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Legislation Patent Law

The STRONGER Patents Act: The House Receives Its Own Legislation to Protect Our Innovation Economy

U.S. Capitol buildingToday, Representatives Steve Stivers (R-OH) and Bill Foster (D-IL) introduced the Support Technology & Research for Our Nation’s Growth and Economic Resilience (STRONGER) Patents Act of 2018. This important piece of legislation will protect our innovation economy by restoring stable and effective property rights for inventors. This legislation mirrors a bill already introduced in the Senate, which I have previously discussed.

The STRONGER Patents Act accomplishes three key goals to protect innovators. First, the Act will make substantial improvements to post-issuance proceedings in the USPTO to protect patent owners from administrative proceedings run amok. Second, it will confirm the status of patents as property rights, including restoring the ability of patent owners to obtain injunctions as a matter of course. Third, it will eliminate fee diversion from the USPTO, assuring that innovators are obtaining the quality services they are paying for.

First and foremost, the STRONGER Patents Act aims to restore balance to post-issuance review of patents administered by the USPTO’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). The creation of the PTAB was a massive regulatory overreach to correct a perceived problem that could have been better addressed by providing more resources towards initial examination. While the USPTO has long been responsible for issuing patents after a detailed examination, it has recently taken on the role of killing patents the same USPTO previously issued. What the USPTO gives with the one hand, it takes with the other.

Data analyzing PTAB outcomes demonstrates just how dire the situation has become. Coordinated and repetitive challenges to patent validity have made it impossible for patent owners to ever feel confident in the value and enforceability of their property rights. In some cases, more than 20 petitions have been filed on a single patent. Although recent headway has been made to address this issue in the administrative context, it only listed factors to be used when evaluating serial petitions. A more complete statutory solution that prohibits serial petitions except in limited circumstances is necessary to fully protect innovators and provide certainty that these protections will continue.

The kill rate of patents by the PTAB is remarkable. In only 16% of final written decisions at the PTAB does the patent survive unscathed. The actual impact on patent owners is far worse. Disclaimer and settlement are alternate ways a patent owner can lose at the PTAB prior to a final written decision. Thus, the fact that only 4% of petitions result in a final written decision of patentability is more reflective of the burden patent owners faced when dragged into PTAB proceedings.

For these reasons, the PTAB has been known as a “death squad.” This sentiment has been expressed not only by those who are disturbed by the PTAB’s behavior, but also those—such as a former chief judge of the PTAB—who are perpetuating it. The list of specific patents that have been invalidated at the PTAB is mind-boggling, such as an advanced detector for detecting leaks in gas lines.

There are even examples where the PTAB has invalidated a patent that had previously been upheld by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. One recent examination further found that there have been at least 58 patents that were upheld in federal district courts that were invalidated in the PTAB on the same statutory grounds. The different results are not mere happenstance but are the result of strategic behavior by petitioners to strategically abuse the procedures of PTAB proceedings.

It has been well known that the procedures have been stacked against patent owners from day one. We and others have noted how broadly construing claims, multiple filings against the same patent by the same challengers, and the inability to amend claims, among other abuses, severely disadvantage patent owners in PTAB proceedings.

With the STRONGER Patents Act, these proceedings will move closer to a fair fight to truly examine patent validity. There are many aspects to this legislation that will improve the PTAB, such as:

  • Harmonizing the claim construction standard with litigation, focusing on the “ordinary and customary meaning” instead of the broadest interpretation a bureaucrat can conceive. This will promote consistent results when patents are challenged, regardless of the forum, by assuring that a patent does not mean different things to different people. Sections 102(a) and 103(a).
  • Confirming the presumption of validity of an issued patent will apply to the PTAB just as it does in litigation. This will allow patent owners to make investments with reasonable security in the validity of the patent. Sections 102(b) and 103(b).
  • Adding a standing requirement, by permitting only those who are “charged with infringement” of the patent to challenge that patent. This will prevent the abusive and extortionate practice of challenging a patent to extract a settlement or short a company’s stock. Sections 102(c) and 103(c).
  • Limiting abusive repetitive and serial challenges to a patent. This will prevent one of the most common abuses, by preventing multiple bites at the apple. Sections 102(d), (f) and 103(d), (f).
  • Authorizing interlocutory review of institution decisions when “mere institution presents a risk of immediate, irreparable injury” to the patent owner as well as in other important circumstances. This change will allow early correction of important mistakes as well as provide for appellate review of issues that currently may evade correction. Sections 102(e) and 103(e).
  • Prohibiting manipulation of the identification of the real-party-in-interest rules to evade estoppel or other procedural rules and providing for discovery to determine the real-party-in-interest. Because many procedural protections depend on identifying the real party-in-interest, this change will assure that determining who that real party is can occur in a fair manner. Sections 102(g) and 103(g).
  • Giving priority to federal court determinations on the validity of a patent. Although discrepancies will be minimized by other changes in this Act, this section assures that the federal court determination will prevail. Sections 102(h) and 103(h).
  • Improving the procedure for amending a challenged patent, including a new expedited examination pathway. This section goes further than Aqua Products, prescribing detailed procedures for adjudicating the patentability of proposed substitute claims and placing the burden of proof on the challenger. Sections 102(i) and 103(i).
  • Prohibiting the same administrative patent judges from both determining whether a challenge is likely to succeed and whether the patent is invalid. This section will confirm the original design of the PTAB by assuring that the decision to institute and final decision are separate. Section 104.
  • Aligning timing requirements for ex parte reexamination with inter partes review by prohibiting requests for reexamination more than one year after being sued for infringement. This section will prevent abuses from the multiple post-grant procedures available in the USPTO. Section 105.

Second, the STRONGER Patents Act will make other necessary corrections to allow patents to promote innovation. For example, as Section 101 of the Act confirms, patents are property rights and deserve the same remedies applicable to other kinds of property. In eBay v. MercExchange, the Supreme Court ignored this fundamental premise by holding that patent owners do not have the presumptive right to keep others from using their property. Section 106 of the STRONGER Patents Act will undo the disastrous eBay decision and confirm the importance of patents as property.

Third, the STRONGER Patents Act will once and for all eliminate USPTO fee diversion. Many people do not realize that the USPTO is funded entirely through user fees and that no taxpayer money goes to the office. Despite promises that the America Invents Act of 2011 would end fee diversion, the federal government continues to redirect USPTO funds to other government programs. This misguided tax on innovation is long overdue to be shut down.

Each of the steps in the STRONGER Patents Act will help bring balance back to our patent system. In addition to the major changes described above, there are also smaller changes that will be important to ensuring a vibrant and efficient patent system. CPIP co-founder Adam Mossoff testified to Congress about the harms being done to innovation through weakened patent protection. It is great news to now see Congress taking steps in the right direction.

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Administrative Agency Commercialization Copyright Copyright Licensing Infringement Innovation Internet Legislation Supreme Court Uncategorized

Letter on FCC Set-Top Box Regulation Once Again Confuses the Issue

Washington, D.C. at nightLast week, a group of law professors wrote a letter to the acting Librarian of Congress in which they claim that the current FCC proposal to regulate cable video navigation systems does not deprive copyright owners of the exclusive rights guaranteed by the Copyright Act. The letter repeats arguments from response comments they  filed along with the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), accusing the Copyright Office of misinterpreting the scope of copyright law and once again bringing up Sony v. Universal to insist that copyright owners are overstepping their bounds. Unfortunately, the IP professors’ recurring reliance on Sony is misplaced, as the 30-year-old case does not address the most significant and troubling copyright violations that will result from the FCC’s proposed rules.

In 1984, the Supreme Court in Sony held that recording television shows on a personal VCR was an act of “time-shifting” and therefor did not constitute copyright infringement. The court also ruled that contributory liability requires knowledge, and such knowledge will not be imputed to a defendant based solely on the characteristics or design of a distributed product if that product is “capable of substantial noninfringing uses.” But while this precedent remains good law today, it does not apply to the real concerns creators and copyright owners have with the FCC’s attempt to redistribute their works without authorization.

The FCC’s proposed rules would require pay-TV providers to send copyrighted, licensed TV programs to third parties, even if the transmission would violate the agreements that pay-TV providers carefully negotiated with copyright owners. A different group of IP scholars recently explained to the FCC that by forcing pay-TV providers to exceed the scope of their licenses, the proposed rules effectively create a zero-rate compulsory license and undermine the property rights of creators and copyright owners. The compulsory license would benefit third-party recipients of the TV programs who have no contractual relationship with either the copyright owners or pay-TV providers, depriving creators and copyright owners of the right to license their works on their own terms.

This unauthorized siphoning and redistribution of copyrighted works would occur well before the programming reaches the in-home navigational device, a fact that the authors of the recent letter to the Librarian of Congress either don’t understand, or choose to ignore. Creators and copyright owners are not attempting to “exert control over the market for video receivers,” as the letter suggests. The manufacture and distribution of innovative devices that allow consumers to access the programming to which they subscribe is something that copyright owners and creators embrace, and a thriving market for such devices already exists.

As more consumers resort to cord cutting, countless options have become available in terms of navigational devices and on-demand streaming services. Apple TV, Roku, Nexus Player and Amazon Fire Stick are just a few of the digital media players consumers can choose from, and more advanced devices are  always being released. But while the creative community supports the development of these devices, it is the circumvention of existing licenses and disregard for the rights of creators to control their works that has artists and copyright owners worried.

Sony has become a rallying cry for those arguing that copyright owners are attempting to control and stymie the development of new devices and technologies, but these critics neglect the substantial problems presented by the transmission of digital media that Sony couldn’t predict and does not address. In the era of the VCR, there was no Internet over which television was broadcast into the home. In 1984, once a VCR manufacturer sold a unit, they ceased to have any control over the use of the machine. Consumers could use VCRs to record television or play video cassettes as they pleased, and the manufacturer wouldn’t benefit from their activity either way.

The difference with the current navigation device manufacturers is that they will receive copyrighted TV programs to which they’ll have unbridled liberty to repackage and control before sending them to the in-home navigation device. The third-party device manufacturers will not only be able to tamper with the channel placement designed to protect viewer experience and brand value, they will also be able to insert their own advertising into the delivery of the content, reducing pay-tv ad revenue and the value of the license agreements that copyright owners negotiate with pay-TV providers. The FCC’s proposal isn’t really about navigational devices, it’s about the control of creative works and the building of services around TV programs that the FCC plans to distribute to third parties free of any obligation to the owners and creators of those programs.

The authors of the letter conflate two distinct issues, misleading influential decision makers that may not be as well versed in the intricacies of copyright law. By stubbornly comparing the copyright issues surrounding the FCC’s proposed rules to those considered by the Supreme Court in Sony, they craftily try to divert attention away from the real matter at hand: Not what consumers do with the creative works they access in the privacy of their own homes, but how those works are delivered to consumers’ homes in the first place.

It’s curious that after many rounds of back-and-forth comments discussing the FCC’s proposal, proponents of the rules still refuse to address this primary copyright concern that has been continuously raised by creators and copyright owners in corresponding comments, articles, and letters (see also here, here, here, and here). Perhaps the authors of the recent letter simply do not grasp the real implications of the FCC’s plan to seize and redistribute copyrighted content, but given their years of copyright law experience, that is unlikely. More probable is that they recognize the complications inherent in the proposal, but do not have a good answer to the questions raised by the proposal’s critics, so they choose instead to cloud the issue with a similar-sounding but separate issue. But if they truly want to make progress in the set-top box debate and clear the way for copyright compliant navigational devices, they’ll need to do more than fall back on the same, irrelevant arguments.

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Economic Study Innovation Inventors Legislation Patent Law Uncategorized

How Patents Help Startups Grow, Innovate, and Succeed

Many academic studies of the patent system focus on the negative, extrapolating from anecdotes about a few bad actors to make the case that our patent system is broken and to bolster cries for legislation weakening patent rights. Precious few studies focus on the countless honest and hardworking patent owners whose inventive labors benefit us all. But understanding how patents support inventive enterprises is a crucial part of the equation, especially at a time when Congress is considering legislation that would make it extremely difficult for startups and individual inventors to enforce their patent rights.

In a newly-published working paper, The Bright Side of Patents, CPIP Edison Fellow Deepak Hegde, along with co-authors Joan Farre-Mensa and Alexander Ljungqvist, take a look how patents help startups grow. They show that, contrary to the claims made by several academics and activists, startups are not victims of the patent system. On the contrary, patents help startups become more successful and innovative.

The study finds that “patent approvals help startups create jobs, grow their sales, innovate, and eventually succeed.” When a startup’s first patent application is approved, its employment growth increases by 36% and its sales growth increases by 51% on average over the next five years. First-patent approval also has a strong causal effect on a startup’s continued ability to innovate, increasing the number of subsequent patent grants by 49% and increasing the quality of those patents by 27%. In fact, a startup with first-patent approval is twice as likely to end up listed on a stock exchange—a common indication of success for a startup.

Negatively affecting startups are delays in the patent application process and ultimate application rejections. For every year an ultimately-approved patent application is delayed, the startup’s employment growth decreases by 21% and its sales growth decreases by 28% on average over the following five years. Furthermore, each year a patent application is delayed, the average number of subsequent patents granted decreases by 14% while the quality of those patents decreases by 7%. And for each year of delay, the probability that a startup will go public is cut in half.

One big reason why patents help startups is that they make it easier to access capital from external investors. The authors find that patents serve to mitigate frictions in information between potential investors and startups. Patents play an important role by alleviating startups’ concerns about having their inventions misappropriated by investors and by alleviating investors’ concerns about the credibility, quality, and monetary future of the startups. Having access to capital in turn sets startups on a path of growth where they can turn ideas into products and services, generate jobs, increase revenue, and undertake further innovation.

What makes this study unique is its unprecedented access to the USPTO’s internal databases, which allowed the authors to evaluate detailed review histories of both approved and rejected patent applications. Prior studies only focused on approved applications, thus making it impossible to accurately separate out the economic and innovative effects. The authors here are able to demonstrate the direct benefits of patent protection with causal evidence from a large-sized sample—45,819 first-time patent applications filed by startups.

There is a surprising amount of criticism of the patent system today. Some claim that patents are a waste of time and resources for startups, useful only for defensive purposes. Others claim that patents actually harm startups. The authors here show that startups that secure patent protection are in fact more likely to succeed. As Congress considers yet another round of large-scale patent legislation, lawmakers need to understand the role that enforceable patent rights play in enabling startups to grow and succeed. This study is a great step in adding some much needed clarity to the ongoing patent policy debates.

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Commercialization History of Intellectual Property Innovation Patent Law Patent Licensing Patent Litigation Uncategorized

Guest Post by Wayne Sobon: A Line in the Sand on the Calls for New Patent Legislation

On June 9-11, the IP Business Congress sponsored by Intellectual Asset Magazine (IAM) hosted a debate on the resolution: “This house believes that the America Invents Act should be a legislative line in the sand and that no more reform of the US patent system is needed.” The debate was moderated by Denise DeFranco, a partner with the Finnegan law firm.  Arguing on behalf of the resolution were David Schwartz, Associate Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law, and Wayne Sobon, Vice President and General Counsel of Inventergy, Inc.  Arguing against the resolution were Michael Meurer, Professor of Law at Boston University School of Law and Dan Lang, Vice President, Intellectual Property, Cisco.  

With Mr. Sobon’s permission, we are publishing here a slightly modified version of his opening statement at the IP Business Congress debate. Mr. Sobon spoke for himself and not on behalf of his employer or any other institutions.

A Line in the Sand on the Calls for New Patent Legislation

Wayne Sobon
Vice President & General Counsel, Inventergy

With the June 4, 2013 announcement by the Obama Administration of a new set of legislative priorities to change our patent laws yet again, bolstered by a chorus of academics and interested corporations, there are now four separate bills in Congress (with more coming) proposing a wide range of changes to the patent system. Fresh from the seven-year battle that concluded with the America Invents Act of 2011, we once more face a highly emotionally-driven campaign to alter the rules of the field, replete with name-calling (“trolls”).

But just as with our personal conflicts, the best way forward usually comes once we let emotions cool and we dispassionately take a longer view.

We just spent the better part of a decade — following significant research, public hearings, the reports of the National Academies of Science and the FTC, and the testimony of a wide variety of NGOs, corporations, and private inventors and citizens — debating and then approving the most significant changes to our patent system since the 1952 Act.  The America Invents Act of 2011was argued in forums like this and on the floor of our Congress as the needed corrective for poor-quality patents, claimed by so-called “trolls” to hold up and oppress innovative companies.

Various companies such as Cisco testified before Congress that the sweeping collection of provisions that make up the AIA were necessary to achieve these policy goals.  When it was enacted, it was heralded as “the most significant reform of the U.S. patent system since 1836.” Yet the ink is barely dry, and the voluminous regulations implementing the AIA have barely been set in motion, when the same group of academics and industry players are once again demanding sweeping new changes to the patent laws.

The United States intellectual property system is a precious resource.  Indeed, the Founding Fathers saw a unified, national regime of patent laws as so crucial to our democracy that they enshrined it as one of the key powers of Congress.  Unanimously and without debate, they passed Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of our Constitution.  One of the first acts of the first Congress was to pass the Patent Law of 1790.  That law has only been significantly amended five times in the last 220 some years.  Five times.  1793‎, 1836, 1870, 1952 and 2011.

One genius of our patent system has been an implicit recognition that since its underlying subject matter, innovation, remains by definition in constant flux, the scaffolding of our system and the ability of all stakeholders to make reasonably consistent, prudent and socially efficient choices, should remain as stable as possible.  But now these latest moves, demanding yet further significant changes to our patent laws, threaten that stability.  And it is in fact systemic instability, from whatever source, that allows the very parasitic behaviors we have termed “troll”-like, to flourish.

It is silly and blindly ahistoric to lump anyone who seeks to license or enforce a patent right, but who does not themselves make a corresponding product, as a “troll.”  Many arguments about Non-Practicing Entities (NPE), Patent Assertion Entities (PAE), Patent Licensing Assertion Entities (PLAE) — the various formal names and acronyms for the more commonly known epithet, “patent troll” — include an implicit and often explicit emotional condemnation of any patent holder who either did not invent or does not manufacture the patented products.  The President’s statements unfortunately are replete with such derision of people or firms who “don’t actually produce anything themselves.”

Yet, from the very outset, our American patent system distinguished itself from its English predecessor, by establishing the unfettered sale in the marketplace of patent rights, precisely because patents are private property rights (see here, here, and here).  In England, patent monopolies were still mostly creatures of the Crown — personal privileges. See B. Zorina Khan, The Democratization of Invention: Patents and Copyrights in American Economic Development, 1790-1920 (Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 36-38.  The United States patent system, based upon objective criteria for inventiveness and established in freely-alienable property rights, was as significant a revolution in the commercial sphere as the federalist structure was in the political.  Id., pp. 49-51, 60-62. And it’s hard to argue against the unprecedented success of the American economy based on the patented innovation protected by these laws.

And indeed, it might come as a surprise, that many of the inventor giants we hold in such high regard today in fact never manufactured the products covered by their patents.  Elias Howe did not make sewing machines.  Rather, having invented the hugely important lock-stitch technology, but being poor himself, he assembled financing, using then novel securitization of patents, and then licensed his patent to others (and famously, fought the equivalent of our smart phone wars, against Singer). Charles Goodyear never manufactured any rubber; he licensed his vulcanization process to others.  Thomas Edison also received third-party financing to operate his famous invention factory in Menlo Park, and he licensed his patented inventions to other companies for manufacture and sale in the marketplace, such as his invention of the first electric pen.  And when the unscrupulous refused to pay licenses, each of these inventors of course moved to enforce.

Rather than focus on practicing vs. non-practicing, as manufacturing and licensing are both equal rights in practicing a property right, let’s focus instead on parasitic behaviors. Let’s respect the genius of our Founders, and make few if any changes to the structure of our system.  And let’s focus on specific, targeted interventions that can actually cut off the systemic rot upon which parasitic behavior thrives.

Here are two important areas that could benefit from targeted interventions: (1) the high costs of litigation for all participants, and (2) the rampant and extended uncertainty of patent disputes.  Both of these interventions rest soundly in the discretion of our Federal Courts.  We already have the tools to bring down discovery costs (I’d argue we need less discovery than what we spend so much time, money, energy and emotion on to yield valid, fair results).  And as noted by now-former Chief Judge Randall Rader in his many public comments, judges already have the legal and procedural tools to cull sham lawsuits from the courts.  It just requires exercising judgment, as they ably can and do.  That’s why they’re called judges.

We do not need yet more statutory changes, changes that will engender more uncertainty and another decade of resulting litigation, to achieve the particular policy goals here.  We simply need our judges and our existing system to do the job they already have.

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Legislation Patent Law Patent Licensing Patent Litigation Uncategorized

Scratching my Head Over the SHIELD Act

By Michael Risch

[The following is a blog posting by Michael Risch, a patent law scholar at Villanova Law School, that he originally posted on March 10, 2013 at the law professor group blog, Madisonian.net, where Professor Risch regularly blogs.  Professor Risch kindly gave us permission to repost his blog posting here.]

Scratching my Head Over the SHIELD Act
By Michael Risch

I get that many people hate patent trolls. I get that many people would like to find a way to limit NPE activities in enforcing patents. But I’m scratching my head over the rhetoric and content SHIELD Act, which was reintroduced last week. For the uninitiated, the proposal would mandate fee shifting for all losing NPEs. Carved out of this group are initial assignees of a patent (that is, individuals and companies who obtained the patents themselves), universities, and companies that spend “substantial” resources making something. Further, NPEs must post a bond for the fees before they can even get into the courthouse.

I should start by saying that I don’t have a strong position on fee shifting. I think that mutual fee shifting might actually do some good to reduce litigation costs and force more reasonable licensing negotiations. I’m also in favor of all sorts of behavior based fee shifting: filing frivolous cases, demanding license fees that far exceed reasonableness, ridiculous claim construction arguments, frivolous discovery requests, unrealistic damages expert reports, etc. I think the threat of fee shifting is a stick that could be used to tame costs. But note that all of these proposals are based on behavior, not identity.

This leads to my concerns with the SHIELD Act, which leave me scratching my head. As a taste of my further thoughts, I’ll note that the EFFs poster child for the act, a podcasting NPE, is actually excluded from the act, and would not have to pay fees on loss.

Rhetoric

Let’s start with the rhetoric. It seems like few people have actually examined the act in detail, and thus support for it sounds like a propagandistic echo chamber. I joined Twitter only recently, and originally attributed this to the 140 character limit. Get rid of trolls! $29 billion in costs! Meritless patents! However, it turns out that longer discussion also repeats the same claims without much analysis, albeit with more words. Indeed, very few of the reports actually link to the text of the act, which is here, but instead link to each other, all saying the same thing.

I have a problem with this rhetoric for two reasons. First, the facts are way, way more complicated than that (see Kesan & Schwartz, for example, for a critique of the $29 billion estimate, and see the PWC study on patent judgments since 1995 for discussion about how often and how much NPEs and practicing entities win).

Furthermore, there are many types of NPEs out there, from pre-adoption technology houses to the most abusive frivolous claim filers. The SHIELD Act and its proponents consider none of this nuance.

This leads to my real problem with the rhetoric: it is driven by large companies and presented as if it will benefit small companies. If we were so worried about small companies, why wouldn’t we make the act apply to all patent plaintiffs? After all, large companies routinely assert their patents against smaller, disruptive entities in order to stake out market position or even put them out of business. Just compare the Barnes & Noble submission to the FTC about Patent Assertion Entities with the Barnes & Noble complaints about Microsoft’s licensing practices. The complaint is the same, so it is unclear why the solution should not be the same.

I am bothered by any rhetoric purportedly intended to “protect innovation” that does not, well, protect innovation by its own terms. The EFF campaign focus on a patent that would not actually be subject to the act is just one example. And the fact that no one pushing the SHIELD Act—many of whom I respect even though I disagree—is asking these questions makes my knees jerk to oppose it.

Content

My general point of view is that we should address the behavior, not the owner. Yes, it’s bad that an NPE has asserted what many think is a meritless podcasting claim against Adam Corolla. (I won’t address the merits here, but I will note that the initial patent application was filed in 1996, not last year).

But would we really feel better if it were a product company making the same claim? A meritless claim hinders innovation no matter who makes it. That’s about all I will say about the core question of whether NPEs should be required to post a bond just to get into the courthouse. I think they should not—nor should anyone,—even if fee shifting were mutual. But defending that statement is more than I can do in this blog post. I’ve written at least two articles that address the topic and there are a multitude of other studies that address the role of NPEs in licensing as well as the parallels between NPE and product making patentee behavior.

Thus, my questions about the Act relate to the particulars and their unintended consequences. Note that the text of the act has been carefully written to carve out everyone who might object to it, except NPEs. This is the root of the problem, because “patent troll” means different things to different people.

Some points:

1. The act mandates a fee award to any party victorious on noninfringement or invalidity. This means that a company can sue for declaratory relief and force fee shifting, even though the patentee never filed suit. I realize that many people would say, “Great! No more demand letters!” But consider two things. First, there are many, many transactions – millions, if not billions of dollars worth – that are undertaken between technology licensing companies and product companies without the imprimatur of “trollishness.” This provision could disrupt that ecosphere in an effort to fix a different one. Second, this provision could have a perverse effect of multiplying the number of litigations. I don’t believe that patent holders should overclaim in order to seek higher licenses, but I also don’t believe that potential infringers should underclaim in order to force litigation.

2. The act excludes parties that have a “substantial investment” in the exploitation of a patent via production or sale. This is fraught with difficulty. First, what does “substantial” mean? Presumably it is intended to ensnare NPEs that decide to make things, but not make enough (or good enough) things. But why should a court get to decide what is enough? And what do we do about start-ups who have patents but have not yet commercialized their invention? Are they trolls, too?

And what is to stop NPEs from becoming distributors? They could buy competing products wholesale (perhaps products where they have secured licenses) and sell them. This only makes sense; by being resellers, they can claim that the competition of the infringing product is harming their sales business. This points to the general complexity of licensing in the first place: companies might license patents when their opponents do not in order to gain a competitive advantage, even if the patent is old.

3. This exploitation prong leads to other questions. What if a claim construction goes against the patentee, and the patent isn’t quite as broad as the owner thought. This happens all the time, to patentees of all types. Does this mean that the product selling patent holder is no longer exploiting the patent? The language seems to say so, and even the biggest producer would be ensnared.

4. The potential for producers to be liable doesn’t stop there. Consider Palm, which developed WebOS, and made stuff. Consider HP, which has spent billions of dollars in research and development. HP bought Palm, and made WebOS tablets. For various reasons, maybe in part due to patent claims from other tablet makers like Apple, HP decides to stop selling WebOS tablets. HP then decides to enforce Palm’s patents. Mind you, HP didn’t just buy the patents, it bought the company. And then it made stuff, it researched, it developed, and it has even licensed WebOS out to LG try to resurrect it for televisions. Is HP a troll now? It falls under the text of this act. I think that just cannot be right, and yet there it is, in black and white. By the way, HP sold some patents to HTC, who then asserted them against Apple. Soon after, HTC and Apple settled a long running, very costly litigation. Would the SHIELD Act change the dynamic of this dispute? I hope not, my family bought HTC phones.

5. Universities and technology transfer organizations are excluded. This offers a potential way for NPEs to avoid the law. They can become technology transfer organizations for small colleges that cannot afford them, or perhaps coordinate with each other to offer 1 year programs that satisfy the higher education requirements. This latter likelihood is a longshot, I think, but when money is at stake, you never know. This exception also ignores the role of universities in the patent ecosystem; do universities really never assert meritless claims? What happens when they start bringing more lawsuits? Maybe NPEs should team with tech transfer organizations and the tech transfer folks can bring suit instead; it would only take a few large university related intermediaries to make the entire bill fall apart.

6. Excluded are “original assignees,” which are assignees prior to patent issuance that appear on the face of the patent. This leads to two issues. First, what if the assignment is done late, even at a product company? It happens. I suppose they would rely on the “investment” prong, but the company might not be making the patented product.

Second, many NPE patents are assigned to the NPE as the initial assignee. NPEs often buy patents while they are in process and assign continuation applications to themselves; those continuations are often the broadest claims (and thus the least likely to be meritorious as a matter of logic). In other words, the patents we worry about most are the patents that are least likely to fall under the rule. Some of the most highly-litigated, most-litigated patents were originally assigned to the NPE enforcing them now. This brings us to the point I made above, Personal Audio, with its podcasting patent, is initially assigned to….Personal Audio. Sorry folks, this is not the SHIELD you are looking for.

Furthermore, to avoid this issue, NPEs can simply buy shell companies that continue to hold the patents, while the original owner, if still active, can spin off any business to a new entity. I think Acacia does a fair amount of this already, and will surely do more. The more I think about it, the more I think that this rule, intended to protect “real” inventors, will instead render the much of the act toothless.

7. Finally, the original inventor can always sue. This leaves me scratching my head on both ends of the spectrum. On the large company end, I cannot comprehend why fee shifting is a bad thing if BigCo enforces patents, but a good thing if BigCo creates BigCoIPSubsidiary to enforce its patents. Are these two worlds really that different? Perhaps it is to those BigCo supporters of the bill that enforce their own patents. I should add that I’m told, but have not verified, that the tax code rewards companies that spin out their patents. The law gives with one hand and takes away with the other. Perhaps a better solution would be to get rid of the tax benefits, but I won’t hold my breath.

On the small side, I see the SHIELD Act as changing the way NPEs enforce patents. Original inventors aren’t covered, so perhaps the original inventor should be a nominal plaintiff and just get funded by the NPE. That’s a great incentive at a time when people are clamoring for more transparency in the system.

One more point: Individuals are a primary source of NPE patents. Small businesses have always held their own as patent plaintiffs in the system and continue to do so. But the number of patents represented by individual inventors is double with NPE participation. It’s easy to see why: it costs a lot to enforce a patent, or even to license it, and NPEs have skill and finances that individuals lack.

And so when we discuss the SHIELD Act, we should be crystal clear about what we are talking about: a system that favors big companies over individuals. I’m not making a value statement; there may be good reasons why we want fewer patents by individuals enforced. For example, individuals invent a lot of software, and a lot of software patents are really bad. But are individual software patents worse than everyone else’s? I’ve read thousands of software patents, and my belief is that big companies can write crappy patents just like everyone else. My point is that we should be truthful about what is at stake, what the impacts will be, and whether those are the results we want. Then, given that truth, we should look at some evidence to decide what to do.

Update A comment below notes that the podcasting patent might indeed fall under SHIELD because it was assigned by a family trust of one of the inventors instead of the inventor. This highlights another problem with the bill that I hadn’t even thought about. I noted issues with purchases of companies above.

But if we also say that a wholly owned and controlled intermediary cannot assign the patent on behalf of the original inventor, then SHIELD has the potential to throw a wrench into the works of corporate financing and restructuring. Every day of the week, companies reform through mergers or financing, often creating “NewCo” shell companies that will serve as intermediate owners of assets or will take on new names post financing. I have known lawyers who have such companies already formed so they can use them on a moments notice.

If we say that the intermediary trust excludes the next assignee from being the “original inventor,” then many restructured startup, merged, and financed companies may be in for a rude surprise when the attempt to enforce their patent portfolios. Now, if you dislike patents generally, this realization would lead to rejoicing. I doubt that’s how this act was intended, though.