Tag: Second Circuit

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Copyright Copyright Licensing

SONA and Songwriters Fight DOJ’s Misguided 100% Licensing Rule

Things are heating up in the lawsuit filed by Songwriters of North America and three of its members (SONA) challenging the new gloss of the Department of Justice (DOJ) on the 75-year-old consent decrees that govern the licensing practices of ASCAP and BMI, the two largest performance rights organizations (PROs). SONA sued the DOJ on September 13, 2016, questioning the DOJ’s reinterpretation of the consent decrees to require the PROs to license all of the works in their repertories on a 100% basis. As reported by Billboard yesterday, CPIP Senior Scholar & Director, Copyright Research and Policy Sandra Aistars is assisting SONA’s legal team at Gerard Fox Law PC in the litigation.

After completing a two-year review of the ASCAP and BMI consent decrees, the DOJ issued a statement on August 4, 2016, concluding that the decrees require the two PROs to offer only “full-work licenses.” On this view, the PROs would not be able to continue licensing the fractional interests in the musical compositions owned by the songwriters they represent. As the U.S. Copyright Office noted in early-2016, such fractional licensing is a “longstanding practice of the music industry.” Nevertheless, the DOJ claimed that the change “should not meaningfully disrupt the status quo in the licensing of public performance rights.”

This assertion was immediately challenged by the PROs. ASCAP President Paul Williams issued a statement that same day vowing to work with BMI “to overturn the DOJ’s decision” in both Congress and the courts. BMI filed a letter with District Judge Louis L. Stanton, who oversees BMI’s consent decree, announcing its intention to seek a declaration that the decree “does not require 100% licensing.” Six weeks later, Judge Stanton issued an opinion declaring that BMI’s consent decree “neither bars fractional licensing nor requires full-work licensing.” The victory was celebrated as a win for songwriters, and both ASCAP and BMI issued statements praising the decision. The DOJ has since appealed the issue to the Second Circuit.

In its complaint filed in the District of Columbia, SONA argues that the DOJ’s 100% licensing rule violates songwriters’ due process rights, both substantive and procedural, under the Fifth Amendment as well as the Administrative Procedures Act. Calling the DOJ’s rule “a dramatic departure from the status quo,” SONA points out that it will “limit and undermine the creative and economic activities” of songwriters by forcing them to “undertake the burdensome and potentially costly process of revisiting and amending their core business practices, private contracts, and collaborative relationships” in order to comply.

Arguing that the case should be dismissed, the DOJ challenges the standing of SONA to even invoke the court’s jurisdiction. The DOJ claims that any harm caused by the consent decrees is too speculative and remote to create an actual case or controversy, and it suggests that no songwriters have been deprived of any protected liberty or property interest under the Due Process Clause. In its opposition brief filed this past Tuesday, SONA strongly opposes that contention:

[P]laintiffs have alleged and will prove at trial that [the DOJ’s] new rule has caused immediate injuries and will cause imminent injuries to each plaintiff, thus establishing standing. Plaintiffs have also pleaded facts sufficient to show that the government’s action is interfering with their freedom to contract, freedom of association, and freedom of speech, and that the government has taken their valuable intellectual-property rights without compensation, thus violating plaintiffs’ substantive and procedural due-process rights.

Admonishing the DOJ’s “casual disregard for the welfare and livelihoods of America’s songwriters,” SONA points out that, under the DOJ’s new rule, songwriters will:

  • Be deprived of the ability to choose the PRO that will license their shares of coauthored works;
  • Be required to withdraw works from representation by ASCAP or BMI;
  • Have songs that they must license outside of the PRO system;
  • Need to cede administrative control over their copyrights, including the right to collect royalties, to unaffiliated third parties;
  • Be compelled to renegotiate existing contractual relationships on a song-by-song basis;
  • Be forced to consider whether they should decline to collaborate with creators who are not members of the same PRO; and
  • Have reason to consider withdrawing from ASCAP or BMI altogether.

    • Now that President Trump is in office, there is new leadership at the DOJ. Jeff Sessions was sworn in as the U.S. Attorney General earlier today, and Brent Snyder took over as acting director of the DOJ’s Antitrust Division less than three weeks ago. Just last week, the DOJ asked the Second Circuit for an extra 90 days to file its opening brief in its appeal of Judge Stanton’s ruling that the BMI consent decree does not require 100% licensing. According to the DOJ, the “requested extension is necessary to allow new leadership in the Department of Justice adequate time to familiarize themselves with the issues.” Perhaps there is hope that the DOJ will discontinue its misguided push for a 100% licensing rule that will inevitably threaten the livelihoods of songwriters.

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    Copyright Uncategorized

    Second Circuit Brings Some Sanity Back to Transformative Fair Use

    the word "inspiration" typed on a typewriterThe Second Circuit handed down an opinion in TCA Television v. McCollum earlier this week holding that a play’s inclusion of Abbott and Costello’s famous “Who’s on First?” routine was not transformative fair use. Given how expansive transformativeness has become lately, especially in the Second Circuit, the opinion is somewhat surprising. What’s more, it’s not clear that the appellate court even needed to reach the fair use issue since it held for the defendants on the alternate ground of lack of ownership. If anything, it appears that this particular panel of judges went out of its way to push back on—and bring some much-needed sanity to—transformative fair use doctrine in the Second Circuit.

    The play at issue, “Hand to God,” features an introverted boy named Jason who communicates through his alter ego sock puppet named Tyrone. In order to impress a girl, Jason and Tyrone perform over one minute of the “Who’s on First?” routine, with Jason as Abbott and Tyrone as Costello. The plaintiffs, including Abbott and Costello’s heirs, sent the defendants, producers and author of the play, a cease and desist letter. When the defendants refused to remove the scene from the play, the plaintiffs sued for copyright infringement. On the first fair use factor, which looks at the “purpose and character of the use,” the district court held that Jason/Tyrone’s almost-verbatim recitation of the heart of the “Who’s on First?” routine was “highly transformative”—so transformative that it was “determinative” of fair use.

    The standard for transformativeness, which comes from the Supreme Court’s opinion in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, looks at “whether the new work merely ‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original creation” or whether it “instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message[.]” The district court held that “Hand to God” used “Who’s on First?” for a different—and thus transformative—purpose, namely, to proffer a “darkly comedic critique of the social norms governing a small town in the Bible Belt.” While Abbott and Costello’s routine was standard vaudevillian fare, the district court reasoned that the play used it for a more dramatic purpose.

    The Second Circuit rejected the district court’s conclusion, pointing out that “the critical inquiry is whether the new work uses the copyrighted material itself for a purpose, or imbues it with a character, different from that for which it was created.” In other words, it’s not enough for “Hand to God” to have a different purpose than “Who’s on First?” The issue is whether “Hand to God” used “Who’s on First?” for a different purpose than Abbott and Costello used the routine. The Second Circuit held that it did not: “The Play may convey a dark critique of society, but it does not transform Abbott and Costello’s Routine so that it conveys that message.”

    The disagreement between the district court and the Second Circuit is subtle, yet important. The lower court determined that having Jason/Tyrone recite the “Who’s on First?” routine was transformative because it gave the audience a glimpse into Jason’s psyche. Whereas Jason is seemingly kind and soft-spoken on the surface, it becomes clear through his sock puppet persona Tyrone that there’s much murkiness beneath. And to the extent that Jason/Tyrone’s recitation of “Who’s on First?” is comedic, the district court thought that the “audience laughs at Jason’s lies, not, as the Plaintiffs claim, simply the words of the Routine itself.”

    By contrast, the Second Circuit held that this “reasoning is flawed in that what it identifies are the general artistic and critical purpose and character of the Play.” Moreover, the district court failed to identify how the “defendants’ extensive copying of a famous comedy routine was necessary to this purpose, much less how the character of the Routine was transformed by defendants’ use.” The Second Circuit’s approach here recognizes that fair use is premised upon necessity, that is, there needs to be a justification for copying the specific original work. In this case, the point of having Jason/Tyrone recite “Who’s on First?” was to demonstrate that Jason was lying when he later claimed to have written it. But that could have been accomplished by using any recognizable work.

    As the Second Circuit noted, “the particular subject of the lie—the Routine—appears irrelevant to that purpose.” And as such, the defendants’ use of “Who’s on First?” had “no bearing on the original work” and lacked the required “justification to qualify for a fair use defense.” This reasoning sounds very close to requiring the copyist to comment upon the original, a principle that, for better or worse, was rejected by the Second Circuit in Cariou v. Prince. Indeed, the appellate panel here mentioned Cariou, noting that, “although commentary frequently constitutes fair use, it is not essential that a new creative work comment on an incorporated copyrighted work to be transformative.” Nevertheless, the Second Circuit easily distinguished Cariou since there the artist at least changed the original work.

    The Second Circuit’s opinion is a refreshing reminder that, despite what some would prefer, not everything arguably-transformative is transformative fair use. If the defendants wanted to use a copyrighted work within the play, the proper course would have been to negotiate a license or to not use the work at all. And given the way “Who’s on First?” was used within the play, there was certainly no shortage of alternatives that could have sufficed. It’s also nice to see that some judges in the Second Circuit are skeptical of cases like Cariou, which the panel here referred to as “the high-water mark of our court’s recognition of transformative works.” The panel also rightfully noted that an overly-expansive view of transformativeness threatens a copyright owner’s exclusive right to prepare derivative works. And the fact that this push-back is coming from within the Second Circuit makes it all the more interesting.

    Categories
    Copyright Infringement Internet Uncategorized

    Second Circuit Deepens Red Flag Knowledge Circuit Split in Vimeo

    a gavel lying on a table in front of booksThe Second Circuit’s recent opinion in Capitol Records v. Vimeo is, to put it mildly, pretty bad. From its convoluted reasoning that copyrights under state law for pre-1972 sound recordings are limited by the DMCA safe harbors, despite the explicit statement in Section 301(c) that “rights or remedies” under state law “shall not be annulled or limited” by the Copyright Act, to its gutting of red flag knowledge by limiting it to the nearly-impossible situation where a service provider actually knows that a specific use of an entire copyrighted work is neither fair nor licensed yet somehow doesn’t also surmise that it’s infringing, it’s hard to see how either result is compelled by the statutes, much less how it was intended by Congress. On the latter point, the Second Circuit in essence has written red flag knowledge out of the statute, reducing the DMCA to a mere notice-and-takedown regime. The reality is that Congress expected red flag knowledge to do far more work, incentivizing service providers to take action in the face of a red flag—even without a notice.

    If there’s any good to come from Vimeo, it might only be that the Second Circuit has now deepened the circuit split with the Ninth Circuit in Columbia Pictures v. Fung on two issues related to red flag knowledge. Under the statute, red flag knowledge exists when a service provider is “aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.” The two circuits are already split on the issue of whether red flag knowledge must pertain to the particular works that are being sued over in the suit. And now with Vimeo, the circuits are split on the issue of whether a service provider can gain red flag knowledge just by looking at an infringing work. The deeper the circuit split, the greater the chance an appeal will make it to the Supreme Court, which would hopefully clean up the current red flag knowledge mess.

    In Fung, the defendant, Gary Fung, operated several piracy havens, including isoHunt, TorrentBox, Podtropolis, and eDonkey. The district court found Fung liable for inducement under MGM v. Grokster and denied him safe harbor protection under the DMCA. The district court’s decision came in 2009, two years before the Ninth Circuit first held in UMG v. Shelter Capital that red flag knowledge requires “specific knowledge of particular infringing activity.” It also came two-and-a-half years before the Second Circuit held in Viacom v. YouTube that red flag knowledge is only relevant if it pertains to the works-in-suit. Regardless, since the vast majority of content available on Fung’s sites was copyrighted, including specific content that he himself had downloaded, the district court held that Fung hadn’t even raised a triable issue of fact as to whether he had red flag knowledge. The fact that none of the works he had been sued over were the same as the ones he had been found to have red flag knowledge of was irrelevant.

    On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that Fung had red flag knowledge as a matter of law. The opinion came out just one week after the same panel of judges issued a superseding opinion in UMG v. Shelter Capital reiterating that red flag knowledge requires “specific knowledge of particular infringing activity.” Importantly, in applying that standard to Fung, the Ninth Circuit did not say that the specific knowledge had to be of the particular works-in-suit. For whatever reason, Fung had failed to argue otherwise. Google even filed an amicus brief supporting the plaintiffs but nonetheless arguing that “the DMCA’s knowledge standards are specific and focus on the particular material that the plaintiff is suing about.” Apparently unaware that this actually helped his case, Fung filed a supplemental brief calling Google’s argument “fallacious.”

    In the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, even though red flag knowledge had to relate to particular infringing activity, that activity did not have to involve the particular works-in-suit. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit held that the “material in question was sufficiently current and well-known that it would have been objectively obvious to a reasonable person” that it was “both copyrighted and not licensed to random members of the public.” Since Fung failed to expeditiously remove the particular material of which he had red flag knowledge, he lost his safe harbor protection across the board. Thus, the Ninth Circuit in Fung held that: (1) red flag knowledge that strips a service provider of its entire safe harbor protection does not have to pertain to the particular works-in-suit, and (2) material can be so “current and well-known” that its infringing nature would be “objectively obvious to a reasonable person.”

    The Second Circuit in Vimeo parted ways with the Ninth Circuit on these two holdings. Since the “evidence was not shown to relate to any of the videos at issue in this suit,” the Second Circuit held that it was “insufficient to justify a finding of red flag knowledge . . . as to those specific videos.” The Second Circuit thus applied the red flag knowledge standard on a work-by-work basis, in direct contrast to the Ninth Circuit in Fung. Also, the Second Circuit held that “the mere fact that a video contains all or substantially all of a piece of recognizable, or even famous, copyrighted music” and was “viewed in its entirety” by an “employee of a service provider” was not enough “to sustain the copyright owner’s burden of showing red flag knowledge.” The court added that even “an employee who was a copyright expert cannot be expected to know when use of a copyrighted song has been licensed.” So while the Ninth Circuit said it would have been objectively obvious to Fung that particular works were infringing, the Second Circuit in Vimeo set the bar far higher.

    Curiously, the Second Circuit in Vimeo didn’t even mention Fung, despite the fact that it was deepening the circuit split with the Ninth Circuit. One wonders whether the omission was intentional. Either way, the circuit split has only gotten deeper. While in the Ninth Circuit an infringement can be so obvious that a court can find that a service provider had red flag knowledge without even sending it to a jury, the Second Circuit says that courts can’t let a jury decide whether a service provider had red flag knowledge even with the most obvious of infringements. And while in the Ninth Circuit a service provider loses its entire safe harbor for failing to remove an obvious infringement that it hasn’t been sued over, the Second Circuit says that red flag knowledge has to be determined on a work-by-work basis for only the works-in-suit. Given this growing divide between the Second and Ninth Circuits, it seems like only a matter of time before the Supreme Court will weigh in on the red flag knowledge standard. And if the Court does finally weigh in, one hopes it will put common sense back into the DMCA.

    Categories
    Copyright Infringement Internet Uncategorized

    Capitol Records v. Vimeo: Courts Should Stop Coddling Bad Actors in Copyright Cases

    Here’s a brief excerpt of my new post that was published on IPWatchdog:

    Here’s where we are after Capitol Records v. Vimeo: A service provider can encourage its users to infringe on a massive scale, and so long as the infringement it encourages isn’t the specific infringement it gets sued for, it wins on the safe harbor defense at summary judgment. This is so even if there’s copious evidence that its employees viewed and interacted with the specific infringing material at issue. No jury will ever get to weigh all of the evidence and decide whether the infringement is obvious. At the same time, any proactive steps taken by the service provider will potentially open it up to liability for having actual knowledge, so the incentive is to do as little as possible to proactively “detect and deal” with piracy. This is not at all what Congress intended. It lets bad faith service providers trample the rights of copyright owners with impunity.

    To read the rest of this post, please visit IPWatchdog.