Tag: Digital Millennium Copyright Act

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Conferences Copyright

C-IP2 2022 Fall Conference Panel Discusses Copyright Under Pressure

The following post comes from Cala Coffman, a 2L at Scalia Law and Research Assistant at C-IP2.

At the recent C-IP2 conference entitled IP on the Wane: IP on the Wane: Examining the Impacts as IP Rights Are Reduced, one panel discussed the current state of copyright law, the pressures it has come under in recent years, and their differing perspectives on how the digital world is shaping copyright. Topics of discussion included enforcement techniques, trends in fair use, and the impact of evolving technology on copyright.

Panelists were Clark Asay (Professor of Law at Brigham Young University J. Reuben Clark Law School), Orit Fischman-Afori (Professor of Law at The Haim Striks School of Law, College of Management Academic Studies (COLMAN)), Terry Hart (General Counsel, Association of American Publishers (AAP)), and Karyn A. Temple (Senior Executive Vice President & Global General Counsel, (Motion Picture Association)), and the session was moderated by Sandra Aistars (Clinical Professor, George Mason University, Antonin Scalia Law School; Senior Fellow for Copyright Research and Policy; and Senior Scholar at C-IP2).

Professor Fischman opened the panel by proposing a reconsideration of criminal enforcement for copyright claims. After reviewing current avenues for civil copyright enforcement, including the newly established Copyright Claims Board in the Copyright Office, Digital Millennium Copyright Act, and civil enforcement in federal court including the opportunity for statutory damages, Professor Fischman suggested that criminal copyright enforcement actions seem to be on the decline and should not be a focus of enforcement efforts. Rather, greater attention should be devoted to civil enforcement. Recently, the U.S. Sentencing Commission reported that criminal Copyright and Trademark cases have dropped from 475 cases in 2015 to 137 cases in 2021.

Over the past two decades, several enforcement mechanisms have been introduced to address the challenges authors face enforcing their copyrights in the digital world. These include the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in 1998, the Digital Theft Deterrence Act of 1999, and the Copyright Alternatives in Small-Claims Enforcement Act of 2020, which improved access to enforcement for small creators by creating a new administrative forum with simplified proceedings in the Copyright Office. Small copyright claims can be pursued there with or without the assistance of counsel. While these civil enforcement mechanisms are effective, they have not been without criticism.

Ultimately, Professor Fischman argued that the combination of civil and criminal enforcement frameworks creates a powerful enforcement mechanism for author’s rights. As we consider the current state of IP rights, criminal enforcement is becoming less meaningful overall, in her opinion.

Next, Professor Asay presented three recent empirical studies examining trends in copyright litigation.

The first study indexed fair use cases from 1991 to 2017. In this study, Professor Asay examines the scope of fair use analysis in copyright infringement cases and finds a “steady progression of both appellate and district courts adopting the transformative use paradigm, with modern courts relying on it nearly ninety percent of the time.” The study finds that at the Federal Circuit Court level, in cases where transformative use was asserted, 48% were found to be transformative, and 91% of transformative uses were found to be fair use. Professor Asay states that “fair use is copyright law’s most important defense to claims of copyright infringement,” but as courts increasingly apply transformative use doctrine, he finds that “it is, in fact, eating the world of fair use.”

The second study Professor Asay presented analyzed over 1000 court opinions from between 1978 and 2020 that used a substantial similarity analysis. In this study, Professor Asay finds first that courts rely on opinions from the Second and Ninth circuits “more than any other source in interpreting and applying the substantial similarity standard.” The study also breaks down trends within the two-step substantial similarity analysis. On the first step, Professor Asay finds that “courts mostly decide this first prong . . . as a matter of whether defendant’s had access to the plaintiff’s work, and they mostly favor plaintiffs.” On the second step, he finds “significant heterogeneity” in analyzing improper appropriation of a plaintiff’s work. He states that “no dominant means exist for resolving this question” and “the data also suggest that one of the keys to winning, for either defendants or plaintiffs, is the extent to which the court engages with and discusses copyright limitations.”

The third study, which is forthcoming, examines DMCA Section 1201 litigation. DMCA Section 1201 prohibits attempts to circumvent technological measures used to control access to a copyrighted work.17 U.S.C. § 1201. This study encompasses 205 cases and 209 opinions, and Professor Asay said during the panel that “the most interesting finding in this study is that there’s not much section 1201 litigation.” Although the DMCA has been in force for nearly twenty-five years, less than one appellate decision is made per year on average. The study also finds that “the most litigated subject matter” (over every other subject matter the study coded for) is software.

Ms. Temple discussed how new technologies, techniques, and distribution methods are constantly requiring courts to re-evaluate how authorship rights function in a digital landscape. She likewise commented on the challenges courts seem to face in appropriately drawing distinctions between derivative uses of copyrighted works that should require a license from the author, and transformative uses that are permissible under the affirmative defense of fair use.

Ms. Temple cited the numerous briefs in Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith (including the Motion Picture Association’s) that note that the transformative use test is becoming the sole criteria courts use to determine fair use. Indeed, the MPA’s brief cited to Professor Asay’s study on transformative use (Is Transformative Use Eating the World?) to support the petitioner’s assertion that “in practice, the transformativeness inquiry is virtually always dispositive of the fair use question.” In closing, Ms. Temple stated that although we may be “waning” in how courts see fair use, Warhol presents a chance to correct the fair use analysis and steer it away from infringing on the derivative work rights of authors.

Finally, Mr. Hart presented on potential threats to authorship rights and the concomitant harms to consumer interests in the e-book arena. Mr. Hart’s perspective was that as businesses, copyright industries legitimately have profit-motivated goals, but happily, their ability to meet these goals is directly tied to the “ultimate goal” of promoting science and the useful arts and thus is beneficial to society as a whole. Mr. Hart stated that “the good news, if we think copyright [protections are] waxing, is that . . . the legal framework both in the United States and internationally recognizes [the] principles” that allow copyright owners to take advantage of and divide their exclusive rights. However, digitization may pose a threat to the ability to license rights as the copyright owner desires, as digital copying and transmission greatly increases risk of infringement of e-books.

The e-book market is unique, according to Mr. Hart, in that authors may be particularly vulnerable to digital threats when “digital copies are completely indistinguishable from the originals, and so they would be competing directly with the copyright owner’s primary markets.” Furthermore, he stated that “threats to the ability of copyright owners . . . to pursue rational choices in how they market and distribute their works can be just as harmful as straight up piracy.”

Mr. Hart characterized the e-book market as a thriving, sustainable economy. E-books have been popular for over a decade now, and there are a “variety of licensing models [available] . . . that continue to evolve to meet both the needs of publishers and libraries.” Mr. Hart stated, “the evidence shows that this is a well-functioning market.” He said that “Overdrive, which is the largest e-book aggregator, reported that in 2021 there was over half a billion check-outs of library e-books worldwide, and the pricing is, in my view, fair and sustainable.” Additionally, Mr. Hart said, “Overdrive also reported . . .  that the average cost per title for libraries declined in 2021, and libraries have been able to significantly grow their e-book collections . . . with collection budgets that, when you’ve adjusted for inflation, have essentially been flat the entire time.”

One of the major threats to authorship rights in the e-book market, in Mr. Hart’s view, is the rise of Controlled Digital Lending (CDL). While this theory is currently being litigated in Hachette Book Group v. Internet Archive, Mr. Hart posits that we are only a few steps from a full-blown digital first-sale doctrine, which could have widespread harms throughout copyright for many types of authors. Many amicus briefs in the Internet Archive case have identified this potential harm, as well. According to Hart, the Copyright Alliance brief, for example, stated that a ruling in favor of CDL would have extremely widespread economic harms for authors.

The second threat Mr. Hart identified comes from recent propositions at the state level that would introduce compulsory licenses for e-books. These proposed laws would outlaw limitations on e-book licenses offered to libraries and allow states to dictate what states believe are “reasonable” pricing for e-book licenses. A flaw in both the arguments for CDL and for compulsory e-book licensing, as Mr. Hart sees it, is that both approaches treat the mere exercise of a copyright owner’s exclusive right as unfair and, if accepted, would be dangerous encroachments on authorship rights.

Ultimately, while the panelists identified significant concerns in the existing copyright regime, they were hopeful about the future of authorship rights, reflecting that even if the protections for copyright law had “waned” in certain respects in recent years, and certain rights remain in peril, there are opportunities for education as courts confront the significant changes that accompany an increasingly digital landscape.

Categories
Copyright Legislation

Senate IP Subcommittee Considers the Role of Private Agreements and Existing Technology in Curbing Online Piracy

The following post comes from Liz Velander, a recent graduate of Scalia Law and a Research Assistant at CPIP.

U.S. Capitol buildingBy Liz Velander

In mid-December, the Senate Intellectual Property Subcommittee, led by its Chairman, Senator Thom Tillis (R-NC), held a hearing entitled “The Role of Private Agreements and Existing Technology in Curbing Online Piracy.” The hearing came ahead of Sen. Tillis’s release of his first discussion draft of legislation to reform the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). In his opening remarks, Sen. Tillis stated that reforming the DMCA is one of his top priorities in the 117th Congress, but it may take his entire second term to get a DMCA reform bill across the finish line. The purpose of the hearing was to identify voluntary steps that copyright owners and tech companies can take now to curb online infringement.

The hearing consisted of two panels. Panel I included: Ruth Vitale, CEO, CreativeFuture; Probir Mehta, Head of Global Intellectual Property and Trade Policy, Facebook, Inc.; Mitch Glazier, Chairman and CEO, Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA); and Joshua Lamel, Executive Director, Re:Create. Panel II included: Katherine Oyama, Global Director of Business Public Policy, YouTube; Keith Kupferschmid, CEO, Copyright Alliance; Noah Becker, President and Co-Founder, AdRev; and Dean Marks, Executive Director and Legal Counsel, Coalition for Online Accountability.

Sen. Tillis began the hearing by voicing his opinion on the matter, informed by a year-long series of hearings and months of feedback from creators, user groups, and technology companies. “There is absolutely more big tech can and should do to stop online piracy,” Sen. Tillis said. “Unfortunately, it seems that some in big tech aren’t serious about stopping online piracy, and I don’t know why that is. Maybe it isn’t a priority—or maybe some companies are actually profiting off the piracy on their site. It is clear as day to me that many multi-national, multi-billion-dollar companies simply aren’t using all the tools they have to stop theft from small creators. And that’s wrong.”

Mitch Glazier, Chairman and CEO of RIAA, stated that the problem is that big tech companies aren’t properly incentivized to take steps in combatting online piracy. Keith Kupferschmid, CEO of the Copyright Alliance, explained that Section 512 of the DMCA has been so misinterpreted by the courts that most service providers know that they have little risk of liability and need only do the absolute minimum required under the DMCA to avoid liability.

Mr. Glazier said that one of the most important things Congress can do is to provide the right incentives to encourage voluntary private agreements. He explained that there are two types of private agreements. First, there are individual agreements entered into by copyright owners and technology providers. These can be nimble and evolve with technology. Second, there are standards developed in the marketplace that eventually achieve broad enough consensus and use that they become required. In Mr. Glazier’s view, that is what the DMCA contemplated—a multi-stakeholder standard technical measure (STM) process where there was enough consensus and use that it would be unfair for outliers to compete without using them. Mr. Glazier said that a voluntary system only works if there exist the right incentives, which the DMCA does not currently provide.

The panelists disagreed as to whether Congress needs to reform the DMCA in order to incentivize voluntary agreements. The panelists representing big tech companies asserted that the process is working as the DMCA intended, pointing to the policies and procedures of their platforms and existing content protection technology. Probir Mehta, Head of Global IP and Trade Policy at Facebook, touted Facebook’s content management tool, Rights Manager. Katherine Oyama, Global Director of Business Public Policy at YouTube, pointed to Youtube’s Copyright Management Tools, which include a webform, Content ID, and Copyright Match. These panelists emphasized the significant amount of work their companies undertook to create these technologies, which they view as going above and beyond the requirements of the DMCA.

Members of the IP Subcommittee were very interested to hear how these tools work in practice. Ruth Vitale, CEO of CreativeFuture, testified that most individual creators are not given access to YouTube’s Content ID, nor are they given an explanation for why they are denied. Ms. Oyama stated that while Content ID has eligibility requirements, YouTube built an entirely new tool for smaller creators, Copyright Match, which runs on Content ID itself. She claimed that Content ID is such a powerful tool that, if used improperly, will erroneously take down content that is noninfringing.

Ranking Member Senator Chris Coons (D-DE) wanted to know what the panelists viewed as the path forward. Mr. Kupferschmid said that while voluntary agreements have a role, they cannot address everything. He emphasized that legislative action is appropriate in this circumstance because service providers are not being cooperative. Noah Becker, President and Co-Founder of AdRev, a digital rights management and media technology company, agreed with Mr. Kupferschmid. He explained his business’ revenue-sharing proposition is a better fit for copyright owners that do not want to use YouTube’s monetization tools. In addition to legislation, he explained that there should be some sort of support for the concept of a list of approved vendors, like AdRev, to be able to access copyright APIs on massive platforms. He urged that this would reduce the large cost and technology burden of accessing APIs, making takedowns more affordable for creators.

Sen. Tillis closed the hearing by stating that the parties need to engage with one another in order to avoid a potential legislative overreach. He said that the hearing showed that tech companies must do more to combat online piracy. Sen. Tillis stressed that they have the tools and resources but must find ways to get greater engagement and create voluntary paths to prevent Congress from paving less voluntary ones.

Categories
Copyright

Senate IP Subcommittee Hearing Addresses Intersection of DMCA and Fair Use

The following post comes from Yumi Oda, an LLM Candidate at Scalia Law and a Research Assistant at CPIP.

U.S. Capitol buildingBy Yumi Oda

As part of its year-long review of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), the Senate Subcommittee on Intellectual Property tackled yet another contentious issue in our copyright system—fair use. A virtual online hearing, held on July 28 and entitled How Does the DMCA Contemplate Limitations and Exceptions Like Fair Use?, focused on the role of fair use for digital platforms. Calling fair use “a bit of a touchy subject,” Chairman Thom Tillis (R-NC) specifically requested the witnesses’ input on how the original DMCA envisioned fair use and how the reform bill should address it. Ranking Member Chris Coons (D-DE) likewise emphasized the importance of striking a balance to “safeguard free speech and fair use, while also combating digital piracy and ensuring creators are fairly compensated.”

The panelists included: Sherwin Siy, Lead Public Policy Manager of Wikimedia Foundation; Mickey H. Osterreicher, General Counsel of National Press Photographers Association; Jane C. Ginsburg, Morton L. Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic Property Law at Columbia University School of Law; Christopher Mohr, Vice President for Intellectual Property and General Counsel of Software and Information Industry Association (SIIA); Rick Beato, Songwriter, Producer, Engineer, and Educator; Yolanda Adams, GRAMMY Award-winning artist and Recording Academy Trustee; Joseph C. Gratz, Partner of Durie Tangri LLP; Matthew Sanderson, Co-lead, Political Law Group of Caplin & Drysdale; and Jacqueline Charlesworth, Partner of Alter, Kendrick & Baron LLP. These panelists represented industry and scholarly experts, as well as creators, users, and intermediaries of copyrighted works.

As a limitation to the exclusive rights in creative works, fair use is intended to simultaneously promote free speech and foster authorship and creativity. Taking a hint from case law, Congress codified Section 107 of the Copyright Act, enumerating four factors to be considered in a fair use analysis, namely: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is commercial or educational; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. However, since these factors are neither dispositive nor exhaustive, courts typically explore fair use claims in an open-ended, case-by-case manner.

On the first panel, Mr. Siy, representing the host of Wikipedia and Wikimedia Commons, testified that his Foundation heavily relies on fair use and the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions. Mr. Siy asserted that his Foundation receives approximately 30 DMCA takedown notices annually as risk-averse volunteers remove seemingly infringing content according to its volunteer-created standards, which are stricter than what the law requires. Of those notices, Mr. Siy explained, two-thirds are usually found to be noninfringing uses, such as fair use, thus demonstrating the ease of attacking harmless fair uses under the DMCA.

On the other hand, Mr. Osterreicher, representing visual journalists, pleaded with the Subcommittee to change the current lop-sided, whack-a-mole situation, which places an “insurmountable” burden on photographers, but “little to no responsibility” on online service providers (OSPs) for online infringement. As he pointed out, “the more amorphous the fair use interpretation the better” for OSPs to draw more visitors and advertisers. He argued that copyright infringement, sometimes disguised as fair use, reduces economic incentives, discourages participation in visual journalism, and “devalues photography as both a news medium and art form.”

Next, Prof. Ginsburg explained how Sections 512 and 1201 accommodate copyright limitations and exceptions. She noted that Section 512 has not worked as intended, largely due to the vastly higher number of postings than Congress originally anticipated. Conversely, the seemingly low number of counternotices, she continued, could suggest that “many fair uses are being suppressed,” “the vast majority of postings are in fact infringing,” or “fear or ignorance [are causing] some fair users to decline to send a counternotification.” As a potential solution to the timely counternotification procedure, Prof. Ginsburg proposed an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanism. Moreover, she explained that “by design, [Section] 1201 does not provide a general fair use defense,” and that the triennial rulemakings to identify exempted classes of works have been largely effective.

Mr. Mohr, representing the software industry, provided the last testimony on this panel. He stated that Sections 512 and 1201 have been successful mainly because Congress left fair use out of both. Rather, he considered fair use as “a built-in safety valve” to preclude overly broad assertions of rights.

Senators Tillis and Coons then raised a series of specific questions. In response to a question regarding the extent to which OSPs should consider fair use, Prof. Ginsburg testified that OSPs have no duty to consider fair use and that they can remain mere conduits as long as they comply with the DMCA safe harbor provisions. Moreover, in response to a question regarding the misunderstanding surrounding fair use and newsworthiness, Mr. Osterreicher answered that there is a common misconception that newsworthy materials can be used more freely, which in turn deprives visual journalists of licensing opportunities due to the time-sensitive nature of such materials. Furthermore, in response to a question regarding the recent evolution of fair use, Prof. Ginsburg testified that broader fair use claims wrongly recognized in lower courts have been corrected by the higher courts, thereby demonstrating that courts are better equipped to analyze the inherently malleable fair use doctrine.

Lastly, each panelist was asked to specify which area of the DMCA Congress should look at in drafting a reform bill. Mr. Siy simply called for a holistic review. Mr. Osterreicher recommended clarifying the red flag knowledge standard for OSPs, and he pledged to continue advocating for the ADR system and the currently blocked Copyright Alternative in Small-Claims Enforcement (CASE) Act. Neither Prof. Ginsburg nor Mr. Mohr advocated for a legislative change, but Prof. Ginsburg did recommend that Congress closely monitor the development of the European Union’s approach to see if requiring OSPs to filter and block infringing content could reach a better balance.

On the second panel, witnesses testified how fair use has been applied in practice in their specific areas, many touching on the hot subject of political misappropriation. First to testify was Mr. Beato, a musician and popular YouTube music instructor who uses excerpts from famous songs in his videos. He explained that he never sought fair use claims in response to DMCA notices because it would be a waste of time and money, although he believed a good case could be made considering the new educational role YouTube has been playing. Although he himself successfully stood up against DMCA notices by a major label thanks to his large viewership, he warned that “frivolous” DMCA notices can be used to harass small content creators. Ultimately, he proposed a “Fair Use Registry,” similar to Twitter’s blue check mark, to certify and notate a good actor and to whitelist his or her use.

Another musician’s input came from Ms. Adams, a renowned gospel singer and songwriter who is also known as the “First Lady of Modern Gospel.” She maintained that “if someone’s claim of fair use reduces the artists’ ability to earn a living, it should be treated as infringement, plain and simple.” In addition to this monetization aspect of fair use, Ms. Adams also focused on its moral aspect, stating that “fair use can be very unfair to the artist if it takes our control away.” Reiterating the importance of the long-standing radio performance right issue, Ms. Adams concluded that seeking “permission” is the key when it comes to working with musicians, including use in political campaigns.

In contrast, Mr. Gratz, representing internet intermediaries, defended free speech and fair use, stating “nobody likes to be criticized or have their music used in ways they can’t control, but . . . even more so where the copyright holder does not like the use, fair use is needed to make sure that free expression can thrive even in the presence of copyrighted material.” Additionally, he made the following three points: (1) Section 512 has provided no practical remedy to the serious DMCA abuse; (2) automated filtering including any “staydown” systems should not be mandated; and (3) the current “reasonableness” standard for terminating repeat infringers is the right standard.

Similarly, Mr. Sanderson, who consults election and advocacy organizations, explained that political campaigns receive increasingly more takedown notices from artists who do not wish to be associated with the campaigns’ messages, even when the uses are permitted under performance rights organizations’ blanket licenses.

Finally, Ms. Charlesworth, an attorney representing songwriters and artists, reminded the Subcommittee that “creators, too, [as well as politicians,] are intended beneficiaries of the First Amendment.” She noted that creators’ messages can be appropriated and altered in political campaigns in ways that alienate fans and cause economic damages. Particularly, she argued that a fair use claim in a political campaign should also be analyzed under the regular four-factor test, with the emphasis on the first factor’s focus on whether the use is “transformative.” On this point, she explained that simply attaching a song to a political campaign video would not amount to a “transformative” use. Citing her clients’ experience, Ms. Charlesworth argued that “the current system imposes unjust burdens on creators and small copyright owners . . . without adequate tools or resources at hand when a political ad containing their song suddenly appears” online.

The second panel did not receive as many questions as the first one because the hearing was cut short by a live vote, but Senator Tillis concluded the hearing by thanking each panelist and acknowledging that some issues probably can be addressed without any legislative fix, while others may require congressional action.

Categories
Copyright

How the Supreme Court Made it Harder for Copyright Owners to Protect Their Rights—And Why Congress Should Fix It

U.S. Supreme Court buildingEarlier this week, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street.com, a case examining the registration precondition to filing a suit for copyright infringement in the federal district courts. While I agree with the Court’s exegesis of the statute at issue, it’s worth noting how the Court’s construction leaves many, if not most, copyright owners in the lurch. Under the Court’s holding, in fact, this very blog post could be infringed today, and there’s very little that could be done to stop it for many months to come. As the Court noted in Harper & Row v. Nation, “copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.” The Court’s holding in Fourth Estate, by contrast, disincentivizes dissemination since it undermines effective copyright protection and prejudices the public interest in the production of, and access to, creative works. Again, I don’t blame the Court for this outcome—in fact, I think it’s correct. The problem, as I’ll explain, lies in the unfortunate fact that nowadays it takes too long to register a copyright claim. And that’s something that Congress needs to fix.

The issue in Fourth Estate is straightforward. Under the first sentence of Section 411(a) of the Copyright Act, “no civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title.” Some courts, like the Ninth Circuit, have applied the so-called “application approach,” finding that “registration . . . has been made” when the copyright owner delivers a complete application to the Copyright Office. Other courts, like the Tenth Circuit, have applied the so-called “registration approach,” where “registration” is not “made” until the Register of Copyrights has acted upon the application (by either approving or rejecting it). Confounding the analysis is the fact that other sections of the Copyright Act alternatively delineate registration as something done by the applicant or by the Copyright Office.

In the decision below, the Eleventh Circuit applied the registration approach, affirming the district court’s dismissal of Fourth Estate’s complaint since the Register of Copyrights had not yet approved or denied its application to register. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision by Justice Ginsburg, affirmed: “We hold . . . that registration occurs, and a copyright claimant may commence an infringement suit, when the Copyright Office registers a copyright.” The issue for the Court was one of pure statutory construction, and the problem for proponents of the application approach is that the second sentence of Section 411(a) clearly indicates that registration is something done by the Copyright Office. It provides, as an exception to the first sentence, that a copyright owner can nevertheless sue for infringement once the application materials “have been delivered to the Copyright Office in proper form and registration has been refused.”

Justice Ginsburg reasoned: “If application alone sufficed to ‘ma[ke]’ registration, § 411(a)’s second sentence—allowing suit upon refusal of registration—would be superfluous.” I’ve always found this to be the better argument, and I’m not surprised to see it front-and-center in the Court’s analysis. Why would applicants need an exception that turns on the subsequent action of the Copyright Office if merely delivering a completed application sufficed? As Justice Ginsburg noted, the application approach “requires the implausible assumption that Congress gave ‘registration’ different meanings in consecutive, related sentences within a single statutory provision.” I think the Court got this one exactly right, and I don’t find arguments to the contrary to be particularly persuasive.

That said, let me now explain why it’s wrong—well, at least why it’s bad for millions of copyright owners and why Congress should fix it ASAP.

The purpose of the registration approach and other similar provisions in the Copyright Act (such as the availability of statutory damages or attorney’s fees) is to incentivize timely registration, which is no longer a prerequisite to copyright protection as it was under the Copyright Act of 1909. Under the current Copyright Act, copyright protection nominally exists once a work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression, and registration is no longer mandatory. (I say “nominally” because the Court’s holding in Fourth Estate ensures that, as a practical matter, countless works with respect to which copyright owners have exclusive rights on paper in fact have no immediate rights in the real world since they can’t actually file suit to quickly stop any ongoing infringement.) However, the incentive-to-register theory makes little sense in the context of the debate over the proper interpretation of Section 411(a) itself as the works being sued upon must be registered under both the application and registration approaches.

With due respect to the Copyright Office, processing a registration application is primarily a ministerial act. The vast majority of applications are granted—97% in 2017 according to the latest available data from the Copyright Office (though 29% of those applications required correspondence with the applicant). Are we really withholding remedies for all copyright owners because of the remaining 3%? And even for the 3% of applications that are denied, the copyright owner can still sue for infringement, asking the district court to reassess the agency’s refusal. No matter what the Copyright Office does with the application, whether it grants or denies, the copyright owner ultimately can sue. And, under the third sentence of Section 411(a), the Register of Copyrights can even “become a party to the action with respect to the issue of registrability of the copyright claim.” So it’s not like the Register can’t have a say should the application be in that slim minority of questionable ones that may merit intervention.

To its credit, the Supreme Court acknowledged that its holding would cause problems for copyright owners—but it also overplayed the exceptions to the registration approach that Congress put in place to alleviate some of these issues. For example, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that Section 408(f) empowers the Register of Copyrights to establish regulations for the preregistration of certain categories of works. Under this regime, as Justice Ginsburg noted, “Congress provided that owners of works especially susceptible to prepublication infringement should be allowed to institute suit before the Register has granted or refused registration.” That’s great for that particular subset of copyright owners, but what about everyone else? And what about authors who publish their works just as soon as they create them? Moreover, Justice Ginsburg’s blithe comment that copyright owners “may eventually recover damages for the past infringement” ignores the fact that injunctive relief to stop the actual, ongoing infringement is unavailable until the registration is processed by the Copyright Office.

The Court laments such policy ramifications: “True, the statutory scheme has not worked as Congress likely envisioned. Registration processing times have increased from one or two weeks in 1956 to many months today.” And this gets to the heart of the problem: The time it takes the Copyright Office to process an application has significantly increased over the years. Just four years after the Copyright Act of 1976 went into effect, the delay was “5 to 6 weeks.” And, as of October 2018, the delay has grown to an “average processing time for all claims” of “7 months.” Indeed, the fastest the Copyright Office processes an application now is one month, and the longest it takes is an incredible 37 months. The following illustration from the Copyright Office breaks this down with more particularity:

To be clear, I don’t think these delays are the Copyright Office’s fault. In fact, I think it’s Congress’s fault for not giving the agency more resources to do the very things that Congress requires it to do. Regardless, the fact remains that even copyright owners who do everything that the Copyright Act expects them to do in order to obtain the greatest protection for their works at the earliest that they can reasonably do so are still left without remedies should—or, perhaps more likely, when—infringement occur once they release their works to the world. The aforementioned constitutional goal of dissemination is thus undercut by the subservient goal of registration, for rational copyright owners would be less motivated to disseminate their works by the right to exclude when that right is in fact illusory. If Congress really wants authors to promote progress via dissemination of new works, it should adjust Section 411(a) to provide for immediate protection to all works, whether registered or not. It can still incentivize registration by limiting the remedies available, but it shouldn’t make it so that there are none.

To see the injustice, one need look no further than this very blog post. According to the Copyright Act, this post was protected the moment it was fixed in a tangible medium of expression (i.e., yesterday evening). Should the copyright owner—presumably the university where I work as this is a work made for hire—have filed for registration as quickly as possible (i.e., this morning), there still would be no way to obtain any injunctive relief while the Copyright Office processes the application. Preregistration was never an option as this post is not a literary work that is protected by the exception for certain works prone to prepublication infringement under Section 202.16 of the CFR. Even if the university had done everything that it was supposed to do as early as it could reasonably have done so to ensure the utmost copyright protection for this post, it could do nothing in the courts to stop an infringer who willfully exploits this post for profit until the Copyright Office acts upon the application—a lifetime for infringement in the digital age. (There is an option to expedite review for $800, but that amount of money is not reasonable for most people.)

Perhaps a takedown notice could be issued under Section 512 of the DMCA, but if there’s a counternotice, the university could not bring suit in the designated 10-14 day window to prevent the service provider from restoring the infringing material since there’s been no registration and thus it cannot sue for infringement. Despite having done everything Congress expected, the university would be powerless to stop the ongoing infringement of its exclusive rights in this post for perhaps several months into the future. And any argument that damages will compensate for infringements occurring before the Copyright Office got around to acting on the application is undercut by the fact that courts routinely grant preliminary injunctive relief precisely because the harm from infringement is irreparable—money damages cannot make the copyright owner whole.

The absurd result of all this is that the promise of exclusive rights in one’s original work of authorship is practically meaningless given the registration approach under Section 411(a). No doubt, Congress intended this disability to act as a stick in order to encourage the carrot of remedies should those rights be infringed. But the reality is that numerous copyright owners who do everything right get the stick and not the carrot—at least until the Copyright Office happens to process their applications. In the meantime, these copyright owners cannot be faulted for thinking twice before disseminating their works. Since enforcement of their rights is precluded through no fault of their own, what else does Congress expect them to do? A right without a remedy is senseless, and given the millions of original works that are created each day, Congress’s promise of copyright protection for new works may be one of the most illusory rights in modern times. Now that the Supreme Court has clarified Section 411(a), it’s time for Congress to fix it.

Categories
Copyright Infringement Internet Uncategorized

Three Years Later, DMCA Still Just as Broken

By Matthew Barblan & Kevin Madigan

cameraIn 2013, CPIP published a policy brief by Professor Bruce Boyden exposing the DMCA notice and takedown system as outdated and in need of reform. The Failure of the DMCA Notice and Takedown System explained that while Section 512 of the DMCA was intended as a way for copyright owners and service providers to work together to fight infringement in the digital age, the notice and takedown system has been largely ineffective in managing the ever-increasing amount of piracy.

Three years later, the DMCA is still just as broken. Since we published the brief, courts have further diminished service providers’ responsibility to cooperate with copyright owners to detect and deter infringement, rendering the DMCA even more fruitless and desperately in need of retooling.

Boyden explained the fundamental problems with the system at the time, beginning with the fact that “despite all the notice, there is precious little takedown to show for it. Unless a site employs some sort of content filtering technology, the same content typically re-appears within hours after it is removed.” The notice and takedown system is particularly unsuited for the twenty-first century, where “infringement is persistent, ubiquitous, and gargantuan in scale. It is a problem that needs to be policed” with more than just takedown notices that don’t give copyright owners “a single day when the content is not available on the most heavily trafficked sites.”

Boyden noted that “even for the largest media companies with the most resources at their disposal, attempting to purge a site of even a fraction of the highest-value content is like trying to bail out an oil tanker with a thimble.” And Boyden pointed out that the courts hadn’t made the situation any better: “The DMCA’s unsuitability as a tool to manage chronic, persistent, and pervasive infringement is particularly apparent after recent decisions from the Second and Ninth Circuit that construed the duty of website owners very narrowly under Section 512.”

To further illustrate his point, Boyden collected data on takedown notices sent by MPAA companies and counter-notices received. Between March and August of 2013, MPAA companies sent takedown notices for over 25 million infringing URLs and received only 8 counter-notices in response. That’s a counter-notice rate of 0.000032%, suggesting that the astronomical volume of notices represents a likewise astronomical volume of infringement rather than overly-aggressive notice-sending.

Grand Totals. Infringing URLs: 25,235,151. URLs Sent to Websites: 13,238,860. URLs Sent to Search Engines: 11,996,291. Counter-Notices Received: 8.

Boyden concluded:

The impossibility of keeping up with new [infringing] uploads means that an online service provider can create a site aimed at and dedicated to hosting infringing copyrighted works, comply with every takedown notice, and still benefit from the safe harbor, as long as its intent remains hidden. If the site has enough users, any popular content removed will be supplanted by new copies almost immediately.

Sadly, three years later the “chronic, persistent, and pervasive” infringement that Boyden described continues, with stolen copyrighted works popping up on sites almost immediately after being taken down. Google Search—one product of one company—has receive nearly 90 million takedown notices this month alone. The situation has gotten so bad that last week a long list of artists, including Paul McCartney and Taylor Swift, signed a digital petition to bring attention to a broken DMCA system that allows companies like YouTube to benefit from infringement at the expense of songwriters and artists.

The artists’ main message: “The existing laws threaten the continued viability of songwriters and recording artists to survive from the creation of music.” They note that “the tech companies who benefit from the DMCA today were not the intended protectorate when it was signed into law nearly two decades ago,” and they ask Congress to “enact sensible reform that balances the interests of creators with the interests of the companies who exploit music for their financial enrichment.”

Recognizing the growing frustration with the DMCA, the U.S. Copyright Office initiated a study earlier this year to examine whether the statute is fulfilling its purpose. We submitted comments to the Copyright Office on behalf of a group of copyright law scholars, noting that courts have disrupted the balance Congress sought to create when it enacted the DMCA. In particular, courts have eliminated any incentive for service providers to work with copyright owners to develop policies and procedures to prevent or curb piracy online. In just one example of how deeply courts have distorted congressional intent, under courts’ current interpretation of the DMCA, search engines can continue to index even obviously infringing sites like The Pirate Bay with no fear of potential of liability.

Adding insult to injury, courts have recently shifted the balance of power even further away from artists and towards service providers, making it easier than ever for companies to enable and profit from infringement while turning a blind eye—or even encouraging—piracy on their sites. In this month’s Capitol Records v. Vimeo decision, for example, the Second Circuit extended the DMCA safe harbor to Vimeo despite smoking-gun evidence that Vimeo employees encouraged users to post stolen works on their site and had viewed the illicit videos at issue in the suit. In a jaw-dropping opinion, the court let Vimeo off the hook simply because the evidence of Vimeo employees encouraging infringement wasn’t directly tied to the specific infringing videos that plaintiffs included in their suit.

CPIP’s Devlin Hartline explains:

After Capitol Records v. Vimeo: A service provider can encourage its users to infringe on a massive scale, and so long as the infringement it encourages isn’t the specific infringement it gets sued for, it wins on the safe harbor defense at summary judgment. This is so even if there’s copious evidence that its employees viewed and interacted with the specific infringing material at issue. No jury will ever get to weigh all of the evidence and decide whether the infringement is obvious. At the same time, any proactive steps taken by the service provider will potentially open it up to liability for having actual knowledge, so the incentive is to do as little as possible to proactively “detect and deal” with piracy. This is not at all what Congress intended. It lets bad faith service providers trample the rights of copyright owners with impunity.

As courts continue to gut the DMCA, making it harder than ever for artists to protect their property and livelihoods, Congress would be wise to heed Bruce Boyden’s advice from three years ago: “It is long past time for a retooling of the notice and takedown regime.”

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Copyright Infringement Internet Uncategorized

Second Circuit Deepens Red Flag Knowledge Circuit Split in Vimeo

a gavel lying on a table in front of booksThe Second Circuit’s recent opinion in Capitol Records v. Vimeo is, to put it mildly, pretty bad. From its convoluted reasoning that copyrights under state law for pre-1972 sound recordings are limited by the DMCA safe harbors, despite the explicit statement in Section 301(c) that “rights or remedies” under state law “shall not be annulled or limited” by the Copyright Act, to its gutting of red flag knowledge by limiting it to the nearly-impossible situation where a service provider actually knows that a specific use of an entire copyrighted work is neither fair nor licensed yet somehow doesn’t also surmise that it’s infringing, it’s hard to see how either result is compelled by the statutes, much less how it was intended by Congress. On the latter point, the Second Circuit in essence has written red flag knowledge out of the statute, reducing the DMCA to a mere notice-and-takedown regime. The reality is that Congress expected red flag knowledge to do far more work, incentivizing service providers to take action in the face of a red flag—even without a notice.

If there’s any good to come from Vimeo, it might only be that the Second Circuit has now deepened the circuit split with the Ninth Circuit in Columbia Pictures v. Fung on two issues related to red flag knowledge. Under the statute, red flag knowledge exists when a service provider is “aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.” The two circuits are already split on the issue of whether red flag knowledge must pertain to the particular works that are being sued over in the suit. And now with Vimeo, the circuits are split on the issue of whether a service provider can gain red flag knowledge just by looking at an infringing work. The deeper the circuit split, the greater the chance an appeal will make it to the Supreme Court, which would hopefully clean up the current red flag knowledge mess.

In Fung, the defendant, Gary Fung, operated several piracy havens, including isoHunt, TorrentBox, Podtropolis, and eDonkey. The district court found Fung liable for inducement under MGM v. Grokster and denied him safe harbor protection under the DMCA. The district court’s decision came in 2009, two years before the Ninth Circuit first held in UMG v. Shelter Capital that red flag knowledge requires “specific knowledge of particular infringing activity.” It also came two-and-a-half years before the Second Circuit held in Viacom v. YouTube that red flag knowledge is only relevant if it pertains to the works-in-suit. Regardless, since the vast majority of content available on Fung’s sites was copyrighted, including specific content that he himself had downloaded, the district court held that Fung hadn’t even raised a triable issue of fact as to whether he had red flag knowledge. The fact that none of the works he had been sued over were the same as the ones he had been found to have red flag knowledge of was irrelevant.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that Fung had red flag knowledge as a matter of law. The opinion came out just one week after the same panel of judges issued a superseding opinion in UMG v. Shelter Capital reiterating that red flag knowledge requires “specific knowledge of particular infringing activity.” Importantly, in applying that standard to Fung, the Ninth Circuit did not say that the specific knowledge had to be of the particular works-in-suit. For whatever reason, Fung had failed to argue otherwise. Google even filed an amicus brief supporting the plaintiffs but nonetheless arguing that “the DMCA’s knowledge standards are specific and focus on the particular material that the plaintiff is suing about.” Apparently unaware that this actually helped his case, Fung filed a supplemental brief calling Google’s argument “fallacious.”

In the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, even though red flag knowledge had to relate to particular infringing activity, that activity did not have to involve the particular works-in-suit. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit held that the “material in question was sufficiently current and well-known that it would have been objectively obvious to a reasonable person” that it was “both copyrighted and not licensed to random members of the public.” Since Fung failed to expeditiously remove the particular material of which he had red flag knowledge, he lost his safe harbor protection across the board. Thus, the Ninth Circuit in Fung held that: (1) red flag knowledge that strips a service provider of its entire safe harbor protection does not have to pertain to the particular works-in-suit, and (2) material can be so “current and well-known” that its infringing nature would be “objectively obvious to a reasonable person.”

The Second Circuit in Vimeo parted ways with the Ninth Circuit on these two holdings. Since the “evidence was not shown to relate to any of the videos at issue in this suit,” the Second Circuit held that it was “insufficient to justify a finding of red flag knowledge . . . as to those specific videos.” The Second Circuit thus applied the red flag knowledge standard on a work-by-work basis, in direct contrast to the Ninth Circuit in Fung. Also, the Second Circuit held that “the mere fact that a video contains all or substantially all of a piece of recognizable, or even famous, copyrighted music” and was “viewed in its entirety” by an “employee of a service provider” was not enough “to sustain the copyright owner’s burden of showing red flag knowledge.” The court added that even “an employee who was a copyright expert cannot be expected to know when use of a copyrighted song has been licensed.” So while the Ninth Circuit said it would have been objectively obvious to Fung that particular works were infringing, the Second Circuit in Vimeo set the bar far higher.

Curiously, the Second Circuit in Vimeo didn’t even mention Fung, despite the fact that it was deepening the circuit split with the Ninth Circuit. One wonders whether the omission was intentional. Either way, the circuit split has only gotten deeper. While in the Ninth Circuit an infringement can be so obvious that a court can find that a service provider had red flag knowledge without even sending it to a jury, the Second Circuit says that courts can’t let a jury decide whether a service provider had red flag knowledge even with the most obvious of infringements. And while in the Ninth Circuit a service provider loses its entire safe harbor for failing to remove an obvious infringement that it hasn’t been sued over, the Second Circuit says that red flag knowledge has to be determined on a work-by-work basis for only the works-in-suit. Given this growing divide between the Second and Ninth Circuits, it seems like only a matter of time before the Supreme Court will weigh in on the red flag knowledge standard. And if the Court does finally weigh in, one hopes it will put common sense back into the DMCA.

Categories
Copyright Infringement Internet Uncategorized

Capitol Records v. Vimeo: Courts Should Stop Coddling Bad Actors in Copyright Cases

Here’s a brief excerpt of my new post that was published on IPWatchdog:

Here’s where we are after Capitol Records v. Vimeo: A service provider can encourage its users to infringe on a massive scale, and so long as the infringement it encourages isn’t the specific infringement it gets sued for, it wins on the safe harbor defense at summary judgment. This is so even if there’s copious evidence that its employees viewed and interacted with the specific infringing material at issue. No jury will ever get to weigh all of the evidence and decide whether the infringement is obvious. At the same time, any proactive steps taken by the service provider will potentially open it up to liability for having actual knowledge, so the incentive is to do as little as possible to proactively “detect and deal” with piracy. This is not at all what Congress intended. It lets bad faith service providers trample the rights of copyright owners with impunity.

To read the rest of this post, please visit IPWatchdog.