Tag: YouTube

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Copyright

Copyright Notebook: The Importance of Artists’ Agency

the word "copyright" typed on a typewriterI am looking forward to hosting a keynote conversation with Grammy-winning composer, performer, songwriter, best-selling author, and essayist Rosanne Cash this week at CPIP’s The Evolving Music Ecosystem conference. One part of Rosanne Cash’s “music ecosystem” is the Artist Rights Alliance (ARA), where she serves as a member of the board. Preparing for that conversation, I am thinking a lot about the importance of artists’ agency. Over the summer, the ARA “rebooted,” relaunching itself with a powerhouse music council of artists and experts. The ARA is “an alliance of working musicians, performers, and songwriters fighting for a healthy creative economy and fair treatment for all creators in the digital world. [They] work to defend and protect artists, guided by [their] Artists’ Bill of Rights, which outlines fundamental principles for today’s music economy.”

Those principles:

The Right to Control Our Work
The Right to Economic and Artistic Freedom
The Right to Attribution and Acknowledgment
The Right to a Music Community
The Right to Competitive Platforms
The Right to Information and Platform Transparency
The Right to Political Participation

 

All share one core attribute—an artist’s agency—over their work, their livelihood, their community, themselves. That the ARA found it necessary to relaunch this summer is not surprising. The triple threat of a pandemic decimating artists’ livelihoods, the surging power of technology platforms, and the challenges of ensuring one’s work is not distorted by others or used to send disagreeable political messages has heightened awareness among artists about the issues for which ARA stands.

Several notable lawsuits have also brought these issues to the forefront this summer that may shape the nature of artists’ agency over their work for years to come. Here are some thoughts about why they are significant and some issues you may not have noticed.

Hachette Book Group et al. v. Internet Archive

On June 1, 2020, four of the world’s preeminent publishing houses sued Internet Archive (IA) for willful mass copyright infringement. The IA styles itself an online library, open to anyone to borrow books, music, and other works. It scans millions of copyrighted as well as public domain works and makes them available to “borrowers” for free. It had previously operated under an already controversial policy of “controlled digital lending” (more on that below), but in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, dropped even these minimal restrictions on its distribution of works. As the Authors Guild put it in an open letter to the IA:

[B]y declaring a spurious “copyright emergency” and making a massive trove of copyrighted books available for free without any restrictions, Internet Archive has demonstrated a shocking disrespect for the rule of law—the cornerstone of our civil, democratic society—at a time when we most need it to prevail. You cloak your illegal scanning and distribution of books behind the pretense of magnanimously giving people access to them. But giving away what is not yours is simply stealing, and there is nothing magnanimous about that. Authors and publishers—the rights owners who legally can give their books away—are already working to provide electronic access to books to libraries and the people who need them. We do not need Internet Archive to give our works away for us.

 

In their complaint, the publishers argue that IA’s assertion that it should not be liable for infringement is based on “an invented theory called ‘Controlled Digital Lending’ (‘CDL’)—the rules of which have been concocted from whole cloth and continue to get worse.” As the complaint sets forth:

[A]t first, under this theory IA claimed to limit the number of scanned copies of a title available for free download at any one time to the number of print books of that title in its collection—though no provision under copyright law offers a colorable defense to the systematic copying and distribution of digital book files simply because the actor collects corresponding physical copies. Then, in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, IA opportunistically seized upon the global health crisis to further enlarge its cause, announcing with great fanfare that it would remove these already deficient limitations that were purportedly in place. Today, IA offers an enormous universe of scanned books to an unlimited number of individuals simultaneously in its “National Emergency Library.” IA’s blatant, willful infringement is all the more egregious for its timing, which comes at the very moment that many authors, publishers, and independent bookstores, not to mention libraries, are both struggling to survive amidst economic uncertainty, and planning deliberatively for future, changing markets.

 

The publishers’ lawsuit is important because it is the first “live” judicial challenge to the legal theory of “controlled digital lending”—a legal theory which was announced by certain academics and internet advocates in 2018. They argue that it should be fair use for libraries to scan or obtain scans of physical books they own and lend them electronically, provided certain restrictions are applied, such as limitations that attempt to emulate the limitations of lending in the physical world (e.g., limits on lending periods and on numbers of copies that can be loaned at a given time).

I refer to this as the first “live” judicial challenge because, while it is the first time CDL has been challenged in the courts, the supporters of CDL sought and failed to receive the blessing of the Second Circuit for IA’s original Open Library service when that court was reviewing the decision in Capitol Records v ReDigi. Unsurprisingly, the court declined to do so. In an opinion written by Judge Leval, the Second Circuit rejected ReDigi’s and its amici’s fair use argument because market harm would be likely since the sales of ReDigi’s digital files would compete directly with those of Capitol Records. Because “used” digital files do not deteriorate like used physical media, there would be no reason for customers to buy new licenses from Capitol Records if they could obtain the files from ReDigi at a lower price.

One imagines that the impact of free CDL on e-book sales would only be worse—first, because it is free, rather than merely a reduced price for “used” files, and second, because it would be usurping a valuable market authors and publishers have continued to actively develop and license for several years since the ReDigi decision. This includes licensing to libraries for free lending via services like OverDrive. It is likewise significant that the “Emergency Library” at issue in the publishers’ case against IA is far less restricted than the version of IA’s “Open Library” the amici sought and failed to have blessed by the Second Circuit in ReDigi.

Maria Schneider et. al. v. YouTube

Another case to watch is the class action lawsuit filed by composer and jazz performer Maria Schneider against YouTube and its parent companies Google and Alphabet in July. The lawsuit alleges that “YouTube has facilitated and induced [a] hotbed of copyright infringement [on its website] through its development and implementation of a copyright enforcement system that protects only the most powerful copyright owners such as major studios and record labels.” Because members of the class are denied access to the copyright management tool YouTube offers its corporate partners—Content ID—the lawsuit alleges that rather than preventing repeat infringements of works, the tool “actually insulates the vast majority of known and repeated copyright infringers from YouTube’s repeat infringer policy, thereby encouraging its users’ continuing upload of infringing content.”

This is all part of a deliberate strategy, according to the complaint:

Defendants Alphabet, Google, and YouTube reap billions of dollars annually from the online hosting of videos, including millions of works that infringe on the exclusive copyrights of Plaintiffs and the Class. Defendants permit and facilitate this infringement because it furthers their growth and revenue strategies and because they have determined that Plaintiffs and the Class—unlike YouTube’s preferred Content ID partners—lack the resources and leverage necessary to combat copyright infringement on the scale at which it is perpetuated on YouTube.

 

Maria Schneider argues many of the same things she and other artist advocates have asserted before Congress, the U.S. Copyright Office, and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office in hearings and roundtable proceedings exploring the provisions of Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA):

Faced with litigation by major music studios and other significant rights holders, Defendants have crafted distinct and disparate systems of copyright “enforcement” on their platform. For those entities with vast stores of copyright material and thus the leverage to require Defendants to appease their copyright management concerns, YouTube created its Content ID program, which allows qualifying copyright owners automatically to identify and manage their content on YouTube. . . . Smaller rights holders, including [Schneider], are, however, denied access to Content ID and thus are relegated to vastly inferior and time-consuming means of trying to police and manage their copyrights such as scanning the entirety of YouTube postings, searching for keywords, titles, and other potential identifiers.

 

They must then send notices identifying infringements URL by URL, filling out cumbersome webforms, often laden with advertising, struggle with captcha codes, and contend with requests for additional information or challenges from employees reviewing the requests.

While many artists have neither the pocketbook nor the backbone to stand up to an adversary like YouTube in federal court, this lawsuit seems particularly well-timed given that the ongoing focus on Section 512 in multiple government venues over the past decade has developed a solid record articulating the scope and the magnitude of the problem, as well as that the complaints against YouTube and other web platforms by individual artists seem to be almost universally shared.

Regardless of Maria Schneider’s lawsuit, the Senate and the U.S. Copyright Office are not done considering the issue. The Copyright Office released its much-anticipated Section 512 Report earlier this May and engaged in a subsequent exchange of letters with Senators Thom Tillis and Patrick Leahy regarding additional statutory clarifications that the Senate might consider and other approaches that could improve the operation of the DMCA without legislative amendment. Among the issues addressed in that letter is a request from the Senators to the Copyright Office to conduct stakeholder meetings to identify and adopt standard technical measures (STMs) as was anticipated in Section 512(i) of the DMCA. It is notable that Maria Schneider has herself been an active participant in the Copyright Office’s Section 512 proceedings, and in February of 2017, she submitted comments to the Copyright Office urging that Content ID be recognized as a STM under the DMCA and that all creators be granted access to it in order to be able to more efficiently police YouTube’s platform. The Copyright Office did not take up her suggestion.

In answer to the Tillis/Leahy request, on June 29, 2020, the Copyright Office responded in part that it will convene virtual meetings in late summer/early fall “focused on identifying any potential obstacles to the identification of potential STMs, as well as the requirements that must be met in order to adopt and implement an STM,” and to “begin identifying the kinds of technologies that may meet the statutory definition. Once the bounds of potential qualifying technologies have been identified, the Office would then convene further discussion to evaluate whether individual technologies meet the other requirements of section 512(i), including discussions to learn more about the terms upon which the technologies are offered in the marketplace.”

To date, hypothetical discussions (as well as lawsuits and licensing) have focused on digital fingerprinting technologies. Such technologies are designed to identify content by taking a “fingerprint” of a file that is being or has been uploaded to a platform and matching it to a database of sample content submitted by copyright owners. Regardless of the technology identified as an STM, the challenge may come not from choosing the technology, but rather in applying it. What one copyright owner is willing to tolerate in the name of marketing and fan word of mouth, another will not be. What a technology platform may set the technology to overlook, a filmmaker on the eve of a festival premiere will consider a “match.” Hence the importance of artists’ agency. Or as the ARA would have it: the right to competitive platforms and the right to information and platform transparency. Unless artists are informed about the STMs platforms apply and how they apply them, and unless they have the ability to keep their work from platforms that don’t meet their requirements, identifying an STM on its own won’t make much of a difference. Without artists’ agency and the right to control what happens to their creative output, we may just have the digital fingerprint version of the notice-and-takedown “whack-a-mole” game.[1]

Neil Young v. Donald J. Trump for President

Musicians have perpetually battled with political campaigns over the unauthorized use of their music at rallies and other campaign events. Given the particularly heated nature of this year’s presidential contest, it is perhaps not surprising that Neil Young has sued the Trump campaign for copyright infringement for publicly performing his musical works Rockin’ in the Free World and Devil’s Sidewalk at numerous campaign rallies and events, including one in Tulsa, Oklahoma. The complaint alleges: “The Campaign has willfully ignored Plaintiff’s telling it not to play the Songs and willfully proceeded to play the Songs despite its lack of a license and despite its knowledge that a license is required to do so.”

Neil Young is not the only musician battling the Trump campaign. Leonard Cohen’s estate is considering whether to file suit for the campaign’s use of Halleluiah during the last night of the Republican National Convention, and the Rolling Stones are working with ASCAP and BMI to persuade the Trump campaign to stop playing You Can’t Always Get What You Want at rallies. Campaigns typically assert that they are permitted to play any songs included in the Performing Rights Organizations’ political entities licenses, from which artists may seek to exclude their works if they object to use at political rallies. The allegations by Neil Young, the Cohen estate, and the Stones seem to be that the particular uses by the Trump campaign have gone beyond what a venue license for a political gathering envisions and that the campaign is instead using the songs to either distort their meaning or suggest an endorsement by the artist.

As the members of the Artist Rights Alliance wrote to all of the Republican and Democratic National Campaign Committees this July: “Like all other citizens, artists have the fundamental right to control their work and make free choices regarding their political expression and participation. Using their work for political purposes without their consent fundamentally breaches those rights—an invasion of the most hallowed, even sacred personal interests.”

These lawsuits are interesting because, until now, due to a combination of the veneer of protection offered by the venue licenses, and the time constraints imposed by campaign season, the only viable mechanism for discouraging unwanted uses of an artist’s work by a campaign has been public shaming via social media or statements by the artist publicly disowning and rejecting the candidate. Consequently, neither the moral rights or right of publicity-like qualities of the complaints nor the availability of damages for the infringing use have been explored. Since the Trump campaign is unlikely to settle a lawsuit, this case may define the boundaries of political entities licensed uses or add a new tool to musicians’ arsenals in ensuring they are not unwillingly conscripted into the service of a campaign they do not support.

RIP Matt Herron[2]

A civil rights era photographer I admired and came to know when I was CEO of the Copyright Alliance—Matt Herron—recently passed. Matt was inspiring on many levels. He described himself as an “activist with a camera,” and he covered some of the most meaningful moments in the effort to gain voting rights for Black people in the 1960s—including the Selma to Montgomery march.

“I photograph things I believe in. I try to photograph the things that are important in my life,” said Herron during a panel I moderated in 2011. He felt so strongly about what he saw happening in the 1960s south that he picked up his family and moved from Philadelphia to Mississippi because he thought they could be more relevant there. In doing so, through his photographs, he gave countless generations a front row seat to history. He described the five days he spent documenting the march from Selma to Montgomery:

As photographers, we are mostly voyeurs. We stand a little bit aside from an event. Part of our mind is clicking through F Stops and the rest of it is trying to figure out where images and angles are. But sometimes something happens that sucks us in and we lose that voyeuristic element and become part of the event itself. Certainly for me, the Selma March—five  days of walking in rain and sunshine and all kinds of conditions—was one of those moments. I have no memory of where I slept, what I ate, how I handled any of my basic physical problems. All I remember is the camera, the walking, and the faces.

 

Matt Herron lived by the copyright of his photographs and used them to further education about the social causes he covered. Besides the Selma march, he shot whaling protests by Greenpeace and the AIDS quilt. He explained that copyright laws help him keep collections of his images together and allow him to present them for the benefit of the causes covered:

I’ve put some effort into making not just single photographs but collections. I have historical collections and copyright allows me to decide how these images will be presented and how these historical moments can be disseminated. If I didn’t own the copyright some of these pictures of Martin Luther King might be used to advertise shoes. As it is, I can disseminate these images in ways that add to our national heritage, in educational ways for school children and to preserve a piece of history. Copyright allows me to retain this control not so I can keep them to myself but present them to the world in a way that’s coherent.

 

Matt Herron’s lifetime of work demonstrates in a way that is perhaps clearer this summer than any in recent memory why ensuring that artists are guaranteed agency over their creative output—whether they be photographers chronicling our history, musicians expressing our yearning, or authors giving words to our conscience—is crucial to democracy.

[1] Although it is approximately a decade old, this article, The (Im)possibility of “Standard Technical Measures” for UGC Websites, written by then student, now partner at Wilson Sonsini, Lauren Gallo, is the most thorough, balanced, and articulate examination of the issues the USCO is undertaking to date. Gallo notes that already in 2011 when her note was published, rights owners and UGC service providers were deploying fingerprinting technology to protect copyrighted works on the internet and operate repeat infringer policies. She writes: “In light of the widespread use of this successful technology and Congress’ mandate that ‘standard technical measures’ be developed ‘expeditiously,’ individual or infrequent holdouts should not obstruct the consensus necessary to define the term. . . . [F]ingerprinting technology should qualify as ‘standard technical measures’ under section 512(i), so that right holders and service providers may be on notice of their statutory obligations and may continue to develop ‘best practice’ applications for that technology.”

Ms. Gallo’s current practice focuses on novel legal questions online, involving among other issues, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, and she has represented Google and YouTube in cases challenging their decisions regarding whether or not to remove or limit access to online content.

[2] Portions of this section appeared as a blog post in June of 2011 on the Copyright Alliance website, when I was CEO of that organization.

Categories
Copyright

Stream Ripping Emerges as the New Face of Music Piracy

Cross-posted from the Mister Copyright blog.

chrome 3D copyright symbolAs formats change and advances in technology continue to transform the way we listen to music, new methods of pirating content are never far behind. What started with the analog dubbing and bootlegging of cassettes forty years ago evolved with the digital age into CD burning and MP3 sharing, eventually leading to a chaotic illegal downloading landscape at the turn of the century that would force the music industry to develop novel anti-piracy efforts and distribution models. Digital streaming services have since taken over as the preferred way to consume music, boasting over 100 million subscribers in 2016—a number that recently surpassed the total number of Netflix streaming video subscribers.

A Fast Growing Threat

Despite this substantial base of paying customers and affordable monthly subscription rates, many are choosing to bypass legitimate services by “ripping” songs from streaming platforms, which involves recording, converting, and saving songs to downloadable file. It sounds complicated, but the internet is teeming with free apps and programs that make the ripping process easy, and its popularity has prompted some in the industry to flag it the fastest growing form of music piracy.

Stream ripping has existed for about ten years, with the digital performance rights organization Sound Exchange recognizing its dangers in 2007. But, as a Billboard magazine article from the same year noted, “even the music industry concedes that the impact of stream ripping is minimal.” The article goes on to explain the inefficient nature of ripping software and the inability of users to search internet radio services—which were at the time were not yet on-demand—for their desired content. It was similar to listening to terrestrial radio with a blank cassette tape ready and waiting for the song you want to be played in order to record it. Needless to say, times have changed and now on-demand streaming services and advanced stream recording technology have made ripping a very real threat to copyright holders and creators.

A survey by the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) found that three in ten internet users had engaged in stream ripping over a six-month period in 2016. A similar 2016 study by MUSO, a leading content protection and piracy data specialist, measured a 60% increase in visits to stream ripping sites in one year from 2015 to 2016. This growing popularity is made more troubling by the fact that a predominantly younger audience is involved, with the IFPI survey finding that 49% of internet users between the ages of 16 and 24 regularly engage in stream ripping to acquire music. Though these numbers are already concerning, a forthcoming IFPI report is expected to show increases in stream ripping activity across the board.

Like most websites and programs that enable copyright infringement, ripping services make money from advertising based on the high levels of traffic they attract. And, nearly a year ago, a report from the RIAA estimated that traffic to the top 30 stream ripping sites topped 900 million in one month alone. It’s difficult to imagine that, in a year that has seen little progress in shutting down these ripping services, this number of monthly visitors wouldn’t have increased significantly. Making matters worse for artists and rights owners, unlike the illegal copies of songs or albums that permeate file sharing sights which can be identified and tagged to aid with takedown notices, these ripped versions are copied directly from the source, rendering them untraceable.

While different stream-ripping programs can record data from any number of streaming services, many developers have focused their attention on YouTube, where infringing content is rampant. Because YouTube is free and full of both licensed music videos and user generated content that often features unauthorized, full versions of copyrighted songs, it’s become an attractive destination for those who want to rip music but don’t want to pay to join a streaming service like Spotify or Apple Music.

YouTube-mp3.org

In 2016, a group of major record labels sued the operators of a stream ripping service based in Germany whose program was directed to the “rapid and seamless” copying of sound recordings from YouTube. YouTube-mp3.org is one of the most popular stream ripping tools available online, with 303.8 million visitors to its website in 2016 (making it the 141st most visited website globally). Users are attracted to its service not only because it’s free and doesn’t require an account, but because it’s incredibly easy to use. One simply pastes the YouTube URL in a search box and clicks a button that automatically converts the video’s audio track to an MP3 that can be stored on any number of devices.

According to the complaint, YouTube-mp3.org is guilty of direct, contributory, and vicarious copyright infringement, as well as inducement based on their blatant promotion of the stream ripping of copyright protected songs. Describing the nature of stream ripping in general, and YouTube-mp3.org specifically, the complaint warns:

“The scale of stream ripping, and the corresponding impact on music industry revenues, is enormous. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that tens, or even hundreds, of millions of tracks are illegally copied and distributed by stream ripping services each month. And YTMP3, as created and operated by Defendants, is the chief offender, accounting for upwards of 40% of all unlawful stream ripping that takes place in the world.”

The complaint also alleges that YouTube-mp3.org circumvents technological protection measures (TPMs) that YouTube has implemented to prevent the very copying the program facilitates, thereby violating Section 1201(a) of the Copyright Act. Discussing the circumvention, the complaint explains:

“More specifically, Defendants’ service descrambles a scrambled work, decrypts an encrypted work, or otherwise avoids, bypasses, removes, deactivates, or impairs a technological measure without the authority of Plaintiffs or YouTube.”

The complaint looks to enjoin not only YouTube-mp3.org, but also all third parties—including web-hosting services and domain name registries—through which the Defendants infringe copyrights. As of the time of this post, the lawsuit had been stalled due to difficulties in serving the international defendants, but stake holders on all sides will continue to monitor the case closely.*

The Future of Music Piracy

According to the IFPI survey, stream ripping’s rapid growth has seen it bypass pirate site downloading and other forms of streaming as the most popular way to steal music. One reason for the shift to ripping may be the increasingly focused offensive against established torrent sites like the Pirate Bay and Kickass Torrents. But also contributing to the rise of ripping is the compatibility of the programs with mobile devices, which MUSO explains “is a key insight into the longer-term stream ripping trend.” The study identifies Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey as countries where mobile stream ripping is the most prevalent and connects this popularity to the quickly expanding smartphone markets. These accessible mobile interfaces provide a younger audience not only with the portability they want, but also with the ability to listen to music offline, which can be essential in countries with limited internet infrastructure.

Like the file sharing programs and torrent sites that came before it, stream ripping technology is not inherently illegal. But, like Grokster and IsoHunt, many of the most popular ripping services—which display prominently in Google search results for “stream ripping software”—were developed to facilitate piracy and are actively inducing copyright infringement. Also like these now defunct websites, YouTube-mp3.org tries to make the argument that it’s merely an intermediary and immune from liability based on 512(c) safe harbor provisions of the DMCA. On its website, YouTube-mp3.org claims that, “[d]ifferent from other services, the whole conversion process will be performed by our infrastructure and you only have to download the audio file from our servers.” By hosting the content on its own servers at the direction of a user, YouTube-mp3.org attempts to cast itself as a passive intermediary, and exposing it as a piracy-inducing bad actor is imperative to deter the development and promotion of similar services dedicated to copyright infringement.

With the music industry’s widespread commitment to the streaming model, ripping is a threat to legitimate services that must be confronted by both the creative industries and the platforms that distribute music. Thankfully, platforms like Soundcloud, Spotify, and YouTube have a stake in the fight against ripping, as they ultimately want users to watch videos and listen to music over and over on their websites where they are subject to advertisements, rather than steal content and leave. Whereas tech companies and platforms may not have had as much to lose when it came to file sharing and illegal downloading, stream ripping stands to affect not only rights owners, but also the tech industry that is increasingly involved in the creation and distribution of copyrighted content.

*On September 4, 2017, it was reported that the RIAA and Youtube-mp3.org had reached a settlement in which Youtube-mp3.org  would shut down indefinitely, hand over its domain, and pay an undisclosed amount to the RIAA.

Categories
Copyright Uncategorized

Librarians’ Contradictory Letter Reveals an Alarming Ignorance of the Copyright System

U.S. Capitol buidlingOn December 14th, a group of librarians sent a letter to Congress explaining why they believe the Copyright Office should remain under the control of the Library of Congress. Written by University of Virginia Library’s Brandon Butler, the letter is a self-contradicting and uninformed response to recent recommendations on reform of the Copyright Office offered by leading members of the House Judiciary Committee. While the lawmakers’ report proposes overdue, sensible reforms to the framework of a department in need of modernization, the librarians’ letter favors a one-sided approach to reform and reveals a gross misunderstanding of how copyright law and the Copyright Office ensure public access to creative works.

The Letter Embraces the Very Conflict It Claims to Reject

The letter begins by criticizing another recent letter to Congress from former Registers of Copyright Ralph Oman and Marybeth Peters in which they question the recent firing of Register of Copyright Maria Pallante and discuss the urgent need for an independent Copyright Office. Butler takes issue with the former Registers’ suggestion that the Library of Congress and the Copyright Office have different priorities and distinguishable missions, insisting that if any tensions exist, they are a result of bias at the Copyright Office. Alleging that the former Registers and the Copyright Office are “on the side of authors and media companies,” Butler proclaims that libraries “in all their richness and complexity” truly serve the interest of all. It’s a nice-sounding theory, but unfortunately it’s completely inaccurate and soon contradicted by a palpable disregard for the rights of authors and creators.

Claiming that librarians and the Library of Congress don’t subscribe to the theory of an adverse dichotomy between authors and the public, the letter then reinforces this theory by suggesting the scales should be tipped in favor of the public. In one paragraph, Butler endorses the “important balance between the short-term, private interests of authors and intermediaries, and the long-term interests of the public.” Curiously, just after he lauds this “important balance,” it is abruptly discarded as a reflection of “a narrow conception” and “inimical” priorities that cause an unproductive tension between the Office and the Library of Congress. Soon after describing libraries as the “fulcrum” upon which the balance of copyright and the public interest rests, the letter declares that “[we] reject this false dichotomy between copyright and the public interest.”

Regardless of this hollow denunciation, it’s clear that Butler believes there is a conflict between the interests of authors and the interests of the public, as he preaches to it throughout the letter. After paying lip service to rising above tensions between copyright and the public interest, Butler distinctly pushes for a system that values libraries over creators and the rights in their works. Describing the “crucial parts” of the copyright system embraced by libraries and librarians, the letter lists “fair use, first sale, interlibrary loan,” and claims that “without them libraries as we know them in this country could not exist.” One might argue that more crucial to the existence of libraries are the creative works that line their stacks, but this reality doesn’t seem worth mentioning. In fact, Butler asserts that copyright law has a “fundamentally public-serving character,” contrary to the letter’s earlier emphasis on serving copyright owners, authors, and the public equally. After praising the balance, then rejecting it, the letter unequivocally elevates the importance of the access libraries provide over the contributions and rights of creators.

The Letter Fails to Take into Account a Complex Creative Economy Based on Property Rights

James Madison observed in Federalist No. 43 that “the public good fully coincides . . . with the claims of individuals.” The Founders of our country recognized that creative economies are built upon the property rights of authors and artists, and as CPIP’s recent policy brief on creative markets explains, they “had the foresight to recognize that the public ultimately benefits when this protection is secured by law.” Promoting the public interest by recognizing the importance of individual interests was a theory drawn from Adam Smith and his seminal The Wealth of Nations. In it, Smith explained that concerted efforts to benefit the public are often less effective—and less helpful to society—than uncoordinated individual efforts to pursue private interests, and that society benefits the most when individuals are empowered to create valuable goods and services by pursuing their own interests.

Embodying these principles, copyright empowers authors and creators to pursue their own private interests by granting them exclusive property rights in their works. These same property rights support creative industries and provide significant benefits by playing a key role in facilitating the myriad transactions that contribute to a vibrant creative economy grounded in free market principles. Among other things, these property rights enable the division of labor, encourage product differentiation and competition, and spur investments in the development and distribution of creative works. Copyright not only incentivizes the creation of works, but also the commercialization of these works through further development, marketing, and distribution.

Copyright’s intricate ecosystems are based on incentives that ensure the continued creation and distribution of original works of authorship, yet the librarians’ letter doesn’t seem to appreciate their significance or how they function. Butler dedicates much of the letter to emphasizing the importance of public access to copyrighted works, but access is only the final step in a complex system of investment, commercialization, and distribution of creative works. The librarians claim to “understand that copyright is a complex ecosystem,” but nothing in the letter validates this assertion. The only part of the creative economy they deem worth discussing is the end result of access, with all other imperative stages either not realized or ignored.

The Librarians Are Oblivious to a Broken System

Ending with a plea to Congress not to interfere with the current “relationship” between the Library of Congress and the Copyright Office, the letter claims the Library is in the best position to lead a desperately needed modernization initiative at the Office. It’s a bold claim, given that the Library stood by as the Office’s infrastructure became embarrassingly outdated and underfunded over the past twenty years. Before her untimely ouster, Register Pallante provided Congress with a perspective on copyright review that included a detailed list of deficiencies within the Office in need of improvement. Specifically, Pallante cited the diminishing number of fulltime employees and inadequate budget that have made it all but impossible to support growth and development at the Copyright Office:

The Copyright Office budget is consistently in the neighborhood of $50 million, of which $30 million is derived from fees paid by customers for registration and other services. The Library’s overall budget for 2015 is approximately $630 million, inclusive of the Copyright Office. Without taking anything away from the important duties or funding deficiencies in the rest of the Library, the Copyright Office’s resources are inadequate to support the digital economy it serves.

Pallante’s report goes on to discuss the serious information technology (IT) problems facing the Office, and to question the Library’s plan to address IT concerns by exerting more control over the Office’s departments and decisionmaking. The former Register was wise to question a plan that would give more control to an organization that has consistently failed to value or support the Copyright Office and its mission.

Further demonstrating just how out of touch they are with the realities of the current copyright law landscape, an affiliated group of librarians recently professed their faith in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) safe harbor system that is undoubtedly failing creators, copyright owners, and the public. In comments submitted to the Copyright Office as part of its study on the effectiveness of Section 512 of the DMCA, the Library Copyright Alliance (LCA) makes the absurd claim that the “safe harbors are working exactly as the stakeholders and Congress intended.” But, just before this assertion, the comments accuse copyright owners of abusing the DMCA’s notice and takedown process, and suggest amendments to the DMCA are necessary “to curtail this abuse.” Not only are the LCA’s comments utterly contradictory, they ignore substantial evidence and testimony from dozens of interested parties that the DMCA needs to be reformed and updated.

As CPIP highlighted in a recent examination of the state of the DMCA, the notice and takedown system has been largely ineffective in managing the ever-increasing amount of piracy, and courts continue to diminish service providers’ responsibility to cooperate with copyright owners to detect and deter infringement. The constant game of whack-a-mole with websites offering infringing content continues, and platforms such as YouTube are teeming with unauthorized works. Artist, creators and copyright owners have loudly voiced their frustration with the current system and called for reforms that better respect their rights. In the face of such obvious evidence of a broken system, to claim the DMCA is working exactly as intended speaks volumes of the librarians’ inability to recognize the reality of the situation.

It’s Time for Change at the Copyright Office

The House Judiciary Committee’s proposal on copyright reform is a response to years of listening “to the views and concerns of stakeholders from all sides of the copyright debate,” and it identifies modernization efforts that address the concerns of these interested parties. Since 2013, the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Internet has conducted 20 copyright review hearings on the current state of copyright law which included testimony from 100 witnesses. In addition to the hearings, Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte and Ranking Member John Conyers brought a copyright listening tour to Nashville, Silicon Valley, and Los Angeles where a wide range of creators, innovators, technology professionals, and users of copyrighted works had the opportunity to tell the Committee directly what changes they believe are needed to ensure U.S. copyright law evolves with the digital age.

The resulting policy proposals reflect a broad acknowledgment by those who participated  in the review that the Copyright Office must be updated to keep up with the digital culture it serves. Two of the most important steps in this modernization effort identified by the Committee include requiring the Office to maintain an updated digital database and granting the Office autonomy with respect to the Library of Congress. If Brandon Butler and the signatories of his letter had their way, the Copyright Office would remain under control of an organization that has proven it is unable to help propel the Office into the 21st century. It’s not particularly surprising that librarians would want the Library of Congress to retain control over the Copyright Office, but an overwhelming majority of creators, copyright law experts, and lawmakers recognize that the Office needs to move forward, rather than remain trapped in the past.

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Copyright Infringement Internet Uncategorized

Three Years Later, DMCA Still Just as Broken

By Matthew Barblan & Kevin Madigan

cameraIn 2013, CPIP published a policy brief by Professor Bruce Boyden exposing the DMCA notice and takedown system as outdated and in need of reform. The Failure of the DMCA Notice and Takedown System explained that while Section 512 of the DMCA was intended as a way for copyright owners and service providers to work together to fight infringement in the digital age, the notice and takedown system has been largely ineffective in managing the ever-increasing amount of piracy.

Three years later, the DMCA is still just as broken. Since we published the brief, courts have further diminished service providers’ responsibility to cooperate with copyright owners to detect and deter infringement, rendering the DMCA even more fruitless and desperately in need of retooling.

Boyden explained the fundamental problems with the system at the time, beginning with the fact that “despite all the notice, there is precious little takedown to show for it. Unless a site employs some sort of content filtering technology, the same content typically re-appears within hours after it is removed.” The notice and takedown system is particularly unsuited for the twenty-first century, where “infringement is persistent, ubiquitous, and gargantuan in scale. It is a problem that needs to be policed” with more than just takedown notices that don’t give copyright owners “a single day when the content is not available on the most heavily trafficked sites.”

Boyden noted that “even for the largest media companies with the most resources at their disposal, attempting to purge a site of even a fraction of the highest-value content is like trying to bail out an oil tanker with a thimble.” And Boyden pointed out that the courts hadn’t made the situation any better: “The DMCA’s unsuitability as a tool to manage chronic, persistent, and pervasive infringement is particularly apparent after recent decisions from the Second and Ninth Circuit that construed the duty of website owners very narrowly under Section 512.”

To further illustrate his point, Boyden collected data on takedown notices sent by MPAA companies and counter-notices received. Between March and August of 2013, MPAA companies sent takedown notices for over 25 million infringing URLs and received only 8 counter-notices in response. That’s a counter-notice rate of 0.000032%, suggesting that the astronomical volume of notices represents a likewise astronomical volume of infringement rather than overly-aggressive notice-sending.

Grand Totals. Infringing URLs: 25,235,151. URLs Sent to Websites: 13,238,860. URLs Sent to Search Engines: 11,996,291. Counter-Notices Received: 8.

Boyden concluded:

The impossibility of keeping up with new [infringing] uploads means that an online service provider can create a site aimed at and dedicated to hosting infringing copyrighted works, comply with every takedown notice, and still benefit from the safe harbor, as long as its intent remains hidden. If the site has enough users, any popular content removed will be supplanted by new copies almost immediately.

Sadly, three years later the “chronic, persistent, and pervasive” infringement that Boyden described continues, with stolen copyrighted works popping up on sites almost immediately after being taken down. Google Search—one product of one company—has receive nearly 90 million takedown notices this month alone. The situation has gotten so bad that last week a long list of artists, including Paul McCartney and Taylor Swift, signed a digital petition to bring attention to a broken DMCA system that allows companies like YouTube to benefit from infringement at the expense of songwriters and artists.

The artists’ main message: “The existing laws threaten the continued viability of songwriters and recording artists to survive from the creation of music.” They note that “the tech companies who benefit from the DMCA today were not the intended protectorate when it was signed into law nearly two decades ago,” and they ask Congress to “enact sensible reform that balances the interests of creators with the interests of the companies who exploit music for their financial enrichment.”

Recognizing the growing frustration with the DMCA, the U.S. Copyright Office initiated a study earlier this year to examine whether the statute is fulfilling its purpose. We submitted comments to the Copyright Office on behalf of a group of copyright law scholars, noting that courts have disrupted the balance Congress sought to create when it enacted the DMCA. In particular, courts have eliminated any incentive for service providers to work with copyright owners to develop policies and procedures to prevent or curb piracy online. In just one example of how deeply courts have distorted congressional intent, under courts’ current interpretation of the DMCA, search engines can continue to index even obviously infringing sites like The Pirate Bay with no fear of potential of liability.

Adding insult to injury, courts have recently shifted the balance of power even further away from artists and towards service providers, making it easier than ever for companies to enable and profit from infringement while turning a blind eye—or even encouraging—piracy on their sites. In this month’s Capitol Records v. Vimeo decision, for example, the Second Circuit extended the DMCA safe harbor to Vimeo despite smoking-gun evidence that Vimeo employees encouraged users to post stolen works on their site and had viewed the illicit videos at issue in the suit. In a jaw-dropping opinion, the court let Vimeo off the hook simply because the evidence of Vimeo employees encouraging infringement wasn’t directly tied to the specific infringing videos that plaintiffs included in their suit.

CPIP’s Devlin Hartline explains:

After Capitol Records v. Vimeo: A service provider can encourage its users to infringe on a massive scale, and so long as the infringement it encourages isn’t the specific infringement it gets sued for, it wins on the safe harbor defense at summary judgment. This is so even if there’s copious evidence that its employees viewed and interacted with the specific infringing material at issue. No jury will ever get to weigh all of the evidence and decide whether the infringement is obvious. At the same time, any proactive steps taken by the service provider will potentially open it up to liability for having actual knowledge, so the incentive is to do as little as possible to proactively “detect and deal” with piracy. This is not at all what Congress intended. It lets bad faith service providers trample the rights of copyright owners with impunity.

As courts continue to gut the DMCA, making it harder than ever for artists to protect their property and livelihoods, Congress would be wise to heed Bruce Boyden’s advice from three years ago: “It is long past time for a retooling of the notice and takedown regime.”

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Copyright Internet Uncategorized

Attacking the Notice-and-Staydown Straw Man

Ever since the U.S. Copyright Office announced its study of the DMCA last December, the notice-and-staydown issue has become a particularly hot topic. Critics of notice-and-staydown have turned up the volume, repeating the same vague assertions about freedom, censorship, innovation, and creativity that routinely pop up whenever someone proposes practical solutions to curb online infringement. Worse still, many critics don’t even take the time to look at what proponents of notice-and-staydown are suggesting, choosing instead to knock down an extremist straw man that doesn’t reflect anyone’s view of how the internet should function. A closer look at what proponents of notice-and-staydown are actually proposing reveals that the two sides aren’t nearly as far apart as critics would have us believe. This is particularly true when it comes to the issue of how well notice-and-staydown would accommodate fair use.

For example, Joshua Lamel’s recent piece at The Huffington Post claims that “innovation and creativity are still under attack” by the “entertainment industry’s intense and well-financed lobbying campaign” pushing for notice-and-staydown. Lamel argues that the “content filtering proposed by advocates of a ‘notice and staydown’ system . . . would severely limit new and emerging forms of creativity.” And his parade of horribles is rather dramatic: “Parents can forget posting videos of their kids dancing to music and candidates would not be able to post campaign speeches because of the music that plays in the background. Remix culture and fan fiction would likely disappear from our creative discourse.” Scary stuff, if true. But Lamel fails to cite a single source showing that artists, creators, and other proponents of notice-and-staydown are asking for anything close to this.

Similarly, Elliot Harmon of the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) argues that “a few powerful lobbyists” are pushing for notice-and-staydown such that “once a takedown notice goes uncontested, the platform should have to filter and block any future uploads of the same allegedly infringing content.” Harmon also assumes the worst: “Under the filter-everything approach, legitimate uses of works wouldn’t get the reasonable consideration they deserve,” and “computers would still not be able to consider a work’s fair use status.” Like Lamel, Harmon claims that “certain powerful content owners seek to brush aside the importance of fair use,” but he doesn’t actually mention what these supposed evildoers have to say about notice-and-staydown.

Harmon’s suggestion that the reliance on uncontested takedown notices gives inadequate consideration to fair use is particularly strange as it directly contradicts the position taken by the EFF. Back in October of 2007, copyright owners (including CBS and Fox) and service providers (including Myspace and Veoh) promulgated a list of Principles for User Generated Content Services. These Principles recommend that service providers should use fingerprinting technology to enact notice-and-staydown, with the general caveat that fair use should be accommodated. Two weeks later, the EFF published its own list of Fair Use Principles for User Generated Video Content suggesting in detail how notice-and-staydown should respect fair use.

The EFF’s Fair Use Principles include the following:

The use of “filtering” technology should not be used to automatically remove, prevent the uploading of, or block access to content unless the filtering mechanism is able to verify that the content has previously been removed pursuant to an undisputed DMCA takedown notice or that there are “three strikes” against it:

1. the video track matches the video track of a copyrighted work submitted by a content owner;
2. the audio track matches the audio track of that same copyrighted work; and
3. nearly the entirety (e.g., 90% or more) of the challenged content is comprised of a single copyrighted work (i.e., a “ratio test”).

If filtering technologies are not reliably able to establish these “three strikes,” further human review by the content owner should be required before content is taken down or blocked.

Though not explicitly endorsing notice-and-staydown, the EFF thinks it’s entirely consistent with fair use so long as (1) the content at issue has already been subject to one uncontested takedown notice, or (2) the content at issue is at least a 90% match to a copyrighted work. And the funny thing is that supporters of notice-and-staydown today are actually advocating for what the EFF recognized to be reasonable over eight years ago.

While Harmon never explicitly identifies the “powerful lobbyists” he accuses of wanting to trample on fair use, he does link to the Copyright Office’s recently-announced study of the DMCA and suggest that they can be found there. Reading through that announcement, I can only find three citations (in footnote 36) to people advocating for notice-and-staydown: (1) Professor Sean O’Connor of the University of Washington School of Law (and Senior Scholar at CPIP), (2) Paul Doda, Global Litigation Counsel at Elsevier, and (3) Maria Schneider, composer/conductor/producer. These three cites all point to testimonies given at the Section 512 of Title 17 hearing before the House Judiciary Committee in March of 2014, and they show that Harmon is attacking a straw man. In fact, all three of these advocates for notice-and-staydown seek a system that is entirely consistent with the EFF’s own Fair Use Principles.

Sean O’Connor seeks notice-and-staydown only for “reposted works,” that is, “ones that have already been taken down on notice” and that are “simply the original work reposted repeatedly by unauthorized persons.” His proposal only applies to works that “do not even purport to be transformative or non-infringing,” and he specifically excludes “mash-ups, remixes, covers, etc.” This not only comports with the EFF’s recommendations, it goes beyond them. Where the EFF would require either a previously uncontested notice or at least a 90% match, O’Connor thinks there should be both an uncontested notice and a 100% match.

The same is true for Paul Doda of Elsevier, who testifies that fingerprinting technology is “an appropriate and effective method to ensure that only copies that are complete or a substantially complete copy of a copyrighted work are prevented or removed by sites.” Doda explicitly notes that filtering is not suitable for “works that might require more detailed infringement analysis or ‘Fair Use’ analysis,” and he praises YouTube’s Content ID system “that can readily distinguish between complete copies of works and partial copies or clips.” Doda’s vision of notice-and-staydown is also more protective of fair use than the EFF’s Fair Use Principles. While the EFF suggests that a previously uncontested notice is sufficient, Doda instead only suggests that there be a substantial match.

Unlike O’Connor and Doda, Maria Schneider is not a lawyer. She’s instead a working musician, and her testimony reflects her own frustrations with the whack-a-mole problem under the DMCA’s current notice-and-takedown regime. As a solution, Schneider proposes that creators “should be able to prevent unauthorized uploading before infringement occurs,” and she points to YouTube’s Content ID as evidence that “it’s technically possible for companies to block unauthorized works.” While she doesn’t explicitly propose that there be a substantial match before content is filtered, Schneider gives the example of her “most recent album” being available “on numerous file sharing websites.” In other words, she’s concerned about verbatim copies of her works that aren’t possibly fair use, and nothing Schneider recommends contradicts the EFF’s own suggestions for accommodating fair use.

Lamel and Harmon paint a picture of powerful industry lobbyist boogeymen seeking an onerous system of notice-and-staydown that fails to adequately account for fair use, but neither produces any evidence to support their claims. Responses to the Copyright Office’s DMCA study are due on March 21st, and it will be interesting to see whether any of these supposed boogeymen really show up. There’s little doubt, though, that critics will continue attacking the notice-and-staydown straw man. And it’s really a shame, because advocates of notice-and-staydown are quite conscious of the importance of protecting fair use. This is easy to see, but first you have to look at what they’re really saying.

Categories
Copyright Innovation Internet Uncategorized

Notice-and-Staydown and Google Search: The Whack-A-Mole Problem Continues Unabated

After my last post discussing the necessity for notice-and-staydown to help copyright owners with the never-ending game of whack-a-mole under the DMCA, I was asked to clarify how this would work for Google Search in particular. The purpose of my post was to express the need for something better and the hope that fingerprinting technologies offer. But, admittedly, I did not do a good job of separating out how notice-and-staydown would work for hosting platforms as compared to search engines. I think the whack-a-mole problem with hosting sites is indeed different than with search engines, and while fingerprinting may work well for the former, it’s probably ill-suited for the latter.

It’s clear enough how fingerprinting technologies can be applied to hosting platforms, and the simple fact is that they are already being deployed. YouTube uses its own proprietary technology, Content ID, while other platforms, such as Facebook and SoundCloud, use Audible Magic. These technologies create digital fingerprints of content that are then compared to user-uploaded content. When there’s a match, the copyright owner can choose to either allow, track, mute, monetize, or block the uploaded content.

There isn’t a lot of publicly-available information about how accurate these fingerprinting technologies are or how widely copyright owners utilize them. We do know from Google’s Katherine Oyama, who testified to Congress in early 2014, that “more than 4,000 partners” used Content ID at the time and that copyright owners had “‘claimed’ more than 200 million videos on YouTube” with the technology. She also acknowledged that “Content ID is not perfect, sometimes mistakenly ascribing ownership to the wrong content and sometimes failing to detect a match in a video.” Despite these imperfections, the scale of which she didn’t spell out, YouTube continues to offer Content ID to copyright owners.

Oyama also indicated that Content ID does not “work for a service provider that offers information location tools (like search engines and social networks) but does not possess copies of all the audio and video files that it links to.” This scenario is clearly different. When a site hosts content uploaded by its users, it can easily match those uploads to the content it’s already fingerprinted. When a site links to content that’s hosted elsewhere, it may not be possible to analyze that content in the same way. For example, the linked-to site could simply prevent automated crawling. Of course, not all sites block such crawling, but more would probably start doing so if fingerprinting were used in this way.

For Google Search, notice-and-staydown would likely not depend upon fingerprinting technology. Instead, the changes would come from: (1) delisting rogue sites, (2) promoting legitimate content, (3) improving auto-complete, and (4) ceasing to link to the very links that have already been taken down. These suggestions are not anything new, but it’s clear that Google has not done all it can to make them effective. This is not to say that improvements haven’t been made, and Google is to be commended for the work that it’s done so far. But it can and should do more.

Sticking with the example of The Hateful Eight from my prior post, it’s easy to see how Google Search promotes piracy. Using a fresh installation of Chrome so as not to skew the results, I need only type “watch hat” into Google Search before its auto-complete first suggests I search for “watch hateful 8 online.” After following this suggestion, the first seven results are links to obviously-infringing copies of the film. The first link points to the film at the watchmovie.ms site. A quick glance at that site’s homepage shows that it offers numerous (if not only) films that are still in theaters, including Spectre, Star Wars: The Force Awakens, Creed, and The Hateful Eight. In other words, Google’s first search result from its first suggested search term points me to an illicit copy of the film on a site that’s obviously dedicated to infringement.

I’ve never heard of watchmovie.ms, so I checked its WHOIS data. The site was registered on October 14th of last year, and Google’s Transparency Report indicates that it started receiving takedown notices for it just a few days later. To date, Google has received 568 requests to remove 724 infringing links to watchmovie.ms, but its search engine dutifully continues to crawl and index “about 39,000 results” at the site. And, for reasons I simply cannot fathom, Google prefers to send me to that pirate site rather than point me to Google Play (or to any number of other sites) where I can pre-order the film and “watch hateful 8 online” legally.

Making matters worse, at the bottom of the first page of search results for “watch hateful 8 online,” Google links to four DMCA takedown notices it received from copyright owners that resulted in five links being removed from the first page of results. These four notices, in turn, contain a combined total of 499 illicit links to The Hateful Eight that Google has already taken down. This truly boggles the mind. Google takes down five infringing links from one page of search results, consistent with the DMCA, but then it links to those five links along with 494 more such links. And these linked-to links are even better for infringers, since they’ve been vetted by Google as being worthy of taking down.

As the producer of The Hateful Eight, Richard Gladstein, relayed to The Hollywood Reporter, Google told him that it is “not in a position to decide what is legal and what is illegal online.” This is a cop out. In other venues, Google contends that it’s doing a lot to fight piracy. It submitted comments to the U.S. Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator this past October explaining how “changes made to [its] algorithm have been highly effective in demoting sites receiving a high number of takedown notices.” This shows that it is indeed in a position to determine what is “illegal online” and to take action against pirate sites. But simply demoting these sites is not enough—they should be delisted altogether.

Everyone knows that The Pirate Bay is a pirate site, yet Google indexes “about 914,000 results” from just one of its domains. As of today, Google has received 187,540 requests to remove 3,628,242 links to that domain, yet Google doesn’t choose to delist the site from its results. Nor does it even appear to be demoting it. The top three search results for “thepiratebay hateful 8” are links to infringing copies of the film on The Pirate Bay. It’s clear that these links are infringing, yet Google makes copyright owners continue playing whack-a-mole for even the most obvious infringements.

This isn’t how the DMCA is supposed to work. Congress even envisioned this whack-a-mole scenario with search engines when it wrote the DMCA. The legislative history provides: “If, however, an Internet site is obviously pirate, then seeing it may be all that is needed for the service provider [i.e., search engine or other information location tool] to encounter a ‘red flag.’ A provider proceeding in the face of such a ‘red flag’ must do so without the benefit of a safe harbor.” The Pirate Bay is “obviously pirate,” and Google knows as much even without the 3.6 million takedown notices it’s received. It knows the same thing about lots of pirate sites, including the other domain names contained in its list of greatest hits.

Google could be doing more to help copyright owners with the whack-a-mole problem, but so far, it’s only taken a few baby steps. And when defending its refusal to delist obvious pirate sites, Google contends that it’s defending freedom of speech:

[W]hole-site removal sends the wrong message to other countries by favoring over-inclusive private censorship over the rule of law. If the U.S. embraces such an overbroad approach to address domestic law violations (e.g., copyright), it will embolden other countries to seek similar whole-site removal remedies for violations of their laws (e.g., insults to the king, dissident political speech). This would jeopardize free speech principles, emerging services, and the free flow of information online globally and in contexts far removed from copyright.

Delisting The Pirate Bay from Google Search isn’t about favoring “censorship over the rule of law.” It’s about Google favoring the rule of law over blatant criminal infringement and doing its part to be a good citizen in the digital economy where it plays no small role. The comparison of the conduct of criminal infringers to the speech of political dissidents rings hollow, and delisting the most obvious and egregious sites does not threaten free speech. Google already claims to demote pirate sites, yet that doesn’t “jeopardize free speech principles.” Neither will delisting them. And as long as Google consciously decides to index known pirate sites with its search engine, the whack-a-mole problem will only continue unabated for copyright owners.

Categories
Copyright Innovation Internet Uncategorized

Endless Whack-A-Mole: Why Notice-and-Staydown Just Makes Sense

Producer Richard Gladstein knows all about piracy. As he recently wrote for The Hollywood Reporter, his latest film, The Hateful Eight, was “viewed illegally in excess of 1.3 million times since its initial theatrical release on Christmas Day.” Gladstein is not shy about pointing fingers and naming names. He pins the blame, in no small part, on Google and (its subsidiary) YouTube—the “first and third most trafficked websites on the internet.” While acknowledging that fair use is important, Gladstein argues that it has become “an extremely useful tool for those looking to distract from or ignore the real copyright infringement issue: piracy.” His point is that it’s simply not fair use when someone uploads an entire copyrighted work to the internet, and claims that service providers can’t tell when something is infringing are disingenuous.

Gladstein questions why Google and YouTube pretend they are “unable to create and apply technical solutions to identify where illegal activity and copyright infringement are occurring and stop directing audiences toward them.” In his estimation, “Google and YouTube have the ability to create a vaccine that could eradicate the disease of content theft.” While Gladstein doesn’t mention the DMCA or its notice-and-takedown provisions specifically, I think what he has in mind is notice-and-staydown. That is, once a service provider is notified that the copyright owner has not authorized a given work to be uploaded to a given site, that service provider should not be able to maintain its safe harbor if it continues hosting or linking to the given work.

No small amount of ink has been spilled pointing out that the DMCA’s notice-and-takedown provisions have led to an endless game of whack-a-mole for copyright owners. Google’s own transparency report boasts how its search engine has received requests to take down over 63 million URLs in the past month alone. And it helpfully tells us that it’s received over 21 million such requests over the past four years for just one site: rapidgator.net. Google’s transparency doesn’t extend to how many times it’s been asked to remove the same work, nor does it tell us anything about takedown requests for YouTube. But there’s no reason to think those numbers aren’t equally as frustrating for copyright owners.

The question one should ask is why these numbers aren’t frustrating for Google and YouTube, as they have to deal with the deluge of notices. Apparently, they don’t mind at all. According to the testimony of Google’s Senior Copyright Policy Counsel, Katherine Oyama, the “DMCA’s shared responsibility approach works.” Oyama notes that Google has spent tens of millions of dollars creating the infrastructure necessary to efficiently respond to the increasing number of takedown notices it receives, but many (if not most) copyright owners don’t have those kinds of resources. For them, it’s daily battles of manually locating infringements across the entire internet and sending takedown notices. For Google, it’s mostly-automated responses to take down content that otherwise brings ad-based revenue.

These struggles hit individual authors and artists the hardest. As the U.S. Copyright Office noted in its recently-announced study of the DMCA, “[m]any smaller copyright owners . . . lack access to third-party services and sophisticated tools to monitor for infringing uses, which can be costly, and must instead rely on manual search and notification processes—an effort that has been likened to ‘trying to empty the ocean with a teaspoon.’” What makes the process so frustrating—and futile—is the fact that the same works get uploaded to the same platforms time and time again. And any time spent sending the same takedown notice to the same service provider is time that is not spent honing one’s craft and creating new works.

Gladstein is correct: Service providers like Google and YouTube could be doing more. And, somewhat ironically, doing more for copyright owners would actually mean that both sides end up doing less. The obvious solution to the whack-a-mole problem is notice-and-staydown—it just makes sense. There’s simply no reason why a copyright owner should have to keep telling a service provider the same thing over and over again.

Those who object to notice-and-staydown often point out that the DMCA process is susceptible to abuse. Indeed, there are some who send notices in bad faith, perhaps to silence unwanted criticism or commentary. But there’s no reason to think that such abuse is the rule and not the exception. Google’s own numbers show that it complied with 97% of notices in 2011 and 99% of notices in 2013. That’s still a potentially-significant amount of abuse from notice-senders, but it’s also certainly a ton of intentional abuse from infringers whose conduct generated the legitimate notices in the first place. And the vast majority of those infringers won’t get so much as a slap on the wrist.

Turning back to Gladstein’s theme, discussions about fair use or takedown abuse are beside the point. The simple fact is that garden-variety copyright infringement involves neither issue. As CPIP Senior Scholar Sean O’Connor testified to Congress, “for many artists and owners the majority of postings are simply straight-on non-transformative copies seeking to evade copyright.” It’s this simple piracy, where entire works are uploaded to the internet for all to take, that concerns copyright owners most. Gladstein cares about the 1.3 million illicit distributions and performances of The Hateful Eight that are obviously infringing, not the commentary of critics that would obviously be fair use. And takedown notices sent because of these illicit uploads are anything but abusive—the abusers are the infringers.

The technology to make notice-and-staydown work already exists. For example, Audible Magic and YouTube both have the technology to create digital fingerprints of copyrighted works. When users later upload these same works to the internet, the digital fingerprints can be matched so that the copyright owner can then control whether to allow, monetize, track, or block the upload altogether. This technology is a great start, but it’s only as good as its availability to copyright owners. The continued proliferation of infringing works on YouTube suggests that this technology isn’t being deployed properly. And Google has no comparable technology available for its search engine, leaving copyright owners with little choice but to continue playing endless whack-a-mole.

Fortunately, the tides have been turning, especially as the technology and content industries continue to merge. And strides are being made in the courts as well. For example, a Court of Appeal in Germany recently held that YouTube has the duty to both take down infringing content and to make sure that it stays down. A quick search of YouTube today shows that The Hateful Eight, which is still in theaters, is legitimately available for pre-order and is illicitly available to be streamed right now. One wonders why YouTube chooses to compete with itself, especially when it has the tool to prevent such unfair competition. Regardless, there is real hope that Gladstein’s call for a “vaccine that could eradicate the disease of content theft” will be just what the doctor ordered—and that “vaccine” is notice-and-staydown.

[Update: This post unintentionally generated confusion as to whether I think notice-and-staydown means that fingerprinting technologies should be used with search engines. I do not think that would work well. I explain how search engines could do more to help copyright owners with the whack-a-mole problem in this follow-up post.]

Categories
Copyright Internet Uncategorized

Let’s Get Real About Kim Dotcom: The Indictment Clearly Alleges Felony Copyright Infringement

By Devlin Hartline & Terrica Carrington

After countless delays, the extradition hearing against Kim Dotcom began yesterday in New Zealand. Dotcom has been indicted on several charges, including criminal copyright infringement, racketeering, money laundering, and wire fraud, in connection with his notorious Megaupload website. He allegedly reproduced and distributed large amounts of copyrighted works, including movies, songs, TV programs, and computer software. In anticipation of the hearing, we’ve heard much opinion and speculation about the case against Dotcom.

Most recently, Harvard law professor Larry Lessig wrote a puzzling affidavit in which he argues that the superseding indictment and the summary of evidence against Dotcom are insufficient to establish a prima facie case of felony copyright infringement. Lessig has a long history of being on the losing end of things with his novel arguments concerning copyright law, and this affidavit appears to continue that trend. Lessig argues that “the DOJ fails to show direct criminal copyright infringement on the part of Megaupload personnel” and that “there is no showing that any specific Megaupload representative . . . had the requisite mens rea to willfully violate copyright law.”

Lessig is wrong: The superseding indictment and the summary of evidence allege direct criminal copyright infringement by Dotcom and his co-defendants. Looking at just two examples from the indictment, Count Four relates to the pre-release movie “Taken” that was uploaded to Megaupload by one of Dotcom’s co-defendants, and Count Eight concerns the scraping of YouTube done by the co-defendants at Dotcom’s command. There are smoking gun emails establishing that these crimes were done willfully. Remarkably, Lessig makes no mention whatsoever of the movie “Taken,” the scraping of YouTube, or the emails. It’s time to get real about Kim Dotcom.

Sufficiency of the Indictment

As a preliminary matter, it’s important to understand the procedural posture of this case. The case isn’t at trial, and it hasn’t even reached discovery yet—this is merely an indictment. Under federal law, a criminal indictment has two primary purposes: (1) to sufficiently outline the charges so that the accused is on notice and may prepare to defend against those charges, and (2) to enable the defendant to avoid double jeopardy by defining the scope of the charges.[1] At this early stage, courts assume that the prosecution’s alleged facts are true, and the indictment will only be dismissed if the allegations fail to state an offense.[2]

Lessig attacks the indictment’s sufficiency: “Counts Four through Eight allege that respondents themselves committed crimes of copyright infringement. General allegations in such Counts do not find support in specific facts set forth in the Record of the Case.” He further states that “no individual Megaupload defendant is shown to have . . . ‘willfully’ or criminally copied or distributed a copyrighted work.” While it’s true that these things haven’t been proved beyond a reasonable doubt after a trial on the merits, it’s simply not true that the indictment doesn’t allege these things sufficiently to put Dotcom on notice of the crimes he’s accused of committing.

As we’ll see below, Counts Four and Eight in the indictment simply follow the language of the applicable statutes, supported by the alleged facts that establish willfulness. The Supreme Court has stated numerous times that “[i]t is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished.”[3] The Counts here do just that—they quote the statutes and fully set forth the elements of the crimes.

Count Four: Pre-Release Movie “Taken”

Count Four of the indictment accuses Dotcom of felony copyright infringement for the pre-release distribution of the movie “Taken” in violation of Section 506(a)(1)(C) of the Copyright Act,[4] which provides:

Any person who willfully infringes a copyright shall be punished as provided under section 2319 of title 18, if the infringement was committed . . . by the distribution of a work being prepared for commercial distribution, by making it available on a computer network accessible to members of the public, if such person knew or should have known that the work was intended for commercial distribution.

Tracking the language of the statute, Count Four states:

On or about October 25, 2008, in the Eastern District of Virginia and elsewhere, the defendants . . . did willfully, and for purposes of commercial advantage and private financial gain, infringe a copyright by distributing a work being prepared for commercial distribution in the United States, to wit, the copyrighted motion picture “Taken ” (which would not be commercially distributed until on or about January 30, 2009) by making it available on a computer network accessible to members of the public, when defendants knew, and should have known, that the work was intended for commercial distribution.

The superseding indictment and summary of evidence clearly allege that this crime was committed willfully. “Taken” was released in the United States in January of 2009, and one of Dotcom’s co-defendants, Bram Van Der Kolk, uploaded it more than three months earlier in October of 2008:

On or about October 25, 2008, VAN DER KOLK uploaded an infringing copy of a copyrighted motion picture entitled “Taken 2008 DVDRip Repack [A Release Lounge H264 By Micky22].mp4” to Megaupload.com and e-mailed the URL link for the file to another individual. An infringing copy of this copyrighted work was still present as of October 27, 2011, on a server in the Eastern District of Virginia controlled by the Mega Conspiracy.

In February of 2009, Van Der Kolk told another co-defendant, Mathias Ortmann, that he had uploaded several movies, and then he sent Ortmann a link to “Taken”:

On or about February 7, 2009, via Skype, VAN DER KOLK told ORTMANN, “I have many old videos in my portfolio.” VAN DER KOLK then said, “I uploaded full dvd rips” and then sent ORTMANN a Mega URL to the copyrighted motion picture Taken and commented, “that was a 1013.05 MB upload :)” ORTMANN responded, “looks good :)” and VAN DER KOLK replied, “yeah.”

Three months later, another of Dotcom’s co-defendants, Finn Batato, emailed Ortmann with a message from a customer who had watched “Taken”:

On or about May 25, 2009, BATATO sent an e-mail to ORTMANN that contained customers’ e-mails. One of the customer e-mails indicated: “We watched Taken successfuly and then tried to watch the “Alphabet Killer ” a day later and got the message to upgrade if we wanted to continue watching.”

The alleged facts show that one of Dotcom’s co-defendants, Van Der Kolk, uploaded “Taken” and that two others, Ortmann and Batato, knew about it. Given his admission that he had “uploaded full dvd rips,” and given that the file was named “Taken 2008 DVDRip Repack [A Release Lounge H264 By Micky22].mp4,” it’s obvious that Van Der Kolk knew that this was infringement. These smoking gun emails establish that this infringement was done willfully, with the approval of two other co-defendants.

But what about Dotcom? Why is he charged with this crime? There is no evidence that Dotcom himself knew about this particular movie—nor does there have to be. Count Four of the indictment also alleges aiding and abetting, and Dotcom can be found guilty for the acts taken by his co-defendants since he’s their accomplice. Under federal criminal law, anyone who “aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures” the commission of a federal crime can be punished as if he committed the crime himself. This “reflects a centuries-old view of culpability: that a person may be responsible for a crime he has not personally carried out if he helps another to complete its commission.”[5]

The test is whether Dotcom “(1) takes an affirmative act in furtherance of that offense, (2) with the intent of facilitating the offense’s commission.”[6] The government here alleges ample facts, including smoking gun emails, to show that Dotcom encouraged his co-defendants to commit copyright infringement on an incredible scale. For example, Dotcom forwarded an email from someone complaining about 130 “illegal links” to Ortmann and Van Der Kolk with the following instruction: “Never delete files from private requests like this.” In another email, Dotcom berated Van Der Kolk and two other co-defendants for deleting thousands of links after rightholders complained: “I told you many times not to delete links that are reported in batches of thousands from insignificant sources. . . . [T]he fact that we lost significant revenue because of it justifies my reaction.”

This evidence paints a picture of Dotcom creating Megaupload from the ground up as a profit-making, piracy-focused machine. To pin this crime on Dotcom, the government will have to prove that Van Der Kolk uploaded “Taken” as part of the venture Dotcom associated with, participated in, and sought by his own actions to make succeed.[7] This task hardly seems insurmountable.

Despite what Lessig would have us believe, Count Four clearly alleges facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case for felony copyright infringement of the pre-release movie “Taken.” The movie was uploaded by Van Der Kolk three months before it was released as part of the criminal enterprise Dotcom and his co-defendants participated in willfully. Remarkably, Lessig never even mentions the movie “Taken” in his affidavit.

Count Eight: Scraping YouTube Videos

A look at Count Eight of the indictment results in a similar conclusion. Count Eight accuses Dotcom of felony copyright infringement for scraping videos from YouTube in violation of Section 506(a)(1)(A) of the Copyright Act,[8] which provides:

Any person who willfully infringes a copyright shall be punished as provided under section 2319 of title 18, if the infringement was committed . . . for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain[.]

Tracking the language of the statute, Count Eight states:

For the 180 days up to and including October 31, 2007, in the Eastern District of Virginia and elsewhere, the defendants . . . did willfully, and for purposes of commercial advantage and private financial gain, infringe copyrights from the Youtube.com platform, by reproducing and distributing by electronic means, during a 180-day period, at least ten copies and phonorecords of one or more copyrighted works which had a total retail value of more than $2,500.

The superseding indictment and summary of evidence also clearly allege that this crime was committed willfully. The relevant 180-day period is from May of 2007 to October of 2007, but the scraping of YouTube started well before that. In April of 2006, Van Der Kolk messaged Ortmann to see if they had enough server space for the scraped YouTube videos that Dotcom himself had asked for:

On or about April 10, 2006, VAN DER KOLK sent an e-mail to ORTMANN asking “Do we have a server available to continue downloading of the Youtube’s vids? … Kim just mentioned again that this has really priority.”

Van Der Kolk also expressed concern that YouTube might detect the scraping:

On or about April 10, 2006, VAN DER KOLK sent an e-mail to ORTMANN indicating “Hope [Youtube.com is] not implementing a fraud detection system now… * praying *”.

Ortmann responded that this might not be a problem:

On or about April 10, 2006, ORTMANN sent an e-mail to VAN DER KOLK in reply to the “fraud detection” message indicating “Even if they did, the usefulness of their non-popular videos as a jumpstart for Megavideo is limited, in my opinion.”

Van Der Kolk then replied that they only had 30% of YouTube’s videos:

On or about April 10, 2006, VAN DER KOLK sent an e-mail to ORTMANN in reply to the “jumpstart for Megavideo ” message indicating that “Well we only have 30% of their videos yet.. In my opinion it’s nice to have everything so we can descide and brainstorm later how we’re going to benefit from it.”

In February of 2007, Van Der Kolk reminded Ortmann that Dotcom wanted every single YouTube video:

On or about February 11, 2007, VAN DER KOLK sent an e-mail to ORTMANN indicating that “Kim really wants to copy Youtube one to one.”

These emails establish that the co-defendants willfully infringed by scraping as many videos from YouTube as they could at Dotcom’s insistence. These scraped YouTube videos were part of their plan to “jumpstart” the popularity of their websites, and the co-defendants were concerned that YouTube would catch on to what they were doing. In order to cover their tracks, the government explains how the scraped YouTube videos would be made to appear under random users’ accounts:

A preliminary investigation of the data bases and associated software code shows that the Mega Conspiracy implemented a software tool to copy videos from Youtube.com. After copying a video from Youtube.com, the tool would import the video into the account of a randomly-selected, already-existing user of the Mega Sites. In addition, the tool would assign the video a random, false “view” count. This is consistent with what is discussed in Paragraph 28(d), which describes an August 12, 2007 e-mail, where a copyright owner complains that a video from his Youtube.com account appeared to have been infringed by a user on Megavideo.com, but that the Megavideo.com user had not logged on during that time period.

This practice of scraping YouTube continued for many years—presumably resulting in millions of intentional infringements. In January of 2011, one of the co-defendants, Sven Echternach, forwarded an email from an employee to Van Der Kolk and another co-defendant, Julius Bencko, acknowledging that YouTube was still a go-to video source:

On or about January 27, 2011, ECHTERNACH forwarded an e-mail to VAN DER KOLK and BENCKO that an employee from the Megateam in the Philippines wrote that asked about access to Youtube. In that e-mail, the employee admits, “Even video resource sites such as Youtube which is our source for videos which we upload to Megavideo.”

The alleged facts show that several of the co-defendants were involved in the scraping of YouTube under Dotcom’s direct command. This wasn’t some one-off fluke—it was deliberate infringement on an incredible scale. Dotcom’s role in the matter is obvious since he was the one who gave the order to the co-defendants to scrape every single YouTube video. And as with Count Four, this makes him guilty of the crime as if he had committed it himself since he’s an aider and abettor.

Remarkably, Lessig makes no mention of any of this evidence either. The years-long scraping of YouTube videos is not discussed anywhere in his affidavit. Despite Lessig’s claims to the contrary, Count Eight of the indictment clearly alleges facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case for felony copyright infringement.

Conclusion

As the Megaupload saga evolves, we’ll surely hear many more claims about the legal and moral implications of the case. Lessig is not the first, and he will certainly not be the last, to argue that Dotcom and his co-defendants should not be punished for their behavior. Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind what allegedly happened here: Dotcom and his co-defendants made millions of dollars through the rampant theft and dissemination of countless artists’ and creators’ copyrighted works. For the sake of these artists and creators, who worked hard to produce the works that were unmercifully stolen, let us hope that Dotcom and his co-defendants are held accountable for their crimes.

[1] United States v. Williams, 152 F.3d 294, 299 (4th Cir.1998); Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64 (2013).

[2] United States v. Thomas, 367 F.3d 194, 197 (4th Cir.2004).

[3] Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974) (quotations and citation omitted); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1) (“The indictment or information must be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged . . . . For each count, the indictment . . . must give the official or customary citation of the statute, rule, regulation, or other provision of law that the defendant is alleged to have violated.”).

[4] See also 18 U.S.C. § 2319(d)(2) (“Any person who commits an offense under section 506(a)(1)(C) of title 17 . . . shall be imprisoned not more than 5 years, fined under this title, or both, if the offense was committed for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain[.]”).

[5] Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1245 (2014).

[6] Id.

[7] United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938) (L. Hand, J.) (“It will be observed that all these definitions . . . demand that [the defendant] in some sort associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed.”).

[8] See also 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(1) (“Any person who commits an offense under section 506(a)(1)(A) of title 17 . . . shall be imprisoned not more than 5 years, or fined in the amount set forth in this title, or both, if the offense consists of the reproduction or distribution, including by electronic means, during any 180-day period, of at least 10 copies or phonorecords, of 1 or more copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of more than $2,500[.]”).