routine in the digital age. It’s time to give small creators and copyright owners a realistic shot at protecting their works, and making the CASE Act law would lead the way in this long-overdue and worthy endeavor.