Categories
Innovation Patent Law

New CPIP Policy Brief: The Long Shadow of the Blackberry Shutdown That Wasn’t

CPIP logoCPIP has published a new policy brief by CPIP Senior Fellow for Innovation Policy Jonathan Barnett entitled The Long Shadow of the Blackberry Shutdown That Wasn’t. The policy brief looks at how the Blackberry litigation and the “patent troll” narrative ultimately contributed to the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in eBay v. MercExchange that limited the availability of injunctive relief for successful patentees.

Professor Barnett then examines the problematic legacy of the post-eBay case law, which significantly shifted the legal infrastructure supporting the U.S. innovation markets. In particular, he explains how this shift has led to opportunistic infringement that favors downstream incumbents with the resources to fund extensive litigation at the expense of upstream innovators—a dynamic that is exemplified in the recent litigation between Sonos and Google.

The introduction is copied below:

Introduction

In early 2006, there was widespread public interest in a seemingly arcane patent infringement litigation brought by a small IP licensing entity, NTP, Inc., against Research in Motion (or “RIM”), the maker of the then-ubiquitous Blackberry mobile communications device. The reason: NTP alleged that the Blackberry device and service infringed upon its patents relating to wireless email communications. In the district court litigation, NTP had secured a judgment of willful patent infringement against RIM, entitling NTP to treble damages, attorneys’ fees, and a permanent injunction (stayed pending appeal) that placed at risk the continued operation of the Blackberry service.

Given NTP’s success at the district court, and uncertainty surrounding RIM’s ability to design a non-infringing alternative, there seemed to be a material risk that the appeals court would sustain the lower court’s rulings and, most importantly, the injunction order. Faced with this predicament, RIM settled all claims with NTP in March 2006 for the impressive sum of $612.5 million.

In this contribution, I revisit the almost 15-year-old Blackberry litigation and its connection with both the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, which limited patent owners’ ability to secure injunctions, and ongoing infringement litigation (commenced in January 2020) involving Google and Sonos, a leading innovator and supplier of wireless audio systems. While the eBay decision may have deterred certain opportunistic uses of patent infringement litigation, there are growing indications that it has had a significant adverse effect on the innovation ecosystem.

As illustrated by the Google/Sonos litigation, eBay and post-eBay case law has enabled incumbents that maintain key technology platforms and distribution pathways to infringe upon patent-protected technologies held by others at relatively modest legal and business risk. The increasing normalization of patent infringement as a rational business strategy endangers the property-rights infrastructure behind important segments of the U.S. innovation economy.

To read the policy brief, please click here.

Categories
Infringement Patent Theory

Explaining Efficient Infringement

By Adam Mossoff & Bhamati Viswanathan

files labeled as "patents"In a recent New York Times op-ed, “The Patent Troll Smokescreen,” Joe Nocera used in print for the first time the term, “efficient infringement.” This pithy phrase quickly gained currency if only because it captures a well-known phenomenon that has been impossible to describe in even a single sentence. Unfortunately, some commentators are confused about the validity of this term. This is understandable, because no one has yet described exactly what it means, especially in comparison to the similar commercial practice of “efficient breach” in contract law.

In a nutshell, efficient infringement occurs when a company deliberately chooses to infringe a patent given that it is cheaper than to license the patent. The reason it is cheaper is what makes it hard to explain briefly: a slew of legal changes to the patent system by Congress, courts, and regulatory agencies in the past ten years have substantially increased the costs and uncertainties in enforcing patents against infringers.

Accused infringers now can very easily invalidate patents, either in court or at the “patent death squad” known as the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. If a patent owner runs this gauntlet after several years of costly litigation and obtains a judgment in its favor, courts are increasingly refusing to award injunctions for anyone other than manufacturing companies. What is left for the patent owner is only damages, but changes in the legal rules for awarding damages have made damage awards very minimal compared to the actual economic harms suffered by a patent owner (a 2015 PricewaterhouseCoopers study found that median damage awards in 2014 were at their second lowest level in the past 20 years).

The result of all of this is that a company economically gains from deliberately infringing patents. It pays less in either legal fees or in court-ordered damages than it would have paid in a license negotiated with a patent owner. This is efficient infringement.

As a term in the legal policy debates, efficient infringement draws some inspiration from the well-known economic model of “efficient breach” in contract law. But the two seem very different, at least superficially.  Thus, efficient infringement needs further explanation by way of a more explicit comparison to efficient breach theory.

The model of efficient breach posits an overall net gain in social welfare from a willful breach of contract. It supposes a scenario in which one contracting party has an opportunity to obtain a higher payment for its goods or services, producing a profit that exceeds any damages from a breach of contract that would be paid to the other contracting party. Thus, the contracting party breaches: it receives the higher payment, it pays the other contracting party its “expectancy interest” (lost profits), and it pockets its net profits. Everyone wins and society is better off, at least according to this highly stylized and abstract economic model.

In practice, though, one rarely finds cases in which this opportunistic breach of contract works. The losses suffered by a victim of a breach of contract easily exceed mere profits, and courts account for this by awarding reliance and restitution damages, as well as punitive damages for deliberate misconduct like opportunistic breach of contract. Other legal claims, such as tortious interference with a contract and equitable claims for rescission and restitution, provide additional sources of relief for victims of willful breaches of contracts. In fact, one reason contracting parties negotiate liquidated damages provisions in their agreements is to limit liability for these widely recognized costs that go beyond mere expectancy interests.

These additional damages reflect the total costs created by strategic, opportunistic breaches of contract. These include institutional and systemic harms in eroding reasonable reliance on contractual commitments, lost investments made on the basis of contractual commitments, lost opportunities to pursue other commercial transactions, reputational harms, and so on. A victim of an opportunistic contract breach, for example, can seek the equitable remedy of rescinding the contract and seek restitution to disgorge the willful bad actor of his wrongful gains at the expense of the victim.

This is why one usually finds successful efficient breach only in hypothetical examples in economic textbooks or in law review articles, and not in actual court cases. As one of the scholars who first coined this term in 1977 recently observed, “efficient breach is both a null set as well as an oxymoron.” Or, as Professor Gregory Klass similarly notes, efficient breach is a “dead letter,” although he still believes it “remains a great teaching tool.”

Recognizing this difference between theory and practice is key in understanding the parallels between efficient breach and efficient infringement.  In theory, efficient breach considers only the lost profits in a one-off case of contract breach, and it thus sounds like a gain in social welfare because everyone benefits. But, in practice, contracting parties and courts recognize the total individual and systemic costs caused by willful violations of legal rights, whether a contract right or a property right. The same is true for efficient infringement, in both theory and practice.

Theoretically, efficient infringement posits a breach of a legal right that enhances both private and social welfare. The company benefits privately because it pays less via a patent infringement lawsuit in either legal fees (invalidating the patent) or in a compulsory license (court-awarded damages). Society is better off, too, because the company engaging in efficient infringement has more resources to put to productive endeavors, as opposed to paying for use of an invalid patent (a monopoly) or in making a larger wealth transfer payment on the basis of a negotiated license.

In the real world, though, efficient infringement creates more costs than merely the lost licensing profits for the patent owner, or the lost patent itself. The more fundamental problem with efficient infringement is that it undermines the proper functioning of the patent system. It frustrates the promise of the reward to the innovator for one’s inventive labors. Once inventors know that the deck of (legal) cards is stacked against them and that they will suffer efficient infringement, they will create less patentable innovation. Without legal security in stable and effective property rights, venture capitalists will not invest in inventors or startups and the innovation economy will suffer.

The important point is that these negative dynamic efficiency effects from efficient infringement are systemic in nature. This is similar to the concern about systemic costs represented by such causes of action for willful breach of contract as restitution and disgorgement of wrongful gains. As a matter of real-world practice, the costs created by efficient infringement are similar to the broader private and systemic costs created by opportunistic breaches of contract—both threaten the viability of legal institutions and the policies that drive them, such as incentivizing investments and promoting commercial transactions.

Categories
Copyright

Another Huge Setback in CloudFlare’s Quixotic Campaign to Protect Pirate Sites

the word "copyright" typed on a computerLast August, I wrote about CloudFlare’s “desperate new strategy” to protect MP3Skull, a notorious pirate site that was sued by various recording companies for copyright infringement. CloudFlare offers content delivery networking, web optimization, and other performance services for websites. The plaintiffs easily obtained a permanent injunction against MP3Skull when it didn’t even bother to respond to the suit. However, that didn’t stop MP3Skull from opening up shop under several new top-level domains using CloudFlare’s services. When the plaintiffs sent a copy of the injunction to CloudFlare and asked it stop servicing the sites, CloudFlare put up a fight.

CloudFlare has a history of supporting pirate sites. After Grooveshark was found liable for willful copyright infringement and shut down, CloudFlare was there to lend a helping hand to the copycat sites that later sprung up. The plaintiffs obtained a restraining order against the new sites, and they asked CloudFlare to not provide them with services. CloudFlare balked at the suggestion, arguing in the district court that it was not in cahoots with the enjoined defendants. The district court held that, under Rule 65, CloudFlare was indeed bound by the injunction against the copycat sites. By providing the copycats with numerous services, CloudFlare was in “active concert or participation” with the defendants.

Just as CloudFlare took the low-road with Grooveshark, it again decided to stand up for adjudicated pirates with MP3Skull. Once confronted with the injunction against MP3Skull, CloudFlare tried a new strategy. Instead of arguing that it wasn’t acting in concert with the enjoined defendants, it argued that it couldn’t be enjoined because of the DMCA. In particular, CloudFlare contended that since Section 512(j) controls injunctions against internet service providers, and since that standard was not applied here, it was not bound by the injunction. As I mentioned in my last post, this argument is ridiculous for one simple reason: CloudFlare is not being enjoined.

This past Thursday, District Judge Marcia G. Cooke of the Southern District of Florida easily shredded CloudFlare’s silly and self-serving argument: “CloudFlare contends that Section 512 of the Copyright Act (‘Section 512’) guides how the Permanent Injunction applies to it, not Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. I disagree.”

Judge Cooke agreed with CloudFlare that “Section 512 outlines rules for copyright infringement-related injunctions involving online service providers[.]” But she disagreed that Section 512(j) has anything to do with whether CloudFlare was bound by the injunction against MP3Skull under Rule 65. She noted that Section 512 “does not blunt a court’s power to enforce a permanent injunction involving non-parties such as CloudFlare that may be ‘in active concert or participation’ with Defendants.” Indeed, Judge Cooke stated that “[e]very injunction . . . automatically forbids non-parties” from aiding and abetting enjoined defendants.

This is clearly the correct result. The standards that apply when enjoining a service provider under Sections 512 have no applicability to the general rule that it’s contemptuous to aid and abet a defendant that has already been enjoined. Again, CloudFlare was not the party enjoined—only MP3Skull was enjoined. And even though Section 512(j) would apply if CloudFlare were being enjoined, that’s irrelevant to the issue of whether CloudFlare, or any other non-party, is bound by the injunction against MP3Skull.

Despite this huge loss for CloudFlare, Judge Cooke left open the possibility that it could continue its mission to protect the MP3Skull defendants. Since the parties did not brief the issue of whether CloudFlare is in “active concert or participation” with the defendants, Judge Cooke found that due process requires her to give CloudFlare a chance to argue that it is not. Given its past conduct, it seems likely that CloudFlare will vigorously argue that the services it provides don’t actually help its customers to do anything. Of course, given the Grooveshark defeat on this same issue, I don’t think Judge Cooke will waste too many pages rejecting CloudFlare’s next desperate attempt to protect pirate sites.

Categories
Copyright Internet Uncategorized

CloudFlare’s Desperate New Strategy to Protect Pirate Sites

a gavel lying on a table in front of booksSan Francisco-based CloudFlare has earned a somewhat dubious reputation in the online world. Website owners can set up CloudFlare in just a few minutes, gaining the performance, security, and privacy benefits the service provides. Traffic routed through CloudFlare’s global content delivery network is cached for faster delivery times and protected from numerous online threats. Pirate sites have flocked to the service because it hides their true identities from copyright owners by default. And it probably doesn’t hurt that CloudFlare CEO Matthew Prince thinks that “censoring the Internet” is “creepy,” even “under a court order.”

Prince practices what he preaches, and CloudFlare has been all-too-ready to lend a helping hand to even the most notorious pirates. When The Pirate Bay rose from the ashes in early 2015, CloudFlare provided the site with services that helped manage its massive server loads. CloudFlare’s encryption technology even made it easy for users in the UK to circumvent the High Court’s ban ordering ISPs to block the pirate site. Amazingly, The Pirate Bay is now back in the United States, using its original thepiratebay.org Virginia-based domain and benefiting from CloudFlare’s robust services to make its criminal enterprise run smoothly worldwide.

Of course, the only reason CloudFlare can get away with supporting the world’s most-visited torrent site is because the DMCA is such a mess. Courts have set the bar so high that CloudFlare wouldn’t likely be found to have red flag knowledge of the massive amounts of infringement it certainly knows its service enables for globally-infamous criminal infringers like The Pirate Bay. Rather than taking the high road and refusing to work with obvious pirate sites, CloudFlare lawyers up when pushed and denies the supportive role that its service provides.

We saw this last year in the Grooveshark case. After the original Grooveshark site was found liable for willful infringement and agreed to shut down, copycat sites sprung up at different top-level domains such as grooveshark.io and grooveshark.pw. The plaintiffs obtained a temporary restraining order against the copycats, which registrars Namecheap and Dynadot promptly complied with by disabling some of the domains. But when the plaintiffs asked CloudFlare to stop providing services to some of the other copycats, they were met with firm resistance. The plaintiffs had to turn to the court for an order clarifying that the injunction against the copycat sites prevented CloudFlare from providing them services.

With the backing of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, CloudFlare put up a big fight. It denied that it was in “active concert or participation” with the copycats, which under Rule 65 would have made it bound by their existing injunction. CloudFlare argued that its services were merely passive and that the domains would still remain accessible even if its services were cut off. The district court rejected CloudFlare’s self-serving arguments, noting that it was in fact aiding and abetting the copycat sites by operating their authoritative domain name servers and optimizing their traffic worldwide. Since CloudFlare had actual notice of the injunction and was in “active concert or participation” with the enjoined copycats, it was also bound by their injunction under Rule 65.

Hit with what must have been the eye-opening reality that, under penalty of contempt, it couldn’t knowingly help its enjoined customer engage in the very wrong the court had ordered it to stop committing, one might think that CloudFlare would have become more respectful of court orders involving its customers. However, as recent developments in the MP3Skull case show, CloudFlare has decided to again take the low road in shirking its responsibility to the court. And its argument here as to why it’s beyond the court’s reach is even more desperate than before.

In April of 2015, several record label plaintiffs sued MP3Skull for copyright infringement, easily obtaining a default judgment when the defendants failed to respond to the suit. Earlier this year, the plaintiffs were granted a permanent injunction, which the defendants quickly flouted by setting up shop under several different top-level domains. Naturally, the common denominator of these multiple MP3Skull sites was that they used CloudFlare. The plaintiffs’ lawyers sent a copy of the injunction against the pirate sites to CloudFlare, asking it to honor the injunction and stop supplying services to the enjoined domains. But, as with Grooveshark, CloudFlare again refused to comply.

The record label plaintiffs have now gone back to the district court, filing a motion requesting clarification that CloudFlare is bound by the injunction against the MP3Skull sites. They argue that the “law is clear that CloudFlare’s continued provision of services to Defendants, with full knowledge of this Court’s Order, renders CloudFlare ‘in active concert or participation’ with Defendants,” and they point to the opinion in the Grooveshark case in support. According to the plaintiffs, the only issue is whether CloudFlare is aiding and abetting the enjoined defendants by providing them services.

CloudFlare opposes the motion, though it noticeably doesn’t deny that it’s in “active concert or participation” with the enjoined defendants. Instead, CloudFlare argues that, since this is a copyright case, any injunction against it must comply with the DMCA:

Section 512(j) prescribes specific standards and procedures for injunctions against service providers like CloudFlare in copyright cases. It places strict limits on injunctions against eligible service providers. 17 U.S.C. § 512(j)(1). It specifies criteria that courts “shall consider” when evaluating a request for injunctive relief against a service provider. 17 U.S.C. § 512(j)(2). And it requires that a service provider have notice and an opportunity to appear, before a party may bind it with an injunction. 17 U.S.C. § 512(j)(3). Plaintiffs ignored those requirements entirely.

The gist of CloudFlare’s argument is that Section 512(j) controls injunctions against service providers like itself, notwithstanding the fact that Rule 65 binds those in “active concert or participation” with an enjoined party. In other words, CloudFlare says that the DMCA gives service providers unique immunity from having to obey court-issued injunctions under the Federal Rules—a remarkable claim requiring remarkable proof. And the case law cited to back up this claim? None. Zip. Nada. CloudFlare fails to produce one single cite showing that any injunctive-relief statute, whether copyright or otherwise, has ever been deemed to preempt the longstanding rule that it’s contempt of court to aid and abet an enjoined defendant. The desperation is palpable.

The reason the DMCA doesn’t apply to CloudFlare is obvious. Section 512(j) states that it “shall apply in the case of any application for an injunction under section 502 against a service provider” that qualifies for the safe harbors. CloudFlare goes on for pages about how it’s a service provider that would qualify for the safe harbor defense if given the chance, but all of this misses the point: CloudFlare is not being enjoined. The only service provider being enjoined is MP3Skull—and that injunction was issued under Section 502 without the limitations set forth in Section 512(j) because MP3Skull didn’t even bother to show up and attempt to claim the safe harbors. But the plaintiffs have not sought an injunction against CloudFlare, which they could only do by naming CloudFlare as a party to the suit.

Since CloudFlare itself isn’t being enjoined under Section 502, Section 512(j) provides it no limitations. The issue is simply whether, under the Federal Rules, CloudFlare is bound by the injunction that has already been issued against the MP3Skull sites. Perhaps not wanting to get bench-slapped again on the aiding and abetting question under Rule 65, CloudFlare is taking an even lower road with this desperate new argument that it’s magically immune to court orders against its customers under the Federal Rules. The district court has yet to rule on the plaintiffs’ motion, but my guess is that it will make short work in reminding CloudFlare of the court’s true power to hold aiders and abettors in contempt.

Categories
Uncategorized

The MovieTube Litigation: Who Needs SOPA?

Cross-posted from the Law Theories blog.

On July 24th, six major studios sued MovieTube for direct and indirect copyright infringement, trademark infringement, and unfair competition in the Southern District of New York. MovieTube is alleged to have operated twenty-nine foreign-based websites that streamed, displayed, and uploaded infringing copies of the studios’ copyrighted works. Not knowing the defendants’ true identities, the studios brought suit against the “John Does, Jane Does and/or XYZ Corporations” that allegedly operated the MovieTube sites. The district court allowed the studios to serve process on the defendants via email.

The remedies being sought by the studios have raised a few feathers. MovieTube operates out of Singapore, and the studios argue that it is “essential . . . that injunctive relief include orders directed at third parties whose services enable Defendants’ activities.” Since MovieTube relies on “domain name registries and other third-party service providers and their network of affiliates to carry out their activities,” the studios are seeking an order “requiring that: (i) registries and registrars disable the domain names used to operate the MovieTube Websites and (ii) third-party service providers cease providing services to the MovieTube Websites and Defendants in relation to the Infringing Copies.”

While some have suggested that the studios “didn’t get the memo that SOPA failed,” I think the real question is, “Who needs SOPA?” Everyone knows that SOPA never became law, and the studios haven’t brought any claims under SOPA. Moreover, even if SOPA were the law, it would make no difference here. SOPA would have only provided private rightholders with statutory remedies against a “payment network provider” or an “Internet advertising service.” Only actions brought by the Attorney General would qualify for statutory remedies against service providers such as registrars, registries, and search engines.

The studios instead argue that the court’s power to issue such orders comes from:

(i) 17 U.S.C. § 502, which allows a court to “grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright;”

(ii) 15 U.S.C § 1116(a), which provides for an injunction “according to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem reasonable, to prevent the violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office or to prevent a violation under subsection (a), (c), or (d) of section 43 [15 U.S.C. § 1125];”

(iii) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2), which imbues courts with the power to issue injunctions that bind parties, parties’ officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys and any “other persons who are in active concert or participation with” any such individuals or entities;

(iv) the Court’s “inherent equitable power to issue provisional remedies ancillary to its authority to provide final equitable relief,” which encompasses injunctions as broad as restraining defendants’ assets to preserve them for disgorgement of profits and equitable accounting . . . and/or

(v) the Court’s power pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (the All Writs Act) to issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of its jurisdiction and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.

The question is whether the court has the power under these authorities to issue an injunction against MovieTube that binds third-party service providers. SOPA has nothing to do with it.[1]

After the studios filed suit, the MovieTube defendants shut down their operations. Nonetheless, a group of tech giants, comprised of Google, Facebook, Tumblr, Twitter, and Yahoo, filed an amicus brief arguing that “the proposed injunction violates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 and the safe-harbor provisions of the DMCA.” Specifically, the amici claim that an injunction against MovieTube couldn’t bind third parties such as themselves because Rule 65(d)(2) and Section 512(j) of the DMCA wouldn’t allow it.[2] I don’t think either of these two arguments holds much water, especially for service providers like these amici that link to or host infringing material.

Blockowicz and Rule 65(d)(2)

Rule 65(d)(2) provides that only three groups may be bound by an injunction:

(2) Persons Bound. The order binds only the following who receive actual notice of it by personal service or otherwise:

(A) the parties;

(B) the parties’ officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and

(C) other persons who are in active concert or participation with anyone described in Rule 65(d)(2)(A) or (B).

The amici argue that Rule 65(d)(2) can’t bind third parties like them since it cannot be shown that they are in “active concert or participation” with the MovieTube defendants. In support, they cite the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Blockowicz v. Williams. The issue there was whether nonparty Ripoff Report was bound by an injunction against some of its users that had posted defamatory material to its site. Ripoff Report conceded “actual notice” of the injunction, but it argued that it was not in “active concert” with its defaming users.

The Seventh Circuit agreed:

Actions that aid and abet in violating the injunction must occur after the injunction is imposed for the purposes of Rule 65(d)(2)(C), and certainly after the wrongdoing that led to the injunction occurred. This requirement is apparent from Rule 65(d)(2)’s text, which requires that nonparties have “actual notice” of the injunction. A non-party who engages in conduct before an injunction is imposed cannot have “actual notice” of the injunction at the time of their relevant conduct. . . .

Further, the [plaintiffs] presented no evidence that [Ripoff Report] took any action to aid or abet the defendants in violating the injunction after it was issued, either by enforcing the Terms of Service or in any other way. . . . [Ripoff Report’s] mere inactivity is simply inadequate to render them aiders and abettors in violating the injunction.

Thus, Ripoff Report was not in “active concert” with its users by simply continuing to host the defamatory material that had been posted to its site before the injunction was issued. The amici here claim that this same logic applies to them: “[E]ven if Plaintiffs had shown that the Neutral Service Providers rendered services to the Defendants, merely continuing to provide those services cannot amount to acting in concert.’”

Blockowicz is not binding precedent here, of course, but the district court could find it persuasive. I think it’s clear that the Seventh Circuit reached the wrong conclusion. The test is whether the third party has actual notice of the injunction and then aids and abets the enjoined defendant. It’s black letter law that anyone who publishes or republishes defaming material is strictly liable for the defamation. On the other hand, a distributor is not liable as a publisher unless it knows or has reason to know that the material is defamatory.

For example, a book publisher is strictly liable for publishing a defamatory book. A bookseller that sells that defamatory book is not liable for the defamation unless it knows the material is defamatory. If it learns of the defamatory nature of the book and then continues to sell it, the bookseller is considered a publisher and is liable for the defamation along with the book publisher. In other words, the passive book distributor becomes an active aider and abettor of the book publisher once it gains knowledge of the defamation and fails to stop selling the book.

Of course, this rule from the physical world does not apply when it’s done on the internet. Section 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act provides: “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” While the statute on its face only grants immunity to a “publisher,” courts have interpreted it broadly to apply to a “distributor” as well. As the Fourth Circuit put it in the leading case, “distributor liability. . . is merely a subset, or a species, of publisher liability, and is therefore also foreclosed by § 230.”

Section 230’s immunity for a publisher extends to a distributor with knowledge because that knowledge transforms the distributor into a publisher. The plaintiffs in Blockowicz could not go after Ripoff Report directly because Section 230 granted it immunity from civil liability. The reason it had such immunity was precisely because the knowledge of the defamation transformed it from a passive distributor to an active publisher. The plaintiffs instead went after the defamers directly, asking the court to bind Ripoff Report under Rule 65(d)(2). The Seventh Circuit’s refusal to stop Ripoff Report from aiding and abetting the enjoined defendants left the plaintiffs without a remedy—an absurd result.

Turning back to MovieTube, the amici claim that an injunction against the defendants could not bind them since they wouldn’t be aiding and abetting the defendants. This is simply not true. As with defamation, it’s black letter law that a service provider that knowingly provides material support to an infringer is contributorily liable for the infringement. In other words, the passive service provider becomes an active aider and abettor of the infringer once it gains knowledge of the underlying infringement and fails to act. This is why service providers such as the amici remove infringing material once they receive notice that they are linking to or hosting it.

When it comes to copyright infringement, the amici cannot hide behind the broad immunities of Section 230. They instead can only hope to qualify for the limitations on liability found in Section 512 of the DMCA. Of course, these safe harbors don’t protect the amici if they learn of infringing material on their systems and fail to remove it. Under Section 512(d)(1), a search engine such as Google or Yahoo does not get immunity unless it, “upon obtaining . . . knowledge or awareness” of infringing material, “acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material.”[3] The same holds true under Section 512(c)(1) for sites like Facebook, Tumblr, and Twitter that host content uploaded by their users.

When a service provider learns of infringing material on its system and fails to remove it, it becomes an aider and abettor that is jointly and severally liable with the direct infringer. But this is only true when that service provider’s contribution to the infringement is material. The DMCA codified exclusions to the safe harbors for contributions that were decidedly material, such as linking to or hosting infringing material. However, things get hazier at the margins. For example, a panel of the Ninth Circuit once split over whether a credit card processor materially contributes by servicing an infringing site. Over the vociferous dissent of Judge Alex Kozinski,[4] the two-judge majority held that it did not.

The problem for Google, Facebook, Tumblr, Twitter, and Yahoo is that there is no doubt that their failure to act once they receive notice of infringing material unquestionably constitutes aiding and abetting. Not only is it enough to find them in “active concert” with their users under Rule 65(d)(2), it’s enough to hold them contributorily liable for the infringement. They aren’t like a credit card processor, where the materiality of the contribution is in doubt. It’s well-settled that what the amici do—linking to and hosting copyrighted works—constitutes material contribution. That’s why the safe harbors under Section 512, which codified the case law, don’t apply to service providers such as them that fail to remove infringing material upon notice.


[1] I get that many people are just playing the SOPA card for rhetorical effect. But some are also arguing that SOPA would have provided rightholders with these remedies, and since SOPA is not the law, the studios therefore don’t have these remedies available. This argument is simply fallacious. With or without SOPA, the issue remains whether the court has the authority to grant the studios the requested relief.

[2] The amici do not address the existence of such authority under the Lanham Act or under the court’s inherent equitable power, and neither do I. They do argue that the All Writs Act provides no such authority, but I leave that argument aside.

[3] See also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1172 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Accordingly, we hold that a computer system operator can be held contributorily liable if it has actual knowledge that specific infringing material is available using its system and can take simple measures to prevent further damage to copyrighted works yet continues to provide access to infringing works. . . . Applying our test, Google could be held contributorily liable if it had knowledge that infringing Perfect 10 images were available using its search engine, could take simple measures to prevent further damage to Perfect 10’s copyrighted works, and failed to take such steps.”) (quotations and citations omitted).

[4] See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 816 (9th Cir. 2007) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“Defendants here are alleged to provide an essential service to infringers, a service that enables infringement on a massive scale. Defendants know about the infringements; they profit from them; they are intimately and causally involved in a vast number of infringing transactions that could not be consummated if they refused to process the payments; they have ready means to stop the infringements.”).

Categories
Copyright Injunctions Internet Remedies Trademarks Uncategorized

CloudFlare Enjoined From Aiding Infringers: Internet Unbroken

Just how far does a court’s power to enjoin reach into cyberspace? It’s clear enough that those directly posting or hosting infringing content are subject to an injunction. But what about a company such as CloudFlare that provides content delivery network and domain name server services? Does an injunction under Rule 65 against anyone acting in “active concert or participation” with an online infringer apply to an internet infrastructure company such as CloudFlare? CloudFlare recently argued that its service is “passive” and untouchable, but a district court vehemently—and rightly—disagreed.

The controversy started with the shutdown of the Grooveshark music streaming service pursuant to a settlement agreement with the major record label plaintiffs this past April. Back in September of 2014, Grooveshark and its two founders were found directly and indirectly liable for copyright infringement. After the district court held that their infringement was “willful,” thus subjecting them to potential statutory damages exceeding $736 million for the 4,907 works-in-suit, they consented to paying $50 million in damages and shutting down the grooveshark.com site rather than risk it with a jury.

But the demise of Grooveshark was short-lived, and just days after publicly apologizing for failing “to secure licenses from right holders,” two copycat sites popped up at different top-level domains: grooveshark.io and grooveshark.pw. The record label plaintiffs filed a new complaint and obtained ex parte relief, including a temporary restraining order (TRO), against the new sites. Upon receipt of the TRO, Namecheap, the registrar for both sites, disabled the .io and .pw domain names. When another copycat site was established at grooveshark.vc, the domain name was quickly disabled by Dynadot, the registrar, after it received the TRO.

Undeterred, the defendants publicly taunted the plaintiffs and registered yet another copycat site at grooveshark.li. Rather than continuing this global game of domain name Whac-A-Mole, the plaintiffs served the TRO on CloudFlare, the service utilized by the defendants for each of the infringing domains. And this is where things got interesting. Rather than swiftly complying with the TRO, as the domain name registrars had done, CloudFlare lawyered up and contended that it was beyond the court’s reach.

In its briefing to the court, CloudFlare argued that it played merely a passive role for its customers—including the defendants and their copycat site—by resolving their domain names and making their websites faster and more secure. CloudFlare disavowed the ability to control any content on the copycat site, and it denied that it was in active concert or participation with the defendants:

Active concert requires action, and CloudFlare has taken none. Participation means assisting a defendant in evading an injunction. CloudFlare has not so assisted defendants and, in fact, has no ability to stop the alleged infringement. Even if CloudFlare—and every company in the world that provides similar services—took proactive steps to identify and block the Defendants, the website would remain up and running at its current domain name.

CloudFlare did not deny that the defendants utilized its services; it instead argued that the TRO would not remove the infringing site from the internet. Thus, CloudFlare’s position hinged on its own passivity and on the futility of enjoining it from providing services to the defendants.

A moment’s reflection reveals the superficiality of this position. The fact that CloudFlare had no control over the content of the copycat site was not dispositive. The question was whether CloudFlare aided the defendants, and there was no doubt that it did. It was not only the defendants’ authoritative domain name server, it also optimized and secured their copycat site. That the defendants could have used other services did not erase the fact that they were using CloudFlare’s services. And once CloudFlare was served with the TRO and made aware of the copycat site, its continued provision of services to the defendants constituted active concert or participation.

CloudFlare’s policy arguments were similarly unpersuasive. It suggested that the TRO “would transform a dispute between specific parties into a mandate to third parties to enforce” the plaintiffs’ rights “against the world in perpetuity.” Of course, that is not what happened here. The question was not who else in the world the TRO reached; the question was whether the TRO reached CloudFlare because it aided the defendants.

CloudFlare further argued that it could not be enjoined because “Congress explicitly considered and rejected granting such authority to the courts with respect to Internet infrastructure providers and other intermediaries for the purpose of making a website disappear from the Internet.” To enjoin it, CloudFlare proposed, would be to pretend that the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) “had in fact become law.” This argument, however, completely ignored the fact that courts have long been empowered to enjoin those in active concert or participation with infringers.

In reply, the record label plaintiffs rebuffed CloudFlare’s claim that it was not aiding the defendants: “CloudFlare’s steadfast refusal to discontinue providing its services to Defendants – who even CloudFlare acknowledges are openly in contempt of this Court’s TRO – is nothing short of breathtaking.” They pointed to how CloudFlare continued to aid the defendants, even after being on notice of the TRO: “[T]he failure of an Internet service provider to stop connecting users to an enjoined website, once on notice of the injunction, readily can constitute aiding and abetting for purposes of Rule 65.”

In the real world, CloudFlare markets the benefits of its services to its customers. It touts its content delivery network as delivering “the fastest page load times and best performance” through its “34 data centers around the world.” It boasts having “web content optimization features that take performance to the next level.” It offers robust “security protection” and “visitor analytics” to its customers. And its authoritative domain name server proudly serves “43 billion DNS queries per day.” But when it came to the defendants’ copycat site, it claimed to be a “passive conduit” that in no way helped them accomplish their illicit goals. This disingenuousness is, to borrow the plaintiffs’ term, “breathtaking.”

District Judge Alison J. Nathan (S.D.N.Y.) made short work in rejecting CloudFlare’s shallow denials. She noted that there was no factual question that CloudFlare operated the defendants’ authoritative domain name server and optimized the performance and security of their copycat site. The question was whether these acts were passive such that CloudFlare was not in “active concert or participation” with the defendants. Judge Nathan held that the services CloudFlare provided to the defendants were anything but passive:

CloudFlare’s authoritative domain name server translates grooveshark.li as entered in a search browser into the correct IP address associated with that site, thus allowing the user to connect to the site. Connecting internet users to grooveshark.li in this manner benefits Defendants and quite fundamentally assists them in violating the injunction because, without it, users would not be able to connect to Defendants’ site unless they knew the specific IP address for the site. Beyond the authoritative domain name server, CloudFlare also provides additional services that it describes as improving the performance of the grooveshark.li site.

Furthermore, Judge Nathan dismissed CloudFlare’s argument that it was not helping the defendants since they could simply use other services: “[J]ust because another third party could aid and abet the Defendants in violating the injunction does not mean that CloudFlare is not doing so.” And to CloudFlare’s concern that the TRO was overly broad, Judge Nathan reasoned that the issue before her was CloudFlare’s own actions, not those of other, possibly more attenuated, third parties: “[T]he Court is addressing the facts before it, which involve a service that is directly engaged in facilitating access to Defendants’ sites with knowledge of the specific infringing names of those sites.”

This TRO wasn’t about the “world at large,” and it wasn’t about turning the companies that provide internet infrastructure into the “trademark and copyright police.” It was about CloudFlare knowingly helping the enjoined defendants to continue violating the plaintiffs’ intellectual property rights. Thankfully, Judge Nathan was able to see past CloudFlare’s empty and hyperbolic position. Protecting intellectual property in the digital age is difficult enough, but it’s even more challenging when services such as CloudFlare shirk their responsibilities. In the end, reason trumped rhetoric, and, best of all, the internet remains unbroken. In fact, it’s now even better than before.

Further reading: Leo Lichtman, Copyright Alliance, Bringing Accountability to the Internet: Web Services Aiding and Abetting Rogue Sites Must Comply With Injunctions