Tag: PATENT Act

Categories
Patent Law

Supreme Court to Assess USPTO’s Controversial Attorneys’ Fees Position

U.S. Supreme Court buildingBy Chris Katopis & Devlin Hartline

This week, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear an important case concerning patent law procedures and the American legal system in general. In Iancu v. NantKwest, the Court asks, “Does all really mean all?” Specifically, the Court will examine whether Section 145 of the Patent Act, which provides that “[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings shall be paid by the applicant,” includes the personnel expenses that the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) incurs when its employees and attorneys defend the agency in the proceedings.

Under U.S. patent law, a patent applicant who is disappointed with the final decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) has the right to seek judicial review through one of two options. Applicants may either appeal directly to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit under Section 141, or they may file a civil action against the Director of the USPTO in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia under Section 145. Unlike Section 145, Section 141 mentions nothing about recouping expenses.

In the present case, NantKwest is the assignee of a patent application directed to a method for treating cancer. The examiner rejected the claims as obvious and the PTAB affirmed. NantKwest then sued the Director of the USPTO in the Eastern District of Virginia. The district court held on summary judgment that the claims were obvious, and the Federal Circuit affirmed in a nonprecedential opinion.

In the district court, the USPTO moved for reimbursement of nearly $112,000 in expenses under Section 145 to cover attorneys, paralegals, and expert witnesses. The district court granted the expert-witness expenses but denied the personnel expenses. A divided panel of the Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the personnel expenses were compensable under Section 145. The Federal Circuit then took the case en banc, with the majority affirming the district court’s holding that the personnel expenses were not “expenses” under Section 145.

The USPTO then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which NantKwest opposed. Just yesterday, the Court agreed to hear the case. The USPTO argues that when Congress enacted Section 145, it was clear that “all” meant “all” regarding any costs or expenses arising from the district court litigation. Accordingly, the USPTO argues, an applicant who initiates a civil action under Section 145 must pay all of the expenses borne by the USPTO in the proceedings, including the salaries of the government’s attorneys and paralegals.

Notably, this recent position on Section 145 by the USPTO is a sharp departure from decades of earlier practice. It also presents a potentially costly factor for patents applicants seeking to challenge adverse PTAB decisions in the Eastern District of Virginia, where they would have to pay the government’s personnel expenses even if their patent rights are vindicated by the federal courts.

In its en banc majority opinion by Judge Kara Stoll, the Federal Circuit held that “the American Rule prohibits courts from shifting attorneys’ fees from one party to another absent a ‘specific and explicit’ directive from Congress.” Under the American Rule, the opposing parties in litigation pay their own attorneys’ fees, whether they win or lose. This Rule, the majority noted, promotes “fair access to the legal system” for those who “might be unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their rights,” especially the “small businesses and individual inventors” who seek to avail themselves of Section 145’s benefits.

Having held that the American Rule’s presumption against shifting attorneys’ fees applies to Section 145, the Federal Circuit found that nothing in the text of Section 145 rebutted it. Under Supreme Court precedent, there must be a “specific and explicit” authorization by Congress to displace the American Rule. The Federal Circuit held that Section 145’s statement that applicants must pay “[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings” was ambiguous and thus fell short of the Supreme Court’s stringent standard.

The majority emphasized the fact that, under the USPTO’s interpretation, even successful applicants would have to pay the government’s personnel expenses, and it noted that the USPTO itself could not identify any other such provision for shifting fees to the prevailing party. That sharp departure from the bedrock principle of the American Rule, the majority reasoned, made the government’s anomalous position all the more suspect since Congress would have made it more clear if it intended this odd result.

This case has significant ramifications for the American innovation economy. Patent applicants at the cutting-edge of innovation occasionally receive multiple rejections from patent examiners that are affirmed by the PTAB. Some seek to vindicate their rights in the Eastern District of Virginia, which is their right under Section 145 of the Patent Act as enacted by Congress. The shifting of attorneys’ fees to such applicants would increase the cost of inventing and commercializing new technology. It would strongly discourage dissatisfied applicants from challenging the PTAB before a federal district court.

The American Rule is grounded on the notion that those who feel they have been wronged should not be afraid to seek justice in the courts. The USPTO would flip this bedrock principle on its head, even in cases where the courts reverse the agency’s wrongful denial of patent rights to innovators. Hopefully the Supreme Court will affirm the Federal Circuit’s defense of the American innovation economy, lest our innovative entrepreneurs be forced to think twice before taking their case to the federal courts.

Categories
Innovation Patent Litigation

CPIP Scholars Ask Supreme Court to Resist Call to Restrict Venue Choices for Patent Owners

U.S. Supreme Court buildingOn March 8, 2017, CPIP Scholars Adam Mossoff, Devlin Hartline, Chris Holman, Sean O’Connor, Kristen Osenga, & Mark Schultz joined an amicus brief in TC Heartland v. Kraft Foods. CPIP Scholars worked with USD Law’s Ted Sichelman to organize, write, and file the brief. The case focuses on whether patent owners may sue corporate defendants in any judicial district where the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant, which is the default rule in federal cases.

Concerned about the allegedly abusive behavior of certain firms suing in the Eastern District of Texas, some would like to severely restrict where all patent owners may sue. The amici note that, even if the Supreme Court restricts venue choices as these people would like, patent lawsuits would not be equitably distributed as a result. A recent study showed that 60% of all patent cases would still be concentrated in 5 of the 94 judicial districts. Furthermore, instead of concentrating in one district—the Eastern District of Texas—cases would primarily concentrate in two districts—the Northern District of California and the District of Delaware.

As the amici argue: “No plausible argument can be made—and Petitioner and its amici have not offered an argument—that shifting cases from one district to two districts would result in a meaningful distribution of patent cases among the ninety-four federal district courts.” The amici note that concerns about “forum shopping” are overblown since patentees are just doing what all federal plaintiffs do—choosing “the forum that gives it the best opportunity for success.” Since “corporate defendants are generally subject in any civil complaint to venue in any district in which personal jurisdiction lies,” the amici suggest that the same rule should apply in patent cases.

The amici conclude: “Innovators and their investors have long been vital to a flourishing innovation economy in the United States. Startups, venture capitalists, individual inventors, universities, and established companies often rely heavily on patents to recoup their extensive investments in both research & development and commercialization. By restricting the districts in which a patent owner can bring suit, the value of the patent itself is lessened, diminishing the economic incentives the patent system provides to spur innovation.”

To read the amicus brief, please click here.

Categories
Innovation Intellectual Property Theory Inventors Legislation Patent Law Patent Litigation Patent Theory Uncategorized

Unintended Consequences of “Patent Reform”: The Customer Suit Exception

U.S. Capitol buildingIn the last two weeks, the House and Senate Judiciary Committees marked up wide-ranging patent legislation ostensibly aimed at combating frivolous litigation by so-called “patent trolls.” But while the stated purpose of the House and Senate bills—H.R. 9 (the “Innovation Act”) and S. 1137 (the “PATENT Act”), respectively—is to combat abusive litigation, a closer look at the actual language of the bills reveals broad provisions that go far beyond deterring frivolous lawsuits. This far-reaching language has raised concerns in the innovation industries that, instead of curbing ambulance-chasing patentees, Congress is preparing to fundamentally weaken the property rights of all inventors, emboldening patent infringers in the process.

The “customer suit exception” or “customer stay” provisions that appear in both bills are particularly troubling. These provisions direct courts to stay patent infringement suits against “retailers” and “end users” in favor of suits involving manufacturers higher up the supply chain. While the basic idea makes sense—we’ve all heard stories of coffee shops being sued for patent infringement because of the Wi-Fi routers they used—the provisions are drafted so broadly and inflexibly that they invite abuse and gamesmanship by infringers at the expense of legitimate patent owners.

Both the Innovation Act and the PATENT Act provide that “the court shall grant a motion to stay at least the portion of the action against a covered customer” that relates “to infringement of a patent involving a covered product or covered process” if certain conditions are met. The first condition in both bills is that the “covered manufacturer” must be a party to the same action or to a separate action “involving the same patent or patents” related to “the same covered product or covered process.” In other words, so long as the manufacturer is challenging the patentholder, the customer is off the hook.

The two main problems here are that (1) the definition of “covered customer” in both bills is exceedingly broad, such that almost any party can claim to be a “customer,” and (2) the provisions leave the courts no discretion in deciding whether to grant a stay, forcing them to halt proceedings even when it’s not warranted.

Both bills define “covered customer” as “a retailer or end user that is accused of infringing a patent or patents in dispute.” “Retailer,” in turn, is defined as “an entity that generates” its “revenues predominantly through the sale to the public of consumer goods and services,” and it explicitly excludes “an entity that manufactures” a “covered product or covered process” or “a relevant part thereof.” Thus, a “retailer” is a “customer,” but a “manufacturer” is not.

This language is far broader than necessary to achieve the stated purpose of protecting downstream retailers and end users. The Senate’s section-by-section breakdown of the PATENT Act claims that the “customer stay is available only to those at the end of the supply chain.” But the actual definitions in both bills are so broad that almost any entity in the supply chain would be eligible for a mandatory stay. This is so because almost all manufacturers are also retailers of other manufacturers; that is, almost all manufacturers could claim to be a “customer.”

Take, for example, a smartphone company that sources its components from a third-party manufacturer. If the smartphone company were sued for patent infringement over a component, it could claim to be a “covered customer” under both bills. Many smartphone companies generate “revenues predominantly through the sale to the public of consumer goods and services,” and they would not be considered “an entity that manufactures” the component. As a “retailer,” the smartphone company would be entitled to a mandatory stay, even though it’s nothing like the mom-and-pop coffee shop the customer stay provisions are designed to help. A district court would be forced to grant the stay, even if doing so hampered a legitimate patentholder’s ability to enforce its property right.

Against this backdrop, it’s important to keep in mind that the decision to stay proceedings has historically been left to the discretion of judges. Sometimes there are indeed good reasons to grant a stay, but each case is unique, and courts frequently weigh many factors in deciding whether a stay is appropriate. Instead of recognizing this dynamic, the Innovation Act and the PATENT Act mandate a one-size-fits-all solution to an issue that is best determined on a case-by-case basis. In effect, the bills tie the hands of district court judges, forcing them to stay suits even when the equities dictate otherwise.

While in some cases a manufacturer may be the more appropriate party to litigate a patent suit, it is not always true that efficiency or justice dictates staying a suit against a customer in favor of litigation involving the manufacturer. Courts generally balance several factors, such as convenience, availability of witnesses, jurisdiction over other parties, and the possibility of consolidation, when deciding whether to grant a stay. Courts consider whether the stay will lead to undue prejudice or tactical disadvantage, and they examine whether it will simplify the issues and streamline the trial. The decision to stay involves an extensive cost-benefit analysis for both the court itself and the litigants.

The Supreme Court has often emphasized the importance of judicial discretion in deciding whether a stay is warranted. As Justice Cardozo wrote for the Court in 1936, the decision to stay “calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance.” Justice Cardozo warned that the judiciary “must be on our guard against depriving the processes of justice of their suppleness of adaptation to varying conditions.” In the patent law context, Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court in 1952, declared: “Necessarily, an ample degree of discretion, appropriate for disciplined and experienced judges, must be left to the lower courts.”

The problem with the House and the Senate bills is that they take away this important “exercise of judgment” and threaten to remove much-needed flexibility and adaptation from the litigation process. The customer stay provisions take the “ample degree of discretion,” which is “appropriate for disciplined and experienced judges,” and place it into the hands of the alleged infringers. Infringers are not likely to be motivated by important notions of efficiency or justice; they’re likely to be motivated by self-interested gamesmanship of the system to their own advantage.

The proponents of the customer stay provisions claim that they’re necessary to help the little guy, but the provisions in both bills just aren’t drafted like that. Instead, they’re drafted to tie the hands of judges in countless cases that have nothing to do with small-time retailers and end users. The courts already have the power to stay proceedings when the equities tip in that direction, but these bills disrupt the judicial discretion on which the patent system has long depended. Customer stays certainly have their place, and that place is in the hands of judges who can take into account the totality of the circumstances. Judges should not be forced to make the important decision of whether to grant a stay based on overbroad and inflexible statutory language that goes far beyond its stated purpose.