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Antitrust Innovation Patent Licensing

IP for the Next Generation of Mobile Technology: How the Antitrust Division Devalued Standard-Essential Patents

In advance of our Sixth Annual Fall Conference on IP for the Next Generation of Technology, we are highlighting works on the challenges brought by the revolutionary developments in mobile technology of the past fifteen years.

hand holding a phone with holographs hovering over the screenAs we highlighted in previous posts in this series (see here and here), a 2015 policy change at the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers-Standards Association (IEEE)—a standard-setting organization (SSO) for mobile technologies—placed one-sided restrictions on patent owners that have demonstrably harmed innovator participation and technological advancement.

Writing about the policy revisions, economist Gregory Sidak, the Founder and Chairman of Criterion Economics LLC in Washington, D.C., explains how the IEEE made these profound changes to its patent licensing policies with the encouragement and blessing of the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. The amendments were intended to ameliorate the supposed problems of patent holdup and royalty stacking, but they went much further than necessary and weakened the rights of patent owners in the process.

Despite the lack of evidence of harm from patent holdup or royalty stacking, the Antitrust Division commended the IEEE for changing its policies. Mr. Sidak notes that the Antitrust Division simultaneously turned a blind eye to the collusion of the implementers who had pushed for the changes (and who benefited from them by way of suppressed royalty obligations at the expense of the patent owners), and he argues that this course of action was a dereliction of duty on the part of the Antitrust Division to dispassionately assess the competitive implications of such concerted activity.

To read the Sidak article, which was published in the Georgetown Law Journal, please click here.

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Innovation Patent Licensing

IP for the Next Generation of Mobile Technology: How Ignorance of Standard Setting Operations Hinders Innovation

In advance of our Sixth Annual Fall Conference on IP for the Next Generation of Technology, we are highlighting works on the challenges brought by the revolutionary developments in mobile technology of the past fifteen years.

hand holding a phone with holographs hovering over the screenThe development and implementation of technology standards is a complex process, and it’s one often misunderstood by commentators, courts, and government agencies. In an article detailing the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) misguided suit against Qualcomm for alleged unwillingness to license its patents on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms, CPIP Senior Scholar Kristen Osenga exposes a pervasive ignorance of technology standards and the standard setting organizations (SSOs) that develop them.

According to Professor Osenga, the lack of sound economic evidence and evidentiary findings in the FTC’s allegations are indicative of a larger and more fundamental lack of knowledge that is negatively impacting important legal, business, and policy decisions. It’s a troubling trend that has the potential to not just hinder the development of technology standards, but innovation itself.

To read the Osenga article, which was published in the University of Louisville Law Review, please click here.

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Innovation Patent Licensing

IP for the Next Generation of Mobile Technology: How IEEE’s Policy Changes Have Created Uncertainty for Innovators

In advance of our Sixth Annual Fall Conference on IP for the Next Generation of Technology, we are highlighting works on the challenges brought by the revolutionary developments in mobile technology of the past fifteen years.

hand holding a phone with holographs hovering over the screenEarlier this year, CPIP’s Adam Mossoff and Kevin Madigan detailed an in-depth empirical study on the troubling repercussions of policy changes at the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers-Standards Association (IEEE).

In a rigorous study tracking the activity of creators and owners of technologies incorporated into standards by the IEEE, Kirti Gupta and Georgios Effraimidis show how policy shifts at the IEEE have required patent owners to effectively relinquish their legal right to stop the deliberate and unauthorized uses of their property. Unfortunately, as Gupta and Effraimidis explain, the current unbalanced nature of standard setting at the IEEE is resulting in inefficient licensing negotiations and delayed standards development, and it’s threatening the development of new and innovative consumer products at a crucial time for mobile technologies.

The full Gupta & Effraimidis study is available here, and the synopsis by Adam Mossoff and Kevin Madigan can be found here.

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Innovation Patent Licensing

Focusing on IP for the Next Generation of Mobile Technology

hand holding a phone with holographs hovering over the screenIn advance of our Sixth Annual Fall Conference on IP for the Next Generation of Technology, the Center for the Protection of Intellectual Property will be highlighting works on the challenges brought by the revolutionary developments in mobile technology of the past fifteen years. These articles address issues related to patent licensing, standard setting in the mobile technology sector, and developing business models at the dawn of the 5G era. Contrary to the tread-worn claims that new technological developments render IP rights obsolete, these articles show how stable and effective property rights in innovative technologies continue to foster the groundbreaking advancements that benefit societies.

Much debate in the mobile technology sector has centered on recent policy changes in the standard setting organizations responsible for the development of global industry standards. In a recent paper focusing on the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standards Association (IEEE), mobile industry expert Keith Mallinson explores the practical impact of policy changes made in 2015 by the IEEE that implemented the “patent holdup” theory by restricting the rights of owners of patents on technology that is contributed to standards.

Providing an empirical analysis of the activity of innovators of new standards technology since the 2015 change in the IEEE’s patent policy, Mallinson finds that innovators are not contributing their patents resulting from their massive investments over many years into risky research and development of cutting-edge technologies. This is evidence that the one-sided and unbalanced restrictions on innovators, and not on implementers, that were imposed by the IEEE in 2015 under the “patent holdup” theory have slowed the adoption and implementation of pioneering technologies. Mallinson explains that a more balanced and clear respect for the rights of owners of patented technologies that are contributed to standards must be restored in order to better facilitate technological advancements.

To read the Mallinson article, which first appeared on the 4iP Council website in September 2017, please click here.

Categories
Innovation Patent Licensing

Study Finds IEEE’s 2015 Patent Policy Sowing Uncertainty and Slowing Innovation

dictionary entry for the word "innovate"By Kevin Madigan & Adam Mossoff

As the world prepares for the game-changing transition to 5G wireless systems, the high-tech industry must continue to efficiently develop and implement technologies and networks that work together across different platforms and devices. Few people are aware of how this happens, because it occurs solely between the companies who develop and implement technological products and services in the marketplace, such as Qualcomm, InterDigital, Microsoft, Apple, and others. These companies participate in private standard setting organizations, which develop technological standards agreed upon by these companies, such as three-prong electrical plugs, USB drives, hard disk storage drives, and even communications technologies such as Wi-Fi and 2G, 3G, and 4G.

In sum, the development of standards is a key part of how new technological innovations are efficiently sold and used by consumers and work for everyone. The reason standard setting organizations came into existence is because the alternative is neither efficient nor good for consumers. A standards “war” between companies in the marketplace leads to years of incompatible devices being sold while consumers wait for one company to establish (private) market dominance with its products and services such that everyone else must use that standard, such as what happened between VHS and Betamax in the 1980s or the market fight between Blu-ray Disc and HD DVD in the 1990s, to name just two examples. Standard setting organizations preempt this unnecessary and wasteful commercial war by bringing together the innovators and implementers of new technology to agree beforehand on a standard so that new standardized products and services can get into the hands of consumers faster.

Unfortunately, some standard setting organizations are changing their rules for the companies that invest hundreds of millions of dollars in long-term R&D to create groundbreaking technologies like those used in our smartphones. These new rules create uncertainty for these innovators. As a result, this uncertainty is threatening investments in new high-tech products and the ongoing growth in the U.S. innovation economy.

Detailing this troubling trend is a recently released, in-depth, and rigorous study by Kirti Gupta and Georgios Effraimidis, which tracks the changes in the rules for the creators and owners of the technologies incorporated into technological standards by one of the largest and more influential organizations—the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers-Standards Association (IEEE). In 2015, the IEEE adopted a new policy governing how owners of patents on technologies incorporated into its technological standards can protect and secure their investments via their legal rights to their patents. This shift in policy required patent owners effectively to relinquish their legal right to stop deliberate and unauthorized uses of their property and thus made it harder for them to license reasonable royalties for the use of their technology equally among all industry stakeholders.

As Gupta and Effraimidis show through detailed analyses, the IEEE’s new policy has distorted the longstanding market processes and licensing negotiations that have led to billions of smartphones being sold to consumers at relatively low cost around the world over the past decade. This is a vitally important study, because it brings key data to the policy discussions about technological standards, patents, and the incredible products and services made possible by them and on which everyone relies on today.

A Quick Summary of Standard Setting Organizations and Patented Technologies

A traditional requirement of the IEEE and several other standard setting organizations is that innovators commit to license equally their patented technologies that are incorporated into an agreed-upon standard for all companies implementing this standard in products and services. The law already provides that a patent owner will receive a “reasonable royalty” as damages for any past unauthorized uses of a patented technology, and thus standard setting organizations added the contractual requirement that this reasonable royalty also be non-discriminatory. To create a pleasant-sounding acronym, the phrase used is that licensing rates for patented technologies incorporated into market standards must be fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND). The goal of FRAND is to ensure that all companies creating products and services that are sold to consumers in the marketplace pay the same rates for incorporating the necessary standardized technologies into these products and services, such as the standardized 4G transmission technology used by everyone’s smartphones.

About a decade ago, some professors and lawyers posited a theory based on an abstract, economic model that owners of patents on technologies incorporated into these standards could exploit their ability to seek injunctions for violations of their patents and thus impose unduly higher costs on the companies implementing these standards in things like smartphones, laptop computers, tablets, and other devices and services. It was a simple story about property owners “holding up” people who wished to use their technologies, cashing in on the ubiquitous knowledge that any property owner can post a sign that says “no trespassing.” Based on this “patent holdup” theory, which deduced from an abstract model that patent owners would demand inordinately high royalties from the companies that need to incorporate agreed-upon technological standards into their products and services, these academics argued for “reforms” in the law to stop “patent holdup.”

But the “patent holdup” theory is just that—a theory. More than a decade of rigorous empirical studies have not only failed to confirm the “patent holdup” hypothesis of systemic market failures in the patent-intensive high-tech industry, and instead have found market conditions that directly contradict the core claim of “patent holdup” theory (see here for a letter to Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim summarizing this research and listing many of the studies). One study has shown that the average royalty rate for key technologies used in smartphones is only 3.4%, which is contrary to the 67% royalty rate predicted by “patent holdup” theory. Another study, among others, found significant quality-adjusted drops in consumer prices of smartphones and increasing entry of new manufacturers of smartphones, as well as other market conditions in the smartphone industry, that directly contradict the predictions of “patent hold” theory.

Unfortunately, in response to lobbying and the successful pushing of the “broken patent system” narrative in Washington, D.C., antitrust regulators forged ahead at the DOJ to push for policy changes at standard setting organizations on the basis of this unproven “patent holdup” theory. (Thankfully, recent antitrust regulators have returned back to evidence-based, balanced policy-making.) Several years after the first article propounding the “patent holdup” theory was published in 2007, implementers began pushing this theory at the IEEE to effect changes in its internal patent policy, which ultimately responded to this effort by revising its patent policy in 2015.

IEEE Policy Changes for Owners of Patents on Technological Standards

As Gupta and Effraimidis explain, the IEEE’s new patent policy has been highly controversial and generated much discussion among academics and industry practitioners. Separate from what they disclose in their article, there have been allegations that the internal process at the IEEE in changing its patent policy was initially cloaked in secrecy and was not open to all IEEE members as to when meetings were held and as to what the substantive decision-making processes were at these meetings. One commentator referred to it politely as an “opaque decision-making process” by the IEEE. If true, this is very troubling given that this violates the exemption accorded to the IEEE under the antitrust laws for operating as a standards setting organization.

Essentially, the IEEE patent policy was changed in 2015 in two key ways that impacted innovators. First, the new policy prohibits a patent owner seeking an injunction until all efforts at obtaining a license fee have been exhausted, including suing and litigating to a final judicial decision awarding a reasonable royalty. This of course incentives purported licensors to drag out licensing negotiations while they are infringing the patent, imposing large costs on patent owners in having to file lawsuits and pursue their legal remedies in court for many years and who have no choice but to allow the unauthorized use of their property during this time.

Extending these negotiations then allows licensors to take advantage of the second major rule change by the IEEE in its patent policy: the policy shifts licensing rates from the longstanding, market-based licensing of the technology given the value of the consumer device to the component level of the value of the chip itself. Of course, a smartphone without 4G or Wi-Fi is a beautiful 1995 cell phone with a very pretty, colorful screen and nothing more, which is why the free market settled on the value added to the entire smartphone for the basis of the licensing rate for this standardized technology. Moreover, calculating royalty rates based on the very cheap computer chips that contain the valuable technology fails to account for the hundreds of millions of dollars in R&D investments in developing the technology in the first place. Again, this is why the arrangement first reached in the free market between innovators and implementers was a balanced approach in device-level licensing rates that accounted for the costs of R&D and the costs of manufacturing the smartphones that contained the technology derived from this R&D. As a recent empirical study has shown, this is approximately 3.4% per smartphone, which is anything but an example of a massive payment to patent owners on 4G or Wi-Fi, especially for these core technologies that make a cell phone a “smartphone.”

Why then did IEEE change its patent policy? Consistent with the concerns about the “opaque decision-making process” at the IEEE, economist Greg Sidak has identified how the new rules were drafted by an ad hoc committee at the IEEE dominated almost entirely by implementers who license the patented technologies from the innovators who develop and contribute these technologies to the standard-setting process. In effect, the licensees strategically dominated the process and used their clout to push through a policy change that devalued the patented technologies, because they were seeking to lower their own manufacturing costs in implementing this technology in the consumer products and services they manufacture and sell in the marketplace. As evidence, Sidak shows that comments submitted in opposition to the new rules were rejected at nearly double the rate of those in support, reflecting a process that betrayed the IEEE’s core principles of openness, consensus, and the right to appeal. Instead of alleviating any alleged problems caused by patent owners, the IEEE’s rule changes actually facilitated collusion among implementers and resulted in “buyer-side price-fixing” of the patented technologies.

Negative Impact on Contributions of New Technology to Standards at the IEEE

The heart of the Gupta and Effraimidis article is not the theoretical and empirical background to the “patent holdup” dispute, but a detailed empirical study of the impact the new IEEE patent policy has had on the standard development process. Focusing on IP-intensive standards related to the development of Wi-Fi and Ethernet networks, the study first looks into the number of Letters of Assurances (LoAs) submitted to the IEEE in the years before and after the patent policy change took effect.

(LoAs are documents submitted by inventing companies who contribute new technological innovation in the standard-setting process. These technology contributors have patents on these innovations, and in these LoAs, they identify what patents may be essential to the standard that is being developed and they identify the terms under which they’re willing to license this technology if it ends up being incorporated into the standard that is ultimately set by the standard setting organization. An LoA is labeled “positive” if the contributor agrees to license its technology under the patent policy set by the standard setting organization or “negative” if the contributor declines to commit to these terms.)

The Gupta and Effraimidis study found that the number of positive LoA submissions has dropped a whopping 91% since IEEE changed its patent policy in 2015 and the number of negative LoAs rose to an all-time high in 2016. Gupta and Effraimidis explain:

The results suggest that many [patent] owners are reluctant to license their patent portfolio on the new FRAND terms. More importantly, the uncertainty on implementers’ side has increased, as new standards . . . have been approved despite the presence of negative and/or missing LoAs . . . .

Their article also tracks changes in the duration of the comments period that takes place before a new standard is approved—this is the period of time during which IEEE members discuss, debate, and resolve any concerns about a standardized technology before it is ultimately adopted as an official standard by the IEEE. Before the IEEE’s new patent policy went into effect in 2015, the average duration of the first two rounds of comments was 233 days. After the new patent policy took effect, Gupta & Effraimidis found a 42.5% increase in the comment period duration, resulting in an average resolution time of 332 days. This increase by almost half in the standard-setting process, especially in an industry marked by rapid development of new smartphones, laptops, and other high-tech consumer products and services, is concerning, to say the least. These delays are wasting private as well as public resources and impeding the commercial development of important IP-intensive technologies.

Finally, the Gupta and Effraimidis study analyzes the change in the number documents submitted at the IEEE that trigger the development of a new standard technology, which is a proxy for the development of new standards by the IEEE. Here, Gupta and Effraimidis’ findings contradict another recent study that alleged a high number of submissions in 2016 reflected a positive impact of the IEEE’s new patent policy. Gupta and Effraimidis reveal that hundreds of the submissions counted in the prior study either came from standards for which no patented inventions were contributed or were for standards of little or no value. Focusing properly on submissions for technologies that have significant value and produce an overwhelming majority of IEEE standards, they find submissions of new standards documents have in fact declined by 16% since 2015.

In sum, the changes in the internal standard-setting process at the IEEE since it adopted its new patent policy in 2015 represent a concerning shift following a strategic and collusive effort by implementers to devalue the patented technology created by innovators and contributed to standard setting organizations like the IEEE. The evidence is slowly building, showing that the IEEE’s new patent policy has devalued the innovative activity of technological innovators based on a purely theoretical and unproven claim that there is a systemic problem with so-called “patent holdup” in the smartphone and other high-tech industries. Unfortunately, in leaping into action on the basis of unproven theories, the IEEE has contributed to pervasive uncertainty and weakened incentives in the development and commercial implementation of innovative technologies, as is increasingly being documented and discussed by legal scholars and economists.

Moving Forward

The Gupta and Effraimidis study analyzes for the first time empirical data in fully detailing the effects of the IEEE’s new patent policy on the standard setting process. Their study shows that innovators are unwilling to continue to contribute the technologies they develop to the standard setting process under onerous terms requiring them effectively to give up their legal rights to their patents, and that these policies are having a perverse effect in creating inefficient licensing negotiations and delayed standards development. Their findings may sound intuitive to patent lawyers and innovators, but it is imperative to bring data into the public policy debates after ten years of concerted efforts to implement unproven theories, such as “patent holdup” theory, in both law and in the policies of private organizations like IEEE.

Gupta and Effraimidis conclude that a proper patent policy for a standard setting organization like the IEEE “should enhance incentives of technology contributors to innovate, while ensuring unlimited access to the new technology standards.” In considering its key role as a long-time professional association for the high-tech industry reaching back to Nikola Tesla and Thomas Edison, as well as its key role as standard setting organization in the innovation economy, the IEEE hopefully will reconsider its patent policy in light of actual economic and legal evidence. It should return back to the balanced patent policy that successfully promoted the computer and mobile revolutions of the past four decades. The future of new and innovative consumer products is at stake, such as the 5G technology that was first being developed many years ago and will start to be introduced into consumer products in the coming year.

Categories
Antitrust Patent Licensing

Department of Justice Recognizes Importance of Reliable Patent Rights in Innovation Economy

dictionary entry for the word "innovate"It is undeniable that the patent system has been under stress for the past decade, as courts, regulators, and even the Patent Office itself (as the newly confirmed Director Andrei Iancu has acknowledged) have sowed legal uncertainty, weakened patent rights, and even outright eliminated patent rights. This is why a series of recent speeches by Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim—head of the Antitrust Division at the Department of Justice—have signaled an important and welcome policy change from the past decade. It’s just one step, but it’s an important first step to restoring reliability and predictability to property rights in patents, which, as Director Iancu has also been saying in recent speeches, drives innovation and economic growth by promoting investments by inventors, venture capitalists, and companies in the new inventions that make modern life a veritable miracle today.

Delrahim’s speeches are important because one significant point of stress for the patent system and the innovation economy over the past decade has occurred at the intersection of antitrust law and the licensing of patents in standard setting organizations (SSOs). Many people are unaware of this particular issue, and it’s understandable why it flies under the radar screen. The technical standards set by SSOs are the things that make everything work, such as electrical plugs, toasters, and pencils, among millions of other products and services, but they are not obvious to everyday consumers who use these products. Also, antitrust law is a complex domain of lawyers, policy-makers and economists. Still, the patented innovation that comprises technical standards, such as 4G, WiFi, USB, memory storage chips, and other key features of our smart phones and computers, have been essential drivers of innovation in the telecommunications revolution of the past several decades.

In a series of recent speeches, Delrahim has signaled an important and welcome change from his predecessors in how antitrust law will be applied to patented technology that is contributed to the standards that drive innovation in the high-tech industry. Delrahim’s predecessors at the DOJ gave many speeches criticizing (and instigating investigations of) alleged “anti-competitive behavior” by patent owners on technical standards. The DOJ’s approach was one-sided, unbalanced, and lacked evidence confirming the allegations of anti-competitive behavior. Instead, Delrahim is emphasizing the key importance of promoting and properly securing to innovators the technology they create through their long-term, risky, and multi-billion-dollar R&D investments (as succinctly described in two paragraphs here about Qualcomm’s R&D in 5G by an official at the Department of Treasury).

Delrahim has announced that he will return to an evidence-based, balanced antitrust policy at the DOJ. He will not take action against innovators unless there is real-world evidence of consumer harm or proven harm to the development of innovation. The absence of such evidence is well known among scholars and policy-makers. In February 2018, for instance, a group of scholars, former government officials, and judges wrote that “no empirical study has demonstrated that a patent-owner’s request for injunctive relief after a finding of a defendant’s infringement of its property rights has ever resulted either in consumer harm or in slowing down the pace of technological innovation.” It’s significant that Delrahim has announced that the DOJ will constrain its enforcement actions with basic procedural and substantive safeguards long provided to citizens in courts, such as requiring actual evidence to prove assertions of harm. This guards against unfettered and arbitrary regulatory overreach against innocent owners of private property rights. This self-restraint is even more important when overreach negatively impacts innovation, which portends badly for economic growth and the flourishing lives we have all come to expect with our high-tech products and services.

For example, Delrahim has rightly recognized that “patent holdup” theory is just that—a theory about systemic market failure that remains unproven by extensive empirical studies. Even more concerning, “patent holdup” theory—the theory that patent owners will exploit their ability to seek injunctions to protect their property rights and thus “holdup” commercial implementers by demanding exorbitantly high royalties for the use of their technology—is directly contradicted by the economic evidence of the smart phone industry itself. The smart phone industry is one of the most patent-intensive industries in the U.S. innovation economy; thus, “patent holdup” theory hypothesizes that there will be higher prices, slower technological development, and less and less new development of products and services. Instead, as everyone knows, smart phones—such as the Apple iPhone and the Samsung Galaxy, among many others—are defined by rapidly dropping quality-controlled prices, explosive growth in products and services, and incredibly fast technological innovation. The 5G revolution is right around the corner, which will finally make real the promise of the Internet of Things.

In sum, Delrahim has repeatedly stated that antitrust officials must respect the equal rights of all stakeholders in the innovation industries—the inventors creating fundamental technological innovation, the rights of the companies who implement this innovation, and the consumers who purchase these products and services. This requires restraining investigations and enforcement actions to evidence, and not acting solely on the basis of unproven theories, colorful anecdotes, or rhetorical narratives developed inside D.C. by lobbyists and activists (such as “patent trolls”). This is good governance, which is what fosters ongoing investments in the R&D that makes possible the inventions that drives new technological innovation in smart phones and in the innovation economy more generally.

We will delve more deeply into the substantive issues and implications of Delrahim’s recent speeches in follow-on essays. Since his speeches have been delivered over the course of the past six months, we have aggregated them here in one source. Read them and come back for further analyses of these important speeches (and more speeches that will likely come, which we will keep adding to the list below):

  • November 10, 2017. In a speech at the University of Southern California, Gould School of Law, Assistant Attorney General Delrahim discussed why patent holdout is a bigger problem than patent hold-up. “[T]he hold-up and hold-out problems are not symmetric. What do I mean by that? It is important to recognize that innovators make an investment before they know whether that investment will ever pay off. If the implementers hold out, the innovator has no recourse, even if the innovation is successful.” He further noted that antitrust law has a role to play in preventing the concerted anticompetitive actions that occur during holdout.
  • February 1, 2018. In a speech at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, Delrahim noted that the proper antitrust focus should be on protecting the innovative process, not “short-term pricing” considerations. With this focus, using antitrust remedies should be approached with “caution.”
  • February 21, 2018. In a speech at the College of Europe, in Brussels Belgium, Delrahim observed that antitrust enforcers have aggressively tried to police patent license terms deemed excessive, and “have strayed too far in the direction of accommodating the concerns of technology licensees who participate in standard setting bodies, very likely at the risk of undermining incentives for the creation of new and innovative technologies.” The real problem and solution he noted is that the “dueling interests of innovators and implementers always are in tension, but the tension is best resolved through free market competition and bargaining.”
  • March 16, 2018. In a speech at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, Delrahim expanded on his detailed remarks from his talk at USC by adding some historical context from the founding fathers. He also made the core point that “patent hold-up is not an antitrust problem,” noting that FRAND commitments from patent owners are part of the normal competitive process and are therefore appropriately policed by contract and common law remedies. He further describes the necessary impacts of having a right to exclude in the patent right, including that the “unilateral and unconditional refusal to license a patent should be considered per se”
  • April 10, 2018. In a keynote address at the LeadershIP Conference on IP, Antitrust, and Innovation Policy in Washington, D.C., Delrahim emphasized the harm that can occur when “advocacy positions lead to unsupportable or even detrimental legal theories when taken out of context.” He specifically noted that some advocacy about patent hold-up could undermine standard setting as “putative licensees have been emboldened to stretch antitrust theories beyond their rightful application, and that courts have indulged these theories at the risk of undermining patent holders’ incentives to participate in standard setting at all.”
Categories
Antitrust Innovation

Letter to Antitrust Chief Applauds DOJ’s New Evidence-Based Approach to IP Enforcement

hand under a lightbulb drawn on a chalkboardA group of judges, former judges and government officials, law professors and economists with expertise in antitrust law and patent law sent a letter to Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim earlier today applauding his recent announcements that the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) would now take a balanced, evidence-based approach in applying antitrust law to patent licensing, especially to patented innovations that have been contributed to technological standards.

Signatories to the letter include Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg of the D.C. Circuit, former Chief Judge Paul Michel of the Federal Circuit, former FTC Commissioner Joshua D. Wright, and former Director of the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office David Kappos, among others.

A few weeks after his confirmation this past September, AAG Delrahim delivered remarks at a conference held at the USC Gould School of Law in Los Angeles, California. The comments signaled a major shift in intellectual property (IP) policy for the Antitrust Division from the policies pursued by the previous Obama Administration. Indeed, AAG Delrahim pointed out that he is the first head of the Antitrust Division to be a registered patent attorney, and his plans for protecting free market competition in the IP licensing realm reflected a robust understanding of what drives our innovation economy.

AAG Delrahim indicated that antitrust enforcers had “strayed too far” in protecting the interests of implementers of patented technology at the expense of innovators who create the technology in the first place. Such “misapplication of the antitrust laws,” he said, “could undermine the process of dynamic innovation itself.” In particular, AAG Delrahim stated that the recent focus on the “so-called ‘hold-up’ problem,” where innovators threaten to withhold licenses to implementers, fails to recognize the “more serious risk” of the “hold-out problem,” where implementers threaten to use the technology without taking licenses from innovators. AAG Delrahim explained that the “one-sided focus on the hold-up issue” posed a “serious threat to the innovative process.”

Last month, a group of industry representatives sent a letter to AAG Delrahim expressing concerns over the Antitrust Division’s new approach to IP licensing. The letter claimed that “patent hold-up is real, well documented, and harming US industry and consumers,” and it argued that the hold-out problem did not raise similar competition law issues. Remarkably, the industry representatives did not offer one citation to back up their broad claims about the supposed harm from “patent hold-up” or lack of harm from patent hold-out. Given the data connecting stable and effective patent rights and economic growth, the burden should be on the advocates for the “patent hold-up” theory to produce at least some evidence to support their position. Thankfully, AAG Delrahim made clear that he will let the evidence be his guide.

To that end, the letter submitted today by judges, government officials, legal academics, and economists points out the glaring omissions in the letter by the industry representatives: The claims about “patent hold-up” are merely theoretical, and they are “inconsistent with actual market data.” Moreover, today’s letter notes that the implications of the “patent hold-up” theory are testable, and that the empirical studies to date have failed to show that innovators are harming consumers or inhibiting innovation. To bolster its claims, the letter includes an appendix of rigorous empirical studies that directly contradict the “patent hold-up” theory proffered by the industry representatives.

Read the letter below or download it here: Letter to AAG Delrahim

***

February 13, 2018

Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim
Department of Justice Antitrust Division
950 Pennsylvania Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20530-0001

Dear Assistant Attorney General Delrahim,

As judges, former judges and government officials, legal academics and economists who are experts in antitrust and intellectual property law, we write to express our support for your recent announcement that the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice will adopt an evidence-based approach in applying antitrust law equally to both innovators who develop and implementers who use technological standards in the innovation industries.

We disagree with the letter recently submitted to you on January 24, 2018 by other parties who expressed their misgivings with your announcement of your plan to return to this sound antitrust policy. Unfortunately, their January 24 letter perpetuates the long-standing misunderstanding held by some academics, policy activists, and companies, who baldly assert that one-sided “patent holdup” is a real-world problem in the high-tech industries. This claim rests entirely on questionable models that predict that opportunistic behavior in patent licensing transactions will result in higher consumer prices. These predictions are inconsistent with actual market data in any high-tech industry.

It bears emphasizing that no empirical study has demonstrated that a patent-owner’s request for injunctive relief after a finding of a defendant’s infringement of its property rights has ever resulted either in consumer harm or in slowing down the pace of technological innovation. Given the well understood role that innovation plays in facilitating economic growth and well-being, a heavy burden of proof rests on those who insist on the centrality of “patent holdup” to offer some tangible support for that view, which they have ultimately failed to supply in the decade or more since that theory was first propounded. Given the contrary conclusions in economic studies of the past decade, there is no sound empirical basis for claims of a systematic problem of opportunistic “patent holdup” by owners of patents on technological standards.

Several empirical studies demonstrate that the observed pattern in high-tech industries, especially in the smartphone industry, is one of constant lower quality-adjusted prices, increased entry and competition, and higher performance standards. These robust findings all contradict the testable implications of “patent holdup” theory. The best explanation for this disconnect between the flawed “patent holdup” theory and overwhelming weight of the evidence lies in the institutional features that surround industry licensing practices. These practices include bilateral licensing negotiations, and the reputation effects in long-term standards activities. Both support a feed-back mechanism that creates a system of natural checks and balances in the setting of royalty rates. The simplistic models of “patent holdup” ignore all these moderating effects.

Of even greater concern are the likely negative social welfare consequences of prior antitrust policies implemented based upon nothing more than the purely theoretical concern about opportunistic “patent holdup” behavior by owners of patented innovations incorporated into technological standards. For example, those policies have resulted in demands to set royalty rates for technologies incorporated into standards in the smartphone industry according to particular components in a smartphone. This was a change to the longstanding industry practice of licensing at the end-user device level, which recognized that fundamental technologies incorporated into the cellular standards like 2G, 3G, etc., optimize the entire wireless system and network, and not just the specific chip or component of a chip inside a device.

In support, we attach an Appendix of articles identifying the numerous substantive and methodological flaws in the “patent holdup” models. We also point to rigorous empirical studies that all directly contradict the predictions of the “patent holdup” theory.

For these reasons, we welcome your announcement of a much-needed return to evidence-based policy making by antitrust authorities concerning the licensing and enforcement of patented innovations that have been committed to a technological standard. This sound program ensures balanced protection of all innovators, implementers, and consumers. We are confident that consistent application of this program will lead to a vibrant, dynamic smartphone market that depends on a complex web of standard essential patents which will continue to benefit everyone throughout the world.

Sincerely,

Jonathan Barnett
Professor of Law
USC Gould School of Law

Ronald A. Cass
Dean Emeritus,
Boston University School of Law
Former Vice-Chairman and Commissioner,
United States International Trade Commission

Richard A. Epstein
Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law,
New York University School of Law
James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law Emeritus,
University of Chicago Law School

The Honorable Douglas H. Ginsburg
Senior Circuit Judge,
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and
Professor of Law,
Antonin Scalia Law School
George Mason University

Justin (Gus) Hurwitz
Assistant Professor of Law
University of Nebraska College of Law

David J. Kappos
Former Under Secretary of Commerce and Director
United States Patent & Trademark Office

The Honorable Paul Michel
Chief Judge (Ret.),
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Damon C. Matteo
Course Professor,
Graduate School of Economics and Management
Tsinghua University in Beijing
Chief Executive Officer,
Fulcrum Strategy

Adam Mossoff
Professor of Law
Antonin Scalia Law School
George Mason University

Kristen Osenga
Professor of Law
University of Richmond School of Law

David J. Teece
Thomas W. Tusher Professor in Global Business
Haas School of Business
University of California at Berkeley

Joshua D. Wright
University Professor,
Antonin Scalia Law School
George Mason University
Former Commissioner,
Federal Trade Commission

 

Appendix

 

Richard A. Epstein & Kayvan Noroozi, Why Incentives for Patent Hold Out Threaten to Dismantle FRAND and Why It Matters, Berkeley Tech. L. Rev. (forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2913105

Anne Layne-Farrar, Why Patent Holdout is Not Just a Fancy Name for Plain Old Patent Infringement, CPI North American Column (Feb. 2016), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/North-America-Column-February-Full.pdf

Anne Layne-Farrar, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Theory and Evidence: Where Do We Stand After 15 Years of History?, OECD Intellectual Property and Standard Setting (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/WD%282014%2984&doclanguage=en

Alexander Galetovic & Stephen Haber, The Fallacies of Patent Holdup Theory, 13 J. Comp. L. & Econ., 1 (2017), https://academic.oup.com/jcle/article/13/1/1/3060409

Alexander Galetovic, Stephen Haber, & Lew Zaretzki, An Estimate of the Average Cumulative Royalty Yield in the World Mobile Phone Industry: Theory, Measurement and Results (Feb. 7, 2018), https://hooverip2.org/working-paper/wp18005

Alexander Galetovic, Stephen Haber, & Ross Levine, An Empirical Examination of Patent Hold-Up (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21090, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21090.pdf

Douglas H. Ginsburg, Koren W. Wong-Ervin, & Joshua Wright, The Troubling Use of Antitrust to Regulate FRAND Licensing, CPI Antitrust Chronicle (Oct. 2015), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/Uploads/GinsburgetalOct-151.pdf

Douglas H. Ginsburg, Taylor M. Ownings, & Joshua D. Wright, Enjoining Injunctions: The Case Against Antitrust Liability for Standard Essential Patent Holders Who Seek Injunctions, The Antitrust Source (Oct. 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2515949

Gerard Llobet & Jorge Padilla, The Optimal Scope of the Royalty Base in Patent Licensing, 59 J. L. & Econ. 45 (2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2417216

Keith Mallinson, Theories of Harm with SEP Licensing Do Not Stack Up, IP Fin. Blog (May 24, 2013), http://www.ip.finance/2013/05/theories-of-harm-with-sep-licensing-do.html

Jorge Padilla & Koren W. Wong-Ervin, Portfolio Licensing to Makers of Downstream End-User Devices: Analyzing Refusals to License FRAND-Assured Standard-Essential Patents at the Component Level, 62 The Antitrust Bulletin 494 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X17719762

Jonathan D. Putnam & Tim A. Williams, The Smallest Salable Patent-Practicing Unit (SSPPU): Theory and Evidence (Sept. 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2835617

Gregory Sidak, The Antitrust Division’s Devaluation of Standard-Essential Patents, 104 Geo. L.J. Online 48 (2015), https://georgetownlawjournal.org/articles/161/antitrust-division-s-devaluation-of/pdf

Joanna Tsai & Joshua D. Wright, Standard Setting, Intellectual Property Rights, and the Role of Antitrust in Regulating Incomplete Contracts, 80 Antitrust L.J. 157 (2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2467939

Joshua D. Wright, SSOs, FRAND, and Antitrust: Lessons from the Economics of Incomplete Contracts, 21 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 791 (2014), http://www.georgemasonlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Wright-Website-Version.pdf

Categories
Antitrust Commercialization DOJ High Tech Industry Innovation Inventors Patent Law Patent Licensing Uncategorized

Busting Smartphone Patent Licensing Myths

closeup of a circuit boardCPIP has released a new policy brief, Busting Smartphone Patent Licensing Myths, by Keith Mallinson, Founder of WiseHarbor. Mr. Mallinson is an expert with 25 years of experience in the wired and wireless telecommunications, media, and entertainment markets.

Mr. Mallinson discusses several common myths concerning smartphone patent licensing and argues that antitrust interventions and SSO policy changes based on these myths may have the unintended consequence of pushing patent owners away from open and collaborative patent licensing. He concludes that depriving patentees of licensing income based on these myths will remove incentives to invest and take risks in developing new technologies.

We’ve included the Executive Summary below. To read the full policy brief, please click here.

Busting Smartphone Patent Licensing Myths

By Keith Mallinson

Executive Summary

Smartphones are an outstanding success for hundreds of handset manufacturers and mobile operators, with rapid and broad adoption by billions of consumers worldwide. Major innovations for these—including standard-essential technologies developed at great expense and risk primarily by a small number of companies—have been shared openly and extensively through standard-setting organizations and commitments to license essential patents on “fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms.”

Despite this success, manufacturers seeking to severely reduce what they must pay for the technologies that make their products possible have widely promoted several falsehoods about licensing in the cellular industry. Unsubstantiated by facts, these myths are being used to justify interventions in intellectual property (IP) markets by antitrust authorities, as well as changes to patent policies in standard-setting organizations. This paper identifies and dispels some of the most egregious and widespread myths about smartphone patent licensing:

Myth 1: Licensing royalties should be based on the smallest saleable patent practicing unit (SSPPU) implementing the patented technology, and not on the handset. The SSPPU concept is completely inapplicable in the real world of licensing negotiations involving portfolios that may have thousands of patents reading on various components, combinations of components, entire devices, and networks. In the cellular industry, negotiated license agreements almost invariably calculate royalties as a percentage of handset sales prices. The SSPPU concept is inapplicable because it would not only be impractical given the size and scope of those portfolios, but it would not reflect properly the utility and value that high-speed cellular connectivity brings to bear on all features in cellular handsets.

Myth 2: Licensing fees are an unfair tax on the wireless industry. License fees relate to the creation—not arbitrary subtraction—of value in the cellular industry. They are payments for use of essential patented technologies, developed at significant cost by others, when an implementer chooses to produce products made possible by those technologies. The revenue generated by those license fees encourages innovation, and is directly related to the use of the patented technologies.

Myth 3: Licensing fees and cross-licensing diminish licensee profits and impede them from investing in their own research and development (R&D). Profits among manufacturers are determined by competition among them, including differences in pricing power and costs. Core-technology royalty fees, which are charged on a non-discriminatory basis and are payable by all implementers, are not the cause of low profitability by some manufacturers while others are very profitable. Cross-licensing is widespread: It provides in-kind consideration, which reduces patent-licensing costs and incentivizes R&D.

Myth 4: Fixed royalty rates ignore the decreasing value of portfolio licenses as patents expire. Portfolio licensing is the norm because it is convenient and cost efficient for licensor and licensee alike. All parties know the composition of the portfolio will change as some patents expire and new patents are added. Indeed, this myth is particularly fanciful given that the number of new patents issued greatly exceeds the number that expires for the major patentees. In fact, each succeeding generation of cellular technology has represented and will continue to represent a far greater investment in the development of IP than the prior generation.

Myth 5: Royalty charges should be capped so they do not exceed figures such as 10% of the handset price or even well under $1 per device. There is no basis for arbitrary royalty caps. It is not unusual for the value of IP to predominate as a proportion of total selling prices, in books, CDs, DVDs, or computer programs. Market forces—not arbitrary benchmarks wished for or demanded by vested interests and which do not reflect costs, business risks, or values involved—should also be left to determine how costs and financial rewards are allocated in the cellular industry with smartphones.

Categories
Antitrust Injunctions ITC Patent Law Patent Licensing Patent Theory Remedies Uncategorized

Guest Post by Richard Epstein: The Dangerous Adventurism of the United States Trade Representative – Lifting the Ban against Apple Products Unnecessarily Opens a Can of Worms in Patent Law

The Dangerous Adventurism of the United States Trade Representative:
Lifting the Ban against Apple Products Unnecessarily Opens a Can of Worms in Patent Law

 Richard A. Epstein

In ordinary times, the business of the International Trade Commission does not appear as the lead story in the Wall Street Journal, predicting massive changes in the high-stakes patent battles. But these are not ordinary times, given the ongoing multi-front war between Apple and Samsung, in which each side has accused the other of serious acts of patent infringement. So when the International Trade Commission issued its order excluding Apple’s still popular iPhone 4 and older versions of the iPad, the smart money predicted that the Obama Administration, acting through the United States Trade Representative, would for the first time in 25 years decide to overrule a decision of the ITC, which it pointedly did in a three page letter of August 3, 2012, signed by Ambassador Michael B. G. Froman and addressed to Irving A. Williamson, Chairman of the ITC, whose wings have definitely been clipped.

Injunctions, Damages, or Something in Between

Properly understood, that letter should be regarded as a patent bombshell whose significance goes far beyond the individual case. The choice of remedy in patent disputes has been, at least since the much-cited 2006 Supreme Court decision in eBay v. MercExchange, one of the central issues in patent law. In the academic literature there has been an extensive debate as to whether various forms of injunctive relief should be allowed as a matter of course, or whether the court should place great weight on so-called public interest factors that many modern patent lawyers claim should displace a remedy which under prior legal practice had been awarded largely “as a matter of course.”

That last phrase is not intended to indicate that blanket injunctions should be awarded in any and all cases. Instead, by analogy to traditional equitable principles as applied in various other contexts, including ordinary nuisance cases, the basic principle is subject to some important qualifications that do not undermine the force of the basic rule. First, any patentee may forfeit in whole or in part the right to an injunction by improper conduct on his own part: taking undue delay with respect to enforcement could lead to a loss in some cases of injunctive relief. But the application of this doctrine is within the control of the patentee, who can preserve his rights by promptly asserting them, which means that this issue almost never comes into play with valuable patents that are consistently asserted. Second, traditional doctrine allows a court to delay the enforcement of an injunction to allow the infringer to fix his device, and perhaps even deny the injunction in those cases where a complex device contains many patented components, of which only one is in violation.

The Magic of Section 337 in FRAND Cases

The decision of the Trade Representative did not point to any such complications in the case justifying a departure from the usual remedy of an injunction. Indeed the ITC order was not lightly entered into, for it was agreed by all commissioners that Apple had indeed infringed the Samsung patents in ways that would have resulted in extensive damage awards if the case had been tried in a federal court. The ITC does not have statutory powers to award damages, so the Commission thought, perhaps mistakenly, that it was bound to make an all-or-nothing choice: allow or exclude the importation of the infringing device. Under the applicable statutory provisions of Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, the ITC is supposed to take into account a number of “public interest factors” that address “the effect of such [exclusion or order] upon the public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the United States economy, the production of like or directly competitive articles in the United States, and United States consumers . . .”

The language in this section is quite broad on its face, and if it were applied in a literal fashion, the history of proceedings before the ITC should be replete with decisions that let infringing products into the United   States. The words “public health and welfare” are in modern American English broad enough to allow foreign pharmaceuticals into the United States even if they infringe key pharmaceutical patents. Any mysterious reference to competitive principles would again seem to invite a wide-ranging inquiry that could easily turn this provision of the Tariff Act into an open sesame for infringing products. The 25-year gap between decisions allowing importation of infringing products makes it quite clear that this provision has never been read to invite the broad type of “facts and circumstances inquiry” that the Trade Representative invoked to decide whether to grant or deny injunctive relief.

Against this background, it is critical to note that the dispute in this case boiled down to the question of the scope of Samsung to license its key patent on fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory, or FRAND terms, to all comers including Apple. In ordinary cases, no owner of property is required to license or sell its property to a competitor. But for hundreds of years, common carriers have by virtue of their monopoly power been under an obligation to take all passengers on fair and reasonable terms. The thumbnail sketch for this position runs as follows. The obligation to do business on these terms is an offset to the dangers of monopoly power. The prohibition against discrimination is intended to make sure that the common carrier does not duck its obligation by offering its products only at prices so high that it is confident that no passenger will pay them. The concern with nondiscrimination is intended to make sure that the firm does not play favorites among potential customers to whom it can supply the essential service at roughly identical cost.

The carryover of FRAND obligations to the patent space arises only in connection with what are termed “standard-essential patents,” which are those patents that cover an invention that is incorporated in an industry standard that all parties must use in order to market and deploy their own products. The FRAND obligation requires parties to enter into negotiations to make sure that all market participants have a fair shot, so that the owner of the essential patent cannot hold out against a potential user.

In dealing with this issue, the Trade Representative took the position that a White House Report from January 2013 dealing with standard-essential patents revealed the manifest risk of holdout that could take place in these contexts, and recommended a fact-specific inquiry be made into each dispute to determine whether the action of the patent holder was unreasonable under the circumstances. The Trade Representative then extended his discretion further into this situation by insisting that “reverse holdouts” (i.e. those by a potential licensee) should be subject to a similar analysis.

How the Trade Representative Overreaches

It would be foolish to respond to the position of the Trade Representative by saying that there is no holdout risk at stake whenever a party has monopoly power. But there is a vast disagreement over the proper institutional arrangements to deal with these FRAND obligations. The implicit subtext of the Trade Representative’s Report is that holdout is a major risk in these settings that requires some heavy lifting to combat, not only before the ITC, but also in ordinary patent disputes. Just that position was taken by Commissioner Dean Pinkert in dissent below, who relied on some recent work by the well-known Professors Mark Lemley of Stanford and Carl Shapiro of Berkeley, who have proposed major intervention in a form of “final offer baseball arbitration,” whereby the arbitrator chooses between the royalty rates proposed by the two parties.

The obvious point is that this baseball form of arbitration seems ill-suited to determine the complex set of terms that are normally found in any complex licensing agreement. Why propose something that no one has ever used in the voluntary market? But put that point aside, and address the prior question of whether any compulsory remedy is needed to deal with the asserted holdout problem at all. The issue is one to which I have some exposure because I have worked on this question as a legal consultant with Qualcomm. On the strength of that work, and other work of my own on the biomedical anticommons, coauthored with Bruce Kuhlik (now general counsel at Merck), I have concluded that the frequency and severity of this problem is in fact far less than asserted by the overwrought statements of those who advance this theory. In work that I did with Scott Kieff and Dan Spulber, we reported that Qualcomm was a member of some 84 standard organizations and reported few if any problems in working through the details with any of them. Indeed, apart from the citation of a few cases that dealt with tangential issues, there is nothing in the Lemley and Shapiro paper that indicates that this problem has serious dimensions.

The question then arises why this might be so, and the answer is a collection of factors, none of which is decisive but all of which are to some degree relevant. The process of standard-setting does not take place in a vacuum, but involves repeat play by individual firms, all of whom know that coordination is key to their mutual success. The common pattern of standard-setting involves having technical people coming up with a sound technical solution before worrying about who holds what patent position. Standard-setting organizations then require their participants to disclose patents that read onto the standard. These organizations typically revisit standards as circumstances and technology change, which creates a subtle threat for patentees that the standard may migrate away from their patented technology if the patentee’s license terms become too risky. The threat of retaliation is real as well, and all parties know that if they hold up a standard they not only hurt their competitors but also themselves. The process may not look pretty, but in the hands of experienced professionals, the evidence is that it works well.

The choice in question here thus boils down to whether the low rate of voluntary failure justifies the introduction of an expensive and error-filled judicial process that gives all parties the incentive to posture before a public agency that has more business than it can possibly handle. It is on this matter critical to remember that all standards issues are not the same as this particularly nasty, high-stake dispute between two behemoths whose vital interests make this a highly atypical standard-setting dispute. Yet at no point in the Trade Representative’s report is there any mention of how this mega-dispute might be an outlier. Indeed, without so much as a single reference to its own limited institutional role, the decision uses a short three-page document to set out a dogmatic position on issues on which there is, as I have argued elsewhere, good reason to be suspicious of the overwrought claims of the White House on a point that is, to say the least, fraught with political intrigue

Ironically, there was, moreover a way to write this opinion that could have narrowed the dispute and exposed for public deliberation a point that does require serious consideration. The thoughtful dissenting opinion of Commissioner Pinkert pointed the way. Commissioner Pinkert contended that the key factor weighing against granting Samsung an exclusion order is that Samsung in its FRAND negotiations demanded from Apple rights to use certain non standard-essential patents as part of the overall deal. In this view, the introduction of nonprice terms on nonstandard patterns represents an abuse of the FRAND standard. Assume for the moment that this contention is indeed correct, and the magnitude of the problem is cut a hundred or a thousand fold. This particular objection is easy to police and companies will know that they cannot introduce collateral matters into their negotiations over standards, at which point the massive and pointless overkill of the Trade Representative’s order is largely eliminated. No longer do we have to treat as gospel truth the highly dubious assertions about the behavior of key parties to standard-setting disputes.

But is Pinkert correct? On the one side, it is possible to invoke a monopoly leverage theory similar to that used in some tie-in cases to block this extension. But those theories are themselves tricky to apply, and the counter argument could well be that the addition of new terms expands the bargaining space and thus increases the likelihood of an agreement. To answer that question to my mind requires some close attention to the actual and customary dynamics of these negotiations, which could easily vary across different standards. I would want to reserve judgment on a question this complex, and I think that the Trade Representative would have done everyone a great service if he had addressed the hard question. But what we have instead is a grand political overgeneralization that reflects a simple-minded and erroneous view of current practices.

The enormous technical advances in all these fields are not consistent with the claim that holdout problems have brought an industry to a standstill. The brave new world of discretionary remedies could easily backfire and undermine cooperative behavior by rewarding those who refuse to cooperate. If the critics of the current system focused on that one background fact, they might well be more diffident about pushing vast industries into uncharted territories on their regrettable overconfidence in their own untested judgments.

Richard A. Epstein is the Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law at New York University School of Law, the Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, and the James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law Emeritus and Senior Lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School. He is currently consulting with QUALCOMM on the issues at stake in this case.