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CPIP Roundup

CPIP Roundup – December 2, 2020


Greetings from CPIP Executive Director Sean O’Connor

Sean O'Connor

I hope you had an enjoyable, restful Thanksgiving. At CPIP, we’re winding down 2020 while planning our spring and summer events—including biopharma and copyright roundtables, the 2021 WIPO-CPIP Summer School on Intellectual Property, and more.

As usual, our team has been up to many great things. Director of Copyright Research and Policy Sandra Aistars’ Arts & Entertainment Advocacy Clinic co-hosted a virtual clinic with Washington Area Lawyers for the Arts (WALA). The event was a huge success. You can read our write-up here, and a recording of the Rock Creek Kings’ featured performance is available here. Sandra also participated in a November 12 panel hosted by the Law of Intellectual Property (LIP) student organization at the University of Oregon School of Law (home to CPIP Senior Scholar Eric Priest).

I taught my annual workshop on “Public-Private Partnerships–Innovation and Technology Transfer” in the CEIPI-WIPO-INPI Advanced Training Course on Intellectual Property, Technology Transfer and Licensing. I also published an op-ed at The Hill on price controls, explaining why the government cannot seize or bypass pharmaceutical patents.

Our affiliates have also been doing great things as well. Scalia Law Alumna and Arts & Entertainment Advocacy Clinic Adjunct Professor Terrica Carrington and Lateef Mtima of Howard University School of Law and IIPSJ have great quotes in this Billboard article on choreography, copyright, and social justice. CPIP Senior Fellow for Innovation Policy Jonathan Barnett continues to blog at Truth on the Market; you can catch his latest piece here and read his take on how antitrust law can be abused to promote unproductive rent-seeking. Meanwhile Chris Holman, CPIP Senior Fellow for Life Sciences, continues writing for the Biotechnology Law Report, where he serves as Executive Director; his latest article is available here.

Below we highlight new papers from CPIP Edison Fellows Christa Laser (Equitable Defenses in Patent Law), Talha Syed (Owning Knowledge: A Unified Theory of Patent Eligibility), and Tabrez Ebrahim (Artificial Intelligence Inventions & Patent Disclosure).

While 2020’s end-of-year holiday season may well be challenging, I hope you and yours will find a way to share the spirit and renewal of this coming season while looking forward to a successful new year!


Spotlight on Scholarship

a pair of glasses, an apple, and a stack of books

The scholars from our Thomas Edison Innovation Fellowship program continue to publish high quality scholarship and cutting-edge research that promotes the value of intellectual property. Here are some recent publications:

Tabrez Y. Ebrahim, Artificial Intelligence Inventions & Patent Disclosure, 125 Penn. St. L. Rev. 147 (2020)

In his new paper at Penn State Law Review, Artificial Intelligence Inventions & Patent Disclosure, Professor Tabrez Ebrahim of California Western School of Law claims that AI fundamentally challenges disclosure in patent law, which has not kept up with rapid advancements in AI, and seeks to invigorate the goals that patent law’s disclosure function is thought to serve for society. In so doing, Prof. Ebrahim assesses the role that AI plays in the inventive process, how AI can produce AI-generated output (that can be claimed in a patent application), and why it should matter for patent policy and for society. He also introduces a taxonomy comprising AI-based tools and AI-generated output that he maps with social-policy-related considerations, theoretical justifications and normative reasoning concerning disclosure for the use of AI in the inventive process, and proposals for enhancing disclosure and the impact on patent protection and trade secrecy.

To read our blog post summarizing the paper, please click here.

Christa J. Laser, Equitable Defenses in Patent Law, 75 U. Miami L. Rev. 1 (2020)

In patent law, equitable defenses can play an essential role in multi-million-dollar patent infringement cases. Unclean hands, misuse, or estoppel can render a potential verdict unenforceable. Professor Christa Laser of Cleveland-Marshall College of Law dives into the unique and unsettled role of equity in her new paper, Equitable Defenses in Patent Law, which is forthcoming at the University of Miami Law Review. Prof. Laser compares two theories to determine how courts might interpret undefined language governing equitable defenses in patent statutes, and she analyzes whether Congress codified preexisting decisional law or expanded it with the 1952 Patent Act. Finally, Prof. Laser suggests that Congress could delegate its authority to an agency to handle the ever-changing patent landscape.

To read our blog post summarizing the paper, please click here.

Talha Syed, Owning Knowledge: A Unified Theory of Patent Eligibility (forthcoming)

In his new draft paper, Owning Knowledge: A Unified Theory of Patent Eligibility, Professor Talha Syed of Berkeley Law argues that the confusion surrounding patentable subject matter under Section 101 is two-fold. First, it results from our failure to develop a functionality doctrine that can clearly distinguish technological applications of knowledge from other forms of knowledge. Second, he offers a root cause of this failure. There is a distracting preoccupation in patent law with “physicalism,” that is, the notion that a patent is awarded for a thing (tangible or not) rather than for knowledge of that thing. In order to move forward, Prof. Syed states that we must first unwind the physicalist assumptions that are tangled up in our Section 101 analyses. Only then can we develop a functionality doctrine free of those encumbrances.

To read our blog post summarizing the paper, please click here.


Categories
Copyright

House Judiciary Committee Hearing Reacts to Copyright Office Report on Efficacy of Section 512

The following post comes from Liz Velander, a recent graduate of Scalia Law and a Research Assistant at CPIP.

U.S. Capitol buildingBy Liz Velander

In late September, the House Judiciary Committee held a hearing entitled Copyright and the Internet in 2020: Reactions to the Copyright Office’s Report on the Efficacy of 17 U.S.C. 512 After Two Decades. As Chairman Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) explained, the hearing sought “perspectives on whether Section 512 is working efficiently and effectively for this new internet landscape.” The hearing was guided by the U.S. Copyright Office’s Section 512 Report, released in May, which concluded that the operation of the Section 512 safe harbor system disfavors copyright owners—contrary to “Congress’ original intended balance.”

The witnesses included: Jeffrey Sedlik, President & CEO, PLUS Coalition; Meredith Rose, Senior Policy Counsel, Public Knowledge; Morgan Grace Kibby, Singer and Songwriter; Jonathan Band, Counsel, Library Copyright Alliance; Matthew Schruers, President, Computer & Communications Industry Association; and Terrica Carrington, Vice President, Legal Policy and Copyright Counsel, Copyright Alliance.

Enacted in 1998 as part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Section 512 establishes a system for copyright owners and online service providers (OSPs) to address online infringement, including a “safe harbor” that limits liability for compliant OSPs. To qualify for safe harbor protection, an OSP must fulfill certain requirements, generally consisting of implementing measures to expeditiously address online copyright infringement. Congress sought to create a balance between two goals in enacting Section 512: (1) providing important legal certainty for OSPs so that the internet ecosystem can flourish without the threat of the potentially devastating economic impact of liability for copyright infringement as a result of user activity, and (2) protecting the legitimate interests of authors and other rights owners against the threat of rampant, low-barrier online infringement.

The Copyright Office’s Report determined that the balance Congress originally sought is now “askew.” It found that “despite the advances in legitimate content options and delivery systems, and despite the millions of takedown notices submitted on a daily basis, the scale of online copyright infringement and the lack of effectiveness of Section 512 notices to address that situation, remain significant problems.” The Report did not recommend any wholesale changes to Section 512, but instead identified certain areas that Congress could fine-tune in order to better balance the rights and responsibilities of OSPs and copyright owners. These include eligibility qualifications for the service provider safe harbors, repeat infringer policies, knowledge requirement standards, specificity within takedown notices, non-standard notice requirements, subpoenas, and injunctions.

At the hearing, the six witnesses reacted to the Copyright Office’s Report in dramatically different fashions. Representatives of OSPs disagreed with the Report’s conclusions, testifying that Section 512 is working as Congress intended. Mr. Band from the Library Copyright Alliance referred to Section 512 as a “shining example of enlightened legislation for the public good” that is responsible for the “golden age of content creation and distribution.” Mr. Schruers from the Computer & Communications Industry Association criticized the Report for inadequately reflecting the interests of users and “conspicuously” overlooking the problem of Section 512 misuse. Ms. Rose from Public Knowledge stated “the Office’s analysis performed a familiar sleight-of-hand by presenting user interests as coextensive with those of platforms, effectively erasing free speech concerns from its analysis.”

Representatives of content creators painted an entirely different picture of Section 512’s efficacy. They applauded the Copyright Office for calling attention to areas of imbalance related to Section 512 and to how overly expansive or narrow interpretations of the statute have aided in skewing the balance Congress intended. Mr. Sedlik, a photographer with over 35 years of professional experience and President & CEO of the PLUS Coalition, described how service providers take advantage of his and others’ copyrighted works while hiding behind Section 512’s safe harbors. He explained that, like many other copyright owners, he must spend an exorbitant amount of time searching for infringing materials online and sending takedown notices instead of creating new works.

Ms. Kibby, a singer and songwriter, testified that Section 512 is “undermining creativity, and more alarmingly, quietly undercutting our next generation of artists. It is jeopardizing livelihoods for working class musicians, obliterating healthy monetary velocity in our creative community. It is rewarding unscrupulous services that deal in the unauthorized trade and use of our works. It is fundamentally sabotaging the legitimate online marketplace that we all rely on and that Congress envisioned.” Responding to the argument that notice-and-takedown results in censorship of user-generated content, Ms. Kibby said that Section 512’s “stripping creators of their fundamental rights, their livelihood, and ultimately their creative contributions is the real censorship.”

Ms. Carrington from the Copyright Alliance identified three main problems with Section 512: (1) the ineffective notice-and-takedown process, (2) the effective elimination of the red flag knowledge standard, and (3) ineffective repeat infringer policies. She recommended adjusting the statute to clarify the difference between actual and red flag knowledge, enacting the Copyright Alternative in Small-Claims Enforcement (CASE) Act, and transparently developing effective standard technical measures (STMs).

Members of the Committee recognized the need for reform. Chairman Nadler remarked that the sheer volume of takedown notices being sent does not seem like the hallmark of a system functioning as intended. Some Members first spoke about the importance of copyright law before questioning the panelists. For example, Representative Hank Johnson (D-GA) said “it’s crucial that these creators are able to rely on copyright law protections to make their living. This is even more true in an age where the click of a button can plagiarize a lifetime of work.”

It was heartening to hear the Representatives’ positive response to the concerns of small, individual creators whose livelihoods depend on the commercial viability of their works. It was clear that the Committee is seriously considering the recommendations in the Copyright Office Report and looking for a way to rebalance Section 512 so that it respects what Congress originally intended—a system that respects the rights of authors and artists who face widespread infringement of their rights in the online environment.

Categories
Copyright

Scalia Law Students and CPIP Scholars Make an Impact in Copyright Office Section 512 Study

the word "copyright" written on a typewriterThe U.S. Copyright Office released its long-awaited report on Section 512 of Title 17 late last week. The Report is the culmination of more than four years of study by the Office of the safe harbor provisions for online service provider (OSP) liability in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA). Fortuitously, the study period coincided with the launch of Scalia Law’s Arts and Entertainment Advocacy Clinic. Clinic students were able to participate in all phases of the study, including filing comments on behalf of artists and CPIP scholars, testifying at roundtable proceedings on both coasts, and conducting a study of how OSPs respond to takedown notices filed on behalf of different types of artists. The Office cites the filings and comments of Scalia Law students numerous times and ultimately adopts the legal interpretation of the law advocated by the CPIP scholars.

The Office began the study in December 2015 by publishing a notice of inquiry in the Federal Register seeking public input on the impact and effectiveness of the safe harbor provisions in Section 512. Citing testimony by CPIP’s Sean O’Connor to the House Judiciary Committee that the notice-and-takedown system is unsustainable given the millions of takedown notices sent each month, the Office launched a multi-pronged inquiry to determine whether Section 512 was operating as intended by Congress.

Scalia Law’s Arts and Entertainment Advocacy Clinic drafted two sets of comments in response to this initial inquiry. Terrica Carrington and Rebecca Cusey submitted comments to the Office on behalf of middle class artists and advocates, including Blake Morgan, Yunghi Kim, Ellen Seidler, David Newhoff, and William Buckley, arguing that the notice-and-takedown regime under Section 512 is “ineffective, inefficient, and unfairly burdensome on artists.” The students pointed out that middle class artists encounter intimidation and personal danger when reporting infringements to OSPs. Artists filing takedown notices must include personal information, such as their name, address, and telephone number, which is provided to the alleged infringer or otherwise made public. Artists often experience harassment and retaliation for sending notices. The artists, by contrast, obtain no information about the identity of the alleged infringer from the OSP. The Office’s Report cited these problems as a detriment for middle class artists and “a major motivator” of its study.

A second response to the notice of inquiry was filed by a group of CPIP scholars, including Sandra Aistars, Matthew Barblan, Devlin Hartline, Kevin Madigan, Adam Mossoff, Sean O’Connor, Eric Priest, and Mark Schultz. These comments focused solely on the issue of how judicial interpretations of the “actual” and “red flag” knowledge standards affect Section 512. The scholars urged that the courts have interpreted the red flag knowledge standard incorrectly, thus disrupting the incentives that Congress intended for copyright owners and OSPs to detect and deal with online infringement. Several courts have interpreted red flag knowledge to require specific knowledge of particular infringing activity; however, the scholars argued that Congress intended for obvious indicia of general infringing activity to suffice.

The Office closely analyzed and ultimately adopted the scholars’ red flag knowledge argument in the Report:

Public comments submitted by a group of copyright law scholars in the Study make a point closely related to the rightsholders’ argument above, focusing on the different language Congress chose for actual and red flag knowledge. They note that the statute’s standard for actual knowledge is met when the OSP has “knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on the system or network is infringing” or “knowledge that the material or activity is infringing,” while the red flag knowledge standard is met when the OSP is “aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.” This difference, the copyright law scholars argue, is crucial to understanding the two standards: while the statute uses a definite article—“the”—to refer to material or activity that would provide actual knowledge, it drops “the” to speak more generally about facts or circumstances that would create red flag knowledge. “In Congress’s view,” the comment concludes, “the critical distinction between the two knowledge standards was this: Actual knowledge turns on specifics, while red flag knowledge turns on generalities.”

 

The Office went on to state that “a standard that requires an OSP to have knowledge of a specific infringement in order to be charged with red flag knowledge has created outcomes that Congress likely did not anticipate.” And since “courts have set too high a bar for red flag knowledge,” the Office concluded, Congress’ intent for OSPs to act upon information of infringement has been subverted. This echoed the scholars’ conclusion that the courts have disrupted the balance of responsibilities that Congress sought to create with Section 512 by narrowly interpreting the red flag knowledge standard.

Scalia Law students and CPIP scholars likewise participated in roundtable hearings on each coast to provide further input for the Copyright Office’s study of Section 512. The first roundtable was held on May 2-3, 2016, in New York, New York, at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, where the Second Circuit and Southern District of New York hear cases. The roundtable was attended by CPIP’s Sandra Aistars and Matthew Barblan. They discussed the notice-and-takedown process, the scope and impact of the safe harbors, and the future of Section 512. The second roundtable was held in San Francisco, California, at the James R. Browning Courthouse, where the Ninth Circuit hears cases. Scalia Law student Rebecca Cusey joined CPIP’s Sean O’Connor and Devlin Hartline to discuss the notice-and-takedown process, applicable legal standards, the scope and impact of the safe harbors, voluntary measures and industry agreements, and the future of Section 512. Several of the comments made by the CPIP scholars at the roundtables ended up in the Office’s Report.

In November 2016, the Office published another notice of inquiry in the Federal Register seeking additional comments on the impact and effectiveness of Section 512. The notice itself included citations to the comments submitted by Scalia Law students and the comments of the CPIP scholars. Under the guidance of Prof. Aistars, the students from Scalia Law’s Arts and Entertainment Advocacy Clinic again filed comments with the Office. Clinic students Rebecca Cusey, Stephanie Semler, Patricia Udhnani, Rebecca Eubank, Tyler Del Rosario, Mandi Hart, and Alexander Summerton all contributed to the comments, which discussed their work in helping individuals and small businesses enforce their copyright claims by submitting takedown notices pursuant to Section 512. The students reported on the practical barriers to the effective use of the notice-and-takedown process at particular OSPs. Two problems identified by the students were cited by the Copyright Office as examples of how OSPs make it unnecessarily difficult to submit a takedown notice. Accordingly, the Office called on Congress to update the relevant provisions of Section 512.

Two years after the additional written comments were submitted, the Office announced a third and final roundtable to be held on April 8, 2019, at the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss any relevant domestic or international developments that had occurred during the two prior years. CPIP’s Devlin Hartline attended this third roundtable to discuss recent case law related to Section 512, thus ensuring that CPIP scholars were represented at all three of the Office’s roundtables.

CPIP congratulates and thanks the students of Scalia Law’s Arts and Entertainment Advocacy Clinic for their skillful advocacy on behalf of artists who otherwise would not be heard in these debates.

Categories
Copyright

Arts & Entertainment Advocacy Clinic Students File Amicus Brief in Brammer v. Violent Hues

a gavel lying on a desk in front of booksBy Rachelle Mortimer & Grant Ossler*

The Arts & Entertainment Advocacy Clinic at Antonin Scalia Law School recently filed an amicus brief in the Brammer v. Violent Hues case that is on appeal in the Fourth Circuit. The Clinic provides a unique opportunity for students interested in intellectual property and entertainment law. Each semester, students participating in the Clinic are able to gain practical experience working with clients and industry professionals on various projects related to copyright law and policy.

One organization that the Clinic often works with is Washington Area Lawyers for the Arts (WALA), which helps to provide legal services for local artists through volunteer attorneys who take on cases pro bono or at a reduced rate. By working with WALA to hold legal intake Clinics and take on pro bono cases, Clinic students are able to understand how copyright law affects individual artists. It is this understanding that led the Clinic to file the amicus brief in order to protect the rights of artists and prevent a dangerous expansion of the fair use defense to infringement.

Working with local attorneys from Protorae Law, students from the Clinic drafted portions of the amicus brief to explain how the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia eviscerated the meaning and analysis of fair use under the Copyright Act.

Case Background

In 2016, the owner of defendant Violent Hues found a photograph online, copied it, cropped it, and posted it on a website that his organization created for its annual film festival. The photo in question was first posted to the photographer’s personal website, as well as to several online image-sharing websites. Violent Hues created the website to guide festival goers and provide information about the local area for filmmakers and festival attendees.

The owner of Violent Hues claimed he did not see a copyright notice on the photo when he used it, believing the photo was “a publicly available photograph.” Plaintiff Russell Brammer sent a demand letter, and upon receipt of the letter, Violent Hues removed the photo from its website. Brammer brought suit against Violent Hues claiming two causes of action: (1) copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 504(b), and (2) removal and alteration of copyright management information under 17 U.S.C. § 1202.

District Court Decision

Brammer did not respond to arguments regarding count two, therefore the district court considered that claim abandoned. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Violent Hues on count one, deeming the use of the photo was fair use per the Copyright Act. Fair use is codified in the Copyright Act and guides us through four factors of consideration when conducting an analysis to determine whether a use is a fair use. These factors are:

(1) The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature …; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.

17 U.S.C.§ 107.

Unfortunately, the district court eviscerated any meaning to fair use under copyright law. In its examination of purpose and character, the district court determined Violent Hues’ use was “transformative in function and purpose” because Violent Hues’ use of the photo was informational: “to provide festival attendees with information regarding the local area.” The district court distinguished this from Brammer’s use, which was “promotional and expressive.” Additionally, the district court determined the use was non-commercial because the photo was not used for advertising or to generate revenue. Regrettably, this is as far as the transformative analysis went.

In the district court’s analysis of the second factor, fair use weighed in favor of Violent Hues again because the photo was factual in nature and “fair use is more likely to be found in factual works than in fictional works.” The district court acknowledged that Brammer incorporated creative elements in his photo (e.g., lighting and shutter speed), but ultimately held that because it was a “factual depiction of a real-world location,” it was purely factual content. The district court determined this without regard to creativity, though. The photo itself is a time-lapse photo of the Adams Morgan neighborhood of Washington, D.C.

In examining the third factor of fair use, the district court determined that Violent Hues did not use any more of the photo than was necessary, and therefore this factor substantiality weighed in favor of Violent Hues. Keep in mind, though, that the photo in question was merely cropped.

Lastly, the district court concluded that because there was no evidence that Violent Hues’ use had any effect on the potential market for the photo, the fourth factor also weighed in favor of Violent Hues. To support its decision, the district court stated: “The Court’s task is to determine whether the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s works would materially impair the marketability of the works and whether it would act as a market substitute.” The district court arrived at this decision despite Brammer testifying he had been compensated for the photo six times—two times after Violent Hues’ infringement.

And thus, we have summary judgment for Violent Hues under a non-comprehensive fair use analysis.

Amicus Brief Summary and Commentary

The purpose of the Clinic’s amicus brief is to assist the court with regard to a proper, comprehensive fair use analysis, and to prevent the possible harm that an overly broad interpretation of the fair use defense could bring.

In examining the first factor of fair use, “purpose and character”, the district court unfortunately dedicated approximately two sentences to the analysis of why Violent Hues’ use was transformative in “function and purpose.” The district court simply stated that because the use was “informational,” and not “expressive” like Brammer’s use, the use was thus transformative. The proper examination requires looking at whether the new use adds something new “with a further purpose or different character.” As Judge Leval stated in his seminal article, Toward a Fair Use Standard, a different purpose or character, constituting a transformative use, is one that “alter[s] the first with new expression, meaning, or message,” and “employs the quoted matter in a different manner or for a different purpose from the original, thus transforming it.”

The district court failed to understand that Violent Hues’ use merely superseded Brammer’s. Violent Hues cropped the top and bottom of Brammer’s photo then posted it to its website with the purpose of showing the Adams Morgan neighborhood. A “wholesale taking” of the heart of the work, without adding additional value or meaning, is not transformative. The erroneous conclusion reached on this first factor destroys any meaning to transformative use and effectively erodes the exclusive rights held by copyright owners. To further illustrate this point, if the district court’s analysis is upheld, an author who writes a book regarding his life as president and his controversial pardon of a former political figure would have no recourse against a film producer who takes the author’s content verbatim and makes it into a movie. Why? Because the book is merely “informational,” while the film is “expressive” and thus transformative in function and purpose.

The district court’s opinion also addressed the role of “good faith” in a fair use defense and concluded that Violent Hues had acted in good faith when it found Brammer’s photo online because a copyright notice was not attached. This is not the law. Copyright protection under U.S. law is automatic from the moment of creation and notice need not be affixed to the published work for that protection to adhere. The good faith of alleged infringers is not frequently considered in fair use cases because “good faith” is not a statutory factor in the fair use analysis, and this has led to a lack of clear precedent on this point.

We proposed in our brief that if an alleged infringer acts in good faith, the court should neither weigh this factor for or against a finding of fair use. However, if an alleged infringer is shown to have acted in bad faith, using an artist’s work with the purpose of usurping the exclusive rights under 17 U.S.C. § 106, it should be weighed against a finding of fair use. Good faith should not weigh in favor of fair use because the purpose of the fair use defense is to protect First Amendment rights and allow limited uses of copyrighted works. On the other hand, bad faith should be weighed against a finding of fair use because trying to usurp an artist’s rights or using a work without paying for it does not align with the important purposes of the fair use defense.

Violent Hues did not act in good faith, but it also did not act in bad faith. Thus, the good faith factor should not have been considered at all in this case. A copyright notice is not required for a photograph to be protected. If the court allows Violent Hues’ lack of education on copyright law to be considered good faith, this would encourage internet users to remain ignorant of copyright law and infringe upon works more frequently. For these reasons, we asked the Fourth Circuit to clarify the role of the good faith factor in a fair use analysis.

The other factor our amicus brief addressed was the second factor of the fair use analysis. Digging into this factor, we asked that the court to clarify the analytical framework for evaluating the nature of the copyrighted work. In clarifying this framework, parties and other courts will be better able to determine when factual elements of copyrighted works are outweighed by the creative elements of such works. Brammer’s photo, specifically, is an appropriate vehicle for this since it combines creative and factual elements. Our brief articulates that a court can borrow from more familiar concepts of trademark’s nominative fair use and the defense of necessity to the tort of trespass on real property (noting that the prevailing theory of copyright is a property). Such theories provide for a defense on the basis of “necessity.”

In this analysis of necessity, one would believe that content in the factual lexicon would lean strongly toward a finding of fair use for the alleged infringer. However, where the use of the copyrighted work is not necessary to convey the same factual content, the motivation behind copyright law should be preserved—rewarding and protecting creativity. Brammer’s photo was a time-lapse photo of the Adams Morgan neighborhood; it was creative and depicted a factual setting. However, the mere fact that an original, creative work is factual does not imply that others may freely copy it.

The district court improperly analyzed this second factor in light of Violent Hues’ use of the photo, and not the intended use of the content creator, giving greater weight to the fact that the photo depicted a real-world location. We argued that this analysis “sanctions abuse of the fair use defense to appropriate copyrighted material so long as the user can claim that a factual element within the whole was the reason for their unauthorized appropriation.” The appropriate analysis centers on the concept of protecting creative elements while simultaneously not limiting the public’s use of facts. In the case at hand, Violent Hues’ use of Brammer’s photo to convey factual information about Adams Morgan was unnecessary because to convey the same message, and arguably in a more factual manner, Violent Hues could have driven to Adams Morgan to take its own snapshot of the neighborhood.

Finally, the district court’s determination that prior publication weighs in favor of a fair use is erroneous. As Patry on Fair Use provides: “The fact that a work is published does not mean that the scope of fair use is broader.” To state that publishing a copyrighted work broadens the scope of fair use renders the exclusive rights afforded to copyright owners null. Such a holding undermines the “special reward” of copyright protection and discourages creation of works—in stark contrast to the affirmative statements on copyright in the U.S. Constitution. Publication should be viewed as neutral until it can be considered under the fourth factor of the fair use analysis, wherein a court examines the impact of the alleged infringing use on the market for the copyrighted work. The district court’s simplistic approach to its analysis allows for parties to undermine the core purposes of copyright protection and, again, eviscerates a proper fair use analysis.

It is our hope that our amicus brief will help guide the Fourth Circuit as it assesses the extent of the fair use doctrine in the digital age. We are especially thankful to Antigone Peyton and David Johnson of Protorae Law, Terrica Carrington of the Copyright Alliance, and Professor Sandra Aistars of the Arts & Entertainment Advocacy Clinic for the opportunity to work on this important issue. To read our amicus brief, please click here.

*Rachelle Mortimer and Grant Ossler are students at Antonin Scalia Law School, where they study under Professor Sandra Aistars in the Arts & Entertainment Advocacy Clinic.

Categories
Copyright Internet Legislation Uncategorized

Middle Class Artists Want a DMCA System That Works

The following guest post comes from Rebecca Cusey, a second year law student at George Mason University School of Law.

By Rebecca Cusey

Rebecca_Cusey_HeadshotMason Law’s Arts & Entertainment Advocacy Clinic filed comments today with the U.S. Copyright Office detailing the frustrations and futilities experienced by everyday artists as they struggle with the DMCA system to protect their copyrights online.

Terrica Carrington and I wrote the comments on behalf of middle class artists, that group of creative professionals who invests in and lives off their art and yet does not have the kind of revenue stream or corporate backing of more well-known artists. These photographers, filmmakers, musicians, and other artists are squeezed between infringement that directly affects their ability to pay for things like a mortgage or orthodontics bill and the exorbitant cost of using the notice and takedown system to fight infringement.

Terrica and I spoke with four artists: Filmmaker Ellen Seidler, news photographer Yunghi Kim, musician Blake Morgan, audiovisual creator David Newhoff. These artists make works of value and have followings, and thus infringement. They make a profession of their art.

A middle class artist must do it all on her own – find infringement by hours of searching the web, compile lists of infringing posts on each site, navigate each site’s confusing DMCA notification system, and send takedown notification after takedown notification. And that’s all just sending the notifications. Monitoring to see if the infringing content has been removed or if it has simply been uploaded in another spot is a whole other job in itself.

The artists with whom we talked said it was not unusual in the least for a song, photograph, or film to be posted illegally in a thousand places, even tens of thousands of places. Finding infringement and sending notices took hundreds and thousands of hours, hours they could have spent taking photographs, making movies, or writing songs.

After all the time spent fighting infringement online, they felt the task was futile because the content simply reappeared, sometimes in a different place on the same site, other times because of counternotices filed with the ISP hosting the content claiming to have the right to post it.

These artists felt the notice and takedown system mandated by Section 512 of the Copyright Act was both all-consuming and futile, all-consuming because it ate hours upon hours and futile because it yielded little to no results. Ultimately, all of them decided to stop spending time trying to enforce their copyrights under the procedures of Section 512. It simply was not worth it.

Our comments were filed in response to a request by the U.S. Copyright Office for comments on the effectiveness of Section 512 in fighting infringement online. The Copyright Office wanted to know in particular if the provisions of Section 512 balanced the needs of ISPs to host content with the needs of copyright owners to control their work.

Middle class artists feel the balance is off and the scale tipped in favor of ISPs. These artists do not object to bearing some responsibility for protecting their copyrights online. They simply want a system that works.

To read our Section 512 comments, please click here.

Categories
Copyright History of Intellectual Property Innovation Inventors Trade Secrets Trademarks Uncategorized

Strong IP Protection Provides Inventors and Creators the Economic Freedom to Create

Here’s a brief excerpt of a post by Terrica Carrington that was published on IPWatchdog.

CPIP went against the grain with this conference, and showed us, bit by bit, what our world might look like today without intellectual property rights. Music wouldn’t sound the same. Movies wouldn’t look the same. You wouldn’t be reading this on your smartphone or have access to the cutting-edge biopharma and healthcare products that you rely on. And some of our greatest artists and inventors might be so busy trying to make ends meet that they would never create the amazing artistic works and inventions that we all enjoy. In short, CPIP explored how intellectual property rights work together as a platform that enables us to innovate, share, and collaborate across industries to develop incredible new products and services at an astounding rate.

To read the rest of this post, please visit IPWatchdog.