Tag: notice and takedown

Categories
Copyright

House Judiciary Committee Hearing Reacts to Copyright Office Report on Efficacy of Section 512

The following post comes from Liz Velander, a recent graduate of Scalia Law and a Research Assistant at CPIP.

U.S. Capitol buildingBy Liz Velander

In late September, the House Judiciary Committee held a hearing entitled Copyright and the Internet in 2020: Reactions to the Copyright Office’s Report on the Efficacy of 17 U.S.C. 512 After Two Decades. As Chairman Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) explained, the hearing sought “perspectives on whether Section 512 is working efficiently and effectively for this new internet landscape.” The hearing was guided by the U.S. Copyright Office’s Section 512 Report, released in May, which concluded that the operation of the Section 512 safe harbor system disfavors copyright owners—contrary to “Congress’ original intended balance.”

The witnesses included: Jeffrey Sedlik, President & CEO, PLUS Coalition; Meredith Rose, Senior Policy Counsel, Public Knowledge; Morgan Grace Kibby, Singer and Songwriter; Jonathan Band, Counsel, Library Copyright Alliance; Matthew Schruers, President, Computer & Communications Industry Association; and Terrica Carrington, Vice President, Legal Policy and Copyright Counsel, Copyright Alliance.

Enacted in 1998 as part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Section 512 establishes a system for copyright owners and online service providers (OSPs) to address online infringement, including a “safe harbor” that limits liability for compliant OSPs. To qualify for safe harbor protection, an OSP must fulfill certain requirements, generally consisting of implementing measures to expeditiously address online copyright infringement. Congress sought to create a balance between two goals in enacting Section 512: (1) providing important legal certainty for OSPs so that the internet ecosystem can flourish without the threat of the potentially devastating economic impact of liability for copyright infringement as a result of user activity, and (2) protecting the legitimate interests of authors and other rights owners against the threat of rampant, low-barrier online infringement.

The Copyright Office’s Report determined that the balance Congress originally sought is now “askew.” It found that “despite the advances in legitimate content options and delivery systems, and despite the millions of takedown notices submitted on a daily basis, the scale of online copyright infringement and the lack of effectiveness of Section 512 notices to address that situation, remain significant problems.” The Report did not recommend any wholesale changes to Section 512, but instead identified certain areas that Congress could fine-tune in order to better balance the rights and responsibilities of OSPs and copyright owners. These include eligibility qualifications for the service provider safe harbors, repeat infringer policies, knowledge requirement standards, specificity within takedown notices, non-standard notice requirements, subpoenas, and injunctions.

At the hearing, the six witnesses reacted to the Copyright Office’s Report in dramatically different fashions. Representatives of OSPs disagreed with the Report’s conclusions, testifying that Section 512 is working as Congress intended. Mr. Band from the Library Copyright Alliance referred to Section 512 as a “shining example of enlightened legislation for the public good” that is responsible for the “golden age of content creation and distribution.” Mr. Schruers from the Computer & Communications Industry Association criticized the Report for inadequately reflecting the interests of users and “conspicuously” overlooking the problem of Section 512 misuse. Ms. Rose from Public Knowledge stated “the Office’s analysis performed a familiar sleight-of-hand by presenting user interests as coextensive with those of platforms, effectively erasing free speech concerns from its analysis.”

Representatives of content creators painted an entirely different picture of Section 512’s efficacy. They applauded the Copyright Office for calling attention to areas of imbalance related to Section 512 and to how overly expansive or narrow interpretations of the statute have aided in skewing the balance Congress intended. Mr. Sedlik, a photographer with over 35 years of professional experience and President & CEO of the PLUS Coalition, described how service providers take advantage of his and others’ copyrighted works while hiding behind Section 512’s safe harbors. He explained that, like many other copyright owners, he must spend an exorbitant amount of time searching for infringing materials online and sending takedown notices instead of creating new works.

Ms. Kibby, a singer and songwriter, testified that Section 512 is “undermining creativity, and more alarmingly, quietly undercutting our next generation of artists. It is jeopardizing livelihoods for working class musicians, obliterating healthy monetary velocity in our creative community. It is rewarding unscrupulous services that deal in the unauthorized trade and use of our works. It is fundamentally sabotaging the legitimate online marketplace that we all rely on and that Congress envisioned.” Responding to the argument that notice-and-takedown results in censorship of user-generated content, Ms. Kibby said that Section 512’s “stripping creators of their fundamental rights, their livelihood, and ultimately their creative contributions is the real censorship.”

Ms. Carrington from the Copyright Alliance identified three main problems with Section 512: (1) the ineffective notice-and-takedown process, (2) the effective elimination of the red flag knowledge standard, and (3) ineffective repeat infringer policies. She recommended adjusting the statute to clarify the difference between actual and red flag knowledge, enacting the Copyright Alternative in Small-Claims Enforcement (CASE) Act, and transparently developing effective standard technical measures (STMs).

Members of the Committee recognized the need for reform. Chairman Nadler remarked that the sheer volume of takedown notices being sent does not seem like the hallmark of a system functioning as intended. Some Members first spoke about the importance of copyright law before questioning the panelists. For example, Representative Hank Johnson (D-GA) said “it’s crucial that these creators are able to rely on copyright law protections to make their living. This is even more true in an age where the click of a button can plagiarize a lifetime of work.”

It was heartening to hear the Representatives’ positive response to the concerns of small, individual creators whose livelihoods depend on the commercial viability of their works. It was clear that the Committee is seriously considering the recommendations in the Copyright Office Report and looking for a way to rebalance Section 512 so that it respects what Congress originally intended—a system that respects the rights of authors and artists who face widespread infringement of their rights in the online environment.

Categories
Copyright

Senate IP Subcommittee Hearing on DMCA Exposes Notice-and-Takedown Problems for Artists and Authors

The following post comes from Yumi Oda, an LLM Candidate at Scalia Law and a Research Assistant at CPIP.

U.S. Capitol buildingBy Yumi Oda

On June 2, the Senate Subcommittee on Intellectual Property held a virtual online hearing entitled Is the DMCA’s Notice-and-Takedown System Working in the 21st Century? The hearing focused on the effectiveness of the Section 512 notice-and-takedown system under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). In what he described as “the longest opening statement” he had ever made, Chairman Thom Tillis (R-NC) first acknowledged the pressing issues of police brutality against African American communities and the COVID-19 crisis. He also emphasized the urgency of the hearing’s agenda considering creators’ ever-increasing dependency on the internet ecosystem during the pandemic. Notably, the deep sorrow over racial injustice and pledge of solidarity was shared among and acknowledged by each panelist throughout the hearing.

The panelists included: Don Henley, Musician and Songwriter; Jonathan Berroya, Interim President and CEO of Internet Association; Douglas Preston, President of The Authors Guild; David Hansen, Associate University Librarian and Lead Copyright & Information Policy Officer of Duke University; Abigail Rives, IP Counsel of Engine; Kerry Muzzey, Independent Classical & Film Composer of Kirbyko Music LLC; Meredith Rose, Policy Counsel of Public Knowledge; and Jeff Sedlik, President of Sedlik Photography. These panelists represented content creators and users of all sizes, highlighting the different types of stakeholders who are impacted by Section 512.

Originally seen as a compromise between copyright owners and online service providers (OSPs), Section 512 limits OSPs’ liability for copyright infringement in exchange for their reasonable efforts to police online piracy, including the duty to remove pirated content promptly once notified. However, as the recent Section 512 report by U.S. Copyright Office concluded, the notice-and-takedown system “is not achieving the balance Congress originally intended.” As such, this was the third hearing of a year-long review of the DMCA, which was expected to offer more practical—and potentially more divisive—insight into the notice-and-takedown system as compared to the first two hearings that were more academic in nature.

Senator Tillis stressed the issue of scale, which was highlighted in the first hearing this past February where CPIP’s Sandra Aistars and Mark Schultz both testified. There, Professor Rebecca Tushnet of Harvard Law School argued that small and medium entities typically only receive a small number of takedown notices, and an additional mandate could drive them out of business and increase market concentration. To conclude his opening statement, Senator Tillis maintained that the current system is badly failing both content creators and users, potentially requiring an entirely new system to tackle online piracy. To this end, he noted that he and Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) sent a letter to the Copyright Office asking for its input on how to best design an anti-piracy takedown system.

On the first panel, Eagles member Mr. Henley and bestselling author and journalist Mr. Preston spoke on behalf of creators, asking for DMCA reform and advocating for a notice-and-staydown system. Mr. Henley described how he was compelled to testify for the sake of millions of people working in the music industry whose voices are unheard, stating: “I come here out of a sense of duty and obligation to those artists, those creators who paved the road for me and my contemporaries, and for those who will travel this road after us.” He further vowed not to be silenced by what he conceived as a targeted attack by “Big Tech,” referring to a Washington Post op-ed that was published a couple of days before the hearing.

Describing it as “a relic of a MySpace era in a TikTok world,” Mr. Henley testified that the DMCA is outdated, patently unfair for music creators, and has been abused by “Big Tech” for over 20 years. In particular, he blamed large digital platforms for turning a blind eye to online piracy in the hopes of keeping traffic and ad income, hiding behind the Section 512 safe harbor protections, paying license fees well below the market price, and failing to share the fair burden of policing (despite having such capability) at the cost of the creative community. Mr. Henley emphasized the need for equitable compensation to be awarded to creators amid the pandemic because digital platforms will be the only reliable sources of income for music creators for some time.

Mr. Preston echoed Mr. Henley’s frustration over the one-sided system. Remembering the traumatic, sickening feeling of first encountering a book piracy website that listed his whole life’s work, Mr. Preston described how the current notice-and-takedown system leaves many creators in “enraging and disheartening” situations with no solution, analogous to “being mugged every single day.” Especially, Mr. Preston explained how he came to give up on filing notices after seeing the same pirated content promptly and repeatedly resurfacing under a different URL. He noted that rampant piracy has led to a 42% decrease in full-time U.S. authors’ writing income in the last decade, making it almost impossible for anyone to make a living writing books.

In contrast, Mr. Berroya, representing internet companies, and Mr. Hansen, representing research libraries and universities, claimed that the DMCA is working just fine. Mr. Berroya contended that the DMCA works as Congress intended, and the Copyright Office’s Section 512 report was inconsistent with his professional experiences. He alleged that the notice-and-takedown system allows copyright owners (whom he believed should be responsible for policing their own works) to take down their content quickly, incentivizes users’ creation and distribution, and encourages tech companies to develop tools beyond DMCA compliance, resulting in the present “golden age of content creation.” He emphasized that the DMCA merely sets a floor, not a ceiling, leaving potential room for further cooperation between creators and digital platforms.

Similarly, Mr. Hansen argued that Section 512 generally works as designed. To facilitate distribution of educational and research content, he would favor a system where content stays online unless a clear showing of infringement is made. He requested Congress to consider the “unintentional consequences” of revising Section 512, hoping that academia would not be an “afterthought” for them.

Mr. Berroya was in the hot seat most frequently on the first panel. His position supporting the status quo directly contradicted the shared, inherent belief that the DMCA should be revised, drawing questions from Senator Tillis, Ranking Member Christopher Coons (D-DE), and Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-CT). His argument largely and repeatedly relied on the potential for old fashioned dialogue, but some Senators were evidently not convinced in light of the other witnesses’ testimonies.

On the second panel, Mr. Muzzey and Mr. Sedlik represented independent artists making a living by creating and licensing their works. While recognizing the effectiveness of YouTube’s Content ID, to which he said he was “very lucky” to have access, Mr. Muzzey described how the DMCA is like “a tiny David” facing “tech Goliaths.” Specifically, in response to each takedown notice for 110,000 infringing videos located on YouTube, he received a counternotice claiming fair use incorrectly “100% of the time,” at which point he is given 10 days to file a lawsuit or the content is reinstated. This means, for a one-person, small business owner like Mr. Muzzey, the DMCA practically offers “no remedy.”

Mr. Sedlik is another artist who has had to spend countless, unproductive hours submitting takedown notices. He explained the dilemma he constantly faces: He needs to enforce his copyrights to maintain their values, but these lost hours leave him less time to create new works. Noting that the the presence of innumerable takedown notices by no means indicates success, Mr. Sedlik proposed several possible revisions to the DMCA.

On the other side of the table was Ms. Rives in support of startups and Ms. Rose on behalf of Public Knowledge. Ms. Rives contended that Section 512 is generally working well, without which many online platforms would not have existed. Referencing points made by Professor Tushnet, she argued that revising the DMCA, even slightly, would “shift the ground underneath today’s startups.” For example, she contended that imposing a duty to monitor, such as with filtering tools, would be ineffective or too costly for most startups.

Ms. Rose shifted the discussion by listing three situations where the current notice-and-takedown system puts users’ freedom of speech at risk, namely, bad DMCA takedown notices, problematic algorithmic enforcement, and most importantly, the inappropriateness of letting a private third party remove someone’s access to broadband without due process. Siding with the status quo, she warned that “asking for greater power and fewer safeguards is akin to discarding a tank and asking for a nuke.”

At the conclusion of the hearing, Senator Tillis reiterated the need to recognize the scale of infringement, and he promised to seek a path forward that would let copyright owners flag clearly infringing content so that it stays down—but without causing an undue burden on businesses and individual users.

Categories
Copyright

Twenty Years Later, DMCA More Broken Than Ever

a lightbulb shatteringWith Section 512 of the DMCA, Congress sought to “preserve[] strong incentives for service providers and copyright owners to cooperate to detect and deal with copyright infringements that take place in the digital networked environment.”[1] Given the symbiotic relationship between copyright owners and service providers, Congress meant to establish an online ecosystem where both would take on the benefits and burdens of policing copyright infringement. This shared-responsibility approach was codified in the Section 512 safe harbors. But rather than service providers and copyright owners working together to prevent online piracy, Section 512 has turned into a notice-and-takedown regime where copyright owners do most of the work. This is not what Congress intended, and the main culprit is how the courts have misinterpreted Section 512’s red flag knowledge standards.

Several provisions in Section 512 demonstrate that Congress expected service providers to also play a role in preventing copyright infringement by doing some of the work in finding and removing infringing material. In order to benefit from the safe harbors, service providers must designate an agent to receive takedown notices, respond expeditiously to takedown notices, act upon representative lists, implement reasonable repeat infringer policies, and accommodate standard technical measures. But it’s also clear that service providers have the duty to remove infringing content even without input from copyright owners. As the Senate Report notes, “Section 512 does not require use of the notice and take-down procedure.”[2] And the knowledge provisions in Section 512 reflect this. Absent a takedown notice, service providers must, “upon obtaining . . . knowledge or awareness” of infringing material or activity, “act[] expeditiously to remove . . . the material” in order to maintain safe harbor protection.[3]

Under Section 512, there are two kinds of knowledge that trigger the removal obligation without input from the copyright owner—actual and red flag. For sites hosting user-uploaded content, actual knowledge is “knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on the system or network is infringing”[4] and red flag knowledge is “aware[ness] of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.”[5] Thus, actual knowledge requires knowledge that specific material (“the material”) or activity using that specific material (“activity using the material”) is actually infringing (“is infringing”), while red flag knowledge requires only general awareness (“aware[ness] of facts or circumstances”) that activity appears to be infringing (“is apparent”). There are similar knowledge provisions for search engines.[6]

Importantly, actual knowledge refers to “the material,” and red flag knowledge does not. It instead refers to “infringing activity”—and it’s not the infringing activity, but infringing activity generally.[7] However, with both actual and red flag knowledge, the service provider is obligated to remove “the material.”[8] With actual knowledge, the service provider doesn’t have to go looking for “the material” since it already has actual, subjective knowledge of it. But what about with red flag knowledge where the service provider only knows of “infringing activity” generally? How does it know “the material” to take down? The answer is simple: Once the service provider is subjectively aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity would be objectively apparent[9]—that is, once it has red flag knowledge—it has to investigate and find “the material” to remove.[10]

The examples given in the legislative history, which relate to search engines, show that red flag knowledge puts the burden on the service provider. As the Senate Report notes, merely viewing “one or more well known photographs of a celebrity at a site devoted to that person” would not hoist the red flag since the images might be licensed or fair use.[11] However, sites that are “obviously infringing because they . . . use words such as ‘pirate,’ ‘bootleg,’ or slang terms . . . to make their illegal purpose obvious . . . from even a brief and casual viewing” do raise the red flag.[12] And a search engine “that views such a site and then establishes a link to it . . . must do so without the benefit of a safe harbor.”[13] Thus, Congress didn’t want search engines worrying about questionable infringements on a small scale, but it also didn’t want search engines to catalog sites that are clearly dedicated to piracy. And, most importantly, red flag knowledge kicks in once a service provider looks at something that is “obviously pirate”—even if it’s an entire website.[14]

So how has Congress’s commonsensical plan worked out? Not very well. As of today, Google indexes nearly 1.5 million results from the infamous pirate site, The Pirate Bay.[15] Like the examples in the legislative history, The Pirate Bay has the word “pirate” in its title, and a brief viewing of the site reveals its obvious, infringing purpose. And it’s not like Google hasn’t been told that The Pirate Bay is dedicated to infringement—nor that it needs to be told. According to data from the Google Transparency Report,[16] the search engine has received requests to remove over 4 million URLs from thepiratebay.org domain alone. There are many other related domains, such as thepiratebay.se, that have received millions of requests as well. In fact, Google tells us that it has received requests to remove over 4 billion URLs from its search engine due to copyright infringement, with many domains receiving more than 10 million requests each.

So how is it that Google can index The Pirate Bay and not be worried about losing its safe harbor? The answer is that the courts have construed Section 512 in a way that contradicts the statutory text and Congress’s intent. They’ve all but read red flag knowledge out of Section 512 and placed the burden of policing infringement disproportionately on the copyright owner. And by narrowing the applicability of red flag knowledge, the courts have perversely incentivized service providers to do as little as possible to prevent infringements. Instead of looking into infringing activity of which they are subjectively aware, they are better off doing nothing lest they gain actual, specific knowledge that would remove their safe harbor protection.

A brief traverse through the case law, especially in the Second and Ninth Circuits, shows how the red flag knowledge train has been derailed. In Perfect 10 v. CCBill, the Ninth Circuit held that domains such as illegal.net and stolencelebritypics.com—the very sort of indicia mentioned in the legislative history—were not enough to raise the red flag.[17] According to the court, “describing photographs as ‘illegal’ or ‘stolen’ may be an attempt to increase their salacious appeal, rather than an admission that the photographs are actually illegal or stolen.”[18] While that’s certainly possible, it’s not likely. And it defies common sense. The Ninth Circuit concluded: “We do not place the burden of determining whether photographs are actually illegal on a service provider.”[19] But this misses the point, and it conflates red flag knowledge with actual knowledge.

The Second Circuit in Viacom v. YouTube held that the “difference between actual and red flag knowledge is . . . not between specific and generalized knowledge, but instead between a subjective and an objective standard.”[20] The court arrived there by focusing on the removal obligation, reasoning that “expeditious removal is possible only if the service provider knows with particularity which items to remove.”[21] And it rejected an “amorphous obligation” to investigate “in response to a generalized awareness of infringement.”[22] By limiting red flag knowledge to specific instances of infringement, the Second Circuit severely curtailed the obligations of service providers to police infringements on their systems. The entire point of red flag knowledge is to place a burden on the service provider to investigate the infringing activity further so that the specific material can be removed.[23]

The Ninth Circuit followed suit in UMG Recordings v. Shelter Capital, holding that red flag knowledge requires specificity.[24] The court reasoned that requiring “specific knowledge of particular infringing activity makes good sense” because it will “foster cooperation” between copyright owners and service providers “in dealing with infringement” online.[25] This “cooperation,” according to the Ninth Circuit, would come from takedown notices sent by copyright owners, who “know precisely what materials they own, and are thus better able to efficiently identify” infringing materials than service providers, “who cannot readily ascertain what material is copyrighted and what is not.”[26] Of course, this is not the shared-responsibility approach envisioned by Congress, and it conflates the red flag knowledge standards with the obligation to respond to takedown notices—separate provisions in Section 512.

Perhaps the most significant gutting of red flag knowledge can be found in the Second Circuit’s opinion in Capitol Records v. Vimeo.[27] The district court below had held that it was a question for the jury whether full-length music videos of current, famous songs that had been viewed by the service provider amounted to red flag knowledge.[28] But the Second Circuit disagreed that there was any jury question: “[T]he mere fact that a video contains all or substantially all of a piece of recognizable, or even famous, copyrighted music and was to some extent viewed . . . would be insufficient (without more) to sustain the copyright owner’s burden of showing red flag knowledge.”[29] That this gloss on red flag knowledge “reduces it to a very small category” was of “no significance,” the Second Circuit reasoned, since “the purpose of § 512(c) was to give service providers immunity, in exchange for augmenting the arsenal of copyright owners by creating the notice-and-takedown mechanism.”[30]

The Second Circuit thus held as a matter of law that there was no need for the factfinder to determine whether the material was so obviously infringing that it would raise the red flag. How is this a question of law and not fact? The court never explains. More importantly, this flies in the face of what Congress provided for with red flag knowledge, and it demotes Section 512 to being merely a notice-and-takedown regime where copyright owners are burdened with identifying infringements on URL-by-URL basis. Giving service providers a free pass when confronted with a red flag turns the Section 512 framework on its head. And it enables service providers to game the system and build business models on widespread, infringing content—even if they welcome it—so long as they respond to takedown notices. The end result is that an overwhelming amount of obvious infringements goes unchecked, and there’s essentially no cooperation between service providers and copyright owners as Congress intended.

[1] S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 40 (emphasis added); see also H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(II), at 49.

[2] Id. at 45; see also H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(II), at 54.

[3] 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii); see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(1)(C).

[4] Id. at § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added).

[5] Id. at § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) (emphasis added).

[6] See id. at §§ 512(d)(1)(A)-(B).

[7] See 4-12B Nimmer on Copyright § 12B.04[A][1][b][ii] (“By contrast, to show that a ‘red flag’ disqualifies defendant from the safe harbor, the copyright owner must simply show that ‘infringing activity’ is apparent—pointedly, not ‘the infringing activity’ alleged in the complaint.” (emphasis in original)).

[8] 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii)

[9] S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 44 (“The ‘red flag’ test has both a subjective and an objective element. In determining whether the service provider was aware of a ‘red flag,’ the subjective awareness of the service provider of the facts or circumstances in question must be determined. However, in deciding whether those facts or circumstances constitute a ‘red flag’–in other words, whether infringing activity would have been apparent to a reasonable person operating under the same or similar circumstances–an objective standard should be used.”); see also H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(II), at 53.

[10] Id at 48 (“Under this standard, a service provider would have no obligation to seek out copyright infringement, but it would not qualify for the safe harbor if it had turned a blind eye to ‘red flags’ of obvious infringement.”); see also H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(II), at 57.

[11] Id.; see also H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(II), at 57-58.

[12] Id.; see also H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(II), at 58.

[13] Id. at 48-49; see also H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(II), at 58.

[14] Id. at 49; see also H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(II), at 58.

[15] See The Pirate Bay, available at https://www.thepiratebay.org/.

[16] See Google Transparency Report, available at https://transparencyreport.google.com/.

[17] See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007).

[18] Id. at 1114.

[19] Id.

[20] Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012).

[21] Id. at 30.

[22] Id. at 30-31.

[23] See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(I), at 26 (“Once one becomes aware of such information, however, one may have an obligation to check further.”).

[24] UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013).

[25] Id. at 1021-22.

[26] Id. at 1022.

[27] Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2016).

[28] Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 972 F. Supp. 2d 537, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[B]ased on the type of music the videos used here—songs by well-known artists, whose names were prominently displayed—and the placement of the songs within the video (played in virtually unaltered form for the entirety of the video), a jury could find that Defendants had ‘red flag’ knowledge of the infringing nature of the videos.”).

[29] Capitol Records, 826 F.3d at 94 (emphasis in original).

[30] Id. at 97.

I presented this at the Fordham IP Conference on April 25, 2019. My oral presentation is here, and the accompanying slides are here.

Categories
Copyright

Trusted Notifier Program Defended Against Misleading Rhetoric

a laptop screenOne year ago, domain name registry Donuts, Inc. and the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) entered into an agreement termed the Trusted Notifier Program in a joint effort to combat piracy. The voluntary initiative “introduced a new way to work towards mitigation of clear and pervasive cases of copyright infringement,” and according to Donuts’ one-year summary, has been a success for “rights owners, registrants and the public at large.”

While the program and similar voluntary agreements are not without their detractors, it’s important to separate good-faith criticism from misleading rhetoric. In an article posted this week, tech pioneer and Internet security expert Paul Vixie responds to a recent paper criticizing the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), trade associations, and standards organizations for implementing a “privately ordered online content regulation.”

The rebuttal deconstructs University of Idaho Law Professor Annmarie Bridy’s paper piece by piece, exposing many of the claims as unsubstantiated or misleading. Among other things, Mr. Vixie’s article provides the following evaluations:

  • No evidence is offered in support of the claim that the sole or primary purpose of voluntary efforts such as the Trusted Notifier Program has been to develop a “large-scale program of privately ordered online content regulation.”
  • Claims that “less sophisticated and economically powerful” ICANN stakeholders take a backseat to rights-holder organization influence have been demonstrated to be false by the existence of new generic top-level domain (gTLD) programs.
  • No evidence is offered in support of the claim that copyright owners “appear to be laying the groundwork for a broad program of DNS-based enforcement, with the long-term goal of implementing a UDRP-like procedure for claims of piracy and counterfeiting that are wholly unrelated to any bad-faith or confusing use of domain names.”
  • The unregulated nature of the Internet has acted as a “stay out of jail free” card for millions of criminals, and some redress and balance is both inevitable and necessary.

In conclusion, Vixie notes that the Trusted Notifier Program represents the engagement of Internet industry stakeholders with rights-holder communities to create efficient takedown-related activities, which is exactly what the Internet technical community told rights holders they should pursue instead of SOPA. The article advises that “asking interested parties not to cooperate on matters of their aligned interest will never be effective. Notice and takedown, at scale, without borders, requires mutual cooperation. And that’s what the Trusted Notifier Program is meant to effect.”

March 27, 2017, update: Bridy’s response to Vixie’s post can be read here.

Categories
Copyright

IP Scholars Explain Why We Shouldn’t Use SurveyMonkey to Select Our Next Register of Copyrights

Washington D.C. at nightIn a letter submitted to House Judiciary Committee today, nine IP scholars (organized by CPIP’s Sandra Aistars) express their support for the Committee’s proposal to modernize the Copyright Office. The letter identifies three major challenges facing the Copyright Office, including “(1) insufficient funds, staff, and infrastructure to efficiently perform its core functions; (2) operational impediments stemming from its integration with the Library of Congress; and (3) potential risk of constitutional challenges to its decision-making authority should the Office take on increased regulatory or adjudicatory responsibility.”

The IP scholars laud the Committee’s recommendation that the Office be led by a principal officer of the government, nominated and confirmed like other senior government officials. The scholars also express their concern with the Library’s highly-unusual method of using a SurveyMonkey questionnaire to identify the knowledge, skills, and abilities required to run the Copyright Office.

On December 16th, the newly-appointed Librarian solicited the public to “provide input to the Library of Congress on expertise needed by the Register of Copyrights.” The survey consists of the following three questions:

    1. What are the knowledge, skills, and abilities you believe are the most important for the Register of Copyrights?

 

    1. What should be the top three priorities for the Register of Copyrights?

 

  1. Are there other factors that should be considered?

The survey then provides an area to upload additional comments and assures that the feedback “will be reviewed and will inform development of knowledge, skills and abilities requirements for the position.”

While there may be benefits to soliciting public input on the knowledge, skills, and abilities a Register of Copyrights should embody, as the IP scholars’ letter points out, relying on a limited SurveyMonkey experiment discounts the guidance codified in Section 701(b) of the Copyright Act. Section 701(b) already lists the functions and duties of the Register of Copyrights, including:

(b) In addition to the functions and duties set out elsewhere in this chapter, the Register of Copyrights shall perform the following functions:

 

(1) Advise Congress on national and international issues relating to copyright, other matters arising under this title, and related matters.(2) Provide information and assistance to Federal departments and agencies and the Judiciary on national and international issues relating to copyright, other matters arising under this title, and related matters.

(3) Participate in meetings of international intergovernmental organizations and meetings with foreign government officials relating to copyright, other matters arising under this title, and related matters, including as a member of United States delegations as authorized by the appropriate Executive branch authority.

(4) Conduct studies and programs regarding copyright, other matters arising under this title, and related matters, the administration of the Copyright Office, or any function vested in the Copyright Office by law, including educational programs conducted cooperatively with foreign intellectual property offices and international intergovernmental organizations.

(5) Perform such other functions as Congress may direct, or as may be appropriate in furtherance of the functions and duties specifically set forth in this title.

Rather than crowd sourcing the job description, the Librarian should review the Copyright Act and consider candidates that would be best qualified to fulfill the explicit and established standards of 701(b).

By handing this over to anyone willing to fill out a SurveyMonkey form, the Library of Congress is politicizing a process that shouldn’t be politicized. The letter warns that “[w]hile it is often laudable to seek public input on important issues of policy, an online survey seeking input on job competencies from any internet user is an inefficient and inappropriate approach for developing selection criteria for this important role, particularly where such minimal background is provided to survey-takers and where there appears to be no mechanism to encourage constructive comments.”

As recently as April of last year, Fight for the Future incited an effort to spam the Copyright Office while it solicited comments regarding the DMCA notice and takedown process. Engaging in a campaign of misinformation, the advocacy group flooded the Office with automated “comments” that crippled the regulations.gov website during the last 48 hours of an important collection period. The Register’s selection process should not be handed over to Internet bullies and trolls.

The next Register of Copyrights will have an immediate and lasting effect on the administration of copyright laws, and the Library of Congress should respect long-standing norms as well as Congress’s instructions as embodied in the Copyright Act. The IP scholars’ letter reiterates that the statutory obligations of Section 701(b) require certain competencies of a Register of Copyrights and ensures that “the successful candidate can meet the management and leadership expectations attendant to a senior executive officer position in the federal government.” This is an important process that deserves more serious consideration than a SurveyMonkey poll.

Categories
Copyright Uncategorized

Librarians’ Contradictory Letter Reveals an Alarming Ignorance of the Copyright System

U.S. Capitol buidlingOn December 14th, a group of librarians sent a letter to Congress explaining why they believe the Copyright Office should remain under the control of the Library of Congress. Written by University of Virginia Library’s Brandon Butler, the letter is a self-contradicting and uninformed response to recent recommendations on reform of the Copyright Office offered by leading members of the House Judiciary Committee. While the lawmakers’ report proposes overdue, sensible reforms to the framework of a department in need of modernization, the librarians’ letter favors a one-sided approach to reform and reveals a gross misunderstanding of how copyright law and the Copyright Office ensure public access to creative works.

The Letter Embraces the Very Conflict It Claims to Reject

The letter begins by criticizing another recent letter to Congress from former Registers of Copyright Ralph Oman and Marybeth Peters in which they question the recent firing of Register of Copyright Maria Pallante and discuss the urgent need for an independent Copyright Office. Butler takes issue with the former Registers’ suggestion that the Library of Congress and the Copyright Office have different priorities and distinguishable missions, insisting that if any tensions exist, they are a result of bias at the Copyright Office. Alleging that the former Registers and the Copyright Office are “on the side of authors and media companies,” Butler proclaims that libraries “in all their richness and complexity” truly serve the interest of all. It’s a nice-sounding theory, but unfortunately it’s completely inaccurate and soon contradicted by a palpable disregard for the rights of authors and creators.

Claiming that librarians and the Library of Congress don’t subscribe to the theory of an adverse dichotomy between authors and the public, the letter then reinforces this theory by suggesting the scales should be tipped in favor of the public. In one paragraph, Butler endorses the “important balance between the short-term, private interests of authors and intermediaries, and the long-term interests of the public.” Curiously, just after he lauds this “important balance,” it is abruptly discarded as a reflection of “a narrow conception” and “inimical” priorities that cause an unproductive tension between the Office and the Library of Congress. Soon after describing libraries as the “fulcrum” upon which the balance of copyright and the public interest rests, the letter declares that “[we] reject this false dichotomy between copyright and the public interest.”

Regardless of this hollow denunciation, it’s clear that Butler believes there is a conflict between the interests of authors and the interests of the public, as he preaches to it throughout the letter. After paying lip service to rising above tensions between copyright and the public interest, Butler distinctly pushes for a system that values libraries over creators and the rights in their works. Describing the “crucial parts” of the copyright system embraced by libraries and librarians, the letter lists “fair use, first sale, interlibrary loan,” and claims that “without them libraries as we know them in this country could not exist.” One might argue that more crucial to the existence of libraries are the creative works that line their stacks, but this reality doesn’t seem worth mentioning. In fact, Butler asserts that copyright law has a “fundamentally public-serving character,” contrary to the letter’s earlier emphasis on serving copyright owners, authors, and the public equally. After praising the balance, then rejecting it, the letter unequivocally elevates the importance of the access libraries provide over the contributions and rights of creators.

The Letter Fails to Take into Account a Complex Creative Economy Based on Property Rights

James Madison observed in Federalist No. 43 that “the public good fully coincides . . . with the claims of individuals.” The Founders of our country recognized that creative economies are built upon the property rights of authors and artists, and as CPIP’s recent policy brief on creative markets explains, they “had the foresight to recognize that the public ultimately benefits when this protection is secured by law.” Promoting the public interest by recognizing the importance of individual interests was a theory drawn from Adam Smith and his seminal The Wealth of Nations. In it, Smith explained that concerted efforts to benefit the public are often less effective—and less helpful to society—than uncoordinated individual efforts to pursue private interests, and that society benefits the most when individuals are empowered to create valuable goods and services by pursuing their own interests.

Embodying these principles, copyright empowers authors and creators to pursue their own private interests by granting them exclusive property rights in their works. These same property rights support creative industries and provide significant benefits by playing a key role in facilitating the myriad transactions that contribute to a vibrant creative economy grounded in free market principles. Among other things, these property rights enable the division of labor, encourage product differentiation and competition, and spur investments in the development and distribution of creative works. Copyright not only incentivizes the creation of works, but also the commercialization of these works through further development, marketing, and distribution.

Copyright’s intricate ecosystems are based on incentives that ensure the continued creation and distribution of original works of authorship, yet the librarians’ letter doesn’t seem to appreciate their significance or how they function. Butler dedicates much of the letter to emphasizing the importance of public access to copyrighted works, but access is only the final step in a complex system of investment, commercialization, and distribution of creative works. The librarians claim to “understand that copyright is a complex ecosystem,” but nothing in the letter validates this assertion. The only part of the creative economy they deem worth discussing is the end result of access, with all other imperative stages either not realized or ignored.

The Librarians Are Oblivious to a Broken System

Ending with a plea to Congress not to interfere with the current “relationship” between the Library of Congress and the Copyright Office, the letter claims the Library is in the best position to lead a desperately needed modernization initiative at the Office. It’s a bold claim, given that the Library stood by as the Office’s infrastructure became embarrassingly outdated and underfunded over the past twenty years. Before her untimely ouster, Register Pallante provided Congress with a perspective on copyright review that included a detailed list of deficiencies within the Office in need of improvement. Specifically, Pallante cited the diminishing number of fulltime employees and inadequate budget that have made it all but impossible to support growth and development at the Copyright Office:

The Copyright Office budget is consistently in the neighborhood of $50 million, of which $30 million is derived from fees paid by customers for registration and other services. The Library’s overall budget for 2015 is approximately $630 million, inclusive of the Copyright Office. Without taking anything away from the important duties or funding deficiencies in the rest of the Library, the Copyright Office’s resources are inadequate to support the digital economy it serves.

Pallante’s report goes on to discuss the serious information technology (IT) problems facing the Office, and to question the Library’s plan to address IT concerns by exerting more control over the Office’s departments and decisionmaking. The former Register was wise to question a plan that would give more control to an organization that has consistently failed to value or support the Copyright Office and its mission.

Further demonstrating just how out of touch they are with the realities of the current copyright law landscape, an affiliated group of librarians recently professed their faith in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) safe harbor system that is undoubtedly failing creators, copyright owners, and the public. In comments submitted to the Copyright Office as part of its study on the effectiveness of Section 512 of the DMCA, the Library Copyright Alliance (LCA) makes the absurd claim that the “safe harbors are working exactly as the stakeholders and Congress intended.” But, just before this assertion, the comments accuse copyright owners of abusing the DMCA’s notice and takedown process, and suggest amendments to the DMCA are necessary “to curtail this abuse.” Not only are the LCA’s comments utterly contradictory, they ignore substantial evidence and testimony from dozens of interested parties that the DMCA needs to be reformed and updated.

As CPIP highlighted in a recent examination of the state of the DMCA, the notice and takedown system has been largely ineffective in managing the ever-increasing amount of piracy, and courts continue to diminish service providers’ responsibility to cooperate with copyright owners to detect and deter infringement. The constant game of whack-a-mole with websites offering infringing content continues, and platforms such as YouTube are teeming with unauthorized works. Artist, creators and copyright owners have loudly voiced their frustration with the current system and called for reforms that better respect their rights. In the face of such obvious evidence of a broken system, to claim the DMCA is working exactly as intended speaks volumes of the librarians’ inability to recognize the reality of the situation.

It’s Time for Change at the Copyright Office

The House Judiciary Committee’s proposal on copyright reform is a response to years of listening “to the views and concerns of stakeholders from all sides of the copyright debate,” and it identifies modernization efforts that address the concerns of these interested parties. Since 2013, the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Internet has conducted 20 copyright review hearings on the current state of copyright law which included testimony from 100 witnesses. In addition to the hearings, Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte and Ranking Member John Conyers brought a copyright listening tour to Nashville, Silicon Valley, and Los Angeles where a wide range of creators, innovators, technology professionals, and users of copyrighted works had the opportunity to tell the Committee directly what changes they believe are needed to ensure U.S. copyright law evolves with the digital age.

The resulting policy proposals reflect a broad acknowledgment by those who participated  in the review that the Copyright Office must be updated to keep up with the digital culture it serves. Two of the most important steps in this modernization effort identified by the Committee include requiring the Office to maintain an updated digital database and granting the Office autonomy with respect to the Library of Congress. If Brandon Butler and the signatories of his letter had their way, the Copyright Office would remain under control of an organization that has proven it is unable to help propel the Office into the 21st century. It’s not particularly surprising that librarians would want the Library of Congress to retain control over the Copyright Office, but an overwhelming majority of creators, copyright law experts, and lawmakers recognize that the Office needs to move forward, rather than remain trapped in the past.

Categories
Copyright Copyright Licensing Copyright Theory Infringement International Law Internet Legislation Uncategorized WIPO

European Union Draws a Line on Infringing Hyperlinks

Cross-posted from the Mister Copyright blog.

a gavel lying on a table in front of booksLast week, the European Court of Justice—the judicial authority of the European Union—issued an anticipated decision in the Sanoma hyperlinking case, declaring that commercial linking with knowledge of unauthorized content constitutes copyright infringement. The opinion comes after years of similar cases in Europe stirred debate over whether linking to pirated works was a ‘communication to the public’ and therefore infringing, and provides a sensible test that protects the works of authors and creators while ensuring the internet remains a bastion of free speech.

Sanoma involved the popular Dutch news and gossip site GeenStijl, which ran an article in 2011 that included links to an Australian website where copyrighted Playboy magazine photos were made available. The photos were published on the Australian website without the consent of Sanoma, Playboy’s editor and copyright owner of the photos at issues, but taken down after the site was notified of their infringing nature. Despite similar notifications, GeenStijl refused to remove the hyperlinks and actually provided links to another website hosting the unauthorized photos after the Australian website took them down.

Sanoma brought a copyright infringement claim against GS Media, which operates the GeenStijl website, and the Supreme Court of the Netherlands sought a preliminary ruling from the European Court of Justice on whether hyperlinks represent the communication of a work to the public. According to an earlier EU directive, any communication to the public of works protected by copyright must be authorized by the copyright owner. Due to the ubiquity of links and hyperlinks on the Internet, a ruling classifying them as communications to the public would have major ramifications for anyone linking to unauthorized content.

In its judgment, the European Court of Justice found that the concept of ‘communication to the public’ requires individual assessment and laid out the following three factors that must be considered when determining whether a link or hyperlink qualifies.

1) The deliberate nature of the intervention – According to the Court, “the user makes an act of communication when it intervenes, in full knowledge of the consequences of its actions, in order to give access to a protected work to its customers.”
2) The concept of the ‘public’ covers an indeterminate number of potential viewers and implies a large number of people.
3) The profit-making nature of a communication to the public – The Court explains that when hyperlinks are posted for profit, “it may be expected that the person who posted such a link should carry out the checks necessary to ensure that the work concerned is not illegally published.”

Applying these criteria to Sanoma, the Court found that because GS Media runs a commercial website that makes money from advertising, it is undisputed that they posted the hyperlinks for profit, and that it is also undisputed that Sanoma had not authorized the publication of the photos. It also found that because they were notified by Sanoma and continued to repost links after the original source website took down the content, GS Media was aware of the infringing nature of the photos and “cannot, therefore, rebut the presumption that it posted those links in full knowledge of the illegal nature of that publication.” The Court concluded that by posting the links, GS Media therefor effected a ‘communication to the public.’

The Court goes on to detail its desire to maintain a fair balance between the interest of copyright owners and authors and the protection of the interests and fundamental rights of Internet users, “in particular their freedom of expression and of information, as well as the general interest.” After providing the criteria for assessing whether a link qualifies as a communication to the public, the opinion emphasizes the important role hyperlinks play in the exchange and free flow of information over the internet, and clarifies that linking—even to unauthorized content—is not a communication to the public if there is no profit motive or knowledge of the infringing nature of the linked-to works. Even so, it’s important to note that not-for-profit hyperlinking may still be considered a communication to the public if the person posting the link knew or should have reasonably known that the content was posted without authorization.

Perhaps most surprising about the Court’s decree is the relative approval by both copyright owners and supporters of the rights of those posting links. While it speaks to the reasonable approach the Court has taken in determining what qualifies as a communication to the public, it may also represent a hesitation to condemn or praise the order due to a significant ambiguity. It’s not entirely clear who carries the evidentiary burden of proving whether an individual knew or should have reasonably known certain content was posted on the Internet without authorization. If copyright owners and authors are forced to prove a user knew or should have known content was unauthorized every time they attempt to remove links that can appear online incessantly, it could render the new directives ineffectual in protecting creative works.

Regardless of the uncertainly surrounding this burden of proof, the current test seems to strike a balance that holds commercial websites more accountable, while allowing for some flexibility for the general public. With debates over the effectiveness of notice and takedown intensifying in the United States, the EU’s decision on communications to the public should be recognized as workable approach to dealing with infringing hyperlinks. As the United States Copyright Office admits in its 2016 study on the making available right, jurisprudence in the US regarding offering access to content hosted elsewhere on the Internet through hyperlinking is less developed as some foreign jurisdictions. But the study acknowledges the progress made in the EU, and emphasizes the need to include ‘offers of access’ in the crucial making available right.

Despite semantic differences, the EU and the US are both moving towards systems that will impose greater accountability for posting links to unauthorized works. The EU’s directive makes clear that commercial hyperlinking to unauthorized content is indeed a communication to the public and therefor copyright infringement, while ensuring that the free flow of information through general public linking will not be threatened and the Internet will remain unbroken. It’s an approach that represents the greater goals of copyright law around the world, and other jurisdictions should follow the lead of the EU when crafting copyright policies that address the intricacies of the Internet.

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Copyright Copyright Licensing Copyright Theory Infringement Intellectual Property Theory Internet Reasonable Royalty Uncategorized

Despite What You Hear, Notice and Takedown is Failing Creators and Copyright Owners

cameraIn a recent op-ed in the LA Times, Professors Chris Sprigman and Mark Lemley praise the notice and takedown provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) as “a bit of copyright law worth saving.” They argue that Section 512 of the DMCA continues to serve its purpose of balancing the rights of copyright owners and creators with those of Internet service providers (ISPs), while leaving both sides only “slightly disappointed.” Satisfying these two groups is indeed a difficult charge, but it’s simply disingenuous to suggest that creators and copyright owners are satisfied with a system so clearly in need of an overhaul.

As the Copyright Office embarks on its review of the DMCA, supporters and critics of the nearly twenty-year-old doctrine are weighing in on its effectiveness in addressing online infringement. Sprigman and Lemley claim that the “process has worked well for years,” and that the result of shifting more enforcement burden to ISPs “could be a broken Internet.” But for those creators and copyright owners who have their works resurface online just minutes after they are taken down, the Internet is already “broken.” The fact that piracy continues to intensify, despite incredible efforts to have infringing content taken down, shows that notice and takedown is largely ineffective.

As CPIP Senior Scholar Sean O’Connor testified before Congress, the notice and takedown system is not working for any of its intended beneficiaries. The constant game of whack-a-mole renders the system essentially futile for copyright owners and creators, and it creates significant burdens for ISPs that want to comply—especially small to mid-level companies that can’t afford compliance staff. Worse still, by shielding service providers from liability, the DMCA creates perverse incentives where there’s little downside to ignoring infringing content. In fact, reviewing content could lead to an ISP having knowledge of infringement and losing its safe harbor.

Now that the Copyright Office’s review is underway, it’s somewhat strange to see some supporters claim that all is well. But has anything actually changed since the Office announced its study?  Of course not. The whack-a-mole problem remains, and the knowledge standards are still interpreted broadly to disproportionately favor ISPs. When one side says the system is working and the other side says it’s broken, the truth is that the system is not working well for everyone. Sprigman and Lemley can claim that the DMCA is “worth saving” only by downplaying the true plight of creators and copyright owners.

A concrete example of this struggle comes from the comments filed by Universal Music Group (UMG) as part of the Copyright Office’s study. UMG describes the painstaking efforts devoted to protect just one artist’s creative work. In October of 2014, UMG and Big Machine Records launched a joint offensive to protect Taylor Swift’s “1989.” A staff of UMG employees dedicated 100% of their time and resources to manually search for infringements on YouTube, SoundCloud, and Tumblr, and through March of 2016, they had sent over 66,000 DMCA takedown notices. Despite their considerable efforts, over 500,000 links to the album were identified, and “1989” was illegally downloaded nearly 1.4 million times from torrent sites.

Of course, this type of effort would be impossible to replicate for any works other than those that attract such massive attention. For most artists, the burden of monitoring the Internet and sending takedown notices would fall entirely on their shoulders, with no guarantee of putting a stop to the theft of their works. Sprigman and Lemley ignore these problems, instead claiming that since copyright owners sent “more than 500 million takedown requests just to Google last year,” we know that the “system is a powerful tool against pirated content.” That would be great, if true, but the reality is that those notices barely made a dent.

Sprigman and Lemley claim that the “genius of the DMCA” is that it “enables entertainment companies to turn piracy into legitimate revenue.” They give the example of “YouTube’s Content ID system,” which “gives copyright owners the opportunity to ‘claim’ their work and share in any advertising revenue rather than pull it off the site.” From the perspective of creators and copyright owners, the only “genius” of this system is that YouTube can legally present them with an unfair choice—suffer infringement and get nothing or monetize and get next to nothing.

While Sprigman and Lemley praise the “more than $1 billion” paid out by YouTube, the real question is how much more copyright owners and creators would have been paid in a properly functioning market. YouTube is consistently teeming with infringing videos—one recent report revealed that over 180 million infringing videos had been removed in 2014 alone. And the artists that YouTube’s largess supposedly benefits are loudly complaining about their exploitation. If Content ID is so great, why are so many creators and copyright owners upset with the arrangement? The monetization Google offers to copyright owners and artists is less than half of the royalties paid out by streaming services like Pandora, an amount that artists have denounced as already inequitable.

In her excellent piece on the fictions of the Content ID system, Grammy-winning artist Maria Schneider exposes Content ID as a way for Google to cash in by actually legitimizing and perpetuating piracy. She explains that a majority of creators that opt for monetization realize miserable percentages of ad revenue, and the continued illegal uploading of their music and content drives billions of users to YouTube’s platform. YouTube has turned the weakness of the DMCA into a system that exploits artists while offering embarrassingly lower royalty rates than what would be negotiated in a free market.

The current situation is untenable, and if change means “breaking” the Internet, then we should pull out the pickaxes and get to work. A system of notice and staydown, rather than just takedown, would help alleviate the constant and seemingly ineffectual vigilance required by the current system. By removing all copies of a protected work and blocking inevitable re-postings, ISPs would honor the original purpose of the DMCA while actually doing their part to earn the protection of the safe harbor provisions. Only by ensuring that targeted works do not resurface will ISPs respect the rights of those without whose content they would cease to exist.

How anyone can honestly say that the current notice and takedown system is working for copyright owners and creators is mystifying given the constant calls for reform from creators and the numerous critical comments filed with the Copyright Office. The incredible magnitude of takedown notices sent and the seemingly unstoppable reappearance of infringing works online are a clear signal that the system is completely failing those it was meant to protect. Creators and copyright owners deserve a better chance at protecting the fruits of their labors, and the DMCA needs to be changed so that it truly is a system “worth saving.”

Categories
Copyright Infringement Internet Uncategorized

Three Years Later, DMCA Still Just as Broken

By Matthew Barblan & Kevin Madigan

cameraIn 2013, CPIP published a policy brief by Professor Bruce Boyden exposing the DMCA notice and takedown system as outdated and in need of reform. The Failure of the DMCA Notice and Takedown System explained that while Section 512 of the DMCA was intended as a way for copyright owners and service providers to work together to fight infringement in the digital age, the notice and takedown system has been largely ineffective in managing the ever-increasing amount of piracy.

Three years later, the DMCA is still just as broken. Since we published the brief, courts have further diminished service providers’ responsibility to cooperate with copyright owners to detect and deter infringement, rendering the DMCA even more fruitless and desperately in need of retooling.

Boyden explained the fundamental problems with the system at the time, beginning with the fact that “despite all the notice, there is precious little takedown to show for it. Unless a site employs some sort of content filtering technology, the same content typically re-appears within hours after it is removed.” The notice and takedown system is particularly unsuited for the twenty-first century, where “infringement is persistent, ubiquitous, and gargantuan in scale. It is a problem that needs to be policed” with more than just takedown notices that don’t give copyright owners “a single day when the content is not available on the most heavily trafficked sites.”

Boyden noted that “even for the largest media companies with the most resources at their disposal, attempting to purge a site of even a fraction of the highest-value content is like trying to bail out an oil tanker with a thimble.” And Boyden pointed out that the courts hadn’t made the situation any better: “The DMCA’s unsuitability as a tool to manage chronic, persistent, and pervasive infringement is particularly apparent after recent decisions from the Second and Ninth Circuit that construed the duty of website owners very narrowly under Section 512.”

To further illustrate his point, Boyden collected data on takedown notices sent by MPAA companies and counter-notices received. Between March and August of 2013, MPAA companies sent takedown notices for over 25 million infringing URLs and received only 8 counter-notices in response. That’s a counter-notice rate of 0.000032%, suggesting that the astronomical volume of notices represents a likewise astronomical volume of infringement rather than overly-aggressive notice-sending.

Grand Totals. Infringing URLs: 25,235,151. URLs Sent to Websites: 13,238,860. URLs Sent to Search Engines: 11,996,291. Counter-Notices Received: 8.

Boyden concluded:

The impossibility of keeping up with new [infringing] uploads means that an online service provider can create a site aimed at and dedicated to hosting infringing copyrighted works, comply with every takedown notice, and still benefit from the safe harbor, as long as its intent remains hidden. If the site has enough users, any popular content removed will be supplanted by new copies almost immediately.

Sadly, three years later the “chronic, persistent, and pervasive” infringement that Boyden described continues, with stolen copyrighted works popping up on sites almost immediately after being taken down. Google Search—one product of one company—has receive nearly 90 million takedown notices this month alone. The situation has gotten so bad that last week a long list of artists, including Paul McCartney and Taylor Swift, signed a digital petition to bring attention to a broken DMCA system that allows companies like YouTube to benefit from infringement at the expense of songwriters and artists.

The artists’ main message: “The existing laws threaten the continued viability of songwriters and recording artists to survive from the creation of music.” They note that “the tech companies who benefit from the DMCA today were not the intended protectorate when it was signed into law nearly two decades ago,” and they ask Congress to “enact sensible reform that balances the interests of creators with the interests of the companies who exploit music for their financial enrichment.”

Recognizing the growing frustration with the DMCA, the U.S. Copyright Office initiated a study earlier this year to examine whether the statute is fulfilling its purpose. We submitted comments to the Copyright Office on behalf of a group of copyright law scholars, noting that courts have disrupted the balance Congress sought to create when it enacted the DMCA. In particular, courts have eliminated any incentive for service providers to work with copyright owners to develop policies and procedures to prevent or curb piracy online. In just one example of how deeply courts have distorted congressional intent, under courts’ current interpretation of the DMCA, search engines can continue to index even obviously infringing sites like The Pirate Bay with no fear of potential of liability.

Adding insult to injury, courts have recently shifted the balance of power even further away from artists and towards service providers, making it easier than ever for companies to enable and profit from infringement while turning a blind eye—or even encouraging—piracy on their sites. In this month’s Capitol Records v. Vimeo decision, for example, the Second Circuit extended the DMCA safe harbor to Vimeo despite smoking-gun evidence that Vimeo employees encouraged users to post stolen works on their site and had viewed the illicit videos at issue in the suit. In a jaw-dropping opinion, the court let Vimeo off the hook simply because the evidence of Vimeo employees encouraging infringement wasn’t directly tied to the specific infringing videos that plaintiffs included in their suit.

CPIP’s Devlin Hartline explains:

After Capitol Records v. Vimeo: A service provider can encourage its users to infringe on a massive scale, and so long as the infringement it encourages isn’t the specific infringement it gets sued for, it wins on the safe harbor defense at summary judgment. This is so even if there’s copious evidence that its employees viewed and interacted with the specific infringing material at issue. No jury will ever get to weigh all of the evidence and decide whether the infringement is obvious. At the same time, any proactive steps taken by the service provider will potentially open it up to liability for having actual knowledge, so the incentive is to do as little as possible to proactively “detect and deal” with piracy. This is not at all what Congress intended. It lets bad faith service providers trample the rights of copyright owners with impunity.

As courts continue to gut the DMCA, making it harder than ever for artists to protect their property and livelihoods, Congress would be wise to heed Bruce Boyden’s advice from three years ago: “It is long past time for a retooling of the notice and takedown regime.”

Categories
Copyright Internet Legislation Uncategorized

Copyright Policy Should Be Based On Facts, Not Rhetoric

Here’s a brief excerpt of a post by Kevin Madigan & Devlin Hartline that was published on IPWatchdog.

After nearly twenty years with the DMCA, the Copyright Office has launched a new study to examine the impact and effectiveness of this system, and voices on both sides of the debate have filed comments expressing their views. For the most part, frustrated copyright owners report that the DMCA has not successfully stemmed the tide of online infringement, which is completely unsurprising to anyone who spends a few minutes online searching for copyrighted works. Unfortunately, some commentators are also pushing for changes that that would make things even more difficult for copyright owners.

To read the rest of this post, please visit IPWatchdog.