Categories
Patent Law

CPIP Affiliate Scholar Erika Lietzan Testifies at HJC Hearing on FDA Approval Process

U.S. Capitol buildingOn July 27, 2017, CPIP Affiliate Scholar and Associate Professor of Law at the University of Missouri–Columbia Erika Lietzan testified before the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law in a hearing on Antitrust Concerns and the FDA Approval Process. The hearing was an attempt by lawmakers to better understand the sometimes complex pharmaceutical development and approval process and to consider legislative tactics that could help curb regulatory abuses in the drug marketplace. Professor Lietzan’s testimony provides her perspective and recommendations on three aspects of the regulatory paradigm of particular interest to the Committee: citizen petitions, use and distribution restrictions, and FDA’s unapproved drugs initiative.

Citizen Petitions

Addressing the first topic, Lietzan praises the development of the citizen petition process, which was initiated in the late 1970s in order to allow any person to request that the FDA issue, amend, or revoke a regulation or order. Though citizen petitions were meant to move the administrative agency towards an “open government” philosophy and embrace transparency, access, and accountability, critics argue that they’ve enabled some innovative drug makers to intentionally delay the approval of generics through frivolous petitions. But as Lietzan points out, many critics’ concerns over meritless innovator petitions are based on inferences and not factual findings.

Professor Erika LietzanLietzan explains that there is scant factual evidence of delay in the approval of generic drugs due to petitions, noting that of 175 petitions related to pending applications over a recent eight-year period, only five resulted in delays not necessary to protect the public health. Additionally, while two of the most relied upon studies track denied petitions, neither of them evaluate the strength or contents of the petitions. As Lietzan notes, “[t]he claim that petitions are frequently frivolous appears based on the timing of petitions and denial rate, not the substance, of the petitions.”

In her recommendations to the Committee, Professor Lietzan suggests enhancing existing empirical work with a robust examination of the agency’s disposition of the issues presented in the petitions, rather than a cursory look at the requests stated in the petitions. In order to help conduct this research, Lietzan recommends providing the agency with additional resources and incentivizing petitioners to include more comprehensive data as part of their submissions.

Use and Distribution Restrictions

Of particular focus during the hearing was the proposed Creating and Restoring Equal Access to Equivalent Samples Act of 2017 (CREATES Act), which aims to prevent drug innovators from using FDA-required risk evaluation and mitigation strategies (REMS)—required for potentially high-risk drugs—to obstruct generic competition. Again, Lietzan points out that the studies relied upon to promote the CREATES Act often involve unclear methodology and weak empirical support.

When dealing with new drugs that may pose great risk to the public, innovators have legitimate concerns about the sale of their products to another company, regardless of a competitive relationship. As Lietzan explains, these innovators have a special responsibility to the public, and the CREATES Act lacks meaningful protections in the event their products lead to toxicity or other harm to patients.

Lietzan then challenges the CREATES Act as “flatly inconsistent with fundamental patent law.” She explains that by requiring a company to practice its patent for the benefit of a competitor, the Act contradicts a central principle of patent law which guarantees that a patent owner has no duty to practice their invention. After she warns that “[e]nacting this provision will inherently devalue patents” and “harm incentives to innovate,” Lietzan asserts that the FDA simply lacks the authority to require a company to practice their patent or sell their product to a competitor.

In lieu of enacting the flawed CREATES Act, Lietzan recommends that robust liability protections be implemented for innovative companies providing products to third parties, and that the agency examine ways to incentivize innovators to manufacture and sell patented drugs, as well as agree to shared access systems.

Unapproved Drugs Initiative

Addressing concerns over recent sharp increases in the price of drugs that have long been available at a low cost, Professor Lietzan explains that—despite public outrage—these  price hikes are a direct result of the FDA’s “unapproved drugs initiative” and represent a system working directly as designed. The reality is that there are several thousands of unapproved drugs marketed in the US, which Lietzan explains are the result of piecemeal evolution of drug approval mechanisms throughout the 20th century.

The FDA has adopted a risk-based approach to combating unapproved drugs, prioritizing those that pose the biggest threats to public health while also providing a grace period for some companies to try to bring their products into compliance. But Professor Lietzan notes that in order for many established medicines to obtain approval, companies must generate substantial data and perform research that will inevitably cost a significant amount of money. And while there may not be a way to bring these drugs into compliance without price disruptions, Lietzan recommends the creation of programs in which companies involved with specific ingredients pool resources and collaborate on research, allowing the FDA to save time and money by approving a group of applications at the same time.

Conclusion

Professor Lietzan’s testimony and recommendations reflect the core values of public health and open government embodied in the FDA’s mission of ensuring that pharmaceuticals are safe and effective. In addition, her testimony stresses the importance of maintaining effective patent property rights and promoting evidence-based policymaking—two fundamental principles that are unfortunately often overlooked.

Video of the full hearing can be found here.

Categories
Innovation Pharma

The Drug Innovation Paradox: Matching Incentives to Market Realities

scientist looking through a microscopeThe hardest things are often the most important things. That’s one of the implicit justifications for the intellectual property system. If we want people to do the hard and important work of researching, developing, and commercializing game-changing innovations, then we need to secure the fruits of their labor with property rights.

In her forthcoming paper, The Drug Innovation Paradox,[1] Professor Erika Lietzan of the University of Missouri School of Law gives reason to question whether our IP and regulatory system is properly encouraging pharmaceutical innovators to work on the most important, and hardest, questions.

This paper, produced while Prof. Lietzan was a CPIP Edison Innovation Fellow, considers a paradox. Some of the biggest health challenges, the most important things, are indeed the hardest things. Therapies for diseases such as multiple sclerosis and Alzheimer’s demand research, development, and testing that takes longer. Unfortunately, the longer something takes to develop, the shorter the term of exclusivity under the IP system, and thus the less secure the investment.

The drug innovation paradox is that the hardest and most important cures are often the ones most poorly supported by our IP system.

Combining several different data sources for the first time, Prof. Lietzan presents comprehensive statistical findings that bring the extent of the drug innovation paradox into focus. The implications for innovation policy are profound, especially if we wish to see groundbreaking new therapies that are inherently more difficult to develop.

Incentives are particularly important in the pharmaceutical industry, where the average cost of developing an approved new medicine is over two billion dollars.[2] Drugmakers would hardly invest so much without the promise of exclusivity once the medicine goes to market. However, the period of exclusivity—the incentive—we give to drugmakers depends upon how long it takes them to bring a new medicine to the market. The more time they spend on developing a new medicine, the less reward they receive for their troubles by way of a shorter patent term.

In the United States, it takes 3.5 years on average for a patent to issue, and in many industries, patent owners thus might expect to enjoy around 16.5 years of clear market exclusivity.[3] However, things are very different in the pharmaceutical industry, where the safety and efficacy of a new drug has to be proven before it can be marketed. Years of preclinical testing and clinical trials run down the patent term clock while a drugmaker awaits approval. Congress has instituted measures to restore a portion of the time lost, but the fact remains that longer development programs result in shorter periods of exclusivity.

Pouring over the data going back to 1984, Prof. Lietzan examines the variables that play a role in perpetuating the drug innovation paradox. Critically, she notes that many of the factors that consistently lead to longer development programs—including the drug, disease, and endpoints to be met—are simply beyond a drugmaker’s control. Of course, it is impossible to say for certain what drugs were never invented because the incentives were not there. But the data does give us an accurate sense of how many years spent in development are lost when the patent expires.

For example, Prof. Lietzan breaks down the data with respect to the category of therapy being developed. As the following figure shows, the average length of the clinical testing period for some therapeutic categories ranges from about 3 to 9 years:

Figure 5. Average Clinical Testing Period by Therapeutic Category. Y-axis: therapeutic category (n). X-axis: Length of Clinical Testing Period in Years (0 through 10). Antimigraine agents (6) – 2.99. Ophthalmic (26) – 4.38. Sleep disorder (5) – 4.47. Antibacterials (51) – 4.59. Antivirals (27) – 4.68. Imaging agents (28) – 5.05. Antifungals (14) – 5.13. Genitourinary (12) – 5.29. Dermatological (13) – 5.38. Anesthetics (8) – 5.57. Metabolic bone disease (7) – 5.58. Respiratory/pulmonary (32) – 5.73. Blood glucose regulators (20) – 6.06. Antidementia agents (5) – 6.08. Cardiovascular drugs (65) – 6.12. Hormonal (31) – 6.33. Analgesics & anti-inflammatories (13) – 6.38). Antineoplastics (58) – 6.39. Antiemetics (7) – 6.58. Blood products (17) – 6.70. Gastrointestinal (19) – 6.72. Immunological (10) – 6.77. Antiparkinson’s agents (7) – 7.48. Anticonvulsants (13) – 8.13. Antidepressants (16) – 8.49. Antipsychotics (9) – 8.63. Central nervous system (13) – 9.30.

It is important to note that this lengthy testing period represents only one part of a development program, and the preclinical testing period has to be taken into account as well. Prof. Lietzan estimates that the average preclinical testing period for new drugs is 5.61 years. It is easy to see how the majority of the patent term for drugs that fall into certain therapeutic categories may be gone before the drug even enters the market.

The danger of the drug innovation paradox is that we may be under-incentivizing pharmaceutical research and development for drugs that are inherently more difficult to develop. The next great breakthrough treatment for difficult-to-treat diseases like cancer or multiple sclerosis may never be developed unless the incentives are there to reward drugmakers for taking the risk to develop the treatments in the first place. The data collected by Prof. Lietzan shows us just how time-consuming these endeavors can be, and they suggest that we should break the paradox if we hope to have even greater drug innovation.

CPIP is pleased to once again have Prof. Lietzan as a CPIP Edison Innovation Fellow for 2017 – 2018. We look forward to supporting more of her groundbreaking work on this difficult, but absolutely important, issue.


[1] Erika F. Lietzan, The Drug Innovation Paradox, 83 Mo. L. Rev. ___ (2018), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=2948604.

[2] See Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. Health Econ. 20 (2016) (estimating average total pre-approval cost of approved new compound at $2.558 billion in 2013 dollars), available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26928437.

[3] See Mark Schultz & Kevin Madigan, The Long Wait for Innovation: The Global Patent Pendency Problem (Ctr. for the Prot. of Intell. Prop. Oct. 2016), available at http://sls.gmu.edu/cpip/wp-content/uploads/sites/31/2016/10/Schultz-Madigan-The-Long-Wait-for-Innovation-The-Global-Patent-Pendency-Problem.pdf.

Categories
Biotech Innovation Patent Law Uncategorized

Proposed CREATES Act Threatens Patent Owners’ Rights

By Erika Lietzan, Kevin Madigan, & Mark Schultz

scientist looking through a microscopeEarlier this month, a bipartisan group of Senators introduced the Creating and Restoring Equal Access to Equivalent Samples Act (or CREATES Act). The proposed bill is aimed at deterring what the bill’s author, Sen. Patrick Leahy, claimed were “inappropriate delay tactics that are used by some brand-name drug manufacturers to block competition from more affordable generic drugs.” Whether the bill would produce the intended consequences is the subject of some debate, but we thought it important to point out some (hopefully) unintended consequences: The CREATES Act would impose vague standards and draconian remedy provisions to force innovators to surrender their intellectual property rights for the benefit of generic competitors.

The CREATES Act

It’s no surprise that the legislation might generate unintended consequences, as it would add further complexity to an already challenging regulatory scheme for approving drugs.

As a general rule, for a generic drug manufacturer to get permission to market a duplicate of an already approved drug, it usually[1] must have access to samples of the already approved drug. The generic drug company uses these samples in the bioequivalence studies required in its abbreviated new drug application. The same general principle applies to companies developing biosimilar versions of already approved biological medicines; they conduct comparative trials for approval of their abbreviated applications, and these trials generally require samples of the “reference” product. In addition, FDA sometimes[2] requires drug and biologic manufacturers to develop risk evaluation and mitigations strategies (REMS) if safety measures beyond standard labeling are needed to ensure that the product’s benefits outweigh its risks. These REMS can include elements to assure safe use (ETASU)—essentially, a system of use or distribution restrictions—if necessary to mitigate a specific serious risk. A generic or biosimilar manufacturer seeking to distribute its version of a product that is subject to a risk management distribution program must generally develop its own system or negotiate to share the existing system.

The CREATES Act is spurred by concerns that innovators are hampering competition by strategically exploiting these regulatory requirements imposed on their generic and biosimilar competitors. That is, critics contend that innovators are raising barriers that prevent their generic and biosimilar competitors from obtaining samples of the reference drug and from participating in existing distribution programs.

While the FTC and members of Congress have raised these concerns before, the concerns are particularly topical because of the controversy surrounding Turing Pharmaceuticals and its notorious former CEO Martin Shkreli (described by one publication as the most-hated man in America). Turing is a small company that acquired the only license to market the off-patent drug Daraprim and raised the price by over 5000%, meanwhile preventing potential competitors from obtaining samples for use in developing a competing supply. While Turing is a small company marketing an off-patent drug, its actions have been misattributed (through confusion or purposeful obfuscation) to mainstream, R&D-intensive innovative drug companies.

The CREATES Act proposes to prevent strategic exploitation of regulatory requirements by giving generic and biosimilar manufacturers their own strategic advantage in their negotiations with competitors – the threat of a lawsuit. The Act would give these follow–on developers the ability to sue their competitors to obtain samples of any drugs that they wish to use as references in testing for approval of generic and biosimilar versions. Follow–on drug developers could also sue their competitors to be allowed to share in existing distribution systems.

Although the Act contemplates that the parties will negotiate with respect to purchase of samples and sharing of any distribution system already in place, it would decisively shift bargaining power in favor of follow-on competitors. To begin with, it imposes unreasonable deadlines on innovators—for instance, one month to manufacture and provide samples, after which the follow–on applicant may sue. Also, it creates enormous liability exposure. If the plaintiff proves its case, the court will order the innovator to provide “sufficient” quantities of its product for testing and, if applicable, to share its REMS distribution system with its follow–on competitor. Further, the court must award not only reasonable attorney fees and costs, but also a “monetary amount sufficient to deter” the innovator from failing to provide other applicants with sufficient quantities, or failing to share its risk management system, as applicable. The “maximum” award—which will surely be taken as a suggestion at least of the magnitude envisioned—is the total revenue on the product for every day that the innovator failed to provide samples or to agree to share its developed risk management system. It bears no rational relationship to any harm suffered by the follow–on applicant and is functionally punitive.

The CREATES Act Creates Potential Intellectual Property Problems

The CREATES Act raises two significant intellectual property issues. Essentially, it would create a mechanism to force innovators and patent owners to supply their products and intellectual property to their competitors.

First, it would require an intellectual property owner to make its product for the benefit of a competitor. The Act allows a generic or biosimilar applicant to sue for drug samples to use in testing. In many instances, those drugs will still be under patent. While the so-called Bolar provision permits a generic or biosimilar applicant to conduct tests during the patent term, the CREATES Act turns the Bolar shield into a sword by empowering a court to order a company to provide its patented drug to a potential competitor. This, in turn, will require the company to manufacture the drug for that competitor. Whether it makes a small or large supply for the market, it will need to adjust its production to ensure supplies for its competitor as well, and indeed as many competitors as want samples. This conflicts directly with a basic and valued tenet of the patent system in the United States: we do not require a patent owner to practice his or her invention. In short, the CREATES Act directs courts to order patent owners to practice their patents for the benefit of others.

Second, it would require a drug company with intellectual property rights in a REMS distribution system to forego those rights for the benefit of a competitor. The Act allows a generic or biosimilar applicant to sue the innovator in order to use the specific risk management system that the innovator developed. Although current law creates a default rule that generic drug companies and drug innovators should use a single shared system, there is no such default rule for biosimilar companies and biologic innovators. And the default for generic drugs is simply a default; FDA may waive the default if, for instance, some aspect of the system is claimed by a patent or subject to trade secret protection. This bill would authorize the court to order the innovator to share its system, regardless of any unexpired patent or trade secret protection. It short, it permits courts to order intellectual property holders to surrender their intellectual property or face the threat of monetary penalties.

An innovator may have lawful and legitimate reasons for declining to manufacture its patented product for its competitors and for declining to share its patented risk management system with those competitors. Yet, the unreasonable deadlines and punitive liability provisions of the CREATES Act mean that it will have little scope to resist the demands of its competitors. This essentially nullifies the innovator’s intellectual property—which will discourage future investment and innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.

Important IP Rights in Safety Systems: The Example of Celgene

The IP problems unleashed by the CREATES Act are illustrated by their effect on the IP rights and incentives of a company such as the Celgene Corporation (which submitted a statement on the bill to the Senate Judiciary Committee). Celgene is an innovative biopharmaceutical company that focuses on treatments for cancer and immune–inflammatory related diseases in patients with limited treatment options. The company’s first approved drug was Thalomid, initially approved by FDA for leprosy and then approved for its primary indication—multiple myeloma, a particularly pernicious form of blood and bone marrow cancer. The active ingredient of Celgene’s product, thalidomide, is a powerful teratogen, causing severe disfiguring birth defects. It was marketed in other parts of the world in the late 1950s and early 1960s as a treatment for morning sickness in women, and FDA has estimated that more than 10,000 children in 46 countries were born with severe birth defects attributable to thalidomide. As a result of this history and the special risks associated with this life–saving medicine, Celgene developed an extremely detailed and meticulous protocol dedicated to ensure safe distribution, prescription, and use. Essentially, Celgene’s innovative contribution was inventing a safe way to use an otherwise dangerous drug to fight cancer. The company’s special system for managing the risk of thalidomide is formalized at FDA as the “elements to assure safe use” portion of a REMS. It is also subject to patent protection.

The CREATES Act would force companies such as Celgene to share the proprietary elements of their REMS programs. It would give the company the choice: share its patent system or face a lawsuit that might result in catastrophic damages and mandatory sharing anyway. This functionally nullifies the patent. This, in turn, would discourage innovation and investment in the programs. The essence of thalidomide, and other drugs subject to use and distribution restrictions, is that these drugs require special programs. Their benefits do not outweigh their risks, without these special programs in place. If functionally nullifying the innovator’s patent protection means the innovator will not invest in creative solutions to difficult safety risks, then the products that require these solutions cannot be approved—and will never reach patients.

Conclusion

The CREATES Act has been presented as a panacea for the suspect activity of a few bad actors. But while it might force those companies to share their products and safety systems, it would also affect—and penalize—the much larger group of innovators that have legitimate reasons for withholding the fruits of their labors. By imposing unreasonable deadlines for action, failing to consider legitimate explanations for the choices made by innovative drug manufacturers, and imposing draconian penalties, it tramples the intellectual property rights of drug innovators. Yet, this industry is deeply reliant on intellectual property rights; they provide the incentive for research into tomorrow’s cures. The CREATES Act should be laid aside, if Congress truly wants to promote innovation and investment in life-saving medicines for future generations of Americans.

Erika Lietzan is an Associate Professor at University of Missouri School of Law and is participating in CPIP’s 2016-2017 Thomas Edison Innovation Fellowship Program.


[1]In fact, the situation is more complicated than proponents of this bill have stated. In instances where samples of an already-approved drug are unavailable for any reason, FDA has several regulatory options at its disposal. After all, if a brand company withdraws its product from the market, that doesn’t preclude generic companies from seeking approval, even years later. So long as the Reference Listed Drug (RLD) was not withdrawn for safety or efficacy reasons, it can be cited in a generic application. In that situation, one thing FDA can do is designate another generic to be the RLD for bioequivalence testing. The statute says only that the ANDA must demonstrate bioequivalence; it does not expressly require that the generic applicant use the innovator’s product in the testing.

Even if there aren’t other generics, it might be possible to obtain ANDA approval based on a showing of bioavailability and the same therapeutic effect. FDA has repeatedly noted, when finding that a particular RLD was not withdrawn for safety or efficacy reasons, that the agency may approve an ANDA for a generic version of a withdrawn product even if the withdrawn product is not commercially available. These Federal Register notices state that if the RLD is not available for bioequivalence testing, the applicant should contact the FDA’s Office of Generic Drugs to determine what showing would be required to satisfy the approval requirements of the statute.

[2]Despite the controversy around this issue, there are relatively few REMS, and even fewer with ETASU. The FDA maintains a downloadable list on its website, with the ETASU marked. As of this writing (July 2016) there are 75 REMS listed, only 40 of which have ETASU. Of these, 6 already have approved generics that share in an approved risk management system. More than a dozen of the remaining products are still under regulatory exclusivity.