Tag: Section 512

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Copyright Internet Legislation Uncategorized

Copyright Policy Should Be Based On Facts, Not Rhetoric

Here’s a brief excerpt of a post by Kevin Madigan & Devlin Hartline that was published on IPWatchdog.

After nearly twenty years with the DMCA, the Copyright Office has launched a new study to examine the impact and effectiveness of this system, and voices on both sides of the debate have filed comments expressing their views. For the most part, frustrated copyright owners report that the DMCA has not successfully stemmed the tide of online infringement, which is completely unsurprising to anyone who spends a few minutes online searching for copyrighted works. Unfortunately, some commentators are also pushing for changes that that would make things even more difficult for copyright owners.

To read the rest of this post, please visit IPWatchdog.

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Separating Fact from Fiction in the Notice and Takedown Debate

By Kevin Madigan & Devlin Hartline

U.S. Capitol buidlingWith the Copyright Office undertaking a new study to evaluate the impact and effectiveness of the Section 512 safe harbor provisions, there’s been much discussion about how well the DMCA’s notice and takedown system is working for copyright owners, service providers, and users. While hearing from a variety of viewpoints can help foster a healthy discussion, it’s important to separate rigorous research efforts from overblown reports that offer incomplete data in support of dubious policy recommendations.

Falling into the latter category is Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice, a recently-released study claiming to take an in-depth look at how well the notice and takedown system operates after nearly twenty years in practice. The study has garnered numerous headlines that repeat its conclusion that nearly 30% of all takedown requests are “questionable” and that echo its suggestions for statutory reforms that invariably disfavor copyright owners. But what the headlines don’t mention is that the study presents only a narrow and misleading assessment of the notice and takedown process that overstates its findings and fails to adequately support its broad policy recommendations.

Presumably released to coincide with the deadline for submitting comments to the Copyright Office on the state of Section 512, the authors claim to have produced “the broadest empirical analysis of the DMCA notice and takedown” system to date. They make bold pronouncements about how “the notice and takedown system . . . meets the goals it was intended to address” and “continues to provide an efficient method of enforcement in many circumstances.” But the goals identified by the authors are heavily skewed towards service providers and users at the expense of copyright owners, and the authors include no empirical analysis of whether the notice and takedown system is actually effective at combating widespread piracy.

The study reads more like propaganda than robust empiricism. It should be taken for what it is: A policy piece masquerading as an independent study. The authors’ narrow focus on one sliver of the notice and takedown process, with no analysis of the systemic results, leads to conclusions and recommendations that completely ignore the central issue of whether Section 512 fosters an online environment that adequately protects the rights of copyright owners. The authors conveniently ignore this part of the DMCA calculus and instead put forth a series of proposals that would systematically make it harder for copyright owners to protect their property rights.

To its credit, the study acknowledges many of its own limitations. For example, the authors recognize that the “dominance of Google notices in our dataset limits our ability to draw broader conclusions about the notice ecosystem.” Indeed, over 99.992% of the individual requests in the dataset for the takedown study were directed at Google, with 99.8% of that dataset directed at Google Search in particular. Of course, search engines do not include user-generated content—the links Google provides are links that Google itself collects and publishes. There are no third parties to alert about the takedowns since Google is taking down its own content. Likewise, removing links from Google Search does not actually remove the linked-to content from the internet.

The authors correctly admit that “the characteristics of these notices cannot be extrapolated to the entire world of notice sending.” A more thorough quantitative study would include data on sites that host user-generated content, like YouTube and Facebook. As it stands, the study gives us some interesting data on one search engine, but even that data is limited to a sample size of 1,826 requests out of 108 million over a six-month period in mid-2013. And it’s not even clear how these samples were randomized since the authors admittedly created “tranches” to ensure the notices collected were “of great substantive interest,” but they provide no details about how they created these tranches.

Despite explicitly acknowledging that the study’s data is not generalizable, the authors nonetheless rely on it to make numerous policy suggestions that would affect the entire notice and takedown system and that would tilt the deck further in favor of infringement and against copyright owners. They even identify some of their suggestions as explicitly reflecting “Public Knowledge’s suggestion,” which is a far cry from a reasoned academic approach. The authors do note that “any changes should take into account the interests of . . . small- and medium-sized copyright holders,” but this is mere lip service. Their proposals would hurt copyright owners of all shapes and sizes.

The authors justify their policy proposals by pointing to the “mistaken and abusive takedown demands” that they allegedly uncover in the study. These so-called “questionable” notices are the supposed proof that the entire notice and takedown system needs fixing. A closer look at these “questionable” notices shows that they’re not nearly so questionable. The authors claim that 4.2% of the notices surveyed (about 77 notices) are “fundamentally flawed because they targeted content that clearly did not match the identified infringed work.” This figure includes obvious mismatches, where the titles aren’t even the same. But it also includes ambiguous notices, such as where the underlying work does not match the title or where the underlying page changes over time.

The bulk of the so-called “questionable” notices comes from those notices that raise “questions about compliance with the statutory requirements” (15.4%, about 281 notices) or raise “potential fair use defenses” (7.3%, about 133 notices). As to the statutory requirements issue, the authors argue that these notices make it difficult for Google to locate the material to take down. This claim is severely undercut by the fact that, as they acknowledge in a footnote, Google complies with 97.5% of takedown notices overall. Moreover, it wades into the murky waters of whether copyright owners can send service providers a “representative list” of infringing works. Turning to the complaint about potential fair uses, the authors argue that copyright owners are not adequately considering “mashups, remixes, or covers.” But none of these uses are inherently fair, and there’s no reason to think that the notices were sent in bad faith just because someone might be able to make a fair use argument.

The authors claim that their “recommendations for statutory reforms are relatively modest,” but that supposed modesty is absent from their broad list of suggestions. Of course, everything they suggest increases the burdens and liabilities of copyright owners while lowering the burdens and liabilities of users, service providers, and infringers. Having overplayed the data on “questionable” notices, the authors reveal their true biases. And it’s important to keep in mind that they make these broad suggestions that would affect everyone in the notice and takedown system after explicitly acknowledging that their data “cannot be extrapolated to the entire world of notice sending.” Indeed, the study contains no empirical data on sites that host user-generated content, so there’s nothing whatsoever to support any changes for such sites.

The study concludes that the increased use of automated systems to identify infringing works online has resulted in the need for better mechanisms to verify the accuracy of takedown requests, including human review. But the data is limited to small surveys with secret questions and a tiny fraction of notices sent to one search engine. The authors offer no analysis of the potential costs of implementing their recommendations, nor do they consider how it might affect the ability of copyright owners to police piracy. Furthermore, data presented later in the study suggests that increased human review might have little effect on the accuracy of takedown notices. Not only do the authors fail to address the larger problem of whether the DMCA adequately addresses online piracy, their suggestions aren’t even likely to address the narrower problem of inaccurate notices that they want to fix.

Worse still, the study almost completely discards the ability of users to contest mistaken or abusive notices by filing counternotices. This is the solution that’s already built into the DMCA, yet the authors inexplicably dismiss it as ineffective and unused. Apart from providing limited answers from a few unidentified survey respondents, the authors offer no data on the frequency or effectiveness of counternotices. The study repeatedly criticizes the counternotice system as failing to offer “due process protection” to users, but that belief is grounded in the notion that a user that fails to send a counternotice has somehow been denied the chance. Moreover, it implies a constitutional right that is not at issue when two parties interact in the absence of government action. The same holds true for the authors’ repeated—and mistaken—invocation of “freedom of expression.”

More fundamentally, the study ignores the fact that the counternotice system is stacked against copyright owners. A user can simply file a counternotice and have the content in question reposted, and most service providers are willing to repost the content following a counternotice because they’re no longer on the hook should the content turn out to be infringing. The copyright owner, by contrast, then faces the choice of allowing the infringement to continue or filing an expensive lawsuit in federal court. The study makes it sound like users are rendered helpless because counternotices are too onerous, but the reality is that the system leaves copyright owners practically powerless to combat bad faith counternotices.

Pretty much everyone agrees that the notice and takedown system needs a tune up. The amount of infringing content available online today is immense. This rampant piracy has resulted in an incredible number of takedown notices being sent to service providers by copyright owners each day. Undoubtedly, the notice and takedown system should be updated to address these realities. And to the extent that some are abusing the system, they should be held accountable. But in considering changes to the entire system, we should not be persuaded by biased studies based on limited (and secret) datasets that provide little to no support for their ultimate conclusions and recommendations. While it may make for evocative headlines, it doesn’t make for good policy.

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Copyright Internet Legislation Uncategorized

Middle Class Artists Want a DMCA System That Works

The following guest post comes from Rebecca Cusey, a second year law student at George Mason University School of Law.

By Rebecca Cusey

Rebecca_Cusey_HeadshotMason Law’s Arts & Entertainment Advocacy Clinic filed comments today with the U.S. Copyright Office detailing the frustrations and futilities experienced by everyday artists as they struggle with the DMCA system to protect their copyrights online.

Terrica Carrington and I wrote the comments on behalf of middle class artists, that group of creative professionals who invests in and lives off their art and yet does not have the kind of revenue stream or corporate backing of more well-known artists. These photographers, filmmakers, musicians, and other artists are squeezed between infringement that directly affects their ability to pay for things like a mortgage or orthodontics bill and the exorbitant cost of using the notice and takedown system to fight infringement.

Terrica and I spoke with four artists: Filmmaker Ellen Seidler, news photographer Yunghi Kim, musician Blake Morgan, audiovisual creator David Newhoff. These artists make works of value and have followings, and thus infringement. They make a profession of their art.

A middle class artist must do it all on her own – find infringement by hours of searching the web, compile lists of infringing posts on each site, navigate each site’s confusing DMCA notification system, and send takedown notification after takedown notification. And that’s all just sending the notifications. Monitoring to see if the infringing content has been removed or if it has simply been uploaded in another spot is a whole other job in itself.

The artists with whom we talked said it was not unusual in the least for a song, photograph, or film to be posted illegally in a thousand places, even tens of thousands of places. Finding infringement and sending notices took hundreds and thousands of hours, hours they could have spent taking photographs, making movies, or writing songs.

After all the time spent fighting infringement online, they felt the task was futile because the content simply reappeared, sometimes in a different place on the same site, other times because of counternotices filed with the ISP hosting the content claiming to have the right to post it.

These artists felt the notice and takedown system mandated by Section 512 of the Copyright Act was both all-consuming and futile, all-consuming because it ate hours upon hours and futile because it yielded little to no results. Ultimately, all of them decided to stop spending time trying to enforce their copyrights under the procedures of Section 512. It simply was not worth it.

Our comments were filed in response to a request by the U.S. Copyright Office for comments on the effectiveness of Section 512 in fighting infringement online. The Copyright Office wanted to know in particular if the provisions of Section 512 balanced the needs of ISPs to host content with the needs of copyright owners to control their work.

Middle class artists feel the balance is off and the scale tipped in favor of ISPs. These artists do not object to bearing some responsibility for protecting their copyrights online. They simply want a system that works.

To read our Section 512 comments, please click here.

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Copyright Scholars: Courts Have Disrupted the DMCA’s Careful Balance of Interests

Washington, D.C. at nightThe U.S. Copyright Office is conducting a study of the safe harbors under Section 512 of the DMCA, and comments are due today. Working with Victor Morales and Danielle Ely from Mason Law’s Arts & Entertainment Advocacy Clinic, we drafted and submitted comments on behalf of several copyright law scholars. In our Section 512 comments, we look at one narrow issue that we believe is the primary reason the DMCA is not working as it should: the courts’ failure to properly apply the red flag knowledge standard. We argue that judicial interpretations of red flag knowledge have disrupted the careful balance of responsibilities Congress intended between copyright owners and service providers. Instead of requiring service providers to take action in the face of red flags, courts have allowed them to turn a blind eye and bury their heads in the sand.

Whether Section 512’s safe harbors are working as intended is a hotly contested issue. On the one hand, hundreds of artists and songwriters are calling for changes “to the antiquated DMCA which forces creators to police the entire internet for instances of theft, placing an undue burden on these artists and unfairly favoring technology companies and rogue pirate sites.” On the other hand, groups like the Internet Association, which includes tech giants such as Google and Facebook, claim that the safe harbors are “working effectively” since they “strike a balance between facilitating free speech and creativity while protecting the interests of copyright holders.” The Internet Association even claims that “the increasing number of notice and takedown requests” shows that the DMCA working.

Of course, it’s utter nonsense to suggest that the more takedown notices sent and processed, the more we know the DMCA is working. The point of the safe harbors, according to the Senate Report on the DMCA, is “to make digital networks safe places to disseminate and exploit copyrighted materials.” The proper metric of success is not the number of takedown notices sent; it’s whether the internet is a safe place for copyright owners to disseminate and exploit their works. The continuing availability of huge amounts of pirated works should tip us off that the safe harbors are not working as intended. If anything, the increasing need for takedown notices suggests that things are getting worse for copyright owners, not better. If the internet were becoming a safer place, the number of takedown notices should be decreasing. It’s not surprising that service providers enjoy the status quo, given that the burden of tracking down and identifying infringement doesn’t fall on them, but this is not the balance that Congress intended to strike.

Our comments to the Copyright Office run through the relevant legislative history to show what Congress really had in mind—and it wasn’t copyright owners doing all of the work in locating and identifying infringement online. Instead, as noted in the Senate Report, Congress sought to “preserve[] strong incentives for service providers and copyright owners to cooperate to detect and deal with copyright infringements that take place in the digital networked environment.” The red flag knowledge standard was a key leverage point to encourage service providers to participate in the effort to detect and eliminate infringement. Unfortunately, courts thus far have interpreted the standard so narrowly that, beyond acting on takedown notices, service providers have little incentive to work together with copyright owners to prevent piracy. Even in cases with the most crimson of flags, courts have failed to strip service providers of their safe harbor protection. Perversely, the current case law incentivizes service providers to actively avoid doing anything when they see red flags, lest they gain actual knowledge of infringement and jeopardize their safe harbors. This is exactly the opposite of what Congress intended.

The Second and Ninth Circuits have interpreted the red flag knowledge standard to require knowledge of specific infringing material before service providers can lose their safe harbors. While tech giants might think this is great, it’s terrible for authors and artists who need service providers to carry their share of the load in combating online piracy. Creators are left in a miserable position where they bear the entire burden of policing infringement across an immense range of services, effectively making it impossible to prevent the deluge of piracy of their works. The Second and Ninth Circuits believe red flag knowledge should require specificity because otherwise service providers wouldn’t know exactly what material to remove when faced with a red flag. We argue that Congress intended service providers with red flag knowledge of infringing activity in general to then bear the burden of locating and removing the specific infringing material. This is the balance of responsibilities that Congress had in mind when it crafted the red flag knowledge standard and differentiated it from the actual knowledge standard.

But all hope is not lost. The Second and Ninth Circuits are but two appellate courts, and there are many others that have yet to rule on the red flag knowledge issue. Moreover, the Supreme Court has never interpreted the safe harbors of the DMCA. We hope that our comments will help expose the underlying problem that hurts so many creators today who are stuck playing the DMCA’s whack-a-mole game when their very livelihoods are at stake. Congress intended the DMCA to be the cornerstone of a shared-responsibility approach to fighting online piracy. Unfortunately, it has become a shield that allows service providers to enable piracy on a massive scale without making any efforts to prevent it beyond acting on takedown notices. The fact that search engines can still index The Pirate Bay—an emblematic piracy site that even has the word “pirate” in its name—without concern of losing their safe harbor protection is a testament to how the courts have turned Congress’ intent on its head. We hope that the Copyright Office’s study will shed light on this important issue.

To read our Section 512 comments, please click here.

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Copyright Internet Uncategorized

Attacking the Notice-and-Staydown Straw Man

Ever since the U.S. Copyright Office announced its study of the DMCA last December, the notice-and-staydown issue has become a particularly hot topic. Critics of notice-and-staydown have turned up the volume, repeating the same vague assertions about freedom, censorship, innovation, and creativity that routinely pop up whenever someone proposes practical solutions to curb online infringement. Worse still, many critics don’t even take the time to look at what proponents of notice-and-staydown are suggesting, choosing instead to knock down an extremist straw man that doesn’t reflect anyone’s view of how the internet should function. A closer look at what proponents of notice-and-staydown are actually proposing reveals that the two sides aren’t nearly as far apart as critics would have us believe. This is particularly true when it comes to the issue of how well notice-and-staydown would accommodate fair use.

For example, Joshua Lamel’s recent piece at The Huffington Post claims that “innovation and creativity are still under attack” by the “entertainment industry’s intense and well-financed lobbying campaign” pushing for notice-and-staydown. Lamel argues that the “content filtering proposed by advocates of a ‘notice and staydown’ system . . . would severely limit new and emerging forms of creativity.” And his parade of horribles is rather dramatic: “Parents can forget posting videos of their kids dancing to music and candidates would not be able to post campaign speeches because of the music that plays in the background. Remix culture and fan fiction would likely disappear from our creative discourse.” Scary stuff, if true. But Lamel fails to cite a single source showing that artists, creators, and other proponents of notice-and-staydown are asking for anything close to this.

Similarly, Elliot Harmon of the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) argues that “a few powerful lobbyists” are pushing for notice-and-staydown such that “once a takedown notice goes uncontested, the platform should have to filter and block any future uploads of the same allegedly infringing content.” Harmon also assumes the worst: “Under the filter-everything approach, legitimate uses of works wouldn’t get the reasonable consideration they deserve,” and “computers would still not be able to consider a work’s fair use status.” Like Lamel, Harmon claims that “certain powerful content owners seek to brush aside the importance of fair use,” but he doesn’t actually mention what these supposed evildoers have to say about notice-and-staydown.

Harmon’s suggestion that the reliance on uncontested takedown notices gives inadequate consideration to fair use is particularly strange as it directly contradicts the position taken by the EFF. Back in October of 2007, copyright owners (including CBS and Fox) and service providers (including Myspace and Veoh) promulgated a list of Principles for User Generated Content Services. These Principles recommend that service providers should use fingerprinting technology to enact notice-and-staydown, with the general caveat that fair use should be accommodated. Two weeks later, the EFF published its own list of Fair Use Principles for User Generated Video Content suggesting in detail how notice-and-staydown should respect fair use.

The EFF’s Fair Use Principles include the following:

The use of “filtering” technology should not be used to automatically remove, prevent the uploading of, or block access to content unless the filtering mechanism is able to verify that the content has previously been removed pursuant to an undisputed DMCA takedown notice or that there are “three strikes” against it:

1. the video track matches the video track of a copyrighted work submitted by a content owner;
2. the audio track matches the audio track of that same copyrighted work; and
3. nearly the entirety (e.g., 90% or more) of the challenged content is comprised of a single copyrighted work (i.e., a “ratio test”).

If filtering technologies are not reliably able to establish these “three strikes,” further human review by the content owner should be required before content is taken down or blocked.

Though not explicitly endorsing notice-and-staydown, the EFF thinks it’s entirely consistent with fair use so long as (1) the content at issue has already been subject to one uncontested takedown notice, or (2) the content at issue is at least a 90% match to a copyrighted work. And the funny thing is that supporters of notice-and-staydown today are actually advocating for what the EFF recognized to be reasonable over eight years ago.

While Harmon never explicitly identifies the “powerful lobbyists” he accuses of wanting to trample on fair use, he does link to the Copyright Office’s recently-announced study of the DMCA and suggest that they can be found there. Reading through that announcement, I can only find three citations (in footnote 36) to people advocating for notice-and-staydown: (1) Professor Sean O’Connor of the University of Washington School of Law (and Senior Scholar at CPIP), (2) Paul Doda, Global Litigation Counsel at Elsevier, and (3) Maria Schneider, composer/conductor/producer. These three cites all point to testimonies given at the Section 512 of Title 17 hearing before the House Judiciary Committee in March of 2014, and they show that Harmon is attacking a straw man. In fact, all three of these advocates for notice-and-staydown seek a system that is entirely consistent with the EFF’s own Fair Use Principles.

Sean O’Connor seeks notice-and-staydown only for “reposted works,” that is, “ones that have already been taken down on notice” and that are “simply the original work reposted repeatedly by unauthorized persons.” His proposal only applies to works that “do not even purport to be transformative or non-infringing,” and he specifically excludes “mash-ups, remixes, covers, etc.” This not only comports with the EFF’s recommendations, it goes beyond them. Where the EFF would require either a previously uncontested notice or at least a 90% match, O’Connor thinks there should be both an uncontested notice and a 100% match.

The same is true for Paul Doda of Elsevier, who testifies that fingerprinting technology is “an appropriate and effective method to ensure that only copies that are complete or a substantially complete copy of a copyrighted work are prevented or removed by sites.” Doda explicitly notes that filtering is not suitable for “works that might require more detailed infringement analysis or ‘Fair Use’ analysis,” and he praises YouTube’s Content ID system “that can readily distinguish between complete copies of works and partial copies or clips.” Doda’s vision of notice-and-staydown is also more protective of fair use than the EFF’s Fair Use Principles. While the EFF suggests that a previously uncontested notice is sufficient, Doda instead only suggests that there be a substantial match.

Unlike O’Connor and Doda, Maria Schneider is not a lawyer. She’s instead a working musician, and her testimony reflects her own frustrations with the whack-a-mole problem under the DMCA’s current notice-and-takedown regime. As a solution, Schneider proposes that creators “should be able to prevent unauthorized uploading before infringement occurs,” and she points to YouTube’s Content ID as evidence that “it’s technically possible for companies to block unauthorized works.” While she doesn’t explicitly propose that there be a substantial match before content is filtered, Schneider gives the example of her “most recent album” being available “on numerous file sharing websites.” In other words, she’s concerned about verbatim copies of her works that aren’t possibly fair use, and nothing Schneider recommends contradicts the EFF’s own suggestions for accommodating fair use.

Lamel and Harmon paint a picture of powerful industry lobbyist boogeymen seeking an onerous system of notice-and-staydown that fails to adequately account for fair use, but neither produces any evidence to support their claims. Responses to the Copyright Office’s DMCA study are due on March 21st, and it will be interesting to see whether any of these supposed boogeymen really show up. There’s little doubt, though, that critics will continue attacking the notice-and-staydown straw man. And it’s really a shame, because advocates of notice-and-staydown are quite conscious of the importance of protecting fair use. This is easy to see, but first you have to look at what they’re really saying.

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Ninth Circuit Gets Fair Use Wrong to the Detriment of Creators

The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Lenz v. Universal is out, and it’s a doozy. The main issue in the case is whether a rightholder has to consider fair use before sending a DMCA takedown notice. Section 512 requires the sender to state that she “has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law.” Section 107 says that “the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright.” The question is whether fair use, which “is not an infringement” under Section 107, is therefore “authorized by . . . the law” under Section 512.

The court concludes that Section 512 “unambiguously contemplates fair use as a use authorized by the law.” This means that rightholders in the Ninth Circuit are now obligated to consider and reject fair use before sending a takedown notice. The court’s new spin on the DMCA places additional obstacles in the way of rightholders—particularly individual creators. The system is already confusing and onerous, and now it burdens people who are not lawyers with the duty to reach legal conclusions. The DMCA notice and takedown regime is a joke, often providing creators and rightholders less than a few minutes of relief before infringing works are reposted, and this opinion only makes the problem worse. But rather than rehash commentary you can read elsewhere, I want to highlight one startling error in the court’s reasoning.

In a bizarre section of the opinion, the Ninth Circuit declares that fair use is not an affirmative defense that excuses infringement: “Given that 17 U.S.C. § 107 expressly authorizes fair use, labeling it as an affirmative defense that excuses conduct is a misnomer[.]” In support, the court purports to quote a footnote from the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Bateman for the proposition that fair use is a right:

Although the traditional approach is to view “fair use” as an affirmative defense, . . . it is better viewed as a right granted by the Copyright Act of 1976. Originally, as a judicial doctrine without any statutory basis, fair use was an infringement that was excused—this is presumably why it was treated as a defense. As a statutory doctrine, however, fair use is not an infringement. Thus, since the passage of the 1976 Act, fair use should no longer be considered an infringement to be excused; instead, it is logical to view fair use as a right. Regardless of how fair use is viewed, it is clear that the burden of proving fair use is always on the putative infringer.

This is extremely misleading. The Ninth Circuit makes it sound like the Eleventh Circuit rejects the notion that fair use is an affirmative defense that excuses otherwise infringing conduct. The reality is that the Eleventh Circuit does no such thing. Here’s the full footnote from Bateman, with a paragraph break added:

Fair use traditionally has been treated as an affirmative defense to a charge of copyright infringement See Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, ––––, 114 S.Ct. 1164, 1177, 127 L.Ed.2d 500 (1994) (stating that “fair use is an affirmative defense”). In viewing fair use as an excused infringement, the court must, in addressing this mixed question of law and fact, determine whether the use made of the original components of a copyrighted work is “fair” under 17 U.S.C. § 107. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560, 105 S.Ct. 2218, 2230, 85 L.Ed.2d 588 (1985) (citing Pacific & Southern Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1495 n. 8 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004, 105 S.Ct. 1867, 85 L.Ed.2d 161 (1985)).

Although the traditional approach is to view “fair use” as an affirmative defense, this writer, speaking only for himself, is of the opinion that it is better viewed as a right granted by the Copyright Act of 1976. Originally, as a judicial doctrine without any statutory basis, fair use was an infringement that was excused—this is presumably why it was treated as a defense. As a statutory doctrine, however, fair use is not an infringement. Thus, since the passage of the 1976 Act, fair use should no longer be considered an infringement to be excused; instead, it is logical to view fair use as a right. Regardless of how fair use is viewed, it is clear that the burden of proving fair use is always on the putative infringer.

The Ninth Circuit here cut out the first half of the footnote, where the Eleventh Circuit quotes binding Supreme Court precedent explicitly saying that “fair use is an affirmative defense” and then explains what must be done when analyzing such an “excused infringement.” Even worse, the Ninth Circuit uses an ellipsis to cut out the part in the second half of the footnote where Judge Birch, who authored Bateman, makes clear that he’s “speaking only for himself” when he says that fair use is not an “infringement to be excused.” The Ninth Circuit pretends to be adopting the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning, when in fact it’s rejecting it.

Judge Birch himself even reiterates the point five years later in his opinion for the Eleventh Circuit in the Suntrust case. In discussing the opinion of the court, he refers to the defendant’s “affirmative defense of fair use.” But then in the accompanying footnote, he likewise says that it’s only his personal opinion that fair use is a right. Here’s what he writes:

I believe that fair use should be considered an affirmative right under the 1976 Act, rather than merely an affirmative defense, as it is defined in the Act as a use that is not a violation of copyright. See Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 n. 22 (11th Cir.1996). However, fair use is commonly referred to as an affirmative defense, see Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590, 114 S.Ct. 1164, 1177, 127 L.Ed.2d 500 (1994), and, as we are bound by Supreme Court precedent, we will apply it as such.

Judge Birch fully understands that fair use is an affirmative defense and that binding Supreme Court precedent compels him to “apply it as such.” And twice he has followed that precedent when writing for the Eleventh Circuit. Yet, the Ninth Circuit here makes it sound like it’s agreeing with the Eleventh Circuit in holding that fair use is a right and not an affirmative defense.

The Eleventh Circuit has even explicitly said that Judge Birch’s view is not the law in that circuit. In an opinion from 2010, the Eleventh Circuit rejects an argument made by the defendant that “fair use is merely a denial of copyright infringement rather than an affirmative defense[.]” The defendant had cited Judge Birch for the proposition, but the Eleventh Circuit notes that “a close reading of Judge Birch’s comments reveal that he was expressing his personal views, not the views of this Court,” and it again holds that “the fair use of copyrighted work is an affirmative defense and should be pleaded as such.”

It’s simply disingenuous for the Ninth Circuit to claim that fair use is not an affirmative defense in the Eleventh Circuit. It is an affirmative defense there and in every other circuit because the Supreme Court has said it’s so. Judge Birch doesn’t get to overrule the Supreme Court, and neither does the Ninth Circuit. Yet, that’s what it purports to do here in Lenz v. Universal.

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The MovieTube Litigation: Who Needs SOPA?

Cross-posted from the Law Theories blog.

On July 24th, six major studios sued MovieTube for direct and indirect copyright infringement, trademark infringement, and unfair competition in the Southern District of New York. MovieTube is alleged to have operated twenty-nine foreign-based websites that streamed, displayed, and uploaded infringing copies of the studios’ copyrighted works. Not knowing the defendants’ true identities, the studios brought suit against the “John Does, Jane Does and/or XYZ Corporations” that allegedly operated the MovieTube sites. The district court allowed the studios to serve process on the defendants via email.

The remedies being sought by the studios have raised a few feathers. MovieTube operates out of Singapore, and the studios argue that it is “essential . . . that injunctive relief include orders directed at third parties whose services enable Defendants’ activities.” Since MovieTube relies on “domain name registries and other third-party service providers and their network of affiliates to carry out their activities,” the studios are seeking an order “requiring that: (i) registries and registrars disable the domain names used to operate the MovieTube Websites and (ii) third-party service providers cease providing services to the MovieTube Websites and Defendants in relation to the Infringing Copies.”

While some have suggested that the studios “didn’t get the memo that SOPA failed,” I think the real question is, “Who needs SOPA?” Everyone knows that SOPA never became law, and the studios haven’t brought any claims under SOPA. Moreover, even if SOPA were the law, it would make no difference here. SOPA would have only provided private rightholders with statutory remedies against a “payment network provider” or an “Internet advertising service.” Only actions brought by the Attorney General would qualify for statutory remedies against service providers such as registrars, registries, and search engines.

The studios instead argue that the court’s power to issue such orders comes from:

(i) 17 U.S.C. § 502, which allows a court to “grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright;”

(ii) 15 U.S.C § 1116(a), which provides for an injunction “according to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem reasonable, to prevent the violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office or to prevent a violation under subsection (a), (c), or (d) of section 43 [15 U.S.C. § 1125];”

(iii) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2), which imbues courts with the power to issue injunctions that bind parties, parties’ officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys and any “other persons who are in active concert or participation with” any such individuals or entities;

(iv) the Court’s “inherent equitable power to issue provisional remedies ancillary to its authority to provide final equitable relief,” which encompasses injunctions as broad as restraining defendants’ assets to preserve them for disgorgement of profits and equitable accounting . . . and/or

(v) the Court’s power pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (the All Writs Act) to issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of its jurisdiction and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.

The question is whether the court has the power under these authorities to issue an injunction against MovieTube that binds third-party service providers. SOPA has nothing to do with it.[1]

After the studios filed suit, the MovieTube defendants shut down their operations. Nonetheless, a group of tech giants, comprised of Google, Facebook, Tumblr, Twitter, and Yahoo, filed an amicus brief arguing that “the proposed injunction violates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 and the safe-harbor provisions of the DMCA.” Specifically, the amici claim that an injunction against MovieTube couldn’t bind third parties such as themselves because Rule 65(d)(2) and Section 512(j) of the DMCA wouldn’t allow it.[2] I don’t think either of these two arguments holds much water, especially for service providers like these amici that link to or host infringing material.

Blockowicz and Rule 65(d)(2)

Rule 65(d)(2) provides that only three groups may be bound by an injunction:

(2) Persons Bound. The order binds only the following who receive actual notice of it by personal service or otherwise:

(A) the parties;

(B) the parties’ officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and

(C) other persons who are in active concert or participation with anyone described in Rule 65(d)(2)(A) or (B).

The amici argue that Rule 65(d)(2) can’t bind third parties like them since it cannot be shown that they are in “active concert or participation” with the MovieTube defendants. In support, they cite the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Blockowicz v. Williams. The issue there was whether nonparty Ripoff Report was bound by an injunction against some of its users that had posted defamatory material to its site. Ripoff Report conceded “actual notice” of the injunction, but it argued that it was not in “active concert” with its defaming users.

The Seventh Circuit agreed:

Actions that aid and abet in violating the injunction must occur after the injunction is imposed for the purposes of Rule 65(d)(2)(C), and certainly after the wrongdoing that led to the injunction occurred. This requirement is apparent from Rule 65(d)(2)’s text, which requires that nonparties have “actual notice” of the injunction. A non-party who engages in conduct before an injunction is imposed cannot have “actual notice” of the injunction at the time of their relevant conduct. . . .

Further, the [plaintiffs] presented no evidence that [Ripoff Report] took any action to aid or abet the defendants in violating the injunction after it was issued, either by enforcing the Terms of Service or in any other way. . . . [Ripoff Report’s] mere inactivity is simply inadequate to render them aiders and abettors in violating the injunction.

Thus, Ripoff Report was not in “active concert” with its users by simply continuing to host the defamatory material that had been posted to its site before the injunction was issued. The amici here claim that this same logic applies to them: “[E]ven if Plaintiffs had shown that the Neutral Service Providers rendered services to the Defendants, merely continuing to provide those services cannot amount to acting in concert.’”

Blockowicz is not binding precedent here, of course, but the district court could find it persuasive. I think it’s clear that the Seventh Circuit reached the wrong conclusion. The test is whether the third party has actual notice of the injunction and then aids and abets the enjoined defendant. It’s black letter law that anyone who publishes or republishes defaming material is strictly liable for the defamation. On the other hand, a distributor is not liable as a publisher unless it knows or has reason to know that the material is defamatory.

For example, a book publisher is strictly liable for publishing a defamatory book. A bookseller that sells that defamatory book is not liable for the defamation unless it knows the material is defamatory. If it learns of the defamatory nature of the book and then continues to sell it, the bookseller is considered a publisher and is liable for the defamation along with the book publisher. In other words, the passive book distributor becomes an active aider and abettor of the book publisher once it gains knowledge of the defamation and fails to stop selling the book.

Of course, this rule from the physical world does not apply when it’s done on the internet. Section 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act provides: “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” While the statute on its face only grants immunity to a “publisher,” courts have interpreted it broadly to apply to a “distributor” as well. As the Fourth Circuit put it in the leading case, “distributor liability. . . is merely a subset, or a species, of publisher liability, and is therefore also foreclosed by § 230.”

Section 230’s immunity for a publisher extends to a distributor with knowledge because that knowledge transforms the distributor into a publisher. The plaintiffs in Blockowicz could not go after Ripoff Report directly because Section 230 granted it immunity from civil liability. The reason it had such immunity was precisely because the knowledge of the defamation transformed it from a passive distributor to an active publisher. The plaintiffs instead went after the defamers directly, asking the court to bind Ripoff Report under Rule 65(d)(2). The Seventh Circuit’s refusal to stop Ripoff Report from aiding and abetting the enjoined defendants left the plaintiffs without a remedy—an absurd result.

Turning back to MovieTube, the amici claim that an injunction against the defendants could not bind them since they wouldn’t be aiding and abetting the defendants. This is simply not true. As with defamation, it’s black letter law that a service provider that knowingly provides material support to an infringer is contributorily liable for the infringement. In other words, the passive service provider becomes an active aider and abettor of the infringer once it gains knowledge of the underlying infringement and fails to act. This is why service providers such as the amici remove infringing material once they receive notice that they are linking to or hosting it.

When it comes to copyright infringement, the amici cannot hide behind the broad immunities of Section 230. They instead can only hope to qualify for the limitations on liability found in Section 512 of the DMCA. Of course, these safe harbors don’t protect the amici if they learn of infringing material on their systems and fail to remove it. Under Section 512(d)(1), a search engine such as Google or Yahoo does not get immunity unless it, “upon obtaining . . . knowledge or awareness” of infringing material, “acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material.”[3] The same holds true under Section 512(c)(1) for sites like Facebook, Tumblr, and Twitter that host content uploaded by their users.

When a service provider learns of infringing material on its system and fails to remove it, it becomes an aider and abettor that is jointly and severally liable with the direct infringer. But this is only true when that service provider’s contribution to the infringement is material. The DMCA codified exclusions to the safe harbors for contributions that were decidedly material, such as linking to or hosting infringing material. However, things get hazier at the margins. For example, a panel of the Ninth Circuit once split over whether a credit card processor materially contributes by servicing an infringing site. Over the vociferous dissent of Judge Alex Kozinski,[4] the two-judge majority held that it did not.

The problem for Google, Facebook, Tumblr, Twitter, and Yahoo is that there is no doubt that their failure to act once they receive notice of infringing material unquestionably constitutes aiding and abetting. Not only is it enough to find them in “active concert” with their users under Rule 65(d)(2), it’s enough to hold them contributorily liable for the infringement. They aren’t like a credit card processor, where the materiality of the contribution is in doubt. It’s well-settled that what the amici do—linking to and hosting copyrighted works—constitutes material contribution. That’s why the safe harbors under Section 512, which codified the case law, don’t apply to service providers such as them that fail to remove infringing material upon notice.

[1] I get that many people are just playing the SOPA card for rhetorical effect. But some are also arguing that SOPA would have provided rightholders with these remedies, and since SOPA is not the law, the studios therefore don’t have these remedies available. This argument is simply fallacious. With or without SOPA, the issue remains whether the court has the authority to grant the studios the requested relief.

[2] The amici do not address the existence of such authority under the Lanham Act or under the court’s inherent equitable power, and neither do I. They do argue that the All Writs Act provides no such authority, but I leave that argument aside.

[3] See also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1172 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Accordingly, we hold that a computer system operator can be held contributorily liable if it has actual knowledge that specific infringing material is available using its system and can take simple measures to prevent further damage to copyrighted works yet continues to provide access to infringing works. . . . Applying our test, Google could be held contributorily liable if it had knowledge that infringing Perfect 10 images were available using its search engine, could take simple measures to prevent further damage to Perfect 10’s copyrighted works, and failed to take such steps.”) (quotations and citations omitted).

[4] See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 816 (9th Cir. 2007) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“Defendants here are alleged to provide an essential service to infringers, a service that enables infringement on a massive scale. Defendants know about the infringements; they profit from them; they are intimately and causally involved in a vast number of infringing transactions that could not be consummated if they refused to process the payments; they have ready means to stop the infringements.”).