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Conferences Patent Law

CPIP 2020 Fall Conference: Day One Recap

The following post comes from Terence Yen, a 4E at Scalia Law and a Research Assistant at CPIP. This is the first of two posts (see day two recap) summarizing our two-day 5G at the Nexus of IP, Antitrust, and Technology Leadership conference that was held online from George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School on October 7-8, 2020.

CPIP 2020 Fall Conference flyerBy Terence Yen

On October 7-8, 2020, CPIP hosted its Eighth Annual Fall Conference, 5G at the Nexus of IP, Antitrust, and Technology Leadership, online from George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School in Arlington, Virginia. The conference featured a keynote address by the Honorable Andrei Iancu, and it was co-hosted by Scalia Law’s National Security Institute (NSI).

This conference addressed fast-emerging intellectual property (IP), antitrust, and technology leadership issues in the 5G and “Internet of Things” innovation ecosystem. Coverage included standard-essential patents (SEPs) along with established and emerging markets on a regional and global basis. Speakers were drawn from the academic, industry, and policymaking communities, with an emphasis on using objective fact-based analysis to explore points of convergence among legal, economic, and geopolitical perspectives on the IP and regulatory infrastructures that underlie these critical industries.

OPENING REMARKS & INTRODUCTIONS

CPIP Executive Director Sean O’Connor opened the conference by welcoming everyone to this year’s event and explaining that the conference was limited to a few hours each day to avoid “Zoom burnout.” Prof. O’Connor discussed the developing technologies of 5G and Internet of Things (IOT), which represents the systems that connect everyday objects and allow them to communicate with each other in real time. This technology increases the capability of a wide variety of industries, including automotives, home appliances, healthcare systems, and more.

CPIP Deputy Director Joshua Kresh then highlighted the various topics that would be covered during the four panel sessions and the keynote address and fireside chat by USPTO Director Andrei Iancu. Mr. Kresh also thanked the CPIP team, including Kristina Pietro, Devlin Hartline, and Mary Clare Durel, and the conference sponsors for making the conference possible.

SESSION 1: USING DATA TO INFORM POLICY: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON SEPS, SSOS AND FRAND ROYALTIES

The first panel focused on the use of data to inform policy, compared with the use of theoretical models for standard-essential patents (SEPs), standard setting organizations (SSOs), and fair reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) commitments. The panelists included Dr. Anne Layne-Farrar of Charles River Associates, Prof. Stephen Haber of Stanford University, and Prof. Daniel Spulber of Northwestern University, and the panel was moderated by Ted Essex of Hogan Lovells.

The panelists discussed how one of the biggest issues in this field is the setting up of royalty rates for industries such as the automotive sector, which utilize 5G and IOT. In the past, economists have warned the public about the looming problem of royalty stacking. Royalty stacking is a theory about industry collapse, wherein market power is exercised excessively and repeatedly. The theory is based on the concept that one monopoly is bad, two monopolies is worse, three monopolies is even worse, and so on. The fundamental concept is that each monopolist sets its price without taking into consideration the prices charged by other monopolists, leading to a situation where, as the number of patent owners increases, the aggregate royalty grows unsustainably and output collapses.

Despite the fears generated by royalty stacking models, however, this issue has not seemed to materialize in the real world. For example, the actual cumulative royalty yield on a smartphone is less than one-twentieth of that predicted by royalty stacking models. The reason we don’t observe this in the real world is that the theory is built on the notion of “one-time” play, meaning the people setting royalties do so independently of each other. As the data shows, this is an inaccurate portrayal of how royalty rates are set up.

The panel then went on to explain that it is important to check theories against data and real results. At the beginning of FRAND litigation, courts worried that implementers were being anticompetitively harmed by high royalty prices. As such, decisions were issued with the policy goal of protecting implementers. Over time, however, we have begun to see more balance from the courts and a higher demand for data prior to the acceptance of theoretical models.

Courts have now recognized that there is a very real problem of people using products without licenses, and that strategic or opportunistic behaviors can happen on either side of the bargaining table. As such, they are now more willing to act as gatekeepers to enforce good faith on both sides, often falling back to comparable licenses as a basic standard.

With this new emphasis on fair play from the courts, most royalty decisions are now being settled through out-of-court negotiations. Evidence shows that practically all SEP licenses are now subject to negotiation. While patent pools are often cited as the main exception, even they generally still have the option of negotiation. Evidence also suggests that SSOs develop standards through consensus decisions that are procompetitive, and most SEP licenses are mostly negotiated and enforced with contract law, making litigation rare. FRAND commitments have generally been found to be clear and effective, and it is believed that excessive regulation and antitrust intervention would impede standardization. Data shows that FRAND commitments encourage the adoption of standards, do not generate market power, and are consistent with invention and innovation.

The increase in negotiation eliminates many predicted outcomes for theories, which makes data even more important. Accurate real-life data informs public policy, and research in this field is shifting towards new techniques for gathering and analyzing big data, as well as increased use of AI and big data.

This trend helps to avoid policy decisions based on guesswork and provides evidence-based analysis helpful to courts and agencies.

KEYNOTE ADDRESS & FIRESIDE CHAT

“IP controls the destiny of virtually every industry.” Andrei Iancu, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the USPTO, started his keynote address with this bold statement. Advanced digital technologies are transforming virtually every product, manufacturing process, and logistical system, and protecting the IP rights to those technologies is not only a right mentioned in the Constitution, but is the foundation of wealth creation for our nation.

As Director Iancu explained, the advancement of 5G and IOT technology will form the backbone of a new system of autonomous vehicles, smart cities, intelligent appliances, telerobotic surgeries, precision agriculture, and much more. However, our nation faces the reality that the United States is falling behind in the intellectual property arms race.

Twenty years ago, the number of patent applications being filed by Chinese citizens was practically zero. By 2018, however, that number reached almost 1.5 million per year, approximately three times the number of American applications. Chinese applications have increased at an average rate of 26% each year, as opposed to a 2-3% annual increase for the U.S. While some may call into question the quality of these Chinese patent applications, Director Iancu noted that the sheer magnitude indicates that China is at minimum attending diligently to its intellectual property portfolios in areas critical to the next technological revolution. This remarkable trend can in part be attributed to China’s extensive system of government incentives for IP, which include tax incentives, subsidies for patents, and other monetary and nonmonetary rewards. As foreign nations like China continue to outperform the U.S. in amassing a rich depth of technological patents, U.S. companies may end up paying billions in royalties as those patents become increasingly vital to the upcoming technological revolution.

Director Iancu went on the explain that the U.S. must take steps to ensure that American technology is able to keep up with foreign technological development. To do so, we must have a robust system of predictable patent rights to maintain the incentives to innovate. If we are forced to use only technologies that are in the public domain, standards will inevitably be stunted.

Recognizing that private sector inventions are the primary source of SEPs, Director Iancu explained the need for a market-driven licensing system and the role of the government in the transition to 5G. He emphasized that it is the Patent Office’s goal to maintain balance between licensors and licensees, and he ended his presentation with the promise that the “USPTO will be steadfast in ensuring that we have a fair and balanced licensing system driven by the needs of the industry.”

Director Iancu then went on to have a fireside chat with CPIP Executive Director Sean O’Connor, taking questions from the audience at the end.

SESSION 2: IP MEETS ANTITRUST AROUND THE GLOBE: POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF SEPS AND FRAND

The final session of the day included panelists Maureen Ohlhausen of Baker Botts, Dr. Urška Petrovčič of the Hudson Institute, Prof. Daniel Sokol of the University of Florida, and Prof. John Yun of Scalia Law. The panel was moderated by Prof. Henry Butler, Dean of Scalia Law and Executive Director of the law school’s Law & Economics Center.

The panelists discussed how innovation is crucial to the U.S. economy and how IP has been one of the primary drivers of the economy for the last 60 years. Throughout that time, IP and antitrust law have consistently been found to be complementary fields, as both are aimed at encouraging innovation, industry, and competition.

FRAND issues arise in the context of standards setting, as SDOs commonly adopt patent policies to promote access after a standard is adopted. In tech areas especially, hundreds of patents are often necessary to create a working product. This requires standards for fair and reasonable licensing policies, though there is some dispute as to whether the breach of FRAND commitments is an antitrust concern. Blanket licensing policies can offer higher efficiencies related to reduced transaction costs and patent peace, but the concern is that it may be a form of tying arrangement. However, it should be noted that U.S. antitrust agencies have long acknowledged that blanket licensing does not always raise antitrust concerns.

One issue of contention is the topic of injunctions. The confusions raised on the subject have drawn the attentions of the DOJ and FTC, most recently with their post-Madison approach. The DOJ holds that patent holdup is not an antitrust problem and that SSOs should better protect against holdout to ensure maximum incentives to innovate. It believes that patent owner injunction rights should be protected, not persecuted, and that a unilateral and unconditional refusal to license a valid patent should be per se legal. The FTC agrees with some of that approach, with the opinion that breach of FRAND alone is not an antitrust problem, but both hold-out and hold-up can raise serious concerns.

As a general trend, U.S. courts have begun to move away from the idea that IP owners are very constrained by antitrust and must license. However, the advent of 5G is sure to raise a whole new slew of issues, and the 5G battle will be a very different conflict from what we have seen before. Up until now, many of the most politically connected companies around the world have not played a significant role in this debate. With 5G being the future of IOT, however, many more elements of the supply chain will be involved on this issue, and many previously uninvolved players will want to shake up the case law in their favor.

Thus far, European courts have also moved towards the trend of acknowledging that FRAND compliance may make injunctions more difficult, but there are no rules specifically barring injunctions, so the option remains on the table. European courts have generally put forth the opinion that they want to protect the interests of both implementers and SEP owners, and they are currently less willing to adopt conclusions based on categorical rules or abstract theories, preferring evidence-based analysis instead.

At the center of this multisided issue is SSOs. SSOs balance the interests of two competing groups with different incentives: the innovators and the implementers. By design, SSOs are avoiding cracking down on the issue with bold decisions so as not to disrupt the balance between two sides.

The panelists agreed that, as of right now, nothing is set in stone. Antitrust, especially in combination with IP and contract law, remains in a state of flux. This has led to a lot of uncertainty in investments, which may impact our ability to innovate. Amongst its concluding thoughts on the issue, the panel noted that there are titanic conflicts yet to come, and as far as this field is concerned, “winter is coming.”

Categories
Patent Licensing

LeadershIP 2020: Injunctive Relief in Standard-Essential Patent Cases

The following post comes from Colin Kreutzer, a 2E at Scalia Law and a Research Assistant at CPIP.

a hand holding a phone with holograms hovering above the screenBy Colin Kreutzer

The LeadershIP conference is dedicated to promoting an open dialogue on global issues surrounding innovation, intellectual property, and antitrust policy. On September 10th, LeadershIP kicked off its 2020 series of virtual events with a panel discussion featuring three government agency leaders: PTO Director Andrei Iancu, NIST Director Walter Copan, and Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim of the DOJ’s Antitrust Division.

Moderator David Kappos, a former PTO Director and current partner at Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, led a discussion about the role of standard-essential patents (SEPs) in modern industry and the legal effect that an SEP designation has on patent owners. The main topic of discussion was the importance of retaining the right to injunctive relief against infringers. The panelists had released a joint statement on this subject last year, following some unwelcome court decisions and what they viewed as misinterpretations of an earlier statement from 2013. View the video of the panel discussion here.

SEPs and F/RAND

The adoption of industry-wide technical standards helps industries to thrive by promoting efficiency and interoperability among competitors. A group that authors such standards is known as a standards developing organization (SDO), and it can include representatives from governments, private companies, and universities all over the world. For example, mobile communications standards such as 4G broadband technology are developed by the ITU, a group within the United Nations.

Developing a complex technical framework necessarily involves the use of many patented technologies. When the use of a certain patented technology is essential for adhering to the industry standard, it is known as a standard-essential patent.

Since owning an SEP can give the patent owner leverage over an entire industry, SDOs often require an agreement from patent owners before electing to use their technology in the standard. To be included, owners must commit to licensing their invention to all interested parties on terms that are fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND). Some forms of this agreement omit the word “fair,” leaving only “RAND.” They can be collectively referred to as F/RAND commitments.

Holdup and Holdout

The combination of public standards and private property rights can create perverse incentives for both patent owners and technology implementers alike. Once a company is bound to an industry standard, a patent owner may refuse to honor its F/RAND commitment and demand licensing fees that are grossly disproportionate to the patent’s actual value. A practice like this is known as “holdup.” But the presence of F/RAND agreements can encourage the licensee to practice “holdout” as well. In that case, a company will simply use the technology without paying any fees, ostensibly because the owner would not agree to fair and reasonable terms. Holdup and holdout can both weaken standard-setting efforts by breeding distrust and discouraging participation.

The panelists talked about the chain of events that they feel resulted in too much emphasis on preventing holdup at the expense of giving holdout a green light.

The 2013 and 2019 Letters

In 2013, the PTO and DOJ released a joint policy statement on the issue of appropriate legal remedies for SEP owners. The statement said it may not always be proper seek an injunction in a district court or to ban importation of products using an exclusion order at the International Trade Commission. Citing “an effort to reduce . . . opportunistic conduct” and the need to “provide assurances to implementers of the standard that the patented technologies will be available,” the letter suggested that a voluntary F/RAND commitment may imply that “money damages, rather than injunctive or exclusionary relief, is the appropriate remedy for infringement in certain circumstances.” The letter indicated that, at least under certain circumstances, no remedies should be available that would halt the actual flow of products or impede the implementation of a technical standard. Instead, the SEP owners could expect only monetary judgments that would be decided after the fact.

In the years following this statement, several court decisions were handed down denying injunctive relief in SEP infringement cases. In Apple v. Motorola for example, the N.D. Illinois court reasoned that when an SEP owner commits to licensing its patent to everyone, the dispute narrows to one of price: “[b]y committing to license its patents on FRAND terms, Motorola committed to license the [patent] to anyone willing to pay a FRAND royalty and thus implicitly acknowledged that a royalty is adequate compensation.” On appeal, the Federal Circuit objected to this rationale as a per se rule, but it upheld the denial of injunctive relief all the same.

The agencies became concerned that an entirely different legal standard was being applied when the patent in question was encumbered by a F/RAND commitment. So in 2019 the USPTO and DOJ, now joined by the NIST, released a new statement. In this one, they sought to clarify that, while F/RAND commitments should be considered as a factor, they “need not act as a bar” to injunctive or exclusionary orders. The three agency heads were unified on the importance of keeping these remedies available.

Andrei Iancu, Director, USPTO

Director Iancu talked about the critical role that innovation plays in the United States economy and the need to be vigilant in our protection of IP. Inventors must be certain that their protections are reliable, whether regarding infringement, remedies, march-in rights, or any other current issue. He discussed the various measures the Office is taking to improve our IP system. This includes COVID-response actions, such as fee deferral for small entities and the switch to an all-electronic filing system.

For an IP system to be robust, it must be founded on sound policy considerations. In this vein, Director Iancu discussed various PTO policies. Recent changes at the PTAB are designed to ensure a balance between patent owners and petitioners. The Office has issued new guidance on § 101 issues to provide greater clarity on what constitutes patentable subject matter. The PTO’s chief economist reported that “uncertainty” has decreased by 44% following this new guidance. And, of course, the joint policy statement is a step toward restoring all available remedies.

On the main topic, Director Iancu kept it simple: SEPs are patents. He emphasized that injunctive relief truly goes to the heart of the property rights conferred by a patent, as the right to exclude is explicitly provided in our Constitution. He rejected the notion that a special set of rules should apply when a F/RAND commitment is involved, and he warned about what would happen if there were: “One of the fundamental principles here is that if you have categorical rules, whether in fact or as perceived, then you create a system that leads to perverse incentives and bad outcomes.” There will be far less incentive to negotiate a license agreement up front when infringers “know categorically that they will not be enjoined.”

Walter Copan, Director, NIST

Director Copan discussed the various roles that NIST play in our economy and in promoting innovation, including: advanced 5G communications, standards leadership and cooperation with the private sector, cybersecurity, biotech innovation and protection, and manufacturing and supply chain security.

His most important objective at NIST is strengthening America’s competitiveness in the world. A strong IP system is the “bedrock” of this position and SEPs figure in prominently. The U.S. share of worldwide IP is on the decline while that of China is growing. One avenue that China is using to assert itself on the world stage is through China Standards 2035, a 15-year plan to become the leader in standards development for next generation technology. Copan and others made a case for the desired SEP remedies as part of an effort to maintain or improve the United States’ global standing on issues of IP and standards development. He said that our international partners are starting to see “the value and power of injunctive relief” to discourage infringement at will.

He also emphasized the same core ideas as the other panelists: SEPs are patents, and they are entitled to the same remedies as any other patent. Rather than favoring one of holdup or holdout over the other, we should focus on encouraging good-faith negotiation.

As a patent owner himself, he has been through a number of injunctive processes and knows first-hand that this form of relief is a “key part in the suite of remedies” available. He expressed excitement about the new policy statement and the international momentum that accompanies it, but he cautioned that this effort “is a journey” and there is a long way to go.

Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney General, USDOJ Antitrust Division

Assistant Attorney General Delrahim described the issues in the context of his New Madison approach to IP and antitrust policy, and the four core principles that form the basis of the New Madison approach.

First, patent holdup is not an antitrust issue. The DOJ has long recognized that SDOs are procompetitive institutions, and that the interoperability they provide is a major benefit to consumers. However, that does not mean that SEP holdup is an inherently anticompetitive practice, or that antitrust law is the appropriate forum in which to settle such disputes. He described as “radical” the idea that a patent owner could be accused of an antitrust violation simply for reneging on F/RAND obligations, and that contract law would be far more appropriate.

Second, SDOs shouldn’t be used as “vehicles” by which either implementers or patent owners gain advantages over each other. Instead SDO policies should strive for a balance which maximizes the incentives for innovators to innovate and for implementers to implement. “Negotiating in the shadow of dubious antitrust liability is not only unnecessary, it dramatically shifts the bargaining power between patent holders and implementers in a way that distorts the incentives for real competition on the merits.”

Third, as discussed above, the fundamental right conferred by a patent is the right to exclude. Courts should be very hesitant to take that right away. Doing so can effectively create a compulsory licensing regime, which has been largely disfavored in the U.S. for decades.

Finally, at least from an antitrust perspective, the refusal to license a patent should not be considered per se legal. This will allow F/RAND negotiations to take place “in the shadows of contract law” without the threat of treble damages under the Sherman Act, and thus without “skewing the negotiations in favor of an implementer.”

Conclusion

In closing, the panelists were unified in their views as laid out in the joint policy statement. They were optimistic about the direction in which the law is headed, both in the U.S. as well as with international partners such as Germany and the U.K. And they looked forward to continuing the full restoration of a critical remedy for owners of standard-essential patents.

Categories
Patents

New CPIP Policy Brief: Barnett on the End of Patent Groupthink

a hand reaching for a shining key hanging among dull keysIn a new CPIP policy brief entitled The End of Patent Groupthink, CPIP Senior Fellow for Innovation Policy Jonathan Barnett highlights some cracks that have emerged in the recent policy consensus that the U.S. patent system is “broken” and it is necessary to “fix” it. Policymakers have long operated on the basis of mostly unquestioned assumptions about the supposed explosion of low quality patents and the concomitant patent litigation that purportedly threaten the foundation of the innovation ecosystem. These assumptions have led to real-world policy actions that have weakened patent rights. But as Prof. Barnett discusses in the policy brief, that “groupthink” is now eroding as empirical evidence shows that the rhetoric doesn’t quite match up to the reality. This has translated into incremental but significant movements away from the patent-skeptical trajectory that has prevailed at the Supreme Court, the USPTO, and the federal antitrust agencies.

Prof. Barnett first looks at how, for the past decade or so, the groupthink about “royalty stacking” and “patent holdup” has led to efforts by the FTC and DOJ Antitrust to limit the enforceability and licensing of standard-essential patents (SEPs) that underlie the global smartphone market. However, this past December, the DOJ and USPTO changed course, saying now that SEP owners should be treated just like any other patent owner and instead expressing concerns about the possibility of “patent holdout” by well-resourced infringers. As Prof. Barnett explains, the theories and stylized models that influenced these federal agencies are now being displaced by empirical data and real-world models that better reflect how the smartphone market actually operates.

Turning to the Supreme Court, Prof. Barnett discusses the overlooked dissent in Oil States by Justice Gorsuch, which was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, in 2018. On the one hand, the Oil States majority continued the Court’s recent spate of cases reflecting the groupthink skepticism towards patents. Justice Gorsuch’s dissent, on the other hand, perhaps reflects a nascent movement among some members of the Court to revisit this conventional wisdom. Prof. Barnett points out other underdiscussed examples of this growing phenomenon within the Court, from cabining the powers of the PTAB in SAS Institute, to questioning the PTAB’s immunization from judicial review in Cuozzo, to finding that federal agencies lack standing to invoke AIA challenges in Return Mail.

Finally, Prof. Barnett addresses the current move away from the old groupthink at the USPTO, where the current leadership has expressed its support of robust patent protection. For starters, empirical evidence has discredited the widely-repeated view that the USPTO is a “rubber stamp” that approves almost all patent applications. As to inter partes reviews (IPRs), Prof. Barnett notes that, early on, institutions and invalidations were the common outcome. While this could support the conclusion that “bad” patents were being struck down, the data is also consistent with the conclusion that the process is sometimes being used opportunistically to invalidate “good” patents. Responding to this concern, recent changes in the examination process, such as the narrower claim construction standard and broader claim amendment opportunities, may enable patentees to survive unjustified validity challenges at the PTAB.

Moving forward, Prof. Barnett suggests that the tide may be turning in the patent policy world as widely shared assumptions behind patent-skeptical groupthink are subjected to rigorous empirical scrutiny. The inescapable truth is that the U.S. innovation economy has flourished while commentators have suggested it should have languished under the supposed burdens of strong patent protection. Prof. Barnett points out that skeptics may have failed to appreciate how robust patents support private incentives to bear the high costs and risks of innovation and commercialization. Current signs of a “redirect” from the old groupthink are a welcome change for preserving the intricate infrastructure that supports a vigorous innovation ecosystem.

To read the policy brief, please click here.

Categories
FTC Innovation

Unverified Theory Continues to Inform FTC’s Policies Toward Patent Owners

dictionary entry for the word "innovate"The Federal Trade Commission’s unfair competition case against Qualcomm, Inc., has now concluded. The parties gave their closing arguments on Tuesday, January 29, and all that remains is Judge Lucy Koh’s ruling. To prevail, the FTC needed to demonstrate actual, quantifiable harm. It completely failed to do so.

The FTC’s complaint charged Qualcomm with using anticompetitive tactics to maintain its alleged monopoly position as a supplier of certain baseband processors (chips that manage cellular communications in mobile products). Specifically, the FTC alleged that Qualcomm engaged in “exclusionary conduct” through a “no license, no chips” policy in which it supplied CDMA[1] and Premium LTE chips[2] only on the condition that cell phone manufacturers agreed to Qualcomm’s license terms. The FTC claimed that Qualcomm’s conduct reduced competitors’ ability and incentive to innovate and raised prices paid by consumers for cellular devices.

In support of this position, the FTC offered Carl Shapiro, an Economics Professor from Berkeley, as an expert witness. Shapiro argued that Qualcomm’s “no license, no chips” policy gave it the market power to demand “supra-FRAND”[3] royalties. He claimed these royalties harmed competition by raising rivals’ costs, weakening them as competitors, and deterring them from doing R&D. Shapiro asserted that Qualcomm had monopoly power over CDMA and Premium LTE markets through 2016.

There are (at least) two glaring errors regarding the FTC’s and Shapiro’s arguments. First, the relevant market definitions for “CDMA” and “Premium LTE” chips are fatally flawed. Regarding CDMA, the FTC defined the relevant market solely as CDMA chips, yet the market includes both CDMA and WCDMA[4] chips, with WCDMA selling 5x more chips than CDMA. Regarding Premium LTE, there is no “premium” chip market separate from other mobile chips. What the FTC and Shapiro define as “premium” actually represents the end-result of a normal product evolution where newer, more innovative chips are incorporated first into higher-end devices. And even if one considers only Premium LTE chips, Qualcomm had a first-mover advantage because it invented the technology. A first-mover advantage is not an antitrust violation. The result of both flawed market definitions is an economic theoretical shell-game to divert attention from the fact that there is simply no evidence of harm to the properly defined actual market.[5]

And this leads to the second and even more critical point: the FTC presented no real-world evidence of harm to competitors or consumers from Qualcomm’s alleged exclusionary conduct. If R&D had been deterred by Qualcomm’s licensing practices, as Shapiro argued, he should have been able to identify at least one actual example.[6] Under his theory, the lack of ongoing R&D and harm to competitors should have resulted in an increasing number of inferior cell phones provided by a decreasing number of companies. To the contrary, more and more competitors have been entering the chip market with more and more innovations as cellular technology has advanced from 3G to 4G. Cell phone quality has dramatically increased over time, without concomitant quality-adjusted price increases.[7]

Notwithstanding the flawed market definition and lack of harm, the FTC has misconstrued the underlying basis for Qualcomm’s “no license, no chips” licensing policy, teeing it up as objectively anticompetitive and onerous. Yet, Qualcomm’s policy simply seeks to prevent “patent holdout” as a legitimate business strategy. Without this policy, device manufacturers could build phones using Qualcomm’s chips, then simply refuse to pay Qualcomm for its telecommunications patents. Qualcomm’s only recourse would be to sue for patent infringement, while the device manufacturers continue to profit from use of the chips. The “no-license, no chips” policy ensures that device manufacturers negotiate necessary patent licenses before receiving chips to build phones.

Assistant Attorney General for the Department of Justice, Makan Delrahim, has stated that condemning this kind of licensing practice, in isolation, as an antitrust violation, while ignoring equal incentives for patent holdout, “risks creating ‘false positive’ errors of over-enforcement that would discourage valuable innovation.” (Delrahim also recently criticized the FTC’s entire case saying that disputes about patent licensing should not be decided by antitrust law.)

The FTC, its experts, and its industry witnesses, however, are basically advocating for patent holdout as a legally legitimate, even preferable, strategy for dealing with patent owners like Qualcomm. Professor Shapiro’s model, in particular, advanced patent holdout in lieu of up-front patent licensing. Shapiro would require a patent owner to wait and then sue for infringement as a prerequisite to any license negotiations. But forcing the patent owner to pursue judicial recourse through a time-consuming and costly patent infringement suit leverages the cost of litigation to artificially decrease the ultimate reward to the patentee.

At the close of this case, one is left wondering why. Why did the FTC pursue a “midnight” filing at the tail end of the Obama Administration, just days before President Trump took office? Why did the FTC pursue the case over Commissioner Ohlhausen’s strong dissent in which she argued that the case was based on a flawed legal theory “that lacks economic and evidentiary support” and that “by its mere issuance, will undermine U.S. intellectual property rights in Asia and worldwide”? And finally, why is the FTC attempting to cripple Qualcomm in the developing 5G technological space in favor of China’s Huawei[8], which will result in actual, quantifiable harm to the U.S.’s competitive advantage over China?


[1] CDMA, which stands for “code-division multiple access,” permits several transmitters to send information over a single communication channel and is a second generation (2G) network used in mobile device.

[2] LTE, which stands for “long term evolution,” is a fourth generation (4G) standard for high-speed wireless communication used in mobile devices.

[3] FRAND stands for “fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory.”

[4] WCDMA stands for “wide band code division multiple access.” It is a third generation (3G) network used in mobile devices.

[5] This is the same game the FTC played in the 1990s with Microsoft where the FTC defined the relevant market as operating systems for IBM compatible PCs, but that argument only worked if one excluded Apple, Linux, and other operating systems. These type of games about defining the relevant market are common in the high-tech context, and the FTC is repeating it here.

[7] “Several empirical studies demonstrate that the observed pattern in high-tech industries, especially in the smartphone industry, is one of constant lower quality-adjusted prices, increased entry and competition, and higher performance standards.” See: https://cip2.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/31/2018/02/Letter-to-DOJ-Supporting-Evidence-Based-Approach-to-Antitrust-Enforcement-of-IP.pdf.

[8] One also wonders why the FTC relied so heavily on Huawei’s testimony in this case given the Trump Administration’s repeated concerns about this company culminating in the Department of Justice’s recent 10-count indictment against Huawei for theft of trade secrets, wire fraud, and obstruction of justice.

Categories
Innovation Patent Licensing

IP for the Next Generation of Mobile Technology: How IEEE’s Policy Changes Have Created Uncertainty for Innovators

In advance of our Sixth Annual Fall Conference on IP for the Next Generation of Technology, we are highlighting works on the challenges brought by the revolutionary developments in mobile technology of the past fifteen years.

hand holding a phone with holographs hovering over the screenEarlier this year, CPIP’s Adam Mossoff and Kevin Madigan detailed an in-depth empirical study on the troubling repercussions of policy changes at the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers-Standards Association (IEEE).

In a rigorous study tracking the activity of creators and owners of technologies incorporated into standards by the IEEE, Kirti Gupta and Georgios Effraimidis show how policy shifts at the IEEE have required patent owners to effectively relinquish their legal right to stop the deliberate and unauthorized uses of their property. Unfortunately, as Gupta and Effraimidis explain, the current unbalanced nature of standard setting at the IEEE is resulting in inefficient licensing negotiations and delayed standards development, and it’s threatening the development of new and innovative consumer products at a crucial time for mobile technologies.

The full Gupta & Effraimidis study is available here, and the synopsis by Adam Mossoff and Kevin Madigan can be found here.

Categories
Antitrust Innovation

Letter to Antitrust Chief Applauds DOJ’s New Evidence-Based Approach to IP Enforcement

hand under a lightbulb drawn on a chalkboardA group of judges, former judges and government officials, law professors and economists with expertise in antitrust law and patent law sent a letter to Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim earlier today applauding his recent announcements that the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) would now take a balanced, evidence-based approach in applying antitrust law to patent licensing, especially to patented innovations that have been contributed to technological standards.

Signatories to the letter include Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg of the D.C. Circuit, former Chief Judge Paul Michel of the Federal Circuit, former FTC Commissioner Joshua D. Wright, and former Director of the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office David Kappos, among others.

A few weeks after his confirmation this past September, AAG Delrahim delivered remarks at a conference held at the USC Gould School of Law in Los Angeles, California. The comments signaled a major shift in intellectual property (IP) policy for the Antitrust Division from the policies pursued by the previous Obama Administration. Indeed, AAG Delrahim pointed out that he is the first head of the Antitrust Division to be a registered patent attorney, and his plans for protecting free market competition in the IP licensing realm reflected a robust understanding of what drives our innovation economy.

AAG Delrahim indicated that antitrust enforcers had “strayed too far” in protecting the interests of implementers of patented technology at the expense of innovators who create the technology in the first place. Such “misapplication of the antitrust laws,” he said, “could undermine the process of dynamic innovation itself.” In particular, AAG Delrahim stated that the recent focus on the “so-called ‘hold-up’ problem,” where innovators threaten to withhold licenses to implementers, fails to recognize the “more serious risk” of the “hold-out problem,” where implementers threaten to use the technology without taking licenses from innovators. AAG Delrahim explained that the “one-sided focus on the hold-up issue” posed a “serious threat to the innovative process.”

Last month, a group of industry representatives sent a letter to AAG Delrahim expressing concerns over the Antitrust Division’s new approach to IP licensing. The letter claimed that “patent hold-up is real, well documented, and harming US industry and consumers,” and it argued that the hold-out problem did not raise similar competition law issues. Remarkably, the industry representatives did not offer one citation to back up their broad claims about the supposed harm from “patent hold-up” or lack of harm from patent hold-out. Given the data connecting stable and effective patent rights and economic growth, the burden should be on the advocates for the “patent hold-up” theory to produce at least some evidence to support their position. Thankfully, AAG Delrahim made clear that he will let the evidence be his guide.

To that end, the letter submitted today by judges, government officials, legal academics, and economists points out the glaring omissions in the letter by the industry representatives: The claims about “patent hold-up” are merely theoretical, and they are “inconsistent with actual market data.” Moreover, today’s letter notes that the implications of the “patent hold-up” theory are testable, and that the empirical studies to date have failed to show that innovators are harming consumers or inhibiting innovation. To bolster its claims, the letter includes an appendix of rigorous empirical studies that directly contradict the “patent hold-up” theory proffered by the industry representatives.

Read the letter below or download it here: Letter to AAG Delrahim

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February 13, 2018

Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim
Department of Justice Antitrust Division
950 Pennsylvania Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20530-0001

Dear Assistant Attorney General Delrahim,

As judges, former judges and government officials, legal academics and economists who are experts in antitrust and intellectual property law, we write to express our support for your recent announcement that the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice will adopt an evidence-based approach in applying antitrust law equally to both innovators who develop and implementers who use technological standards in the innovation industries.

We disagree with the letter recently submitted to you on January 24, 2018 by other parties who expressed their misgivings with your announcement of your plan to return to this sound antitrust policy. Unfortunately, their January 24 letter perpetuates the long-standing misunderstanding held by some academics, policy activists, and companies, who baldly assert that one-sided “patent holdup” is a real-world problem in the high-tech industries. This claim rests entirely on questionable models that predict that opportunistic behavior in patent licensing transactions will result in higher consumer prices. These predictions are inconsistent with actual market data in any high-tech industry.

It bears emphasizing that no empirical study has demonstrated that a patent-owner’s request for injunctive relief after a finding of a defendant’s infringement of its property rights has ever resulted either in consumer harm or in slowing down the pace of technological innovation. Given the well understood role that innovation plays in facilitating economic growth and well-being, a heavy burden of proof rests on those who insist on the centrality of “patent holdup” to offer some tangible support for that view, which they have ultimately failed to supply in the decade or more since that theory was first propounded. Given the contrary conclusions in economic studies of the past decade, there is no sound empirical basis for claims of a systematic problem of opportunistic “patent holdup” by owners of patents on technological standards.

Several empirical studies demonstrate that the observed pattern in high-tech industries, especially in the smartphone industry, is one of constant lower quality-adjusted prices, increased entry and competition, and higher performance standards. These robust findings all contradict the testable implications of “patent holdup” theory. The best explanation for this disconnect between the flawed “patent holdup” theory and overwhelming weight of the evidence lies in the institutional features that surround industry licensing practices. These practices include bilateral licensing negotiations, and the reputation effects in long-term standards activities. Both support a feed-back mechanism that creates a system of natural checks and balances in the setting of royalty rates. The simplistic models of “patent holdup” ignore all these moderating effects.

Of even greater concern are the likely negative social welfare consequences of prior antitrust policies implemented based upon nothing more than the purely theoretical concern about opportunistic “patent holdup” behavior by owners of patented innovations incorporated into technological standards. For example, those policies have resulted in demands to set royalty rates for technologies incorporated into standards in the smartphone industry according to particular components in a smartphone. This was a change to the longstanding industry practice of licensing at the end-user device level, which recognized that fundamental technologies incorporated into the cellular standards like 2G, 3G, etc., optimize the entire wireless system and network, and not just the specific chip or component of a chip inside a device.

In support, we attach an Appendix of articles identifying the numerous substantive and methodological flaws in the “patent holdup” models. We also point to rigorous empirical studies that all directly contradict the predictions of the “patent holdup” theory.

For these reasons, we welcome your announcement of a much-needed return to evidence-based policy making by antitrust authorities concerning the licensing and enforcement of patented innovations that have been committed to a technological standard. This sound program ensures balanced protection of all innovators, implementers, and consumers. We are confident that consistent application of this program will lead to a vibrant, dynamic smartphone market that depends on a complex web of standard essential patents which will continue to benefit everyone throughout the world.

Sincerely,

Jonathan Barnett
Professor of Law
USC Gould School of Law

Ronald A. Cass
Dean Emeritus,
Boston University School of Law
Former Vice-Chairman and Commissioner,
United States International Trade Commission

Richard A. Epstein
Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law,
New York University School of Law
James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law Emeritus,
University of Chicago Law School

The Honorable Douglas H. Ginsburg
Senior Circuit Judge,
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and
Professor of Law,
Antonin Scalia Law School
George Mason University

Justin (Gus) Hurwitz
Assistant Professor of Law
University of Nebraska College of Law

David J. Kappos
Former Under Secretary of Commerce and Director
United States Patent & Trademark Office

The Honorable Paul Michel
Chief Judge (Ret.),
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Damon C. Matteo
Course Professor,
Graduate School of Economics and Management
Tsinghua University in Beijing
Chief Executive Officer,
Fulcrum Strategy

Adam Mossoff
Professor of Law
Antonin Scalia Law School
George Mason University

Kristen Osenga
Professor of Law
University of Richmond School of Law

David J. Teece
Thomas W. Tusher Professor in Global Business
Haas School of Business
University of California at Berkeley

Joshua D. Wright
University Professor,
Antonin Scalia Law School
George Mason University
Former Commissioner,
Federal Trade Commission

 

Appendix

 

Richard A. Epstein & Kayvan Noroozi, Why Incentives for Patent Hold Out Threaten to Dismantle FRAND and Why It Matters, Berkeley Tech. L. Rev. (forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2913105

Anne Layne-Farrar, Why Patent Holdout is Not Just a Fancy Name for Plain Old Patent Infringement, CPI North American Column (Feb. 2016), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/North-America-Column-February-Full.pdf

Anne Layne-Farrar, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Theory and Evidence: Where Do We Stand After 15 Years of History?, OECD Intellectual Property and Standard Setting (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/WD%282014%2984&doclanguage=en

Alexander Galetovic & Stephen Haber, The Fallacies of Patent Holdup Theory, 13 J. Comp. L. & Econ., 1 (2017), https://academic.oup.com/jcle/article/13/1/1/3060409

Alexander Galetovic, Stephen Haber, & Lew Zaretzki, An Estimate of the Average Cumulative Royalty Yield in the World Mobile Phone Industry: Theory, Measurement and Results (Feb. 7, 2018), https://hooverip2.org/working-paper/wp18005

Alexander Galetovic, Stephen Haber, & Ross Levine, An Empirical Examination of Patent Hold-Up (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21090, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21090.pdf

Douglas H. Ginsburg, Koren W. Wong-Ervin, & Joshua Wright, The Troubling Use of Antitrust to Regulate FRAND Licensing, CPI Antitrust Chronicle (Oct. 2015), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/Uploads/GinsburgetalOct-151.pdf

Douglas H. Ginsburg, Taylor M. Ownings, & Joshua D. Wright, Enjoining Injunctions: The Case Against Antitrust Liability for Standard Essential Patent Holders Who Seek Injunctions, The Antitrust Source (Oct. 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2515949

Gerard Llobet & Jorge Padilla, The Optimal Scope of the Royalty Base in Patent Licensing, 59 J. L. & Econ. 45 (2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2417216

Keith Mallinson, Theories of Harm with SEP Licensing Do Not Stack Up, IP Fin. Blog (May 24, 2013), http://www.ip.finance/2013/05/theories-of-harm-with-sep-licensing-do.html

Jorge Padilla & Koren W. Wong-Ervin, Portfolio Licensing to Makers of Downstream End-User Devices: Analyzing Refusals to License FRAND-Assured Standard-Essential Patents at the Component Level, 62 The Antitrust Bulletin 494 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X17719762

Jonathan D. Putnam & Tim A. Williams, The Smallest Salable Patent-Practicing Unit (SSPPU): Theory and Evidence (Sept. 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2835617

Gregory Sidak, The Antitrust Division’s Devaluation of Standard-Essential Patents, 104 Geo. L.J. Online 48 (2015), https://georgetownlawjournal.org/articles/161/antitrust-division-s-devaluation-of/pdf

Joanna Tsai & Joshua D. Wright, Standard Setting, Intellectual Property Rights, and the Role of Antitrust in Regulating Incomplete Contracts, 80 Antitrust L.J. 157 (2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2467939

Joshua D. Wright, SSOs, FRAND, and Antitrust: Lessons from the Economics of Incomplete Contracts, 21 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 791 (2014), http://www.georgemasonlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Wright-Website-Version.pdf