Tag: Section 512

House Judiciary Committee Hearing Reacts to Copyright Office Report on Efficacy of Section 512

Post author By Joshua Grove
Post date October 28, 2020

The following post comes from Liz Velander, a recent graduate of Scalia Law and a Research Assistant at CPIP.

U.S. Capitol building By Liz Velander

In late September, the House Judiciary Committee held a hearing entitled Copyright and the Internet in 2020: Reactions to the Copyright Office’s Report on the Efficacy of 17 U.S.C. 512 After Two Decades. As Chairman Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) explained, the hearing sought “perspectives on whether Section 512 is working efficiently and effectively for this new internet landscape.” The hearing was guided by the U.S. Copyright Office’s Section 512 Report, released in May, which concluded that the operation of the Section 512 safe harbor system disfavors copyright owners—contrary to “Congress’ original intended balance.”

The witnesses included: Jeffrey Sedlik, President & CEO, PLUS Coalition; Meredith Rose, Senior Policy Counsel, Public Knowledge; Morgan Grace Kibby, Singer and Songwriter; Jonathan Band, Counsel, Library Copyright Alliance; Matthew Schruers, President, Computer & Communications Industry Association; and Terrica Carrington, Vice President, Legal Policy and Copyright Counsel, Copyright Alliance.

Enacted in 1998 as part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Section 512 establishes a system for copyright owners and online service providers (OSPs) to address online infringement, including a “safe harbor” that limits liability for compliant OSPs. To qualify for safe harbor protection, an OSP must fulfill certain requirements, generally consisting of implementing measures to expeditiously address online copyright infringement. Congress sought to create a balance between two goals in enacting Section 512: (1) providing important legal certainty for OSPs so that the internet ecosystem can flourish without the threat of the potentially devastating economic impact of liability for copyright infringement as a result of user activity, and (2) protecting the legitimate interests of authors and other rights owners against the threat of rampant, low-barrier online infringement.

The Copyright Office’s Report determined that the balance Congress originally sought is now “askew.” It found that “despite the advances in legitimate content options and delivery systems, and despite the millions of takedown notices submitted on a daily basis, the scale of online copyright infringement and the lack of effectiveness of Section 512 notices to address that situation, remain significant problems.” The Report did not recommend any wholesale changes to Section 512, but instead identified certain areas that Congress could fine-tune in order to better balance the rights and responsibilities of OSPs and copyright owners. These include eligibility qualifications for the service provider safe harbors, repeat infringer policies, knowledge requirement standards, specificity within takedown notices, non-standard notice requirements, subpoenas, and injunctions.

At the hearing, the six witnesses reacted to the Copyright Office’s Report in dramatically different fashions. Representatives of OSPs disagreed with the Report’s conclusions, testifying that Section 512 is working as Congress intended. Mr. Band from the Library Copyright Alliance referred to Section 512 as a “shining example of enlightened legislation for the public good” that is responsible for the “golden age of content creation and distribution.” Mr. Schruers from the Computer & Communications Industry Association criticized the Report for inadequately reflecting the interests of users and “conspicuously” overlooking the problem of Section 512 misuse. Ms. Rose from Public Knowledge stated “the Office’s analysis performed a familiar sleight-of-hand by presenting user interests as coextensive with those of platforms, effectively erasing free speech concerns from its analysis.”

Representatives of content creators painted an entirely different picture of Section 512’s efficacy. They applauded the Copyright Office for calling attention to areas of imbalance related to Section 512 and to how overly expansive or narrow interpretations of the statute have aided in skewing the balance Congress intended. Mr. Sedlik, a photographer with over 35 years of professional experience and President & CEO of the PLUS Coalition, described how service providers take advantage of his and others’ copyrighted works while hiding behind Section 512’s safe harbors. He explained that, like many other copyright owners, he must spend an exorbitant amount of time searching for infringing materials online and sending takedown notices instead of creating new works.

Ms. Kibby, a singer and songwriter, testified that Section 512 is “undermining creativity, and more alarmingly, quietly undercutting our next generation of artists. It is jeopardizing livelihoods for working class musicians, obliterating healthy monetary velocity in our creative community. It is rewarding unscrupulous services that deal in the unauthorized trade and use of our works. It is fundamentally sabotaging the legitimate online marketplace that we all rely on and that Congress envisioned.” Responding to the argument that notice-and-takedown results in censorship of user-generated content, Ms. Kibby said that Section 512’s “stripping creators of their fundamental rights, their livelihood, and ultimately their creative contributions is the real censorship.”

Ms. Carrington from the Copyright Alliance identified three main problems with Section 512: (1) the ineffective notice-and-takedown process, (2) the effective elimination of the red flag knowledge standard, and (3) ineffective repeat infringer policies. She recommended adjusting the statute to clarify the difference between actual and red flag knowledge, enacting the Copyright Alternative in Small-Claims Enforcement (CASE) Act, and transparently developing effective standard technical measures (STMs).

Members of the Committee recognized the need for reform. Chairman Nadler remarked that the sheer volume of takedown notices being sent does not seem like the hallmark of a system functioning as intended. Some Members first spoke about the importance of copyright law before questioning the panelists. For example, Representative Hank Johnson (D-GA) said “it’s crucial that these creators are able to rely on copyright law protections to make their living. This is even more true in an age where the click of a button can plagiarize a lifetime of work.”

It was heartening to hear the Representatives’ positive response to the concerns of small, individual creators whose livelihoods depend on the commercial viability of their works. It was clear that the Committee is seriously considering the recommendations in the Copyright Office Report and looking for a way to rebalance Section 512 so that it respects what Congress originally intended—a system that respects the rights of authors and artists who face widespread infringement of their rights in the online environment.

Tags copyright, Copyright Office, Liz Velander, notice and takedown, Section 512, standard technical measures, STM, Terrica Carrington, U.S. Copyright Office

Copyright Notebook: The Importance of Artists’ Agency

Post author By Joshua Grove
Post date September 9, 2020

the word "copyright" typed on a typewriter I am looking forward to hosting a keynote conversation with Grammy-winning composer, performer, songwriter, best-selling author, and essayist Rosanne Cash this week at CPIP’s The Evolving Music Ecosystem conference. One part of Rosanne Cash’s “music ecosystem” is the Artist Rights Alliance (ARA), where she serves as a member of the board. Preparing for that conversation, I am thinking a lot about the importance of artists’ agency. Over the summer, the ARA “rebooted,” relaunching itself with a powerhouse music council of artists and experts. The ARA is “an alliance of working musicians, performers, and songwriters fighting for a healthy creative economy and fair treatment for all creators in the digital world. [They] work to defend and protect artists, guided by [their] Artists’ Bill of Rights, which outlines fundamental principles for today’s music economy.”

Those principles:

The Right to Control Our Work
The Right to Economic and Artistic Freedom
The Right to Attribution and Acknowledgment
The Right to a Music Community
The Right to Competitive Platforms
The Right to Information and Platform Transparency
The Right to Political Participation

All share one core attribute—an artist’s agency—over their work, their livelihood, their community, themselves. That the ARA found it necessary to relaunch this summer is not surprising. The triple threat of a pandemic decimating artists’ livelihoods, the surging power of technology platforms, and the challenges of ensuring one’s work is not distorted by others or used to send disagreeable political messages has heightened awareness among artists about the issues for which ARA stands.

Several notable lawsuits have also brought these issues to the forefront this summer that may shape the nature of artists’ agency over their work for years to come. Here are some thoughts about why they are significant and some issues you may not have noticed.

Hachette Book Group et al. v. Internet Archive

On June 1, 2020, four of the world’s preeminent publishing houses sued Internet Archive (IA) for willful mass copyright infringement. The IA styles itself an online library, open to anyone to borrow books, music, and other works. It scans millions of copyrighted as well as public domain works and makes them available to “borrowers” for free. It had previously operated under an already controversial policy of “controlled digital lending” (more on that below), but in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, dropped even these minimal restrictions on its distribution of works. As the Authors Guild put it in an open letter to the IA:

[B]y declaring a spurious “copyright emergency” and making a massive trove of copyrighted books available for free without any restrictions, Internet Archive has demonstrated a shocking disrespect for the rule of law—the cornerstone of our civil, democratic society—at a time when we most need it to prevail. You cloak your illegal scanning and distribution of books behind the pretense of magnanimously giving people access to them. But giving away what is not yours is simply stealing, and there is nothing magnanimous about that. Authors and publishers—the rights owners who legally can give their books away—are already working to provide electronic access to books to libraries and the people who need them. We do not need Internet Archive to give our works away for us.

In their complaint, the publishers argue that IA’s assertion that it should not be liable for infringement is based on “an invented theory called ‘Controlled Digital Lending’ (‘CDL’)—the rules of which have been concocted from whole cloth and continue to get worse.” As the complaint sets forth:

[A]t first, under this theory IA claimed to limit the number of scanned copies of a title available for free download at any one time to the number of print books of that title in its collection—though no provision under copyright law offers a colorable defense to the systematic copying and distribution of digital book files simply because the actor collects corresponding physical copies. Then, in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, IA opportunistically seized upon the global health crisis to further enlarge its cause, announcing with great fanfare that it would remove these already deficient limitations that were purportedly in place. Today, IA offers an enormous universe of scanned books to an unlimited number of individuals simultaneously in its “National Emergency Library.” IA’s blatant, willful infringement is all the more egregious for its timing, which comes at the very moment that many authors, publishers, and independent bookstores, not to mention libraries, are both struggling to survive amidst economic uncertainty, and planning deliberatively for future, changing markets.

The publishers’ lawsuit is important because it is the first “live” judicial challenge to the legal theory of “controlled digital lending”—a legal theory which was announced by certain academics and internet advocates in 2018. They argue that it should be fair use for libraries to scan or obtain scans of physical books they own and lend them electronically, provided certain restrictions are applied, such as limitations that attempt to emulate the limitations of lending in the physical world (e.g., limits on lending periods and on numbers of copies that can be loaned at a given time).

I refer to this as the first “live” judicial challenge because, while it is the first time CDL has been challenged in the courts, the supporters of CDL sought and failed to receive the blessing of the Second Circuit for IA’s original Open Library service when that court was reviewing the decision in Capitol Records v ReDigi. Unsurprisingly, the court declined to do so. In an opinion written by Judge Leval, the Second Circuit rejected ReDigi’s and its amici’s fair use argument because market harm would be likely since the sales of ReDigi’s digital files would compete directly with those of Capitol Records. Because “used” digital files do not deteriorate like used physical media, there would be no reason for customers to buy new licenses from Capitol Records if they could obtain the files from ReDigi at a lower price.

One imagines that the impact of free CDL on e-book sales would only be worse—first, because it is free, rather than merely a reduced price for “used” files, and second, because it would be usurping a valuable market authors and publishers have continued to actively develop and license for several years since the ReDigi decision. This includes licensing to libraries for free lending via services like OverDrive. It is likewise significant that the “Emergency Library” at issue in the publishers’ case against IA is far less restricted than the version of IA’s “Open Library” the amici sought and failed to have blessed by the Second Circuit in ReDigi.

Maria Schneider et. al. v. YouTube

Another case to watch is the class action lawsuit filed by composer and jazz performer Maria Schneider against YouTube and its parent companies Google and Alphabet in July. The lawsuit alleges that “YouTube has facilitated and induced [a] hotbed of copyright infringement [on its website] through its development and implementation of a copyright enforcement system that protects only the most powerful copyright owners such as major studios and record labels.” Because members of the class are denied access to the copyright management tool YouTube offers its corporate partners—Content ID—the lawsuit alleges that rather than preventing repeat infringements of works, the tool “actually insulates the vast majority of known and repeated copyright infringers from YouTube’s repeat infringer policy, thereby encouraging its users’ continuing upload of infringing content.”

This is all part of a deliberate strategy, according to the complaint:

Defendants Alphabet, Google, and YouTube reap billions of dollars annually from the online hosting of videos, including millions of works that infringe on the exclusive copyrights of Plaintiffs and the Class. Defendants permit and facilitate this infringement because it furthers their growth and revenue strategies and because they have determined that Plaintiffs and the Class—unlike YouTube’s preferred Content ID partners—lack the resources and leverage necessary to combat copyright infringement on the scale at which it is perpetuated on YouTube.

Maria Schneider argues many of the same things she and other artist advocates have asserted before Congress, the U.S. Copyright Office, and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office in hearings and roundtable proceedings exploring the provisions of Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA):

Faced with litigation by major music studios and other significant rights holders, Defendants have crafted distinct and disparate systems of copyright “enforcement” on their platform. For those entities with vast stores of copyright material and thus the leverage to require Defendants to appease their copyright management concerns, YouTube created its Content ID program, which allows qualifying copyright owners automatically to identify and manage their content on YouTube. . . . Smaller rights holders, including [Schneider], are, however, denied access to Content ID and thus are relegated to vastly inferior and time-consuming means of trying to police and manage their copyrights such as scanning the entirety of YouTube postings, searching for keywords, titles, and other potential identifiers.

They must then send notices identifying infringements URL by URL, filling out cumbersome webforms, often laden with advertising, struggle with captcha codes, and contend with requests for additional information or challenges from employees reviewing the requests.

While many artists have neither the pocketbook nor the backbone to stand up to an adversary like YouTube in federal court, this lawsuit seems particularly well-timed given that the ongoing focus on Section 512 in multiple government venues over the past decade has developed a solid record articulating the scope and the magnitude of the problem, as well as that the complaints against YouTube and other web platforms by individual artists seem to be almost universally shared.

Regardless of Maria Schneider’s lawsuit, the Senate and the U.S. Copyright Office are not done considering the issue. The Copyright Office released its much-anticipated Section 512 Report earlier this May and engaged in a subsequent exchange of letters with Senators Thom Tillis and Patrick Leahy regarding additional statutory clarifications that the Senate might consider and other approaches that could improve the operation of the DMCA without legislative amendment. Among the issues addressed in that letter is a request from the Senators to the Copyright Office to conduct stakeholder meetings to identify and adopt standard technical measures (STMs) as was anticipated in Section 512(i) of the DMCA. It is notable that Maria Schneider has herself been an active participant in the Copyright Office’s Section 512 proceedings, and in February of 2017, she submitted comments to the Copyright Office urging that Content ID be recognized as a STM under the DMCA and that all creators be granted access to it in order to be able to more efficiently police YouTube’s platform. The Copyright Office did not take up her suggestion.

In answer to the Tillis/Leahy request, on June 29, 2020, the Copyright Office responded in part that it will convene virtual meetings in late summer/early fall “focused on identifying any potential obstacles to the identification of potential STMs, as well as the requirements that must be met in order to adopt and implement an STM,” and to “begin identifying the kinds of technologies that may meet the statutory definition. Once the bounds of potential qualifying technologies have been identified, the Office would then convene further discussion to evaluate whether individual technologies meet the other requirements of section 512(i), including discussions to learn more about the terms upon which the technologies are offered in the marketplace.”

To date, hypothetical discussions (as well as lawsuits and licensing) have focused on digital fingerprinting technologies. Such technologies are designed to identify content by taking a “fingerprint” of a file that is being or has been uploaded to a platform and matching it to a database of sample content submitted by copyright owners. Regardless of the technology identified as an STM, the challenge may come not from choosing the technology, but rather in applying it. What one copyright owner is willing to tolerate in the name of marketing and fan word of mouth, another will not be. What a technology platform may set the technology to overlook, a filmmaker on the eve of a festival premiere will consider a “match.” Hence the importance of artists’ agency. Or as the ARA would have it: the right to competitive platforms and the right to information and platform transparency. Unless artists are informed about the STMs platforms apply and how they apply them, and unless they have the ability to keep their work from platforms that don’t meet their requirements, identifying an STM on its own won’t make much of a difference. Without artists’ agency and the right to control what happens to their creative output, we may just have the digital fingerprint version of the notice-and-takedown “whack-a-mole” game.[1]

Neil Young v. Donald J. Trump for President

Musicians have perpetually battled with political campaigns over the unauthorized use of their music at rallies and other campaign events. Given the particularly heated nature of this year’s presidential contest, it is perhaps not surprising that Neil Young has sued the Trump campaign for copyright infringement for publicly performing his musical works Rockin’ in the Free World and Devil’s Sidewalk at numerous campaign rallies and events, including one in Tulsa, Oklahoma. The complaint alleges: “The Campaign has willfully ignored Plaintiff’s telling it not to play the Songs and willfully proceeded to play the Songs despite its lack of a license and despite its knowledge that a license is required to do so.”

Neil Young is not the only musician battling the Trump campaign. Leonard Cohen’s estate is considering whether to file suit for the campaign’s use of Halleluiah during the last night of the Republican National Convention, and the Rolling Stones are working with ASCAP and BMI to persuade the Trump campaign to stop playing You Can’t Always Get What You Want at rallies. Campaigns typically assert that they are permitted to play any songs included in the Performing Rights Organizations’ political entities licenses, from which artists may seek to exclude their works if they object to use at political rallies. The allegations by Neil Young, the Cohen estate, and the Stones seem to be that the particular uses by the Trump campaign have gone beyond what a venue license for a political gathering envisions and that the campaign is instead using the songs to either distort their meaning or suggest an endorsement by the artist.

As the members of the Artist Rights Alliance wrote to all of the Republican and Democratic National Campaign Committees this July: “Like all other citizens, artists have the fundamental right to control their work and make free choices regarding their political expression and participation. Using their work for political purposes without their consent fundamentally breaches those rights—an invasion of the most hallowed, even sacred personal interests.”

These lawsuits are interesting because, until now, due to a combination of the veneer of protection offered by the venue licenses, and the time constraints imposed by campaign season, the only viable mechanism for discouraging unwanted uses of an artist’s work by a campaign has been public shaming via social media or statements by the artist publicly disowning and rejecting the candidate. Consequently, neither the moral rights or right of publicity-like qualities of the complaints nor the availability of damages for the infringing use have been explored. Since the Trump campaign is unlikely to settle a lawsuit, this case may define the boundaries of political entities licensed uses or add a new tool to musicians’ arsenals in ensuring they are not unwillingly conscripted into the service of a campaign they do not support.

RIP Matt Herron[2]

A civil rights era photographer I admired and came to know when I was CEO of the Copyright Alliance—Matt Herron—recently passed. Matt was inspiring on many levels. He described himself as an “activist with a camera,” and he covered some of the most meaningful moments in the effort to gain voting rights for Black people in the 1960s—including the Selma to Montgomery march.

“I photograph things I believe in. I try to photograph the things that are important in my life,” said Herron during a panel I moderated in 2011. He felt so strongly about what he saw happening in the 1960s south that he picked up his family and moved from Philadelphia to Mississippi because he thought they could be more relevant there. In doing so, through his photographs, he gave countless generations a front row seat to history. He described the five days he spent documenting the march from Selma to Montgomery:

As photographers, we are mostly voyeurs. We stand a little bit aside from an event. Part of our mind is clicking through F Stops and the rest of it is trying to figure out where images and angles are. But sometimes something happens that sucks us in and we lose that voyeuristic element and become part of the event itself. Certainly for me, the Selma March—five days of walking in rain and sunshine and all kinds of conditions—was one of those moments. I have no memory of where I slept, what I ate, how I handled any of my basic physical problems. All I remember is the camera, the walking, and the faces.

Matt Herron lived by the copyright of his photographs and used them to further education about the social causes he covered. Besides the Selma march, he shot whaling protests by Greenpeace and the AIDS quilt. He explained that copyright laws help him keep collections of his images together and allow him to present them for the benefit of the causes covered:

I’ve put some effort into making not just single photographs but collections. I have historical collections and copyright allows me to decide how these images will be presented and how these historical moments can be disseminated. If I didn’t own the copyright some of these pictures of Martin Luther King might be used to advertise shoes. As it is, I can disseminate these images in ways that add to our national heritage, in educational ways for school children and to preserve a piece of history. Copyright allows me to retain this control not so I can keep them to myself but present them to the world in a way that’s coherent.

Matt Herron’s lifetime of work demonstrates in a way that is perhaps clearer this summer than any in recent memory why ensuring that artists are guaranteed agency over their creative output—whether they be photographers chronicling our history, musicians expressing our yearning, or authors giving words to our conscience—is crucial to democracy.

[1] Although it is approximately a decade old, this article, The (Im)possibility of “Standard Technical Measures” for UGC Websites, written by then student, now partner at Wilson Sonsini, Lauren Gallo, is the most thorough, balanced, and articulate examination of the issues the USCO is undertaking to date. Gallo notes that already in 2011 when her note was published, rights owners and UGC service providers were deploying fingerprinting technology to protect copyrighted works on the internet and operate repeat infringer policies. She writes: “In light of the widespread use of this successful technology and Congress’ mandate that ‘standard technical measures’ be developed ‘expeditiously,’ individual or infrequent holdouts should not obstruct the consensus necessary to define the term. . . . [F]ingerprinting technology should qualify as ‘standard technical measures’ under section 512(i), so that right holders and service providers may be on notice of their statutory obligations and may continue to develop ‘best practice’ applications for that technology.”

Ms. Gallo’s current practice focuses on novel legal questions online, involving among other issues, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, and she has represented Google and YouTube in cases challenging their decisions regarding whether or not to remove or limit access to online content.

[2] Portions of this section appeared as a blog post in June of 2011 on the Copyright Alliance website, when I was CEO of that organization.

Tags CDL, Content ID, controlled digital lending, copyright notebook, Copyright Office, Donald Trump, Hachette Book Group, Internet Archive, investment, Maria Schneider, Matt Herron, Neil Young, ReDigi, Sandra Aistars, Section 512, standard technical measures, STMs, YouTube

Scalia Law Students and CPIP Scholars Make an Impact in Copyright Office Section 512 Study

Post author By Joshua Grove
Post date May 26, 2020

The U.S. Copyright Office released its long-awaited report on Section 512 of Title 17 late last week. The Report is the culmination of more than four years of study by the Office of the safe harbor provisions for online service provider (OSP) liability in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA). Fortuitously, the study period coincided with the launch of Scalia Law’s Arts and Entertainment Advocacy Clinic. Clinic students were able to participate in all phases of the study, including filing comments on behalf of artists and CPIP scholars, testifying at roundtable proceedings on both coasts, and conducting a study of how OSPs respond to takedown notices filed on behalf of different types of artists. The Office cites the filings and comments of Scalia Law students numerous times and ultimately adopts the legal interpretation of the law advocated by the CPIP scholars.

The Office began the study in December 2015 by publishing a notice of inquiry in the Federal Register seeking public input on the impact and effectiveness of the safe harbor provisions in Section 512. Citing testimony by CPIP’s Sean O’Connor to the House Judiciary Committee that the notice-and-takedown system is unsustainable given the millions of takedown notices sent each month, the Office launched a multi-pronged inquiry to determine whether Section 512 was operating as intended by Congress.

Scalia Law’s Arts and Entertainment Advocacy Clinic drafted two sets of comments in response to this initial inquiry. Terrica Carrington and Rebecca Cusey submitted comments to the Office on behalf of middle class artists and advocates, including Blake Morgan, Yunghi Kim, Ellen Seidler, David Newhoff, and William Buckley, arguing that the notice-and-takedown regime under Section 512 is “ineffective, inefficient, and unfairly burdensome on artists.” The students pointed out that middle class artists encounter intimidation and personal danger when reporting infringements to OSPs. Artists filing takedown notices must include personal information, such as their name, address, and telephone number, which is provided to the alleged infringer or otherwise made public. Artists often experience harassment and retaliation for sending notices. The artists, by contrast, obtain no information about the identity of the alleged infringer from the OSP. The Office’s Report cited these problems as a detriment for middle class artists and “a major motivator” of its study.

A second response to the notice of inquiry was filed by a group of CPIP scholars, including Sandra Aistars, Matthew Barblan, Devlin Hartline, Kevin Madigan, Adam Mossoff, Sean O’Connor, Eric Priest, and Mark Schultz. These comments focused solely on the issue of how judicial interpretations of the “actual” and “red flag” knowledge standards affect Section 512. The scholars urged that the courts have interpreted the red flag knowledge standard incorrectly, thus disrupting the incentives that Congress intended for copyright owners and OSPs to detect and deal with online infringement. Several courts have interpreted red flag knowledge to require specific knowledge of particular infringing activity; however, the scholars argued that Congress intended for obvious indicia of general infringing activity to suffice.

The Office closely analyzed and ultimately adopted the scholars’ red flag knowledge argument in the Report:

Public comments submitted by a group of copyright law scholars in the Study make a point closely related to the rightsholders’ argument above, focusing on the different language Congress chose for actual and red flag knowledge. They note that the statute’s standard for actual knowledge is met when the OSP has “knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on the system or network is infringing” or “knowledge that the material or activity is infringing,” while the red flag knowledge standard is met when the OSP is “aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.” This difference, the copyright law scholars argue, is crucial to understanding the two standards: while the statute uses a definite article—“the”—to refer to material or activity that would provide actual knowledge, it drops “the” to speak more generally about facts or circumstances that would create red flag knowledge. “In Congress’s view,” the comment concludes, “the critical distinction between the two knowledge standards was this: Actual knowledge turns on specifics, while red flag knowledge turns on generalities.”

The Office went on to state that “a standard that requires an OSP to have knowledge of a specific infringement in order to be charged with red flag knowledge has created outcomes that Congress likely did not anticipate.” And since “courts have set too high a bar for red flag knowledge,” the Office concluded, Congress’ intent for OSPs to act upon information of infringement has been subverted. This echoed the scholars’ conclusion that the courts have disrupted the balance of responsibilities that Congress sought to create with Section 512 by narrowly interpreting the red flag knowledge standard.

Scalia Law students and CPIP scholars likewise participated in roundtable hearings on each coast to provide further input for the Copyright Office’s study of Section 512. The first roundtable was held on May 2-3, 2016, in New York, New York, at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, where the Second Circuit and Southern District of New York hear cases. The roundtable was attended by CPIP’s Sandra Aistars and Matthew Barblan. They discussed the notice-and-takedown process, the scope and impact of the safe harbors, and the future of Section 512. The second roundtable was held in San Francisco, California, at the James R. Browning Courthouse, where the Ninth Circuit hears cases. Scalia Law student Rebecca Cusey joined CPIP’s Sean O’Connor and Devlin Hartline to discuss the notice-and-takedown process, applicable legal standards, the scope and impact of the safe harbors, voluntary measures and industry agreements, and the future of Section 512. Several of the comments made by the CPIP scholars at the roundtables ended up in the Office’s Report.

In November 2016, the Office published another notice of inquiry in the Federal Register seeking additional comments on the impact and effectiveness of Section 512. The notice itself included citations to the comments submitted by Scalia Law students and the comments of the CPIP scholars. Under the guidance of Prof. Aistars, the students from Scalia Law’s Arts and Entertainment Advocacy Clinic again filed comments with the Office. Clinic students Rebecca Cusey, Stephanie Semler, Patricia Udhnani, Rebecca Eubank, Tyler Del Rosario, Mandi Hart, and Alexander Summerton all contributed to the comments, which discussed their work in helping individuals and small businesses enforce their copyright claims by submitting takedown notices pursuant to Section 512. The students reported on the practical barriers to the effective use of the notice-and-takedown process at particular OSPs. Two problems identified by the students were cited by the Copyright Office as examples of how OSPs make it unnecessarily difficult to submit a takedown notice. Accordingly, the Office called on Congress to update the relevant provisions of Section 512.

Two years after the additional written comments were submitted, the Office announced a third and final roundtable to be held on April 8, 2019, at the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss any relevant domestic or international developments that had occurred during the two prior years. CPIP’s Devlin Hartline attended this third roundtable to discuss recent case law related to Section 512, thus ensuring that CPIP scholars were represented at all three of the Office’s roundtables.

CPIP congratulates and thanks the students of Scalia Law’s Arts and Entertainment Advocacy Clinic for their skillful advocacy on behalf of artists who otherwise would not be heard in these debates.

Twenty Years Later, DMCA More Broken Than Ever

Post author By Joshua Grove
Post date April 24, 2019

With Section 512 of the DMCA, Congress sought to “preserve[] strong incentives for service providers and copyright owners to cooperate to detect and deal with copyright infringements that take place in the digital networked environment.”[1] Given the symbiotic relationship between copyright owners and service providers, Congress meant to establish an online ecosystem where both would take on the benefits and burdens of policing copyright infringement. This shared-responsibility approach was codified in the Section 512 safe harbors. But rather than service providers and copyright owners working together to prevent online piracy, Section 512 has turned into a notice-and-takedown regime where copyright owners do most of the work. This is not what Congress intended, and the main culprit is how the courts have misinterpreted Section 512’s red flag knowledge standards.

Several provisions in Section 512 demonstrate that Congress expected service providers to also play a role in preventing copyright infringement by doing some of the work in finding and removing infringing material. In order to benefit from the safe harbors, service providers must designate an agent to receive takedown notices, respond expeditiously to takedown notices, act upon representative lists, implement reasonable repeat infringer policies, and accommodate standard technical measures. But it’s also clear that service providers have the duty to remove infringing content even without input from copyright owners. As the Senate Report notes, “Section 512 does not require use of the notice and take-down procedure.”[2] And the knowledge provisions in Section 512 reflect this. Absent a takedown notice, service providers must, “upon obtaining . . . knowledge or awareness” of infringing material or activity, “act[] expeditiously to remove . . . the material” in order to maintain safe harbor protection.[3]

Under Section 512, there are two kinds of knowledge that trigger the removal obligation without input from the copyright owner—actual and red flag. For sites hosting user-uploaded content, actual knowledge is “knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on the system or network is infringing”[4] and red flag knowledge is “aware[ness] of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.”[5] Thus, actual knowledge requires knowledge that specific material (“the material”) or activity using that specific material (“activity using the material”) is actually infringing (“is infringing”), while red flag knowledge requires only general awareness (“aware[ness] of facts or circumstances”) that activity appears to be infringing (“is apparent”). There are similar knowledge provisions for search engines.[6]

Importantly, actual knowledge refers to “the material,” and red flag knowledge does not. It instead refers to “infringing activity”—and it’s not the infringing activity, but infringing activity generally.[7] However, with both actual and red flag knowledge, the service provider is obligated to remove “the material.”[8] With actual knowledge, the service provider doesn’t have to go looking for “the material” since it already has actual, subjective knowledge of it. But what about with red flag knowledge where the service provider only knows of “infringing activity” generally? How does it know “the material” to take down? The answer is simple: Once the service provider is subjectively aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity would be objectively apparent[9]—that is, once it has red flag knowledge—it has to investigate and find “the material” to remove.[10]

The examples given in the legislative history, which relate to search engines, show that red flag knowledge puts the burden on the service provider. As the Senate Report notes, merely viewing “one or more well known photographs of a celebrity at a site devoted to that person” would not hoist the red flag since the images might be licensed or fair use.[11] However, sites that are “obviously infringing because they . . . use words such as ‘pirate,’ ‘bootleg,’ or slang terms . . . to make their illegal purpose obvious . . . from even a brief and casual viewing” do raise the red flag.[12] And a search engine “that views such a site and then establishes a link to it . . . must do so without the benefit of a safe harbor.”[13] Thus, Congress didn’t want search engines worrying about questionable infringements on a small scale, but it also didn’t want search engines to catalog sites that are clearly dedicated to piracy. And, most importantly, red flag knowledge kicks in once a service provider looks at something that is “obviously pirate”—even if it’s an entire website.[14]

So how has Congress’s commonsensical plan worked out? Not very well. As of today, Google indexes nearly 1.5 million results from the infamous pirate site, The Pirate Bay.[15] Like the examples in the legislative history, The Pirate Bay has the word “pirate” in its title, and a brief viewing of the site reveals its obvious, infringing purpose. And it’s not like Google hasn’t been told that The Pirate Bay is dedicated to infringement—nor that it needs to be told. According to data from the Google Transparency Report,[16] the search engine has received requests to remove over 4 million URLs from thepiratebay.org domain alone. There are many other related domains, such as thepiratebay.se, that have received millions of requests as well. In fact, Google tells us that it has received requests to remove over 4 billion URLs from its search engine due to copyright infringement, with many domains receiving more than 10 million requests each.

So how is it that Google can index The Pirate Bay and not be worried about losing its safe harbor? The answer is that the courts have construed Section 512 in a way that contradicts the statutory text and Congress’s intent. They’ve all but read red flag knowledge out of Section 512 and placed the burden of policing infringement disproportionately on the copyright owner. And by narrowing the applicability of red flag knowledge, the courts have perversely incentivized service providers to do as little as possible to prevent infringements. Instead of looking into infringing activity of which they are subjectively aware, they are better off doing nothing lest they gain actual, specific knowledge that would remove their safe harbor protection.

A brief traverse through the case law, especially in the Second and Ninth Circuits, shows how the red flag knowledge train has been derailed. In Perfect 10 v. CCBill, the Ninth Circuit held that domains such as illegal.net and stolencelebritypics.com—the very sort of indicia mentioned in the legislative history—were not enough to raise the red flag.[17] According to the court, “describing photographs as ‘illegal’ or ‘stolen’ may be an attempt to increase their salacious appeal, rather than an admission that the photographs are actually illegal or stolen.”[18] While that’s certainly possible, it’s not likely. And it defies common sense. The Ninth Circuit concluded: “We do not place the burden of determining whether photographs are actually illegal on a service provider.”[19] But this misses the point, and it conflates red flag knowledge with actual knowledge.

The Second Circuit in Viacom v. YouTube held that the “difference between actual and red flag knowledge is . . . not between specific and generalized knowledge, but instead between a subjective and an objective standard.”[20] The court arrived there by focusing on the removal obligation, reasoning that “expeditious removal is possible only if the service provider knows with particularity which items to remove.”[21] And it rejected an “amorphous obligation” to investigate “in response to a generalized awareness of infringement.”[22] By limiting red flag knowledge to specific instances of infringement, the Second Circuit severely curtailed the obligations of service providers to police infringements on their systems. The entire point of red flag knowledge is to place a burden on the service provider to investigate the infringing activity further so that the specific material can be removed.[23]

The Ninth Circuit followed suit in UMG Recordings v. Shelter Capital, holding that red flag knowledge requires specificity.[24] The court reasoned that requiring “specific knowledge of particular infringing activity makes good sense” because it will “foster cooperation” between copyright owners and service providers “in dealing with infringement” online.[25] This “cooperation,” according to the Ninth Circuit, would come from takedown notices sent by copyright owners, who “know precisely what materials they own, and are thus better able to efficiently identify” infringing materials than service providers, “who cannot readily ascertain what material is copyrighted and what is not.”[26] Of course, this is not the shared-responsibility approach envisioned by Congress, and it conflates the red flag knowledge standards with the obligation to respond to takedown notices—separate provisions in Section 512.

Perhaps the most significant gutting of red flag knowledge can be found in the Second Circuit’s opinion in Capitol Records v. Vimeo.[27] The district court below had held that it was a question for the jury whether full-length music videos of current, famous songs that had been viewed by the service provider amounted to red flag knowledge.[28] But the Second Circuit disagreed that there was any jury question: “[T]he mere fact that a video contains all or substantially all of a piece of recognizable, or even famous, copyrighted music and was to some extent viewed . . . would be insufficient (without more) to sustain the copyright owner’s burden of showing red flag knowledge.”[29] That this gloss on red flag knowledge “reduces it to a very small category” was of “no significance,” the Second Circuit reasoned, since “the purpose of § 512(c) was to give service providers immunity, in exchange for augmenting the arsenal of copyright owners by creating the notice-and-takedown mechanism.”[30]

The Second Circuit thus held as a matter of law that there was no need for the factfinder to determine whether the material was so obviously infringing that it would raise the red flag. How is this a question of law and not fact? The court never explains. More importantly, this flies in the face of what Congress provided for with red flag knowledge, and it demotes Section 512 to being merely a notice-and-takedown regime where copyright owners are burdened with identifying infringements on URL-by-URL basis. Giving service providers a free pass when confronted with a red flag turns the Section 512 framework on its head. And it enables service providers to game the system and build business models on widespread, infringing content—even if they welcome it—so long as they respond to takedown notices. The end result is that an overwhelming amount of obvious infringements goes unchecked, and there’s essentially no cooperation between service providers and copyright owners as Congress intended.

[1] S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 40 (emphasis added); see also H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(II), at 49.

[2] Id. at 45; see also H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(II), at 54.

[3] 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii); see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(1)(C).

[4] Id. at § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added).

[5] Id. at § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) (emphasis added).

[6] See id. at §§ 512(d)(1)(A)-(B).

[7] See 4-12B Nimmer on Copyright § 12B.04[A][1][b][ii] (“By contrast, to show that a ‘red flag’ disqualifies defendant from the safe harbor, the copyright owner must simply show that ‘infringing activity’ is apparent—pointedly, not ‘the infringing activity’ alleged in the complaint.” (emphasis in original)).

[8] 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii)

[9] S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 44 (“The ‘red flag’ test has both a subjective and an objective element. In determining whether the service provider was aware of a ‘red flag,’ the subjective awareness of the service provider of the facts or circumstances in question must be determined. However, in deciding whether those facts or circumstances constitute a ‘red flag’–in other words, whether infringing activity would have been apparent to a reasonable person operating under the same or similar circumstances–an objective standard should be used.”); see also H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(II), at 53.

[10] Id at 48 (“Under this standard, a service provider would have no obligation to seek out copyright infringement, but it would not qualify for the safe harbor if it had turned a blind eye to ‘red flags’ of obvious infringement.”); see also H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(II), at 57.

[11] Id.; see also H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(II), at 57-58.

[12] Id.; see also H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(II), at 58.

[13] Id. at 48-49; see also H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(II), at 58.

[14] Id. at 49; see also H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(II), at 58.

[15] See The Pirate Bay, available at https://www.thepiratebay.org/.

[16] See Google Transparency Report, available at https://transparencyreport.google.com/.

[17] See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007).

[18] Id. at 1114.

[19] Id.

[20] Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012).

[21] Id. at 30.

[22] Id. at 30-31.

[23] See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(I), at 26 (“Once one becomes aware of such information, however, one may have an obligation to check further.”).

[24] UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013).

[25] Id. at 1021-22.

[26] Id. at 1022.

[27] Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2016).

[28] Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 972 F. Supp. 2d 537, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[B]ased on the type of music the videos used here—songs by well-known artists, whose names were prominently displayed—and the placement of the songs within the video (played in virtually unaltered form for the entirety of the video), a jury could find that Defendants had ‘red flag’ knowledge of the infringing nature of the videos.”).

[29] Capitol Records, 826 F.3d at 94 (emphasis in original).

[30] Id. at 97.

I presented this at the Fordham IP Conference on April 25, 2019. My oral presentation is here, and the accompanying slides are here.

How the Supreme Court Made it Harder for Copyright Owners to Protect Their Rights—And Why Congress Should Fix It

Post author By Joshua Grove
Post date March 7, 2019

U.S. Supreme Court building Earlier this week, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street.com, a case examining the registration precondition to filing a suit for copyright infringement in the federal district courts. While I agree with the Court’s exegesis of the statute at issue, it’s worth noting how the Court’s construction leaves many, if not most, copyright owners in the lurch. Under the Court’s holding, in fact, this very blog post could be infringed today, and there’s very little that could be done to stop it for many months to come. As the Court noted in Harper & Row v. Nation, “copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.” The Court’s holding in Fourth Estate, by contrast, disincentivizes dissemination since it undermines effective copyright protection and prejudices the public interest in the production of, and access to, creative works. Again, I don’t blame the Court for this outcome—in fact, I think it’s correct. The problem, as I’ll explain, lies in the unfortunate fact that nowadays it takes too long to register a copyright claim. And that’s something that Congress needs to fix.

The issue in Fourth Estate is straightforward. Under the first sentence of Section 411(a) of the Copyright Act, “no civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title.” Some courts, like the Ninth Circuit, have applied the so-called “application approach,” finding that “registration . . . has been made” when the copyright owner delivers a complete application to the Copyright Office. Other courts, like the Tenth Circuit, have applied the so-called “registration approach,” where “registration” is not “made” until the Register of Copyrights has acted upon the application (by either approving or rejecting it). Confounding the analysis is the fact that other sections of the Copyright Act alternatively delineate registration as something done by the applicant or by the Copyright Office.

In the decision below, the Eleventh Circuit applied the registration approach, affirming the district court’s dismissal of Fourth Estate’s complaint since the Register of Copyrights had not yet approved or denied its application to register. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision by Justice Ginsburg, affirmed: “We hold . . . that registration occurs, and a copyright claimant may commence an infringement suit, when the Copyright Office registers a copyright.” The issue for the Court was one of pure statutory construction, and the problem for proponents of the application approach is that the second sentence of Section 411(a) clearly indicates that registration is something done by the Copyright Office. It provides, as an exception to the first sentence, that a copyright owner can nevertheless sue for infringement once the application materials “have been delivered to the Copyright Office in proper form and registration has been refused.”

Justice Ginsburg reasoned: “If application alone sufficed to ‘ma[ke]’ registration, § 411(a)’s second sentence—allowing suit upon refusal of registration—would be superfluous.” I’ve always found this to be the better argument, and I’m not surprised to see it front-and-center in the Court’s analysis. Why would applicants need an exception that turns on the subsequent action of the Copyright Office if merely delivering a completed application sufficed? As Justice Ginsburg noted, the application approach “requires the implausible assumption that Congress gave ‘registration’ different meanings in consecutive, related sentences within a single statutory provision.” I think the Court got this one exactly right, and I don’t find arguments to the contrary to be particularly persuasive.

That said, let me now explain why it’s wrong—well, at least why it’s bad for millions of copyright owners and why Congress should fix it ASAP.

The purpose of the registration approach and other similar provisions in the Copyright Act (such as the availability of statutory damages or attorney’s fees) is to incentivize timely registration, which is no longer a prerequisite to copyright protection as it was under the Copyright Act of 1909. Under the current Copyright Act, copyright protection nominally exists once a work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression, and registration is no longer mandatory. (I say “nominally” because the Court’s holding in Fourth Estate ensures that, as a practical matter, countless works with respect to which copyright owners have exclusive rights on paper in fact have no immediate rights in the real world since they can’t actually file suit to quickly stop any ongoing infringement.) However, the incentive-to-register theory makes little sense in the context of the debate over the proper interpretation of Section 411(a) itself as the works being sued upon must be registered under both the application and registration approaches.

With due respect to the Copyright Office, processing a registration application is primarily a ministerial act. The vast majority of applications are granted—97% in 2017 according to the latest available data from the Copyright Office (though 29% of those applications required correspondence with the applicant). Are we really withholding remedies for all copyright owners because of the remaining 3%? And even for the 3% of applications that are denied, the copyright owner can still sue for infringement, asking the district court to reassess the agency’s refusal. No matter what the Copyright Office does with the application, whether it grants or denies, the copyright owner ultimately can sue. And, under the third sentence of Section 411(a), the Register of Copyrights can even “become a party to the action with respect to the issue of registrability of the copyright claim.” So it’s not like the Register can’t have a say should the application be in that slim minority of questionable ones that may merit intervention.

To its credit, the Supreme Court acknowledged that its holding would cause problems for copyright owners—but it also overplayed the exceptions to the registration approach that Congress put in place to alleviate some of these issues. For example, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that Section 408(f) empowers the Register of Copyrights to establish regulations for the preregistration of certain categories of works. Under this regime, as Justice Ginsburg noted, “Congress provided that owners of works especially susceptible to prepublication infringement should be allowed to institute suit before the Register has granted or refused registration.” That’s great for that particular subset of copyright owners, but what about everyone else? And what about authors who publish their works just as soon as they create them? Moreover, Justice Ginsburg’s blithe comment that copyright owners “may eventually recover damages for the past infringement” ignores the fact that injunctive relief to stop the actual, ongoing infringement is unavailable until the registration is processed by the Copyright Office.

The Court laments such policy ramifications: “True, the statutory scheme has not worked as Congress likely envisioned. Registration processing times have increased from one or two weeks in 1956 to many months today.” And this gets to the heart of the problem: The time it takes the Copyright Office to process an application has significantly increased over the years. Just four years after the Copyright Act of 1976 went into effect, the delay was “5 to 6 weeks.” And, as of October 2018, the delay has grown to an “average processing time for all claims” of “7 months.” Indeed, the fastest the Copyright Office processes an application now is one month, and the longest it takes is an incredible 37 months. The following illustration from the Copyright Office breaks this down with more particularity:

To be clear, I don’t think these delays are the Copyright Office’s fault. In fact, I think it’s Congress’s fault for not giving the agency more resources to do the very things that Congress requires it to do. Regardless, the fact remains that even copyright owners who do everything that the Copyright Act expects them to do in order to obtain the greatest protection for their works at the earliest that they can reasonably do so are still left without remedies should—or, perhaps more likely, when—infringement occur once they release their works to the world. The aforementioned constitutional goal of dissemination is thus undercut by the subservient goal of registration, for rational copyright owners would be less motivated to disseminate their works by the right to exclude when that right is in fact illusory. If Congress really wants authors to promote progress via dissemination of new works, it should adjust Section 411(a) to provide for immediate protection to all works, whether registered or not. It can still incentivize registration by limiting the remedies available, but it shouldn’t make it so that there are none.

To see the injustice, one need look no further than this very blog post. According to the Copyright Act, this post was protected the moment it was fixed in a tangible medium of expression (i.e., yesterday evening). Should the copyright owner—presumably the university where I work as this is a work made for hire—have filed for registration as quickly as possible (i.e., this morning), there still would be no way to obtain any injunctive relief while the Copyright Office processes the application. Preregistration was never an option as this post is not a literary work that is protected by the exception for certain works prone to prepublication infringement under Section 202.16 of the CFR. Even if the university had done everything that it was supposed to do as early as it could reasonably have done so to ensure the utmost copyright protection for this post, it could do nothing in the courts to stop an infringer who willfully exploits this post for profit until the Copyright Office acts upon the application—a lifetime for infringement in the digital age. (There is an option to expedite review for $800, but that amount of money is not reasonable for most people.)

Perhaps a takedown notice could be issued under Section 512 of the DMCA, but if there’s a counternotice, the university could not bring suit in the designated 10-14 day window to prevent the service provider from restoring the infringing material since there’s been no registration and thus it cannot sue for infringement. Despite having done everything Congress expected, the university would be powerless to stop the ongoing infringement of its exclusive rights in this post for perhaps several months into the future. And any argument that damages will compensate for infringements occurring before the Copyright Office got around to acting on the application is undercut by the fact that courts routinely grant preliminary injunctive relief precisely because the harm from infringement is irreparable—money damages cannot make the copyright owner whole.

The absurd result of all this is that the promise of exclusive rights in one’s original work of authorship is practically meaningless given the registration approach under Section 411(a). No doubt, Congress intended this disability to act as a stick in order to encourage the carrot of remedies should those rights be infringed. But the reality is that numerous copyright owners who do everything right get the stick and not the carrot—at least until the Copyright Office happens to process their applications. In the meantime, these copyright owners cannot be faulted for thinking twice before disseminating their works. Since enforcement of their rights is precluded through no fault of their own, what else does Congress expect them to do? A right without a remedy is senseless, and given the millions of original works that are created each day, Congress’s promise of copyright protection for new works may be one of the most illusory rights in modern times. Now that the Supreme Court has clarified Section 411(a), it’s time for Congress to fix it.

Tags copyright, Copyright Office, Devlin Hartline, Digital Millennium Copyright Act, DMCA, exclusive rights, Fourth Estate, infringement, registration, Section 411, Section 512, Supreme Court, USCO, Wall-Street.com

Another Huge Setback in CloudFlare’s Quixotic Campaign to Protect Pirate Sites

Post author By Joshua Grove
Post date March 28, 2017

the word "copyright" typed on a computer Last August, I wrote about CloudFlare’s “desperate new strategy” to protect MP3Skull, a notorious pirate site that was sued by various recording companies for copyright infringement. CloudFlare offers content delivery networking, web optimization, and other performance services for websites. The plaintiffs easily obtained a permanent injunction against MP3Skull when it didn’t even bother to respond to the suit. However, that didn’t stop MP3Skull from opening up shop under several new top-level domains using CloudFlare’s services. When the plaintiffs sent a copy of the injunction to CloudFlare and asked it stop servicing the sites, CloudFlare put up a fight.

CloudFlare has a history of supporting pirate sites. After Grooveshark was found liable for willful copyright infringement and shut down, CloudFlare was there to lend a helping hand to the copycat sites that later sprung up. The plaintiffs obtained a restraining order against the new sites, and they asked CloudFlare to not provide them with services. CloudFlare balked at the suggestion, arguing in the district court that it was not in cahoots with the enjoined defendants. The district court held that, under Rule 65, CloudFlare was indeed bound by the injunction against the copycat sites. By providing the copycats with numerous services, CloudFlare was in “active concert or participation” with the defendants.

Just as CloudFlare took the low-road with Grooveshark, it again decided to stand up for adjudicated pirates with MP3Skull. Once confronted with the injunction against MP3Skull, CloudFlare tried a new strategy. Instead of arguing that it wasn’t acting in concert with the enjoined defendants, it argued that it couldn’t be enjoined because of the DMCA. In particular, CloudFlare contended that since Section 512(j) controls injunctions against internet service providers, and since that standard was not applied here, it was not bound by the injunction. As I mentioned in my last post, this argument is ridiculous for one simple reason: CloudFlare is not being enjoined.

This past Thursday, District Judge Marcia G. Cooke of the Southern District of Florida easily shredded CloudFlare’s silly and self-serving argument: “CloudFlare contends that Section 512 of the Copyright Act (‘Section 512’) guides how the Permanent Injunction applies to it, not Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. I disagree.”

Judge Cooke agreed with CloudFlare that “Section 512 outlines rules for copyright infringement-related injunctions involving online service providers[.]” But she disagreed that Section 512(j) has anything to do with whether CloudFlare was bound by the injunction against MP3Skull under Rule 65. She noted that Section 512 “does not blunt a court’s power to enforce a permanent injunction involving non-parties such as CloudFlare that may be ‘in active concert or participation’ with Defendants.” Indeed, Judge Cooke stated that “[e]very injunction . . . automatically forbids non-parties” from aiding and abetting enjoined defendants.

This is clearly the correct result. The standards that apply when enjoining a service provider under Sections 512 have no applicability to the general rule that it’s contemptuous to aid and abet a defendant that has already been enjoined. Again, CloudFlare was not the party enjoined—only MP3Skull was enjoined. And even though Section 512(j) would apply if CloudFlare were being enjoined, that’s irrelevant to the issue of whether CloudFlare, or any other non-party, is bound by the injunction against MP3Skull.

Despite this huge loss for CloudFlare, Judge Cooke left open the possibility that it could continue its mission to protect the MP3Skull defendants. Since the parties did not brief the issue of whether CloudFlare is in “active concert or participation” with the defendants, Judge Cooke found that due process requires her to give CloudFlare a chance to argue that it is not. Given its past conduct, it seems likely that CloudFlare will vigorously argue that the services it provides don’t actually help its customers to do anything. Of course, given the Grooveshark defeat on this same issue, I don’t think Judge Cooke will waste too many pages rejecting CloudFlare’s next desperate attempt to protect pirate sites.

Tags active concert or participation, DMCA, Grooveshark, injunction, Judge Cooke, MP3Skull, Rule 65, Section 512

Librarians’ Contradictory Letter Reveals an Alarming Ignorance of the Copyright System

Post author By Joshua Grove
Post date December 19, 2016

On December 14th, a group of librarians sent a letter to Congress explaining why they believe the Copyright Office should remain under the control of the Library of Congress. Written by University of Virginia Library’s Brandon Butler, the letter is a self-contradicting and uninformed response to recent recommendations on reform of the Copyright Office offered by leading members of the House Judiciary Committee. While the lawmakers’ report proposes overdue, sensible reforms to the framework of a department in need of modernization, the librarians’ letter favors a one-sided approach to reform and reveals a gross misunderstanding of how copyright law and the Copyright Office ensure public access to creative works.

The Letter Embraces the Very Conflict It Claims to Reject

The letter begins by criticizing another recent letter to Congress from former Registers of Copyright Ralph Oman and Marybeth Peters in which they question the recent firing of Register of Copyright Maria Pallante and discuss the urgent need for an independent Copyright Office. Butler takes issue with the former Registers’ suggestion that the Library of Congress and the Copyright Office have different priorities and distinguishable missions, insisting that if any tensions exist, they are a result of bias at the Copyright Office. Alleging that the former Registers and the Copyright Office are “on the side of authors and media companies,” Butler proclaims that libraries “in all their richness and complexity” truly serve the interest of all. It’s a nice-sounding theory, but unfortunately it’s completely inaccurate and soon contradicted by a palpable disregard for the rights of authors and creators.

Claiming that librarians and the Library of Congress don’t subscribe to the theory of an adverse dichotomy between authors and the public, the letter then reinforces this theory by suggesting the scales should be tipped in favor of the public. In one paragraph, Butler endorses the “important balance between the short-term, private interests of authors and intermediaries, and the long-term interests of the public.” Curiously, just after he lauds this “important balance,” it is abruptly discarded as a reflection of “a narrow conception” and “inimical” priorities that cause an unproductive tension between the Office and the Library of Congress. Soon after describing libraries as the “fulcrum” upon which the balance of copyright and the public interest rests, the letter declares that “[we] reject this false dichotomy between copyright and the public interest.”

Regardless of this hollow denunciation, it’s clear that Butler believes there is a conflict between the interests of authors and the interests of the public, as he preaches to it throughout the letter. After paying lip service to rising above tensions between copyright and the public interest, Butler distinctly pushes for a system that values libraries over creators and the rights in their works. Describing the “crucial parts” of the copyright system embraced by libraries and librarians, the letter lists “fair use, first sale, interlibrary loan,” and claims that “without them libraries as we know them in this country could not exist.” One might argue that more crucial to the existence of libraries are the creative works that line their stacks, but this reality doesn’t seem worth mentioning. In fact, Butler asserts that copyright law has a “fundamentally public-serving character,” contrary to the letter’s earlier emphasis on serving copyright owners, authors, and the public equally. After praising the balance, then rejecting it, the letter unequivocally elevates the importance of the access libraries provide over the contributions and rights of creators.

The Letter Fails to Take into Account a Complex Creative Economy Based on Property Rights

James Madison observed in Federalist No. 43 that “the public good fully coincides . . . with the claims of individuals.” The Founders of our country recognized that creative economies are built upon the property rights of authors and artists, and as CPIP’s recent policy brief on creative markets explains, they “had the foresight to recognize that the public ultimately benefits when this protection is secured by law.” Promoting the public interest by recognizing the importance of individual interests was a theory drawn from Adam Smith and his seminal The Wealth of Nations. In it, Smith explained that concerted efforts to benefit the public are often less effective—and less helpful to society—than uncoordinated individual efforts to pursue private interests, and that society benefits the most when individuals are empowered to create valuable goods and services by pursuing their own interests.

Embodying these principles, copyright empowers authors and creators to pursue their own private interests by granting them exclusive property rights in their works. These same property rights support creative industries and provide significant benefits by playing a key role in facilitating the myriad transactions that contribute to a vibrant creative economy grounded in free market principles. Among other things, these property rights enable the division of labor, encourage product differentiation and competition, and spur investments in the development and distribution of creative works. Copyright not only incentivizes the creation of works, but also the commercialization of these works through further development, marketing, and distribution.

Copyright’s intricate ecosystems are based on incentives that ensure the continued creation and distribution of original works of authorship, yet the librarians’ letter doesn’t seem to appreciate their significance or how they function. Butler dedicates much of the letter to emphasizing the importance of public access to copyrighted works, but access is only the final step in a complex system of investment, commercialization, and distribution of creative works. The librarians claim to “understand that copyright is a complex ecosystem,” but nothing in the letter validates this assertion. The only part of the creative economy they deem worth discussing is the end result of access, with all other imperative stages either not realized or ignored.

The Librarians Are Oblivious to a Broken System

Ending with a plea to Congress not to interfere with the current “relationship” between the Library of Congress and the Copyright Office, the letter claims the Library is in the best position to lead a desperately needed modernization initiative at the Office. It’s a bold claim, given that the Library stood by as the Office’s infrastructure became embarrassingly outdated and underfunded over the past twenty years. Before her untimely ouster, Register Pallante provided Congress with a perspective on copyright review that included a detailed list of deficiencies within the Office in need of improvement. Specifically, Pallante cited the diminishing number of fulltime employees and inadequate budget that have made it all but impossible to support growth and development at the Copyright Office:

The Copyright Office budget is consistently in the neighborhood of $50 million, of which $30 million is derived from fees paid by customers for registration and other services. The Library’s overall budget for 2015 is approximately $630 million, inclusive of the Copyright Office. Without taking anything away from the important duties or funding deficiencies in the rest of the Library, the Copyright Office’s resources are inadequate to support the digital economy it serves.

Pallante’s report goes on to discuss the serious information technology (IT) problems facing the Office, and to question the Library’s plan to address IT concerns by exerting more control over the Office’s departments and decisionmaking. The former Register was wise to question a plan that would give more control to an organization that has consistently failed to value or support the Copyright Office and its mission.

Further demonstrating just how out of touch they are with the realities of the current copyright law landscape, an affiliated group of librarians recently professed their faith in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) safe harbor system that is undoubtedly failing creators, copyright owners, and the public. In comments submitted to the Copyright Office as part of its study on the effectiveness of Section 512 of the DMCA, the Library Copyright Alliance (LCA) makes the absurd claim that the “safe harbors are working exactly as the stakeholders and Congress intended.” But, just before this assertion, the comments accuse copyright owners of abusing the DMCA’s notice and takedown process, and suggest amendments to the DMCA are necessary “to curtail this abuse.” Not only are the LCA’s comments utterly contradictory, they ignore substantial evidence and testimony from dozens of interested parties that the DMCA needs to be reformed and updated.

As CPIP highlighted in a recent examination of the state of the DMCA, the notice and takedown system has been largely ineffective in managing the ever-increasing amount of piracy, and courts continue to diminish service providers’ responsibility to cooperate with copyright owners to detect and deter infringement. The constant game of whack-a-mole with websites offering infringing content continues, and platforms such as YouTube are teeming with unauthorized works. Artist, creators and copyright owners have loudly voiced their frustration with the current system and called for reforms that better respect their rights. In the face of such obvious evidence of a broken system, to claim the DMCA is working exactly as intended speaks volumes of the librarians’ inability to recognize the reality of the situation.

It’s Time for Change at the Copyright Office

The House Judiciary Committee’s proposal on copyright reform is a response to years of listening “to the views and concerns of stakeholders from all sides of the copyright debate,” and it identifies modernization efforts that address the concerns of these interested parties. Since 2013, the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Internet has conducted 20 copyright review hearings on the current state of copyright law which included testimony from 100 witnesses. In addition to the hearings, Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte and Ranking Member John Conyers brought a copyright listening tour to Nashville, Silicon Valley, and Los Angeles where a wide range of creators, innovators, technology professionals, and users of copyrighted works had the opportunity to tell the Committee directly what changes they believe are needed to ensure U.S. copyright law evolves with the digital age.

The resulting policy proposals reflect a broad acknowledgment by those who participated in the review that the Copyright Office must be updated to keep up with the digital culture it serves. Two of the most important steps in this modernization effort identified by the Committee include requiring the Office to maintain an updated digital database and granting the Office autonomy with respect to the Library of Congress. If Brandon Butler and the signatories of his letter had their way, the Copyright Office would remain under control of an organization that has proven it is unable to help propel the Office into the 21st century. It’s not particularly surprising that librarians would want the Library of Congress to retain control over the Copyright Office, but an overwhelming majority of creators, copyright law experts, and lawmakers recognize that the Office needs to move forward, rather than remain trapped in the past.

Tags copyright, copyright infringement, DMCA, Kevin Madigan, notice and takedown, notice-and-staydown, Section 512, U.S. Copyright Office, YouTube

Copyright Copyright Licensing Copyright Theory Infringement Intellectual Property Theory Internet Reasonable Royalty Uncategorized

Despite What You Hear, Notice and Takedown is Failing Creators and Copyright Owners

Post author By Joshua Grove
Post date August 24, 2016

In a recent op-ed in the LA Times, Professors Chris Sprigman and Mark Lemley praise the notice and takedown provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) as “a bit of copyright law worth saving.” They argue that Section 512 of the DMCA continues to serve its purpose of balancing the rights of copyright owners and creators with those of Internet service providers (ISPs), while leaving both sides only “slightly disappointed.” Satisfying these two groups is indeed a difficult charge, but it’s simply disingenuous to suggest that creators and copyright owners are satisfied with a system so clearly in need of an overhaul.

As the Copyright Office embarks on its review of the DMCA, supporters and critics of the nearly twenty-year-old doctrine are weighing in on its effectiveness in addressing online infringement. Sprigman and Lemley claim that the “process has worked well for years,” and that the result of shifting more enforcement burden to ISPs “could be a broken Internet.” But for those creators and copyright owners who have their works resurface online just minutes after they are taken down, the Internet is already “broken.” The fact that piracy continues to intensify, despite incredible efforts to have infringing content taken down, shows that notice and takedown is largely ineffective.

As CPIP Senior Scholar Sean O’Connor testified before Congress, the notice and takedown system is not working for any of its intended beneficiaries. The constant game of whack-a-mole renders the system essentially futile for copyright owners and creators, and it creates significant burdens for ISPs that want to comply—especially small to mid-level companies that can’t afford compliance staff. Worse still, by shielding service providers from liability, the DMCA creates perverse incentives where there’s little downside to ignoring infringing content. In fact, reviewing content could lead to an ISP having knowledge of infringement and losing its safe harbor.

Now that the Copyright Office’s review is underway, it’s somewhat strange to see some supporters claim that all is well. But has anything actually changed since the Office announced its study? Of course not. The whack-a-mole problem remains, and the knowledge standards are still interpreted broadly to disproportionately favor ISPs. When one side says the system is working and the other side says it’s broken, the truth is that the system is not working well for everyone. Sprigman and Lemley can claim that the DMCA is “worth saving” only by downplaying the true plight of creators and copyright owners.

A concrete example of this struggle comes from the comments filed by Universal Music Group (UMG) as part of the Copyright Office’s study. UMG describes the painstaking efforts devoted to protect just one artist’s creative work. In October of 2014, UMG and Big Machine Records launched a joint offensive to protect Taylor Swift’s “1989.” A staff of UMG employees dedicated 100% of their time and resources to manually search for infringements on YouTube, SoundCloud, and Tumblr, and through March of 2016, they had sent over 66,000 DMCA takedown notices. Despite their considerable efforts, over 500,000 links to the album were identified, and “1989” was illegally downloaded nearly 1.4 million times from torrent sites.

Of course, this type of effort would be impossible to replicate for any works other than those that attract such massive attention. For most artists, the burden of monitoring the Internet and sending takedown notices would fall entirely on their shoulders, with no guarantee of putting a stop to the theft of their works. Sprigman and Lemley ignore these problems, instead claiming that since copyright owners sent “more than 500 million takedown requests just to Google last year,” we know that the “system is a powerful tool against pirated content.” That would be great, if true, but the reality is that those notices barely made a dent.

Sprigman and Lemley claim that the “genius of the DMCA” is that it “enables entertainment companies to turn piracy into legitimate revenue.” They give the example of “YouTube’s Content ID system,” which “gives copyright owners the opportunity to ‘claim’ their work and share in any advertising revenue rather than pull it off the site.” From the perspective of creators and copyright owners, the only “genius” of this system is that YouTube can legally present them with an unfair choice—suffer infringement and get nothing or monetize and get next to nothing.

While Sprigman and Lemley praise the “more than $1 billion” paid out by YouTube, the real question is how much more copyright owners and creators would have been paid in a properly functioning market. YouTube is consistently teeming with infringing videos—one recent report revealed that over 180 million infringing videos had been removed in 2014 alone. And the artists that YouTube’s largess supposedly benefits are loudly complaining about their exploitation. If Content ID is so great, why are so many creators and copyright owners upset with the arrangement? The monetization Google offers to copyright owners and artists is less than half of the royalties paid out by streaming services like Pandora, an amount that artists have denounced as already inequitable.

In her excellent piece on the fictions of the Content ID system, Grammy-winning artist Maria Schneider exposes Content ID as a way for Google to cash in by actually legitimizing and perpetuating piracy. She explains that a majority of creators that opt for monetization realize miserable percentages of ad revenue, and the continued illegal uploading of their music and content drives billions of users to YouTube’s platform. YouTube has turned the weakness of the DMCA into a system that exploits artists while offering embarrassingly lower royalty rates than what would be negotiated in a free market.

The current situation is untenable, and if change means “breaking” the Internet, then we should pull out the pickaxes and get to work. A system of notice and staydown, rather than just takedown, would help alleviate the constant and seemingly ineffectual vigilance required by the current system. By removing all copies of a protected work and blocking inevitable re-postings, ISPs would honor the original purpose of the DMCA while actually doing their part to earn the protection of the safe harbor provisions. Only by ensuring that targeted works do not resurface will ISPs respect the rights of those without whose content they would cease to exist.

How anyone can honestly say that the current notice and takedown system is working for copyright owners and creators is mystifying given the constant calls for reform from creators and the numerous critical comments filed with the Copyright Office. The incredible magnitude of takedown notices sent and the seemingly unstoppable reappearance of infringing works online are a clear signal that the system is completely failing those it was meant to protect. Creators and copyright owners deserve a better chance at protecting the fruits of their labors, and the DMCA needs to be changed so that it truly is a system “worth saving.”

Tags copyright, copyright infringement, DMCA, Google, intellectual property, notice and takedown, notice-and-staydown, Sean O'Connor, Section 512, U.S. Copyright Office

Three Years Later, DMCA Still Just as Broken

Post author By Joshua Grove
Post date June 30, 2016

By Matthew Barblan & Kevin Madigan

In 2013, CPIP published a policy brief by Professor Bruce Boyden exposing the DMCA notice and takedown system as outdated and in need of reform. The Failure of the DMCA Notice and Takedown System explained that while Section 512 of the DMCA was intended as a way for copyright owners and service providers to work together to fight infringement in the digital age, the notice and takedown system has been largely ineffective in managing the ever-increasing amount of piracy.

Three years later, the DMCA is still just as broken. Since we published the brief, courts have further diminished service providers’ responsibility to cooperate with copyright owners to detect and deter infringement, rendering the DMCA even more fruitless and desperately in need of retooling.

Boyden explained the fundamental problems with the system at the time, beginning with the fact that “despite all the notice, there is precious little takedown to show for it. Unless a site employs some sort of content filtering technology, the same content typically re-appears within hours after it is removed.” The notice and takedown system is particularly unsuited for the twenty-first century, where “infringement is persistent, ubiquitous, and gargantuan in scale. It is a problem that needs to be policed” with more than just takedown notices that don’t give copyright owners “a single day when the content is not available on the most heavily trafficked sites.”

Boyden noted that “even for the largest media companies with the most resources at their disposal, attempting to purge a site of even a fraction of the highest-value content is like trying to bail out an oil tanker with a thimble.” And Boyden pointed out that the courts hadn’t made the situation any better: “The DMCA’s unsuitability as a tool to manage chronic, persistent, and pervasive infringement is particularly apparent after recent decisions from the Second and Ninth Circuit that construed the duty of website owners very narrowly under Section 512.”

To further illustrate his point, Boyden collected data on takedown notices sent by MPAA companies and counter-notices received. Between March and August of 2013, MPAA companies sent takedown notices for over 25 million infringing URLs and received only 8 counter-notices in response. That’s a counter-notice rate of 0.000032%, suggesting that the astronomical volume of notices represents a likewise astronomical volume of infringement rather than overly-aggressive notice-sending.

Grand Totals. Infringing URLs: 25,235,151. URLs Sent to Websites: 13,238,860. URLs Sent to Search Engines: 11,996,291. Counter-Notices Received: 8.

Boyden concluded:

The impossibility of keeping up with new [infringing] uploads means that an online service provider can create a site aimed at and dedicated to hosting infringing copyrighted works, comply with every takedown notice, and still benefit from the safe harbor, as long as its intent remains hidden. If the site has enough users, any popular content removed will be supplanted by new copies almost immediately.

Sadly, three years later the “chronic, persistent, and pervasive” infringement that Boyden described continues, with stolen copyrighted works popping up on sites almost immediately after being taken down. Google Search—one product of one company—has receive nearly 90 million takedown notices this month alone. The situation has gotten so bad that last week a long list of artists, including Paul McCartney and Taylor Swift, signed a digital petition to bring attention to a broken DMCA system that allows companies like YouTube to benefit from infringement at the expense of songwriters and artists.

The artists’ main message: “The existing laws threaten the continued viability of songwriters and recording artists to survive from the creation of music.” They note that “the tech companies who benefit from the DMCA today were not the intended protectorate when it was signed into law nearly two decades ago,” and they ask Congress to “enact sensible reform that balances the interests of creators with the interests of the companies who exploit music for their financial enrichment.”

Recognizing the growing frustration with the DMCA, the U.S. Copyright Office initiated a study earlier this year to examine whether the statute is fulfilling its purpose. We submitted comments to the Copyright Office on behalf of a group of copyright law scholars, noting that courts have disrupted the balance Congress sought to create when it enacted the DMCA. In particular, courts have eliminated any incentive for service providers to work with copyright owners to develop policies and procedures to prevent or curb piracy online. In just one example of how deeply courts have distorted congressional intent, under courts’ current interpretation of the DMCA, search engines can continue to index even obviously infringing sites like The Pirate Bay with no fear of potential of liability.

Adding insult to injury, courts have recently shifted the balance of power even further away from artists and towards service providers, making it easier than ever for companies to enable and profit from infringement while turning a blind eye—or even encouraging—piracy on their sites. In this month’s Capitol Records v. Vimeo decision, for example, the Second Circuit extended the DMCA safe harbor to Vimeo despite smoking-gun evidence that Vimeo employees encouraged users to post stolen works on their site and had viewed the illicit videos at issue in the suit. In a jaw-dropping opinion, the court let Vimeo off the hook simply because the evidence of Vimeo employees encouraging infringement wasn’t directly tied to the specific infringing videos that plaintiffs included in their suit.

CPIP’s Devlin Hartline explains:

After Capitol Records v. Vimeo: A service provider can encourage its users to infringe on a massive scale, and so long as the infringement it encourages isn’t the specific infringement it gets sued for, it wins on the safe harbor defense at summary judgment. This is so even if there’s copious evidence that its employees viewed and interacted with the specific infringing material at issue. No jury will ever get to weigh all of the evidence and decide whether the infringement is obvious. At the same time, any proactive steps taken by the service provider will potentially open it up to liability for having actual knowledge, so the incentive is to do as little as possible to proactively “detect and deal” with piracy. This is not at all what Congress intended. It lets bad faith service providers trample the rights of copyright owners with impunity.

As courts continue to gut the DMCA, making it harder than ever for artists to protect their property and livelihoods, Congress would be wise to heed Bruce Boyden’s advice from three years ago: “It is long past time for a retooling of the notice and takedown regime.”

Tags Bruce Boyden, Capitol Records v. Vimeo, Devlin Hartline, Digital Millennium Copyright Act, DMCA, Google, MPAA, notice and takedown, Paul McCartney, Pirate Bay, Section 512, Taylor Swift, U.S. Copyright Office, whack-a-mole, YouTube

Second Circuit Deepens Red Flag Knowledge Circuit Split in Vimeo

Post author By Joshua Grove
Post date June 28, 2016

The Second Circuit’s recent opinion in Capitol Records v. Vimeo is, to put it mildly, pretty bad. From its convoluted reasoning that copyrights under state law for pre-1972 sound recordings are limited by the DMCA safe harbors, despite the explicit statement in Section 301(c) that “rights or remedies” under state law “shall not be annulled or limited” by the Copyright Act, to its gutting of red flag knowledge by limiting it to the nearly-impossible situation where a service provider actually knows that a specific use of an entire copyrighted work is neither fair nor licensed yet somehow doesn’t also surmise that it’s infringing, it’s hard to see how either result is compelled by the statutes, much less how it was intended by Congress. On the latter point, the Second Circuit in essence has written red flag knowledge out of the statute, reducing the DMCA to a mere notice-and-takedown regime. The reality is that Congress expected red flag knowledge to do far more work, incentivizing service providers to take action in the face of a red flag—even without a notice.

If there’s any good to come from Vimeo, it might only be that the Second Circuit has now deepened the circuit split with the Ninth Circuit in Columbia Pictures v. Fung on two issues related to red flag knowledge. Under the statute, red flag knowledge exists when a service provider is “aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.” The two circuits are already split on the issue of whether red flag knowledge must pertain to the particular works that are being sued over in the suit. And now with Vimeo, the circuits are split on the issue of whether a service provider can gain red flag knowledge just by looking at an infringing work. The deeper the circuit split, the greater the chance an appeal will make it to the Supreme Court, which would hopefully clean up the current red flag knowledge mess.

In Fung, the defendant, Gary Fung, operated several piracy havens, including isoHunt, TorrentBox, Podtropolis, and eDonkey. The district court found Fung liable for inducement under MGM v. Grokster and denied him safe harbor protection under the DMCA. The district court’s decision came in 2009, two years before the Ninth Circuit first held in UMG v. Shelter Capital that red flag knowledge requires “specific knowledge of particular infringing activity.” It also came two-and-a-half years before the Second Circuit held in Viacom v. YouTube that red flag knowledge is only relevant if it pertains to the works-in-suit. Regardless, since the vast majority of content available on Fung’s sites was copyrighted, including specific content that he himself had downloaded, the district court held that Fung hadn’t even raised a triable issue of fact as to whether he had red flag knowledge. The fact that none of the works he had been sued over were the same as the ones he had been found to have red flag knowledge of was irrelevant.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that Fung had red flag knowledge as a matter of law. The opinion came out just one week after the same panel of judges issued a superseding opinion in UMG v. Shelter Capital reiterating that red flag knowledge requires “specific knowledge of particular infringing activity.” Importantly, in applying that standard to Fung, the Ninth Circuit did not say that the specific knowledge had to be of the particular works-in-suit. For whatever reason, Fung had failed to argue otherwise. Google even filed an amicus brief supporting the plaintiffs but nonetheless arguing that “the DMCA’s knowledge standards are specific and focus on the particular material that the plaintiff is suing about.” Apparently unaware that this actually helped his case, Fung filed a supplemental brief calling Google’s argument “fallacious.”

In the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, even though red flag knowledge had to relate to particular infringing activity, that activity did not have to involve the particular works-in-suit. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit held that the “material in question was sufficiently current and well-known that it would have been objectively obvious to a reasonable person” that it was “both copyrighted and not licensed to random members of the public.” Since Fung failed to expeditiously remove the particular material of which he had red flag knowledge, he lost his safe harbor protection across the board. Thus, the Ninth Circuit in Fung held that: (1) red flag knowledge that strips a service provider of its entire safe harbor protection does not have to pertain to the particular works-in-suit, and (2) material can be so “current and well-known” that its infringing nature would be “objectively obvious to a reasonable person.”

The Second Circuit in Vimeo parted ways with the Ninth Circuit on these two holdings. Since the “evidence was not shown to relate to any of the videos at issue in this suit,” the Second Circuit held that it was “insufficient to justify a finding of red flag knowledge . . . as to those specific videos.” The Second Circuit thus applied the red flag knowledge standard on a work-by-work basis, in direct contrast to the Ninth Circuit in Fung. Also, the Second Circuit held that “the mere fact that a video contains all or substantially all of a piece of recognizable, or even famous, copyrighted music” and was “viewed in its entirety” by an “employee of a service provider” was not enough “to sustain the copyright owner’s burden of showing red flag knowledge.” The court added that even “an employee who was a copyright expert cannot be expected to know when use of a copyrighted song has been licensed.” So while the Ninth Circuit said it would have been objectively obvious to Fung that particular works were infringing, the Second Circuit in Vimeo set the bar far higher.

Curiously, the Second Circuit in Vimeo didn’t even mention Fung, despite the fact that it was deepening the circuit split with the Ninth Circuit. One wonders whether the omission was intentional. Either way, the circuit split has only gotten deeper. While in the Ninth Circuit an infringement can be so obvious that a court can find that a service provider had red flag knowledge without even sending it to a jury, the Second Circuit says that courts can’t let a jury decide whether a service provider had red flag knowledge even with the most obvious of infringements. And while in the Ninth Circuit a service provider loses its entire safe harbor for failing to remove an obvious infringement that it hasn’t been sued over, the Second Circuit says that red flag knowledge has to be determined on a work-by-work basis for only the works-in-suit. Given this growing divide between the Second and Ninth Circuits, it seems like only a matter of time before the Supreme Court will weigh in on the red flag knowledge standard. And if the Court does finally weigh in, one hopes it will put common sense back into the DMCA.

Tags Capitol Records v. Vimeo, circuit split, Columbia Pictures v. Fung, Digital Millennium Copyright Act, DMCA, Gary Fung, Google, inducement, MGM v. Grokster, Ninth Circuit, pre-1972 sound recordings, red flag knowledge, safe harbors, Second Circuit, Section 301, Section 512, UMG v. Shelter Capital, Viacom v. YouTube, Vimeo

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